The NATO Summit in The Hague took place at a pivotal moment. By June 2025, it appeared that even the most optimistic observers had concluded that Russia was not planning to stop its aggression against Ukraine. Donald Trump, the US President, however, remained committed to continued dialogue and improved relations with the head of the Russian State.
Trump was also reluctant to call Russia an aggressor state and to impose additional sanctions on it so as not to derail the “peace process”. President Trump’s territorial claims against NATO allies, his clearly stated intention to reduce the US presence in Europe, and underdeveloped European military capabilities sowed doubt in NATO’s ability to defend its members. To complicate things even more, an increasing number of European intelligence services warned about a possible Russian attack on a NATO country. Despite Russian objections and the uncertainty surrounding NATO’s future, Ukraine sees its Alliance membership as an ultimate security guarantee. This chapter addresses the questions of where NATO–Ukraine relations stand after the NATO Summit in The Hague and whether the summit brought Ukraine’s desired membership any closer.
US efforts to end the war in Ukraine
Through its aggression against Ukraine, Russia challenges Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and right to determine its own security arrangements. Russian officials have claimed on multiple occasions that NATO’s eastward expansion posed a threat to the Russian Federation. The ultimatum Russia presented to NATO two months before launching its full-scale invasion, on 17 December 2021, demanded a legally binding commitment that NATO would cease its eastward expansion and would not admit any other states, including Ukraine, as members.
On his campaign trail, Donald Trump promised to end the war in 24 hours. Trying to achieve this goal, he drastically shifted from President Biden’s commitment to Ukraine and attempted to coerce it into a deal favourable to Russia. He blamed Ukraine for starting the war and echoed the Russian narrative that Ukraine’s desire to join NATO was the reason for the conflict. Trump also engaged with Putin, talking about the “great benefits” of the US and Russia working together and ending Russia’s diplomatic isolation. His administration suspended military aid to Ukraine, cut intelligence sharing, demanded reimbursement for past aid, and immediately conceded on Ukraine’s NATO membership, with Defence Secretary Peter Hegseth stating that it wasn’t “a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement”3. The US also considered recognising Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and discussing NATO non-enlargement with the Russian Federation, despite them being red lines for the EU4.
Ukraine accepted the US proposal for a complete and unconditional ceasefire in March 2025. Russia, on the other hand, intensified its attacks on Ukrainian civilians. In a clear mockery of the US President, Russia followed each Putin–Trump phone call with a massive strike. The Russian delegation at negotiations with Ukraine was led by a low-level official, namely the historian and presidential advisor Vladimir Medinsky, known for promoting Russian historical narratives. Russia continued demanding that Ukraine recognise Crimea’s annexation and withdraw troops from the four Ukrainian regions that Russia claims, even though it does not fully control them. It also wanted to leave Ukraine defenceless by demanding that Ukraine cut down its army and remain permanently neutral with no security assistance from its partners. Russia continued to build up its military and boost its military production. In addition, an intensification of the violent campaign of sabotage and subversion against European NATO members and US facilities in Europe was recorded.
Ukraine’s changing role
On the eve of the Russian full-scale invasion, US intelligence assessed that Ukraine would fall within 72 hours6. Believing that Russia would seek a diplomatic settlement and was interested in managing escalation with a nuclear power, the US and its allies provided military aid to Ukraine insufficiently and incrementally. They also restricted Ukraine’s ability to strike deep into Russian territory using Western arms. In response, Ukraine started innovating and developing its own defence industry. Ukraine remains critically dependent on Western military aid, specifically intelligence, air defence systems, long-range artillery and ammunition, etc. At the same time, the results it has achieved are impressive.
According to Ukrainian officials, its defence production has increased 35-fold since the start of the full-scale war7. In 2024 alone, its defence industry production capacity increased from 12 billion USD to 35 billion USD. Ukraine made considerable progress in producing all types of unmanned systems and is actively integrating AI into them. Solutions for the autonomous targeting of strike FPV drones have been developed, and the next step will be the deployment of drone swarms. Ukraine’s defence industry can produce not only drones but the full spectrum of modern weapons and ammunition, including 155 mm artillery shells, armoured vehicles, missile systems, and more.
