The nuclear component is an integral part of Russia’s foreign policy strategy. The fact that it possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal means that the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Russian Federation can never be dismissed. Other states craft their strategic posture towards the Kremlin through the lens of this reality, and this factor shapes Russia’s foreign policy ambitions, declarations and positioning. Since 1991, Russia’s nuclear arsenal has evolved from being a guarantor of national survival and sovereignty to becoming a tool of direct and indirect coercion.

By 2022, Moscow’s decision to prioritise the nuclear issue in arms control negotiations and broader strategic and political discourse had created existential challenges for the entire Eastern European region. Among these, the most prominent is the issue of Ukraine’s potential membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and security concerns on the part of NATO’s eastern flank states. The nuclear factor played a decisive role in Moscow’s misguided calculations — namely, its confidence in the Alliance’s weakness and its members’ assumed unwillingness to defend or support Ukraine in the event of a full-scale war. Similarly, Russia’s overestimation of its own power and the West’s fear of Russian nuclear escalation were key enablers of the Kremlin’s actions in the months leading up to the invasion. The brazen ‘security proposals’ (in effect, ultimatums) that Moscow presented to the United States in late 2021 — demanding the withdrawal of NATO forces from countries that joined the Alliance after 1997 — clearly illustrate how Russia’s leadership perceives and deploys its nuclear arsenal as a political lever.

Since 2023, Belarus has become an additional source of nuclear threat. According to both Minsk and the Kremlin, Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. While operational control of these warheads formally remains in Moscow’s hands, the Lukashenko regime is actively facilitating the transformation of Belarus into a potential launchpad for Russian nuclear coercion. Public statements by Belarusian officials expressing their readiness to ‘accept and use’ nuclear weapons if necessary are further deepening regional instability and raising the risk of escalation. Therefore, the nuclear threat emanating from Belarus must be viewed as part of a coordinated pressure campaign against the West and Ukraine by the two authoritarian regimes.

Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, several developments have made it increasingly clear that Western states — first and foremost the United States — must fundamentally reassess their strategic approach towards the Russian Federation. Among these developments are repeated instances of nuclear blackmail directed by Moscow against Ukraine, which have not translated into the actual use of nuclear force over the course of 2022–2025. This fact necessitates a detailed analysis of the situation with Russian nuclear blackmail. This study aims to develop effective narratives that will contribute to changing the position of Western countries regarding their attitude toward Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the possibility of its use.

 

Authors:

• Anton Oksentiuk, Research Fellow of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Yehor Valiarenko, Research Fellow of the Security Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Anatolii Chernysh, Research Fellow of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Pavlo Rad, Research Fellow of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History,  Director of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

 

Reviewers:

• Mykhailo Samus, Director, The New Geopolitics Research Network.
• Yan Auseyushkin, Senior Analyst, iSANS.

 

Art and Technical Editor:

• Anatolii Chernysh, Research Fellow of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

 

 

CHAPTER 1: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND METHODS OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL. ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR USE AGAINST UKRAINE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FUTURE ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM  

 

1.1 The Nuclear Doctrine of the Russian Federation

 

Russia’s current stance on the role of nuclear weapons in its national strategy is set out in Presidential Decree No. 355 of July 2, 2020, titled ‘On the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’. According to this document, Russia regards nuclear weapons strictly as a means of deterrence and envisages their use only as an ‘extreme and compelled measure’. Nuclear deterrence is conceptualised as a comprehensive process that encompasses not only the nuclear domain, but also coordinated political, military, technical, diplomatic, economic, informational and other instruments. The overarching goal is to convey to potential adversaries the inevitability of retaliation should they attack the Russian Federation. This deterrent posture primarily targets individual states or military coalitions that view Russia as an adversary and possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or have substantial conventional military capabilities.

 

However, despite its stated intention to use nuclear weapons solely for retaliation and deterrence, the document retains an element of strategic ambiguity. The Decree identifies key security threats that could escalate into military conflicts requiring the use of nuclear deterrence, depending on changes in the military, political, and strategic situation. These threats include:

 

1. Buildup of general-purpose forces, including delivery systems for nuclear weapons, in territories adjacent to Russia or in nearby maritime areas. 
2. Deployment of missile defense systems, intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic and cruise missiles, high-precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, strike-capable unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons by states that consider Russia a potential adversary. 
3. Placement of strike systems and missile defense systems in outer space. 
4. Possession by other states of nuclear or other WMDs capable of being used against Russia, along with the means for their delivery. 
5. Uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems, associated technologies, and production equipment. 
6. Stationing of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems on the territory of non-nuclear states. 

The document specifies four conditions under which the use of nuclear weapons by Russia would be deemed permissible:

1. Reliable information is received regarding the launch of ballistic missiles targeting Russian territory or that of its allies. 
2. An adversary uses nuclear or other WMDs against Russia or its allies. 
3. An attack is carried out against critical civilian or military infrastructure in Russia, which could undermine the capability of its nuclear forces to respond. 
4. Russia is attacked with conventional weapons in a manner that threatens the very existence of the state.

Notably, the decree does not provide any explicit definitions of what constitutes an ‘existential threat’ to the state, nor does it specify what changes to the strategic or military-political environment would justify such extreme measures. Although it formally adheres to a policy of ‘retaliatory strike’, the doctrine gives the Russian political leadership broad scope to interpret these provisions subjectively on a case-by-case basis.

