The European Union and its Member States are showing a genuine interest in Ukraine’s military-industrial complex because it combines innovation, efficiency, and battlefield-proven capabilities. In the period 2024–2025 the EU made several significant strategic decisions regarding military and technical support for Ukraine, as well as the strengthening of its own defence capabilities. If implemented, these decisions could boost European–Ukrainian defence cooperation, which is currently crucial for both parties, particularly in the light of the United States’ unpredictable stance.
However, to achieve this, both Brussels and Kyiv must focus on implementing the planned steps promptly and unwaveringly with long-term priorities in mind. The main areas of cooperation are the development of unmanned platforms, air and missile defence, artillery and ammunition, as well as deep strikes capabilities. It is also important to take a creative approach to tools that can enhance collaboration.
The article is prepared for and published August 2025 issue of the Geopolitics of Resources: Securing the Essentials in a Turbulent World
Source: Hennadiy Maksak, HM (2025). How to Bridge the EU’s and Ukraine’s Defence Industries: Mechanisms and Directions.Future Europe, 6(1), 52–59.
Preconditions for new policy design in the area of EU–Ukraine defence cooperation
Military support from the European Union and EU Member States is one of the keys to Ukraine’s resilience in deterring the enemy on the battlefield and protecting the civilian population of Ukraine. The EU is Ukraine’s strategic partner in countering Russian aggression. In total, as of June 2025 the assistance provided by Brussels and EU Member States to Kyiv since the start of the full-scale invasion had reached €158.6 billion. Of this amount, €56.9 billion went specifically to military support for Ukraine.
However, 2025 has brought new geopolitical and internal challenges to EU–Ukraine military cooperation. Firstly, there is a very real prospect of the US ending its military and technical assistance to Ukraine. This creates an additional financial and resource burden on Ukraine’s other Western partners, including EU members. At the same time, Washington is sending mixed signals about a possible reduction of the US military presence on the European continent, which carries systemic risks of undermining the current system of deterrence and defence based on transatlantic synergy within NATO.
Secondly, there is a clear understanding in most European capitals that their current level of preparedness for a full-scale conventional war is inadequate and does not correspond to the realities of military operations that can be observed on the battlefield in Ukraine. Dominance in the production and use of unmanned systems and their continual modernisation are now an important component of asymmetric defence and deterrence. Traditional approaches to warfare are no longer successful for either side. Currently, 80 per cent of the Ukrainian Defence Forces’ casualties and military equipment losses are caused by various types of unmanned platforms.
Thirdly, approaches to military procurement have been completely transformed compared with European ideas about the quantitative and qualitative formation of military arsenals. Long-term and costly programmes for the development of new combat platforms cannot compete with cheaper, innovative technological solutions that have the potential for rapid scaling.
Fourthly, the modern war that Russia is waging against Ukraine is characterised not only by the situation on the battlefield, but also by the aggressor’s total terrorisation of the civilian population. With each new year of the war, the scale of attacks on the civilian population and infrastructure has grown. For example, in June 2025, Russia achieved the capability to launch more than 500 kamikaze drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles simultaneously in a single night. This situation poses a significant potential risk to the populations of EU countries due to their current lack of air and missile defence capabilities.
Fifthly, EU members and European institutions themselves have felt the political and physical limits of their ability to help Ukraine. Ukraine’s partners’ reserves have been significantly reduced, making it necessary for them to focus on strengthening their own defence capabilities. At the same time, some European initiatives that require 27 votes from national governments are being blocked by certain uncooperative leaders. In particular, since 2023 Hungary has been blocking €6.5 billion worth of military assistance within the framework of the European Peace Fund.
All this has led to a stronger focus on security and defence in political debates at the level of national governments of Member States. It has also influenced the determination of EU institutional leaders to propose new long-term instruments for building their own defence capabilities, not only based on the Ukrainian lessons of full-scale war, but also with the full integration of the Ukrainian defence complex into the European production base.
New EU regulatory frameworks on defence support for Ukraine in 2025
Against the backdrop of these chronic risks, the new European Commission has begun by proposing large-scale conceptual approaches to strengthening European defence. Thus, in early March 2025, the President of the European Commission announced the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 initiative, which proposed a number of new approaches to strengthening European defence capabilities by creating financial opportunities.