As a country engaged in a modern war, Ukraine has accumulated valuable experience in warfighting and resilience. A pioneer in drone warfare, Ukraine is developing the UAV doctrine which, according to Maj. Brovdi, Commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces, may become a blueprint for the NATO doctrine9. Ukraine continues to fight and has carried out several daring operations from which NATO is already learning lessons. Among them are maritime operations in the Black Sea, the August 2024 offensive into the Russian Kursk Oblast, a drone attack on Russian air bases that destroyed almost a third of Russian strategic aviation, known as operation “Spiderweb”, etc. Despite Donald Trump’s claims that it “has no cards”, Ukraine has continued to strike Russian air defences, military enterprises, and oil refineries, eroding Russia’s ability to continue the war.
The importance of these achievements to the Alliance has been acknowledged by NATO officials. Patrick Turner, the head of the NATO representation in Ukraine, said that Ukraine’s actions in the war with Russia are “an absolutely integral part of transatlantic European security and critically necessary for NATO”. He also stressed that supporting Ukraine is a part of NATO’s deterrence efforts10. This perspective is substantiated by the fact that Ukraine’s fight keeps Russian forces engaged and causes them to suffer heavy manpower and materiel losses. This weakens Russia’s military power and reduces the direct threat it poses to NATO countries.
While NATO develops defence plans and sets capability targets, it does not have an army of its own. Armies for NATO missions and exercises are provided by its members, and the members are responsible for the generation of defence capability. With heightened recognition of the Russian threat, the European Union increasingly assists them in this responsibility. The EU has adopted a Defence Industrial Strategy and developed a White Paper for European Defence whose goal is to enhance Europe’s defence readiness. Both documents provide for Ukraine’s participation and some practical cooperation mechanisms, e.g., the EU–Ukraine Task Force on Defence Industrial Cooperation, have been set up. In the Task Force’s June 30 meeting, Ukraine submitted a series of defence-industrial projects for potential financing under the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. Ukraine has also launched two defence sector initiatives, “Build with Ukraine” and “Test in Ukraine”, aimed at developing cooperation with Western partners. Standardisation, an essential element of interoperability, is an important part of these efforts.
Ukraine’s quest for NATO membership
After Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian public support for NATO membership surged to over 80% (compared to between 16 to 19% before 2014 and a little over 40% after Crimea’s attempted annexation)11. The Ukrainian government symbolically applied for expedited NATO membership on 30 September 2022, and launched an aggressive lobbying campaign. NATO continued to provide non-lethal assistance to Ukraine under the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) framework launched in 2014 in response to Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea.
The NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit saw the most active lobbying for a NATO invitation. The US and Germany were openly opposed, which made an invitation impossible because NATO makes such decisions by consensus. In general, the Alliance was reluctant to welcome a new member while it was under continuing Russian assault, because this would bring NATO in direct confrontation with Russia, a development it is determined to avoid. Consequently, it was made clear to Ukraine that no membership was possible before the end of the war. The Alliance affirmed its “unwavering solidarity” and committed to supporting Ukraine’s self-defence. The Summit Communique stated that Ukraine’s future was in NATO and made a vague promise that the Allies “will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met”12.
NATO was not in a position to extend security guarantees to Ukraine; however, several steps were made to facilitate closer integration. The NATO–Ukraine Council was established, allowing Ukraine and NATO member states to participate as equals. Since then, it has developed into a place for joint consultations, decision-making, and a crisis consultation mechanism. NATO also recognised that Ukraine had moved beyond the two-stage accession process, and the Membership Action Plan was replaced with the Adapted Annual National Program (aANP). CAP became a multi-year program of assistance to facilitate Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, institutional transformation, and transition towards NATO interoperability. The G7 countries also launched a Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine in which they pledged long-term security assistance to Ukraine, which Ukraine viewed as a bridge to NATO.
The NATO 2024 Washington summit took place when the presidential campaign in the US was underway. Hedging against a possible re-election of Donald Trump, NATO established the Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) in Wiesbaden, Germany, to “support the transformation of Ukraine’s defence and security forces, enabling its further integration with NATO”. It was supposed to take over from the US if needed. The NATO–Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC) was also established in Bydgoszcz, Poland. “It advances NATO’s long-term goals by translating Ukraine’s battlefield experience into doctrine, training, and capabilities that benefit all Allies and partners”13. It also supports defence reforms in Ukraine and fosters the development of cutting-edge military technologies.
The NATO–Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap was also unveiled in Washington. It includes lessons learned, experimentation, and technology testing in combat conditions. The aim of this Roadmap is “to enhance two-way cooperation between NATO and Ukraine on innovation in a coherent manner, ensuring interoperability and predictability – with a focus both on meeting urgent requirements and ensuring long-term cooperation”14.