 

This flexibility enables the Kremlin to invoke nuclear deterrence in situations that defy conventional expectations of proportionality or relevance. For instance, under the ‘escalate to de-escalate’ doctrine, Russia could launch a limited nuclear strike against troop concentrations or critical command infrastructure to influence the operational balance on the battlefield. Such actions could be justified under Article 4 of the Presidential Decree, which states that the aim of nuclear deterrence policy is to prevent escalation and bring hostilities to an end on terms favourable to Russia and its allies. Although this framework does not provide an exhaustive understanding of how Russia will act in specific situations, it does provide some insight into Russian military and security policy in various areas.

 

Moreover, the updated doctrine explicitly states that an attack by a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear-armed power will be treated as an assault by the associated military coalition as a whole. These changes signal the Kremlin’s heightened readiness to use the mere existence of its nuclear arsenal as a coercive tool against Ukraine’s primary Western allies, particularly the NATO member states in Europe.

 

1.2 The Current State of the Russian Nuclear Arsenal

As of 2025, obtaining precise data on the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal remains a significant challenge. This is primarily due to U.S. inspections of Russian nuclear facilities being suspended since April 2020. These inspections were mandated by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which was signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010.

 

According to the U.S. Department of State, during the treaty’s implementation period, both parties conducted a total of 328 inspections and exchanged over 25,000 notifications concerning the status of their nuclear arsenals. The initial suspension of inspections was due to the travel and quarantine restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, which made on-site verification impossible. However, despite subsequent improvements in the global public health situation, inspections were never resumed in the following years.

 

In August 2022, following the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federation officially withdrew its nuclear arsenal from U.S. inspection, even though the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized the move as temporary. The main justifications provided by Moscow included:

 

• The claim that U.S. and European Union sanctions had effectively closed the airspace of several countries to Russian aircraft, thereby preventing the deployment of Russian inspection teams and creating what Russia described as a unilateral advantage for the United States. 
• Allegations of an ongoing difficult epidemiological situation, which, according to Russia, still precluded the safe resumption of bilateral inspections.

 

Additionally, Russia unilaterally withdrew from the Bilateral Consultative Commission, cancelling the next session scheduled for November 2022. This meeting was subsequently cancelled at Moscow’s discretion.

 

Information provided by Russia under the New START Treaty on 1 September 2022 can be relied upon to assess the quantity of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. At that time, Russia had 1,549 deployed nuclear warheads on 540 strategic launchers. However, since then, Russia has neither provided nor published any new data on the status of its nuclear arsenal.

 

In the absence of more recent information, the most reliable source for evaluating the size and composition of the Russian nuclear arsenal is the analysis conducted by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. According to their May 2025 estimates, the Russian Federation possesses around 4,309 nuclear warheads, comprising both strategic and tactical types. However, this figure does not account for the roughly 1,150 warheads that have been retired or are awaiting dismantlement, yet remain technically usable.

 

1.3 Military-Technical Component of a Potential Russian Nuclear Strike Against Ukraine

 

In the context of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and repeated threats by senior Russian officials to use strategic nuclear weapons, experts generally consider the likelihood of such an attack to be minimal. This is primarily because the design parameters of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are intended for long-range targeting, specifically strikes against the United States and Western Europe. Launching these systems against targets in Ukraine would require launches from locations such as Kamchatka, making the approach both technically and strategically impractical.

 

In contrast, Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons are much more feasible for battlefield use given their operational flexibility and compatibility with delivery systems already being used in the war between Russia and Ukraine. According to U.S. estimates, Russia currently possesses between 1,000 and 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. Analysts from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimate this figure to be around 1,477 warheads, which are stored in specialised storage facilities.

Russian coastal missile complex “Bastion” K300P. “Bastion” is equipped with supersonic P-800 “Oniks” missiles, which can carry a nuclear warhead. Military Watch Magazine.

The time it takes Russia to prepare a tactical nuclear strike depends on the type of weapon and its storage conditions. According to U.S. intelligence assessments, these storage sites are under surveillance, so any preparatory activities, such as retrieving or arming warheads, would likely be detected in advance. Consequently, despite the Kremlin’s repeated rhetorical threats, US officials have consistently stated that there are currently no observable indications of preparations for a nuclear strike.

 

Russia’s nuclear arsenal enables tactical nuclear weapons to be deployed in four main ways: naval forces, air forces, dual-purpose missile and air defence systems, and ground-based missile systems. However, not all of the systems in Russia’s inventory present a credible threat in the context of tactical nuclear employment. The following table lists examples of weapon systems that could plausibly be used should Moscow decide to launch a nuclear strike against Ukraine:

 

Type of Nuclear Weapon Deployment	Naming	Estimated Number of Nuclear Warheads
Naval Forces
Submarines / Surface Ships	(Kalibr 3M14 missile)	Unknown
Air Forces
Bombers and Fighters	Tu-22M3(M3M), Su-24M, Su-34, MiG-31K	430
Air / Missile / Coastal Defense Systems
Air defense systems/missile defense systems	S-300 / S-400 (dual-purpose)	250
Coastal Missile Complexes	Bastion K-300P (Oniks missiles)	23
	Redut System	4
Ground-Based Systems
Operational-Tactical Missile Systems	Iskander-M	75
	Iskander-M (9M729 variant)	20

Source: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight,

 Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2024, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

It is also important to evaluate the technical feasibility of using these weapons in Ukraine. Military operations can be divided into two zones for conceptual purposes: Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces have conducted cross-border operations, and the main frontline areas within Ukraine. While a nuclear strike on Russian territory, such as the Kursk region, might not elicit a Western military response, it would pose significant domestic political risks to the Kremlin. Therefore, this scenario is considered unlikely.