The new mandate of the European Commission was marked by the preparation of the Joint White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030, which was presented by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas in March 2025. One of the tasks set for the EU in this document is to support Ukraine by increasing military aid and deepening the integration of Ukrainian defence industries into the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
In May 2025, under the Polish presidency of the EU Council, the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation was adopted in the shortest possible time – two months –thanks to the use of a legislative procedure to bypass the European Parliament. The SAFE mechanism provides for the use of loans of up to €150 billion, supported by the EU budget, for the defence needs of EU members. Debt repayment can be scheduled for up to 45 years, while the projects under SAFE themselves will be exempt from VAT. However, an important element of this EU regulation is the possibility of participation by third-country partners, including Ukraine (Maślanka, 2025).
The European Commission held consultations with Ukraine on procedural mechanisms and thematic areas of defence and industrial cooperation. The Ukrainian side welcomed the adoption of the EU regulation and expressed its readiness to participate in joint production and joint procurement of weapons and ammunition (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025a). The SAFE mechanism allows Ukrainian arms manufacturers to participate fully in joint European arms procurement, integrate into supply chains, and jointly develop defence projects. This level of defence integration has been proposed to Ukraine for the first time in the history of the EU-Ukraine defence cooperation.
Another potential programme that involves Ukraine’s active participation is the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). The draft programme was presented in spring 2024, but as of June 2025, following heated political battles, only the EU Council’s basic negotiating framework has been outlined, which requires further agreement by the European Parliament. Currently, the draft programme provides for €1.5 billion in grants to be made available to programme members, of which €300 million is earmarked for the Ukraine Support Instrument. The first trialogue on the EDIP between the Council, Parliament, and Commission took place on 30 June, paving the way for further consultations during the Danish presidency the Council (European Council, 2025).
As Ukraine strengthens its military capabilities with innovative defence technologies, it is also important for Ukrainian arms industries to participate fully in the European Defence Fund (EDF).
Although the EDF is not as open as the SAFE and EDIP, the first steps have already been taken. In April 2025, the European Commission announced an investment of €910 million for the 2024 edition of the EDF to promote innovative defence industries in the EU and among its partners. This is the first time that Ukrainian defence companies have been included in EDF projects (European Commission, 2025).
Mechanisms for establishing EU–Ukraine industrial cooperation in the defence sector
In 2024, the EU began developing a new strategic framework for industrial policy in the defence sector. The preparation process took into consideration experience and lessons learned from the Russian–Ukrainian war since 2022, as well as a realistic assessment of the state of the European defence industry.
Specific mechanisms for EU–Ukraine military-industrial cooperation were proposed as part of the implementation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), which was adopted in March 2024. Most of these mechanisms are still being developed and institutionalised, and many of them are interconnected and mutually reenforcing. The main areas of focus include coordinating efforts to exchange information, running information campaigns, searching for partners on both sides, creating a knowledge base based on lessons learned from combat operations in Ukraine, and adapting the defence industry to the current needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
EU–Ukraine Defence Industries Forum
The first inaugural meeting of the EU–Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (DFNC: EU Edition) was held in Brussels in May 2024 as a step towards implementing the EDIS. The second meeting, in May 2025, was attended by representatives of nearly 20 countries, including 100 European arms manufacturers and 30 Ukrainian ones. The aim of these events is to further integrate Ukraine’s defence industry into the EDTIB. They provide a platform for the exchange of experience, the presentation of innovative defence solutions, and the development of pilot projects between European and Ukrainian arms manufacturers. It is also worth noting that Ukraine holds similar forums with individual Western partners, including EU Member States (Ministry for Strategic Industries of Ukraine, 2025a).
EU Defence Innovation Office
The EU opened the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv in September 2024 to strengthen working contacts between European institutions and relevant representatives of the defence industry, including arms and ammunition manufacturers. The office works to strengthen coordination between the EU and Ukraine, identify ideas for flagship defence projects, and address challenges in bilateral cooperation. The centre focuses in particular on preparing Ukrainian companies to participate in European defence programmes and strengthening the research component of bilateral cooperation.
The EU Defence Innovation Office is currently being reformed into the EU Defence Industry Office in Ukraine (EUDIO). In addition to increasing its staff, its functional responsibilities will also include promoting European investment in Ukraine’s defence industry.