Although the Alliance was reluctant to invite Ukraine to join, Ukraine continued to argue that its membership would stabilise the continent. Having heard “no” on other issues which subsequently became a “yes”, Ukrainian officials believed their insistence would pay off. In their meetings with NATO, Ukrainian officials insisted that Ukraine must receive a NATO invitation soon, independent of summit schedules. The invitation should cover Ukraine’s entire territory within internationally recognised borders. Subsequent practical integration details could be worked out afterwards using existing platforms like the NATO–Ukraine Council and other relevant dialogue formats. The aANP is seen by Ukrainian officials as an auxiliary instrument to prepare Ukraine for the accelerated completion of the NATO accession talks once conditions permit. It defines Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership as “fundamental national interests”15.
After Trump’s re-election, there were multiple signals that the Alliance’s position on Ukraine was changing. In contradiction to NATO’s stated policy on Ukraine’s membership, Trump said “I don’t think they’ll ever be able to join NATO”16. In their communications, NATO officials echoed Donald Trump and started emphasising the need to make a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine rather than continue to provide military support to Ukraine. NATO Secretary General reports for 2023 and 2024 are quite different in their treatment of Ukraine; the 2024 report makes no mention of Ukraine’s future membership.
At the same time, working-level cooperation is ongoing, and Ukraine continues to provide updates to NATO on aANP implementation. Among practical steps advancing NATO integration is connecting Ukrainian air defence systems and fighter jets to NATO’s unified Link-16 digital network and aligning Ukrainian military education with NATO standards through an institutional audit. Ukraine also demonstrates growing interoperability by contributing to a draft NATO Science & Technology Strategy, collaborating on new military technologies, and participating in joint cyber exercises like Locked Shields. Providing continued support, NATO, via NSATU – which assumed responsibility from the US in the spring of 2025 – coordinates military aid to Ukraine provided by Capability Coalitions17.
The Hague Summit and its aftermath
The days before the 2025 NATO Summit were marked by uncertainty and anxiety. Ukrainian President Zelenskiy even considered not coming to The Hague because his role would be significantly reduced compared to the 2023 and 2024 meetings. Ultimately, largely due to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s diplomatic skills, Ukraine’s presence at the summit was quite prominent. Although Ukraine was not represented at the NATO heads of state meeting, President Zelenskiy attended the pre-summit dinner with world leaders. He also conducted several bilateral meetings, including one with President Trump, which went quite smoothly. The NATO–Ukraine Council met at the foreign minister level and Zelenskiy and Rutte made a joint press appearance18. Mr. Rutte also announced that before July, European and Canadian Allies had pledged more than 35 billion EUR in support for Ukraine, which meant that most likely by the end of the year they would exceed 50 billion EUR support provided in 2024.
Trying not to irritate President Trump, known for his dislike of prolonged meetings, the Allies made the summit short. Its Communique was also short, containing only 5 points. It reaffirmed the Allies’ commitment to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and mentioned Russia as a long-term and persistent threat. The allies agreed to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP, a major win for President Trump. Direct support for Ukraine and its defence industry is also included in this percentage19. The Allies acknowledged that Ukraine’s security contributes to their own and pledged continued support. They also pledged to rapidly expand transatlantic defence industrial cooperation.
The summit’s Communique did not mention Ukraine’s future membership. Secretary General Rutte, however, said on many occasions that the Alliance’s policy on the issue had not changed. At the Bucharest 9 + Nordic 5 meeting on June 220, he emphasised that Ukraine’s membership could not be part of peace negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow. He stressed that it was agreed on in Washington and that Ukraine and NATO “are building that bridge as we speak”21. Addressing journalists on the eve of the summit, Rutte stressed the irreversibility of Ukraine’s path despite objections from the US, “That is still true today, and it will still be true on Thursday after this summit”.
Many in Ukraine criticised the summit for failing to mention the irreversibility of Ukraine’s path to NATO, but Ukraine’s newly appointed Ambassador to NATO, Alyona Getmanchuk, stressed its positive sides. She pointed out that Russia was the only country identified as a long-term threat in the final communiqué. She asked if any other recent summits with the US leader had mentioned Russia in this way. Ukraine, on the other hand, became the only partner country to receive a separate mention in the communiqué. “And not just a mention: Ukraine was included in the paragraph that reflects the summit’s main outcome – namely, the increase of defence spending to 5% of member states’ GDP”23.