 

In the context of the main frontline in Ukraine, the use of tactical nuclear weapons can be justified from a military point of view only to break through enemy lines and launch a massive counterattack in that area of combat operations. However, this would require Russia to gather significant reserves. It should be taken into account that the front in Ukraine is too wide, which makes it difficult to concentrate large numbers of troops in a small area. As a result, the effect of a single tactical nuclear explosion would be limited, covering an area with a radius of only 1-1.5 km when using a 5-kiloton warhead. This would force Russia to use many nuclear warheads simultaneously.

 

It is unlikely that such large-scale preparations, including the loading and preparation of nuclear warheads, would go unnoticed. Furthermore, there is currently no observable evidence that Russia has equipped its forces with protective gear against radioactive contamination.

 

In the past, the US military calculated the number of nuclear warheads needed to achieve a decisive military effect on a front line stretching about 100 km. These calculations showed that 136 nuclear strikes would be needed to achieve this goal. Such figures indicate that preparations for such an attack by the Russian military would be detected in advance by satellite surveillance.

 

A more plausible option would be for Russia to attempt to disrupt Ukraine’s military logistics by carrying out targeted strikes on infrastructure, such as bridges across the Dnipro River, railway hubs or supply depots, which would have a significant impact on the supply of troops and their ability to effectively continue combat operations of the same intensity in a war of attrition. However, given the political reasons described in the following sections, the Russian side’s readiness to take such a step is questionable.

 

1.4 Methods of Russian Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Terrorism

 

A) Disregard and Violation of International Law

 

On February 21, 2023, the Russian Federation officially suspended its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). President Vladimir Putin announced this decision during the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, a speech that traditionally outlines the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. Although Moscow labeled the decision a suspension rather than a withdrawal, it gave no indication of an intent to resume participation. Notably, New START was extended in 2021 for five years, and Russian officials have hinted that they may allow it to expire in February 2026.

 

Additionally, Russia is using its suspension of participation in the New START treaty as a tool for nuclear blackmail. For instance, when asked about the possibility of Russia resuming its participation in the treaty, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that the likelihood of a nuclear conflict between Russia and the U.S. is high. As one of the key Russian diplomats in dialogue with Washington, Ryabkov is demonstrating Moscow’s intention to continue using nuclear control as leverage against Western countries.

 

B) The Threat of Potential Nuclear Tests

 

During the same period, Russia adopted a new strategy of nuclear blackmail, centered on repeated declarations of its readiness to resume nuclear testing. In November 2023, President Putin signed a law revoking Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although this is a significant move, there is no direct evidence indicating that Moscow is prepared to conduct an actual nuclear test. Technical and meteorological considerations are critical to such preparations. For example, construction activity has been observed in recent years at Russia’s Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site. However, these developments have not yet been directly linked to imminent test preparations. Historically, this site has been used for testing in the autumn months when favorable meteorological conditions, particularly eastward wind patterns, minimize the risk of radioactive fallout affecting Russian territory.

 

Despite these actions, Russia has not demonstrated the political resolve to initiate escalation through testing. In October 2023, Ryabkov stated that Russia would only conduct nuclear tests if the United States did so first.

 

Meanwhile, Russia has sought to portray its military exercises as demonstrations of readiness for escalation. In May 2024, for example, Russia conducted exercises involving simulated tactical nuclear weapon use in Russia and Belarus, which were authorized by Putin. Unlike previous exercises, these were marked by a high degree of public exposure. Russian state propaganda extensively broadcast the movement of military equipment and tactical maneuvers. However, there was no indication that actual nuclear warheads were involved. This strongly suggests that Moscow remains unwilling to escalate beyond rhetorical signaling to concrete operational steps.

 

C) Nuclear Terrorism Involving Nuclear Power Plants

 

In addition to making threats involving tactical nuclear weapons, Russia has employed methods of nuclear terrorism by targeting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) and other nuclear energy infrastructure. The most significant example is the seizure of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) by Russian forces in March 2022. Over the course of the subsequent three years of war, the facility has effectively been transformed into a military base. Russian troops have repeatedly demonstrated a reckless disregard for nuclear safety, engaging in the shelling of the facility, conducting low-altitude missile overflights, and staging provocations near nuclear waste storage areas.

 

Through the state nuclear corporation Rosatom, the Russian authorities took control of the plant and have pressured Ukrainian personnel to sign contracts with the company. These actions have resulted in workforce shortages and complicated operational management, forcing Russia to recruit employees from other Russian nuclear power plants.

Since the beginning of Russia’s occupation, Zaporizhzhia NPP has been effectively turned into a Russian military base. Illustrative photo. RBC-Ukraine.

Russia’s actions at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) constitute clear violations of international humanitarian law. Moscow has disregarded its obligation to safeguard nuclear power plants against military attacks and prevent the deployment of military assets in their vicinity. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has adopted four resolutions urging Russia to stop annexing the plant and withdraw its troops. However, these measures have not resulted in any substantive changes. Another serious aspect of Russia’s nuclear terrorism at ZNPP is the reported use of torture against Ukrainian staff. Ukrainian organizations have repeatedly documented the systematic physical and psychological abuse inflicted by Russian forces on Ukrainian personnel at the plant. 