EU–Ukraine Task Force on Defence Industrial Cooperation
In May 2025, the EU–Ukraine Task Force on Defence Industrial Cooperation, which was proposed in March in the White Paper on European Defence, held its first meeting in Brussels. It is currently expected that the mandate of this group will include the integration of Ukraine’s defence industrial base into the European ecosystem. In this way, the mechanism should promote cooperation in the field of innovation and joint procurement. The group is to coordinate joint actions within the framework of the above-mentioned SAFE and EDIP programmes and use Ukrainian experience to develop thematic EU roadmaps in the field of defence capabilities. A preliminary plan of action for the group was developed at the first meeting.
On the Ukrainian side, the group includes representatives of relevant ministries, the Office of the President of Ukraine, and the Mission of Ukraine to the European Union. On the European side, the delegation is represented by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) (Ministry for Strategic Industries of Ukraine, 2025b).
The Danish model
With the depletion of their own stocks of weapons and military equipment, Western partners needed to find alternative ways to support Ukraine. Denmark proposed a mechanism for financial support for Ukraine’s defence sector, with Copenhagen acting as administrator and intermediary in the investment of Western partners’ resources and in communication with the Ukrainian side. Under this mechanism, Ukraine determines the quantity and nomenclature of weapons and ammunition needed by the Ukrainian defence sector, while Denmark oversees the financing of production, quality control, and the timely and safe delivery of weapons to the battlefield. Although this mechanism initially attracted the attention of individual partners wanting to support Ukraine in this way, the European Union also saw potential in the model. In 2024, funding came from Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland, as well as €390 million from the EU.
In 2025, Denmark will continue to administer this mechanism on behalf of the EU. Currently, €1.3 billion has been allocated for the current year, including through the use of interest on frozen Russian assets. Denmark, Sweden, Canada, and Iceland will also support the model with their own resources. These funds will soon be used to produce Ukrainian weapons, including artillery, strike drones, missiles, and anti-tank weapons.
Capability Coalitions
As of June 2025, nine Capability Coalitions are operational within the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) framework. They deliver tailored assistance aligned with the nine thematic domains: Air Force; Maritime Capability; Integrated Air and Missile Defence; Artillery; Armoured Vehicles and Manoeuvrability; Drones; Demining; IT; and Electronic Warfare (EW). Some of the coalitions were established in late 2023, when Ukraine proposed moving to the ‘Ramstein 2.0’ format. However, most of the groups, organised by thematic areas and capabilities, were institutionalised in 2024. The last group, the EW Capability Coalition, was formed in April 2025, which may indicate the utilitarian nature of the format for Ukraine and its partners. Each coalition has co-leading nations which coordinate all the work within the group.
In early 2025, during a meeting of the UDCG, eight coalition roadmaps for 2027 were approved, setting out specific steps and involving members of these groups in the development of Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Long-term planning allows Ukraine to determine its future battlefield needs and order the appropriate capabilities in advance. Although coalitions are not an instrument that unites only EU Member States, the potential of this instrument is significant and takes into account the specific characteristics and potential of each partner. However, it is important to note that eleven EU members are co-leading nations in the Сoalitions.
Build with Ukraine’ initiative
Kyiv and its partners are already seeking to implement new financial mechanisms to extend the existing formats of defence industrial cooperation. During a recent UDCG meeting, Ukraine proposed an international initiative called ‘Build with Ukraine’ to produce arms jointly with Ramstein format member states, using the potential of the aforementioned EU SAFE loan mechanism. Under this model, Ukraine intends to manufacture drones, missiles, ammunition, EW systems, and other types of weaponry.
It is expected that partners will agree to the terms under which their defence companies will manufacture products for Ukraine’s defence sector and provide financial support for this production. However, this model offers mutual benefits. Ukraine will gain additional access to financial resources, advanced technologies, and production facilities in safe locations. In turn, Western partners will strengthen their production capacity and contribute to enhancing Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The initiative is expected to be supported by leading companies from Europe and North America (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025c).
Thematic areas of defence and industrial cooperation between the EU and Ukraine
Priority areas for joint projects
More than three years of war following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine have provided a clear vision of Ukraine’s medium-term defence strategy. Waging a war of attrition, in 2025–2026 we can expect the Ukrainian military and political leadership to focus on stabilising the front line; maximising the preservation of Defence Forces personnel; maintaining dominance in innovative defence solutions, especially using the potential of unmanned platforms; and preserving resources for rapid, unexpected, asymmetric responses to enemy actions. All this will take place against the backdrop of a strengthening Ukrainian defence industry. According to the government team, Ukraine intends to produce up to 50 per cent of the weapons and ammunition needed by the Ukrainian Defence Forces till the end of 2025.