The Hague summit decision laid the groundwork for a new weapons procurement mechanism known as the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), launched by the US and NATO. Under this arrangement, Ukraine submits requests for American equipment and ammunition, which are confirmed by the SACEUR. NATO will coordinate deliveries through NSATU. Aid packages worth about 500 million USD each will be announced regularly, funded through a special mechanism that allows Alliance members and partners to make voluntary contributions. To speed up delivery, supplies will come directly from US stockpiles. The Netherlands agreed to finance the first package, and on 6 August 2025, US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce announced that Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands will collectively fund over 1 billion USD worth of American weapons for Ukraine. The erratic US behaviour, exemplified by an abrupt decision of the US administration to suspend the delivery of weapons promised to Ukraine by the Biden Administration, only a week after the Hague summit, unfortunately, does not add confidence to the arrangement.
Despite these tumultuous processes taking place in European security, Ukraine continues to define its NATO membership as its fundamental national interest. On July 21st, President Zelenskiy told the annual gathering of Ukrainian heads of diplomatic missions that NATO remains the strongest, and likely the most effective, security architecture in Europe and the world. He stressed that Ukraine’s relations with NATO are now filled with more substance than at any point during Ukraine’s independence and added that at the working level, Ukraine’s integration with NATO continued. Zelenskiy encouraged Ukrainian diplomats to take all possible political steps and to convey to their counterparts that NATO enlargement ensures peace in Europe. “…it is precisely where NATO has advanced that decades of peace have taken hold, while in places where NATO is slow to act, peace is often scarce” Zelenskiy said24.
Conclusions
The primary purpose of the NATO Summit in The Hague was to strengthen the Alliance itself. Its goal was to send a signal to Russia that the transatlantic bond remains strong, and that the Alliance is going to take its security seriously. Neither Ukraine’s membership nor an invitation to NATO were on the agenda. Politically, it was a step back for Ukraine, but the summit’s decisions laid the foundation for practical steps to enhance Ukraine’s security. In addition, none of the previously institutionalised cooperation and integration mechanisms were dismantled and cooperation at the working level continues. After the summit, NATO has become an essential part of the new PURL mechanism for providing military assistance to Ukraine.
Ukraine’s NATO membership appears to no longer be a bargaining chip in talks with Russia. The fact that the Secretary General made an announcement that the Alliance’s policy on the issue had not changed without raising objections indicates that there was a shift in the US stance. It does not mean, however, that Ukraine’s membership has become any closer. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that a unanimous agreement of its members is needed to extend an invitation to a non-member country to join the Alliance. Unanimous agreement is clearly out of reach, with some leaders such as Hungary’s Orban expressing their open opposition, and some, like the newly elected Polish President, Nawrocki, expressing doubts. In addition, Russian hybrid warfare and influence operations in Europe continue, and the position of other NATO countries may still change. Given the volatility of his character, Trump may revisit the issue in pursuit of a deal with Russia, even though it may strain the Alliance because some allies, particularly the Baltics, strongly support Ukraine’s membership.
In a wider context, it is now clear that post-Cold War hopes of integrating Russia into the European security order have failed. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia chose to reconstitute itself as an empire and make a claim to its former colonies, including some Eastern European countries. By refusing to take Donald Trump’s more than generous offers in exchange for stopping the war, and by intensifying its military preparations and hybrid warfare in Europe, Russia is clearly signalling its aggressive intent. Seeking an accommodation rather than stripping Russia of its ability to continue the fight, the approach adopted by the US Administration will allow Russia to reconstitute after securing its gains in Ukraine if an accommodation is reached. Ukraine’s capitulation will have the same result. This approach does not lead to stable security in Europe.
Current NATO policy towards Ukraine is based on the assumption that Russia will escalate in response to NATO offering Ukraine Alliance membership. This is certainly the case if the Alliance’s offer is not backed up by the necessary capabilities and resolve to fight Russia. To date, despite his strong statements, Putin has not crossed the retaliation threshold in his attacks on NATO countries. This is a sign that he is not willing to get involved in a fight with a stronger opponent. Although Ukraine has evolved from being a net recipient of security assistance to a contributor to European and NATO’s security, its capabilities still remain inferior to Russia’s, and it risks losing if the war grinds on. Ukraine’s inclusion into the Alliance (if at the time of the decision it is interoperable with NATO, and all relevant defence plans are made) is going to increase NATO strength, thus deterring Russia. So, it is hard to disagree with President Zelenskiy, who believes that NATO enlargement to include Ukraine will lead to peace.