 

Following the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam by Russian forces in June 2023, a critical nuclear safety issue arose as the reservoir that supplied cooling water for the ZNPP reactors was significantly lowered. While the IAEA stated that there was no immediate danger to the plant due to the availability of alternative water sources, it also warned of long-term risks to the plant’s safe operation.

 

Another component of Russia’s strategy is its attempt to influence international perceptions by portraying Ukraine as a threat to global nuclear safety. Russia has used similar tactics in relation to its own nuclear facilities. Since the start of the invasion, Russia has repeatedly accused Ukraine of provoking attacks on Russian nuclear power plants. A key example is the situation surrounding the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant during Ukrainian military operations in the Kursk Oblast. Russian propaganda has focused on spreading disinformation about the Ukrainian Armed Forces allegedly threatening the plant. Russia has also attempted to manipulate the IAEA to reinforce this narrative. On August 9, 2024, Moscow claimed to have informed the IAEA of missile debris found at the Kursk NPP. During a conversation with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Rosatom head Alexey Likhachev claimed that Ukraine’s actions “pose a direct threat not only to the Kursk NPP, but also to the future of global nuclear energy.” During this same period, Russia increased its use of the occupied Zaporizhzhia plant for continued nuclear blackmail. On August 11, 2024, traces of fire were reported on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) premises. Despite Ukraine’s quick response to the provocation, Russian authorities accused Kyiv of committing “nuclear terrorism”.

 

D) Manipulating the Political Dimension of International Perceptions of Russia’s Nuclear Arsenal

 

The central role of nuclear weapons in the political strategy of the Russian Federation is deeply embedded in the structure of its ruling system and how the system is perceived by the international community. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the idea that Moscow must avoid a military defeat—due to fears of losing control of its nuclear arsenal—has become more prevalent in public discourse. While Western governments rarely openly articulate this argument, it frequently appears in U.S. and European media. There is a persistent concern that a Russian defeat could lead to President Putin’s ousting and subsequent weakening of centralized control over the country’s nuclear weapons. These fears were amplified during Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023 when reports surfaced of NATO representatives contacts with Russian officials to discuss nuclear warhead security.

 

To ensure continued delivery of Western military aid, Ukraine must engage in proactive diplomacy to dispel these concerns. Russia, for its part, has weaponized nuclear blackmail to pursue broader political objectives. For instance, Moscow has long sought negotiations with the West regarding the formation of exclusive spheres of influence, a goal that was made explicit in its December 2021 “security treaty” proposals. These proposals included a demand to withdraw NATO troops from countries that joined the alliance after 1997 and to legally enshrine Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. Russia’s conventional military capabilities do not support its political ambitions, so Moscow resorts to nuclear blackmail to reduce military aid to Ukraine and hint at the possibility of global negotiations through fear of nuclear escalation. In May 2024, Putin’s press secretary D. Peskov confirmed this course, stating the need for a “deep political and diplomatic dialogue” to de-escalate tensions.

 

Russian propaganda plays a key role in sustaining nuclear blackmail. Since the beginning of the war, several Russian experts with close ties to the Kremlin have publicly advocated for using nuclear weapons against Ukraine and other European states. One of the most prominent voices is Sergey Karaganov, a well-known political scientist and founding member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He is also a close associate of Nikolai Patrushev, the former FSB director and former Secretary of the Russian Security Council. Patrushev is currently Putin’s aide and one of his most trusted confidants. In June 2023, Karaganov published an article advocating for a Russian nuclear strike on Poland to achieve victory in the war against Ukraine. While the Russian Federation has not demonstrated concrete readiness for nuclear war with the West, these publications should be viewed as deliberate instruments of psychological warfare against Europe and the United States.

 

Russia’s nuclear blackmail has had a tangible, albeit limited, impact. In April 2024, Michael McCaul, the chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, acknowledged that the White House administration was concerned that Russia might use tactical nuclear weapons if Ukraine received excessive quantities of Western arms. The Kremlin deliberately cultivates an image of unpredictability—an assessment that former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul has echoed. In March 2024, McFaul stated that Putin uses nuclear threats to deter the West from providing military aid to Ukraine.

 

Ukraine must demonstrate that Putin’s nuclear threats are merely rhetorical. Several military actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces support this argument. Throughout the war, only two periods were characterized by a realistic threat of Russian nuclear use. The first occurred in the fall of 2022, when the Russian army suffered major setbacks and Ukraine regained control over much of Kharkiv Oblast and the city of Kherson. During this time, Russian rhetoric reached a peak, with President Putin explicitly stating his readiness to use the full spectrum of available weapons and emphasizing that this was “not a bluff.” However, no practical steps toward nuclear escalation were taken.

 

The second critical period came in August 2024 when the Ukrainian Armed Forces began operating in the Kursk region of the Russian Federation. Despite the direct attack and occupation of part of its territory, the Kremlin did not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that Moscow is not prepared to use its nuclear arsenal. This is an important argument for Ukraine to change US rhetoric and obtain permission to use American weapons on Russian soil. A detailed analysis of Russian nuclear blackmail and its non-implementation will further strengthen this strategy. Ukraine must use the limited time available to strengthen its negotiating position before the possible start of the peace process. Strengthening its military potential is the most effective way to do so.

 

CHAPTER 2. RUSSIA’S USE OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND TERRORISM SINCE THE START OF ITS INVASION OF UKRAINE

 

At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin employed nuclear rhetoric to project an image of invincibility. Just five days before launching the invasion, Russia conducted strategic deterrence exercises, during which it rehearsed the potential use of nuclear weapons. These actions were intended to signal to Western states the seriousness of Moscow’s intent regarding the war with Ukraine.