However, despite the titanic efforts of Ukrainian arms manufacturers to increase their own capabilities to produce the necessary military equipment and ammunition, Ukraine is highly dependent on Western military support for key types of military capabilities. Representatives of the Ukrainian government regularly describe the needs they have identified as critically important for Ukraine to conduct defensive operations and protect the civilian population at meetings with the leadership of European Union institutions, at relevant EU Council meetings, in the UDCG and Capability Coalitions, and in bilateral consultations.
Although the Ukrainian side’s requests may vary depending on the military specialisations of specific countries, it is possible to identify general areas that require joint efforts with European partners. Among the most pressing priorities are joint projects in the fields of air defence, long-range systems, and ammunition of various calibres. Traditionally, the production of various types of drones and means of countering unmanned platforms occupies a prominent place in Ukrainian requests. Not surprisingly, similar capabilities are mentioned as strategic in the Joint White Paper of the European Commission, including air and missile defence; artillery systems; ammunition and missiles; drones and anti-drone systems; and AI, quantum, cyber, and electronic warfare (European Union External Action, 2025).
In the context of Ukraine’s integration into the European defence technology base, the Ukrainian side is proposing a number of initiatives that may be of interest to foreign partners. In particular, Ukraine may be prepared to cooperate in the following formats of joint production:
- foreign investments in current defence production in Ukraine;
- establishment of joint ventures for the development and production of new models of military equipment;
- transfer of licences to Ukraine for the production of Western equipment and ammunition;
- localisation of Western weapons production in Ukraine; and
- production of Ukrainian defence products on the territory of partners.</BL>
Recently, there have been some positive developments in terms of attracting Western defence companies to Ukraine. Several European arms producers have increased their presence in Ukraine, including KNDS (France–Germany), FFG and Rheinmetall (Germany), Kongsberg (Norway), and SAAB (Sweden).
Drone production
The production of drones and all types of unmanned systems is an unconditional priority for Ukraine in building its technological defence doctrine.
Drones, as an alternative to expensive Western weapons systems, are currently the cornerstone of a strategy of attrition warfare. On the battlefield, up to 80 per cent of casualties and military equipment losses are caused by strike drones.
The need to preserve manpower and use new doctrinal approaches to warfare has been demonstrated in the Ukrainian president’s ‘Drone Line’ initiative, which provides for the creation of a continuous 15-kilometre-wide strike zone using unmanned systems. The unmanned systems units involved in the development of this initiative are demonstrating positive results in holding territory and destroying the enemy.
In addition, Ukraine has learned to conduct asymmetric high-tech operations deep into enemy territory, with a strike radius of over 1,500 km. Ukraine is effectively destroying enemy command posts and strategic weapons arsenals. Special Operation Spider Web, successfully carried out by the Security Service of Ukraine, reduced the number of combat-ready strategic aircraft by 35 per cent in a single day.
In the Black Sea, thanks to the effective use of naval drones, Ukraine was able to drive the remnants of the Russian military fleet from Crimea to remote ports and reduce the level of danger. Ukrainian drones are already successfully hunting enemy reconnaissance and strike drones, which is an innovative element, including for the integrated air defence system.
Of course, maintaining such a technological advantage requires a large number of drones and their constant improvement. Currently, compared with Western models of unmanned systems, Ukraine has an advantage due to rapid scaling and significantly lower production costs. According to government estimates, Ukraine can produce up to 10 million drones of various types per year. On average, a Ukrainian drone costs three times less than its Western counterparts.
The Drone Capability Coalition, led by Latvia and the United Kingdom, is working to provide assistance to Ukraine. Ukraine is interested in producing drones jointly with European partners, given that unmanned systems are identified as among the priorities in the development of the EU’s defence capabilities. Kyiv is ready to share innovations in the field of unmanned systems (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025b).
