After the suppression of the 2020 protests in Belarus and the Lukashenka regime’s involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow and Minsk have pursued a course of accelerating integration. This occurs within the framework of the Union State, with coordination efforts extending to the military domain. Specifically, a Regional Forces Group was deployed, the parties began preparing to establish military infrastructure, and cooperation in the defence industry increased to unprecedented levels in the bilateral relationship since 1991.
The deepening of further military cooperation between Russia and Belarus poses a threat not only to Ukraine’s security but also to that of European countries. The end of the Russian-Ukrainian war may prompt Moscow to prepare for its next foreign policy adventure, this time at an even greater cost to Belarusian sovereignty and independence, especially since both Russia and Belarus possess a wide array of tools to implement such a scenario.
About the authors
- Pavlo Rad is an analyst in the Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
- Iaroslav Chornogor, Ph.D. in History, is director of the Programme of Russian and Belarusian Studies at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
Executive summary
- Since Belarus’s 2020 crisis and its involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the two countries have deepened their integration within the framework of the Union State. This includes deepened military integration.
- One consequence of this is the prospect of joint Russian-Belarusian hybrid attacks against NATO’s eastern flank, including the use of illegal migration, efforts to place intelligence agents in other countries, and the possibility of provocations against the Belarusian diaspora.
- More sophisticated options available to Russia and Belarus include information or psychological operations, and direct use if military force. There are therefore a range of possibilities for escalation.
- NATO should enhance its defence posture through exercises, improved readiness forces, and better logistics and air patrol capabilities, while individual member states strengthen national defences and apply lessons from Ukraine’s war experience. A clear European strategy on Belarus is also needed to prevent deeper Russian integration and prepare for possible regime change scenarios.
Content
How Russia-Belarus integration: challenges regional security 1
- Hybrid mechanisms of pressure
- More sophisticated methods of military pressure
- Scenarios for escalation
- Conclusion
6. Policy recommendations
Hybrid mechanisms of pressure
As of today, Russia and Belarus possess a wide range of hybrid and military instruments of influence over regional security, which can be used to exert pressure on NATO’s eastern flank. These include both tools that are employed almost continuously, as well as those that require a higher level of preparation and planning. The first group includes the following:
Illegal migration: Migrants regularly try to break through the Lithuanian and Polish borders, even after the active phase of the migration crisis has ended. For example, in 2023, approximately 24,000 attempts to breach the Belarus-Poland border were recorded, and in 2024 that number rose to 36,000. While the intensity is somewhat lower than in 2021, when nearly 40,000 migrants tried to enter Poland during the autumn and winter months, it is still sufficient to create daily problems for Belarus’s western neighbours.
Infiltration of agent networks and organization of provocations: In parallel, Belarusian and Russian intelligence services are continuously recruiting and infiltrating their agents into neighbouring countries. A striking example is Lithuania, especially after Lithuanian intelligence reported that a well-known Belarusian activist, Olga Karach, had cooperated with Russian security forces. Because of security concerns additional migration restrictions for Belarusians have been introduced. Moreover, provocations targeting the Belarusian diaspora are taking place within the country, likely organized by Belarus’s intelligence services, with the aim of destabilizing Lithuanian society.
More sophisticated methods of military pressure
At the same time, Moscow and Minsk have more complex mechanisms at their disposal, which can be used with a long-term strategic outlook. Importantly, these instruments of influence are usually applied in a comprehensive manner with varying levels of intensity, providing flexibility in the context of indirect confrontation with NATO member states.
Information and psychological operations: One of the most successful information-psychological operations remains nuclear blackmail. Despite Moscow and Minsk announcing in early 2023 the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, there is no concrete evidence that such weapons are actually present in Belarus. A telling example in this regard were the joint exercises to inspect non-strategic weapons that both countries conducted in June 2024. At that time, the Belarusian side did not carry out actual launches with the “Iskander-M” systems, and the Belarusian Ministry of Defence attempted to pass off external fuel tanks on Su-25 aircraft as nuclear munitions. A similar approach is used with the so-called “Oreshnik” missiles, a Russian experimental medium-range ballistic missile, which Russia employed during the attack on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, as well as a tool of political-nuclear intimidation against Ukraine and western states in late 2024. The goal of these actions is to intimidate western countries and provoke anti-war sentiments in the West.