 

The first concrete example of nuclear terrorism by the Russian Federation was the seizure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on February 24, 2022. On the same day, Russian armed forces attacked the Neutron Source research nuclear facility in Kharkiv. Legally speaking, Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian nuclear infrastructure should be classified as an act of nuclear terrorism. The same applies to the takeover of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) by Russian forces in March 2022. This event triggered a major nuclear safety crisis, resulting in the transformation of a civilian nuclear facility into a de facto military base with Russian troops stationed on site. In effect, Moscow turned the ZNPP into a military target, violating international humanitarian law.

 

Just days after the invasion began, Putin made another significant political statement aimed at the West. He accused NATO member states of taking “aggressive actions against Russia” and announced that the country’s nuclear forces would be placed on “special combat duty.” This was consistent with his warning at the start of the invasion that anyone interfering with Russian operations in Ukraine would face consequences “unlike anything they have seen in their history.” Despite these threats, Western countries proceeded to provide military assistance to Ukraine. As a result, even Russia’s most explicit and severe nuclear warnings—which implied a potential nuclear response—ultimately proved ineffective. Although Moscow’s nuclear blackmail did not cease, this early episode revealed a key truth. Russia’s aggressive rhetoric did not lead to concrete nuclear action.

 

2.1. Russia’s Strategy of Nuclear Ambiguity

 

A key element of Russia’s nuclear blackmail strategy is the deliberate use of ambiguity. Moscow has systematically created a situation in which President Putin either hints at or explicitly states the possibility of using nuclear weapons while Russian diplomats and government officials issue statements that downplay or deny such intentions. Russia has even reversed its position multiple times within short timeframes. For instance, in July 2022, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the United States and its allies were on the verge of open military confrontation, warning of a potential direct clash between nuclear powers that could lead to nuclear escalation. However, on August 1, 2022, Putin changed his tone, stating that “there can be no winners in a nuclear war.”

 

Despite Moscow’s use of nuclear intimidation as a hybrid warfare tool, in the lead-up to the 2022 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held from August 1–26, the Russian delegation abruptly adopted a conciliatory tone. Russia’s representative declared that the country had no intention of using nuclear weapons. These assurances came at the same time Russian forces occupying the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant refused to allow IAEA inspectors on-site.

 

Despite Russia’s public rhetoric on the use of nuclear weapons, its legal conduct consistently indicates a departure from any binding commitments not to use nuclear weapons. For example, on August 27, 2022, the Russian Federation blocked the final document of the NPT Review Conference because the draft included language stating that “the states must make every effort to ensure nuclear weapons are never used again.”

 

In September 2022, Putin once again stated that he is ready to use nuclear weapons to protect the Russian people and defend the country’s borders. “We will definitely use all means at our disposal, and I am not bluffing,” he warned. The significance of this threat lay in the fact that it was made against the backdrop of the annexation of four partially occupied Ukrainian regions. In this way, Russia sought to use nuclear blackmail to influence Ukraine in its attempts to regain the occupied territories. Moscow promoted the rhetoric that any attempt to liberate these regions would constitute an attack on Russia itself. As mentioned earlier, this period after the start of the full-scale invasion should be considered one of the most dangerous in terms of the possibility of Moscow using nuclear weapons. However, the fact that Ukraine was able to successfully carry out an operation to liberate the city of Kherson, which at that time had already been “officially annexed,” indicates Putin’s unwillingness to go beyond public rhetoric. After the pseudo-referendums in the temporarily occupied territories, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev posted: “The defense of all annexed territories will be significantly strengthened… any Russian weapons, including strategic nuclear weapons and weapons based on new principles, may be used to achieve this.” It should be noted that Medvedev’s comments are the most radical. Throughout the Russian-Ukrainian war, he has repeatedly threatened not only Ukraine but also Western countries with nuclear weapons. It is likely that such initial comments at the beginning of the full-scale invasion did indeed have an effect. However, three years of observing the lack of practical response from the Russian Federation to the decisive actions of the United States and European countries have shown that Medvedev’s rhetoric is merely a propaganda tool aimed at creating uncertainty and unpredictability regarding Russia’s actions.

 

Private diplomatic channels initiated by the United States played a significant role in countering Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Following President Putin’s October 2022 statement about using “all available means” to retain control over annexed territories, the Biden administration delivered clear messages to the Russian leadership. These communications warned that any use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine would result in U.S. conventional strikes on Russian military assets within Ukrainian territory. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken officially confirmed this fact in an interview with CBS, stating: “It’s important that Moscow hears directly from us and understands that the consequences would be horrific.” On October 4, 2022, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly also warned that any Russian use of nuclear weapons would have consequences. However, the most influential external factor shaping Russia’s nuclear posture regarding Ukraine has been China’s position. On November 4, 2022, Chinese leader Xi Jinping declared, “The international community should jointly oppose the use of or threats to use nuclear weapons.” He further stated that “the world should stand against the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a nuclear crisis.” Clearly, this statement was a response to Russia’s escalating threats during the annexation of four Ukrainian regions. Since Chinese rhetoric does not advocate for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory, it can be inferred that the Chinese leadership perceives Putin’s nuclear threats and blackmail as significant threats. Later that fall, both Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry ruled out the possibility of a Russian nuclear attack on Ukraine. This demonstrates that deterrent signals from the United States and China were strong enough to compel Russia to soften its nuclear rhetoric.