Ammunition
Ukraine makes frequent appeals to its Western partners for supplies of artillery ammunition, especially of 155 mm calibre. Progress in the development of unmanned systems does not mean they will replace artillery. Although the situation on the battlefield is not as critical as it was in early spring 2024, when the enemy’s firepower advantage was ten to one, the mass destruction of artillery equipment and strategic ammunition depots on Russian territory has reduced the aggressor’s advantage. Moreover, by the end of 2024, a European initiative to supply Ukraine with 1 million shells had been implemented, and the so-called Czech initiative, under which Ukraine was supplied with about 1.6 million shells of various calibres, had been almost fully implemented. These measures taken together made it possible to achieve a ratio of two to one.
Currently, most of the EU’s financial support mechanisms for Ukraine, funded by windfall profits from frozen assets, as well as the G7 ERA credit mechanism, are directing a significant portion of funds to the purchase of shells for Ukraine.
Despite the fact that Ukraine did not produce artillery shells of this calibre until 2022, the Ministry of Defence has ambitions to develop its own production of 155 mm calibre ammunition at a rate of 1 million per year. In 2024, Ukrainian companies signed agreements with KNDS, Nammo, and Czechoslovak Group for the licensed production of artillery shells. However, there is also significant scope for joint production, given the acute shortage of artillery shells not only for the battlefield in Ukraine but also for stockpiling by EU Member States.
Long-range capabilities
In 2024, the Ukrainian defence industry reached a strategic level in developing its own long-range weaponry. Ukraine demonstrated its ability to create high-precision weapons capable of destroying important enemy military targets at profound depths. Serial production of Ukrainian cruise missiles has begun, and the first Ukrainian ballistic missile has been successfully tested. According to the Ukrainian government team’s plans, 2025 will be dedicated to scaling up the production of domestic cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as long-range drones and missile drones.
Thanks to international support, the production of long-range drones has increased 22 times compared with 2022. Germany and Sweden recently announced their intentions to support Ukrainian production of long-range weapons (Safronov, 2025). These military capabilities allow Ukraine to destroy strategic energy infrastructure facilities that help finance Russia’s war against Ukraine. These weapons, with their long range and precision, also significantly undermine Russia’s defence capabilities by constantly disrupting the work of the defence sector.
The Ukrainian ballistic missile programme should also be of interest to European partners, as it represents an additional element of deterrence in the future.
Air and missile defence
Strengthening air and missile defence is critical to protecting Ukraine’s civilian population. Ukraine is enduring relentless terror from the sky. On 29 June 2025, Russia set another record by launching 537 strike drones and missiles of various types at Ukraine. Against the backdrop of a shortage of modern air defence systems and corresponding interceptor missiles, Ukraine is trying to use all available means to protect itself, including anti-aircraft missile forces, the air force, electronic warfare units and unmanned systems, and mobile fire groups of the Ukrainian Defence Forces.
Therefore, Ukraine, together with its partners, including members of the Integrated Air and Missile Defence Coalition, has ways to expand the production capabilities of air defence and missile defence systems and the missiles for them. Ukraine is also ready to share its own developments in effective and cost-efficient interceptor systems (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2025d). Anti-aircraft interceptor drones for Russian–Iranian Shahed-type drones also deserve special attention.
The creation of a unified digital air defence space with elements of automation and AI may also be of considerable interest for joint research and development by Ukrainian and European partners.
Conclusions
The period 2024–2025 has seen a radically new policy for the EU regarding its own defence capabilities and military support for Ukraine. The new SAFE and EDIP initiatives open up significant opportunities for Ukraine to become a full member of these initiatives. While on the one hand this is a sign of goodwill on the part of EU representatives towards Ukraine, on the other hand it is a recognition that Ukraine is also a contributor to European defence capabilities.
The EU and Ukraine have a sufficiently broad institutional infrastructure, established in 2024–2025, which allows for maximum effective communication and coordination of positions between the two sides. Although most of these mechanisms are still evolving, there is a wide range of opportunities for European institutions and individual Member States to support Ukraine and strengthen the integration of Ukraine’s defence industry into the EDTIB.
However, even at this stage, it should be noted that the innovative component of bilateral relations between the EU and Ukraine does not match the potential of these relations. Ukraine has focused on defence technologies that are tested daily on the battlefield and are being developed effectively. Its European partners should show greater interest in inviting Ukraine to participate fully in the EDF. Areas of bilateral cooperation such as drones, air defence, and the development of long-range weapons should be seen as mutually beneficial by both the EU and Ukraine.