Preparation of military infrastructure for the long-term deployment of joint forces: The greatest long-term threat lies in the preparation of logistical capabilities for the deployment of a Russian military contingent on Belarusian territory within the framework of the regional grouping of forces (RGF), which was officially deployed in September 2022. It is important to note that the configuration of the deployment and participation of Russian troops within the RGF has been arranged in such a way as to position them along the Brest–Vitebsk line, which spans approximately 500 kilometers, a standard marching distance. This, in turn, allows for the rapid redeployment of troops to the western borders if necessary. Overall, at the current stage, the Russian component of the RGF could comfortably reach 20,000–25,000 troops. As a result, such a situation enables Russia to pose a permanent threat not only to Ukraine but also to the countries of NATO’s eastern flank simply by deploying its forces on Belarusian territory. In the long term, it is highly likely that Belarusian military infrastructure is already capable of hosting up to 30,000 personnel, as this was the approximate number of troops stationed in Belarus in February 2022.
Scenarios for escalation
Although the future course of events will largely depend on the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war, there is a possibility that, in the coming years, NATO’s eastern flank could become a new hotspot in the confrontation between the West and Russia. This is facilitated by both the shared border and the region’s vulnerable geography: Vilnius is located just 50 kilometers from the Belarusian border, and the Baltic states are connected to mainland Europe across the Suwałki Corridor (a stretch of territory connecting Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave).
Hybrid operations: Russia and Belarus may move beyond hybrid pressure tactics and escalate to more serious actions and threats. Regular military exercises near the borders with Poland and Lithuania are possible, similar to those conducted near Ukraine’s borders prior to the full-scale Russian invasion, which would sow anxiety in neighbouring countries. Provocations cannot be ruled out either. For example, violations of NATO member states’ airspace or illegal border crossings by Belarusian military personnel would not only heighten tensions but also confront the governments of these countries with a difficult dilemma: how to respond to such actions.
Large-scale armed conflict: A large-scale military confrontation is possible as well. This scenario is the most distant in time and the most complex to execute, as Russia would need to mobilize a significant amount of both human and material resources to start a war with NATO member states. It is quite likely that the Belarusian military would participate in Russian operations, acting along the Lithuanian direction. One potential target could be the Suwałki Corridor, which is the shortest route from Belarus to the Kaliningrad region. At the same time, the possibility of a main strike along the Vilnius–Kaunas–Klaipėda axis cannot be dismissed. Arguments in favour of the second option include the layout of roads (around the Suwałki Corridor they run north to south, unlike the Vilnius direction), which would simplify the movement of the Russian-Belarusian military contingent, and provide an opportunity to capture the Lithuanian capital as well as the ability to block Lithuania’s access to the sea.
Conclusion
Given Belarus’s complex geopolitical situation and the lack of an effective Western strategy towards the country, there is a likelihood of further erosion of Belarusian sovereignty and deeper integration of the country into Russia’s military-political sphere. There is a risk that, after the end of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, or as a result of significant Russian successes on the battlefield, Belarus could become a launchpad for aggression against Western countries. The range of possible scenarios is broader and more diverse than those presented in this research, and NATO member states need to start preparing now for the transformation of the Alliance’s eastern flank into a potential combat zone, while trying to prevent the complete absorption of Belarus by Russia.
Policy recommendations
- NATO should improve its defence capabilities
National, regional, and NATO-level exercises involving Ukrainian contingents should be planned over the next years. The Alliance should also create a regional logistics support base for operations, strengthen patrol capabilities, and strengthen the capabilities of the NATO Response Force.
- Individual member states need to enhance their military potential
Key NATO members, especially Poland and the Baltic states, should enhance their national defence by growing their military capacity, improving mobilization plans, and expanding trained reserves. They should also integrate lessons learned from Ukraine’s experience in the ongoing war.
- European states should develop a comprehensive strategy towards Belarus
This strategy should not only address security challenges but also aim to prevent the further absorption of Belarus through political and diplomatic means. At the same time, Western actors must prepare for potential scenarios of political transition in Belarus, as Russia will likely attempt to exploit this period of uncertainty to solidify its influence and integrate Belarus more deeply into its security space.
Disclaimer
This policy brief was written for the Warwick Ukraine-Belarus Hub by one of the winners of our seed funding competition. The competition invited proposals for small grants to support research related to the theme ‘Ukraine, Belarus and the Complex Geopolitics of Europe.’ Full details of the competition can be found here.
Its content does not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Warwick Ukraine-Belarus Hub or the University of Warwick.