 

By the beginning of 2023, it was clear that Russia’s nuclear threats were not as effective as they had been in 2022. Western countries had come to understand that neither an increased supply of weapons to Ukraine nor the loss of annexed territories had prompted a serious response from the Kremlin. Concerns over the so-called “red lines” of the Russian leadership diminished significantly. In effect, Russia could no longer meaningfully intimidate the international community. This shift was reflected in the increased military aid provided to Ukraine by the United States and European countries in early 2023. Nevertheless, Russia’s nuclear threats retained some influence, particularly regarding the use of Western-supplied weapons on Russian territory. From winter to spring of 2022–2023, there was a noticeable decline in the frequency of official Russian statements about using nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

 

Following Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the summer of 2023, these statements became more prevalent. On July 5, 2023, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Medvedev, made another statement about the Russian-Ukrainian war: “Any war, even a world war, can end very quickly. It can end either by signing a peace treaty or by doing what the Americans did in 1945 when they used nuclear weapons and bombed two Japanese cities. That’s how they ended the military campaign. The price was the lives of nearly 300,000 civilians.” On July 11, 2023, a public debate erupted in Russia about the possibility of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine or Western countries. The debate was initiated by Karaganov, who wrote an article about the necessity of scaring the West with the threat of using nuclear weapons. If necessary, he suggested striking “a group of targets in a number of countries” to “bring those who have lost their minds to their senses.” In this context, we again see a strategy of public ambiguity. Commenting on this discussion, Putin said he was against the use of nuclear weapons because, first, “there is no need for it,” and second, discussing this topic “lowers the threshold” for its use. However, in the fall of 2023, the Russian president began threatening the West with the Sarmat missile and tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile with a nuclear power plant during a speech at the Valdai Forum in Sochi. Putin recalled that Russia’s military doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons in two situations. The first is a nuclear attack on Russian territory by an enemy, which would provoke a retaliatory strike. The second reason is a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation, even if conventional weapons are used against it. It is important to understand that Russian foreign policy doctrine has repeatedly emphasized the existential nature of the Russian-Ukrainian war for Moscow. In this context, a military defeat of the Russian army could be perceived as a threat to the Russian Federation’s existence.

 

On November 2, 2023, it was revealed that President Putin had signed a law formally withdrawing Russia from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In addition, Russia had previously suspended its participation in the New START Treaty on February 21, 2023. During his address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin justified these moves by citing the West’s alleged intent to inflict a “strategic defeat on Russia.” The suspension of the New START Treaty and Russia’s withdrawal from the CTBT—steps that could lead to the resumption of nuclear testing—represent another example of strategic escalation. While these steps do not constitute direct nuclear threats, they play a significant practical role. Compared to Russia launching a nuclear strike against Ukraine, such legal maneuvers appear considerably more plausible. In the context of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the nuclear threat has evolved from a deterrent to an instrument of aggressive conventional warfare. Nuclear blackmail enables Russia to offset its conventional military shortcomings and constrain Western military assistance to Ukraine. The international community’s lack of a robust strategic response renders nuclear coercion an effective tool, thus encouraging its continued use to achieve Moscow’s military and political objectives.

 

The first practical element of Russian nuclear blackmail occurred in May 2024 with the announcement of missile force exercises in the Southern Military District of the Russian Federation and the Navy. Over the course of several months, Russia and Belarus conducted multiple stages of exercises to practice using tactical nuclear weapons. Such exercises are not unique; they are conducted regularly. What distinguishes these exercises from previous ones is their widespread public coverage and the publication of video footage of military equipment. Moscow stated that these exercises were in response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments regarding the potential deployment of French troops to Ukraine. It’s important to note that Russia recognizes its own exercises involving tactical nuclear weapons as merely a necessary element for starting security negotiations with Western countries. On May 22, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, confirmed this, stating, “The West does not want to talk to us, despite the escalation of the nuclear threat.”

 

Another example of Russia’s attempts to escalate pressure by using nuclear weapons was the first combat launch of the experimental intermediate-range missile “Oreshnik” at the Ukrainian city of Dnipro on November 21, 2024. Commenting on the incident, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that “the missile test was conducted in response to NATO countries’ aggressive actions against Russia.” Official statements and subsequent discussions in the Russian public sphere emphasized that, although the missile was equipped with a non-nuclear warhead, its technical characteristics implied the possibility of its use in a nuclear configuration against Western countries.

Photo illustrating the likely appearance of the Russian experimental medium-range missile “Oreshnik”. Ukrainska Pravda.

Although the Russian leadership framed the launch as a breakthrough in precision weaponry, the missile’s actual features including the absence of explosions, kinetic submunitions, a limited range of 800–850 kilometers, and a lack of evidence of significant damage suggest a demonstrative rather than strategic intent. According to Pentagon assessments, the missile was developed from the intercontinental RS-26 “Rubezh” system and modified to simulate a new type of threat with a reduced range. The following day, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Russia had sent a formal notification to the United States via the nuclear risk reduction channel 30 minutes prior to the launch. Thus, even weapons officially presented as non-nuclear are being used by Moscow for the same purpose as direct nuclear rhetoric: to influence Western governments and public opinion. The absence of real escalation after the launch confirms that these actions remain within the bounds of controlled confrontation. These actions are part of a broader information campaign aimed at sustaining the illusion of an undefined but persistent nuclear threat emanating from Russia.

 

CHAPTER 3 DEPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BELARUS AS A THREAT FACTOR 

A distinct and significant element of Russia’s nuclear blackmail strategy is its deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. This decision was announced on March 25, 2023. Specifically, ten Belarusian Air Force aircraft were announced to have already been modified to carry and deliver this class of weaponry. Additionally, President Putin stated that Russia had transferred the Iskander-M missile system to Belarus, a dual-capable platform that can be equipped with tactical nuclear warheads. Putin stated that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had requested the deployment and emphasized that Russia would proceed “without violating its international obligations on nuclear non-proliferation.” Putin justified this move by citing the United Kingdom’s alleged supply of depleted uranium munitions for Challenger 2 tanks to Ukraine. In response, Moscow characterized the use of such weapons by Ukraine as equivalent to deploying arms “with a nuclear component.” However, the UK immediately accused Putin of spreading disinformation. They pointed out that depleted uranium is a standard component in armor-piercing munitions and that the Russian military has such rounds in its own arsenal.

 

Notably, Russia’s announcement to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus coincided with Ukraine’s preparations for a counteroffensive. Analysis of Russian information channels at the time indicates that a substantial portion of Russian society was concerned about the risk of strategic defeat. From this perspective, Putin may have used the announcement to exert additional pressure on the United States, Western countries, and Ukraine. Given previous indicators that Russia is generally reluctant to escalate beyond rhetorical gestures, the deployment in Belarus is likely primarily symbolic.

 

It is also necessary to consider Lukashenko’s desire for access to nuclear weapons, which is fueled by his personal political ambitions. Even before 2020, the Belarusian government viewed nuclear technology as a tool to strengthen its foreign policy position in the region. The Belarusian nuclear power plant was primarily constructed for the purpose of exporting electricity to the Baltic states.  After the official opening of the plant, Lukashenko repeatedly referred to Belarus as a nuclear power. Since fall 2021, the Belarusian government has publicly admitted to the possibility of deploying unconventional weapons on Belarusian territory. Therefore, the decision to deploy Russian non-conventional weapons on Belarusian territory was a logical continuation of the Belarusian dictator’s ambitions. Shortly after the official announcement on July 6, 2023, he stated that nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory would only be used in the event of NATO aggression against Belarus or Russia. The Belarusian army has also participated in Russian military exercises that practiced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

 

The treaty signed on December 6, 2024, between Russia and Belarus regarding security guarantees within the framework of the “Union State” represents an ongoing effort to project an image of bilateral military unity aimed at countering perceived threats from the West. The document formalizes the deployment of Russian military installations and units in Belarus (Article 5) and establishes provisions for the use of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory (Article 6). Despite rhetoric about a “joint response to aggression,” Minsk has no actual influence over decisions regarding the use of such weapons and remains a tool in the hands of the Kremlin. The agreement contains no technical specifications for combat readiness or infrastructure to store nuclear warheads in Belarus.

The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus also raises additional technical questions. It was announced that Russia had retrofitted ten Belarusian Su-25 aircraft to carry tactical nuclear warheads. However, the Su-25 was not originally designed for this purpose. No Russian aircraft of this type have ever undergone such modernization. These facts call into question the rationale and feasibility of modifying Su-25s, particularly since the Belarusian Air Force already has Su-27 and MiG-29 aircraft that can carry tactical nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Su-25 is a subsonic aircraft, and its technical characteristics do not permit it to swiftly return to a safe zone after dropping a tactical nuclear bomb. The Belarusian Air Force has never publicly demonstrated that its Su-25s are equipped with nuclear payloads. Additionally, on May 7, 2024, Belarusian state television attempted to broadcast footage allegedly showing nuclear weapons; however, the object shown was actually a standard fuel tank. There are also doubts about the deployment location of the aircraft. The only airbase where Belarusian Su-25s are stationed is the Lida airfield, which is located near the Belarus–Lithuania border. This positioning does not enable the aircraft to effectively strike Ukrainian forces on the front lines when armed with nuclear weapons. The Su-25 has a strike range of up to 10 kilometers, making it highly vulnerable to air defense systems. Therefore, even if Su-25s were retrofitted to carry nuclear weapons, they would not pose a significant threat to Ukraine.

 

Similar concerns arise regarding the deployment of Iskander-M missile systems. As previously noted, tactical nuclear weapons require specialized storage facilities. In the Russian Armed Forces, the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is responsible for the maintenance and transportation of nuclear weapons. Constructing storage sites in Belarus would require a significant number of personnel from this directorate. Additionally, residential and support infrastructure would need to be established to accommodate them. However, satellite imagery has revealed no evidence of construction activities. Building nuclear storage facilities is a time-consuming process, contradicting statements by Putin and Lukashenko that the necessary infrastructure would be ready in just a few months. Furthermore, nuclear warheads cannot be transported to a storage location until all infrastructure and personnel are fully prepared and operational.

 

These facts cast serious doubt on the credibility of the claims about the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. Consequently, the urgency of responding to nuclear blackmail by these two states is called into question.

 

CHAPTER 4 FUTURE PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

It can be asserted that nuclear blackmail will remain a part of Russia’s campaign to put pressure on Ukraine and its partners. Accordingly, the Kremlin will attempt to make its nuclear threats appear more credible in order to instill fear within Ukraine’s allies and the Ukrainian government itself. However, the likelihood of Russian nuclear blackmail being effective remains low. Recent developments demonstrate that Moscow’s nuclear threats lack substance, and its so-called “red lines” are largely illusory.

 

This is particularly evident in the Russian leadership’s response to the Ukrainian military operation in Russia’s Kursk region. During the operation, Ukrainian forces gained control over significant portions of border districts, marking the first time Russia lost control of part of its internationally recognized territory. Yet, the Kremlin responded with remarkable restraint, merely announcing the launch of a so-called “counterterrorism operation” and attempting to project an image of control. It’s important to note that, until recently, an attack on internationally recognized Russian territory, especially one involving Western-supplied weapons, was considered a key “red line” that could trigger Moscow’s use of tactical nuclear weapons.

 

However, Ukraine’s Kursk operation proved the opposite. Ukrainian forces conducted military operations virtually unimpeded on Russian soil and struck Russian infrastructure with long-range weapons. This further reinforces the view that the Russian Federation uses nuclear blackmail as a political and informational tool of coercion rather than as a practical threat. This view is supported by the complete absence of nuclear retaliation, even rhetorical, in response to the Ukrainian special services’ operation on Russian air bases on June 1, 2025. The strikes resulted in the destruction and damage of dozens of strategic aviation units, including Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers, which are integral components of Russia’s nuclear triad.

 

Based on this fact, it is reasonable to conclude that Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Any combat use of nuclear weapons or even a provocation involving their use would have significant political, economic, and military consequences for the Russian Federation. Such action could lead to Russia’s international isolation and loss of trust, even among partners like China, which has clearly voiced opposition to nuclear escalation. Therefore, the deployment of nuclear weapons would be highly disadvantageous for Russia due to the unpredictable consequences of such an action. While tactical nuclear weapons could have a strong psychological impact, their military effectiveness, especially in the case of a single strike rather than a massive one, remains questionable due to the characteristics of these weapons.

 

In practical terms, Russia’s actions in the realm of nuclear blackmail are likely to be limited to nuclear force exercises and maneuvers involving the relocation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Kremlin may continue to exploit the situation surrounding tactical nuclear weapons stationed in the Republic of Belarus to intimidate Ukraine’s allies, particularly by issuing statements about increasing the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems on Belarusian territory.

 

Based on the above information, the following projections can be made regarding Russia’s potential future use of nuclear blackmail as a strategic instrument:

 

• In the informational and political spheres, Russia’s nuclear rhetoric will likely remain unchanged. However, it will increasingly focus on sustaining pressure and instilling fear among the Ukrainian population and Ukraine’s international partners by spreading disinformation. Nevertheless, these nuclear threats will be met with greater skepticism and scrutiny as their substance continues to erode and the so-called “red lines” around nuclear use are exposed as illusory.
• Russia will remain unable to use nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine due to the unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences of doing so. However, Moscow may continue to provoke nuclear incidents at seized Ukrainian nuclear facilities, especially the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). However, the probability of a nuclear accident remains low because such an outcome would endanger Russian forces stationed on temporarily occupied Ukrainian territory.
• The Kremlin will continue to use the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus as a political tool against Ukraine and its allies. However, as with other scenarios involving Russian nuclear use, the probability of launching nuclear strikes from Belarusian territory is extremely low due to similar strategic constraints and deterrents.
• Additionally, Russia may launch a disinformation campaign accusing Ukraine of nuclear blackmail or terrorism. This could involve spreading disinformation about Ukraine preparing a “dirty bomb” or planning attacks on Russian nuclear infrastructure.

 

In summary, Russia will likely continue to use nuclear blackmail as a tool. However, due to the reasons and developments outlined above, its effectiveness is expected to decline over time. The nuclear threat will largely remain political, as the Kremlin would face highly unpredictable and undesirable consequences if it were to use nuclear weapons.

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it has transformed its nuclear arsenal from a tool of strategic deterrence into a central instrument of coercion and threat. Moscow continues to use its nuclear capabilities to put pressure on the United States and European nations, with the aim of undermining the delivery and use of Western military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This approach yielded some results during the invasion’s early stages. At the same time, Russia has never provided any concrete evidence of its intentions to use its nuclear arsenal against Ukraine. Thus, we continue to observe only public rhetoric. A key aspect of this strategy is the inconsistency in statements made by Russian officials. For over three years since the war began, Moscow has used its nuclear arsenal to blackmail Western countries and Ukraine, all the while claiming that Russia has no intention of using it.

 

The same logic applies to Russia’s behavior regarding international security agreements. Since the start of the war, the Kremlin has suspended or withdrawn from several international and bilateral treaties related to nuclear arms control. This calculated dismantling of arms control frameworks is intended to put political pressure on the United States and its European allies. One notable example is Russia’s withdrawal of its ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

 

Despite numerous statements and threats by Russian politicians regarding the potential use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine and NATO member states, Russia has never acted on these threats. We have not observed any real preparations for the use of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, even during significant military defeats of the Russian army on the front lines.

 

Russia has deliberately cultivated an image of itself as an unpredictable and irrational state. Through a combination of nuclear threats, disinformation, and manipulation of fears over nuclear escalation, the Kremlin has sought to establish a deterrent effect not only on the battlefield, but also in the policy decisions of Ukraine’s allies. This continues to create barriers for Ukraine in terms of the supply and use of Western weapons. However, the available evidence of Russia’s lack of real political will to use nuclear weapons enables Ukrainian authorities to present additional arguments for removing these barriers.

 

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The policy paper was prepared by researchers of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program and the Security Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The research represents the position of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.