At this stage, Russia’s position on peace negotiations to end the war is based on two key factors. The first and main factor is to demonstrate exclusively maximalist conditions for both ending the war and starting negotiations. An important part of this strategy is the complete absence of signals about Russia’s readiness to make concessions, both military and political. This stance began to take shape in June 2024, when Putin, at a meeting with representatives of the Russian diplomatic corps, for the first time since the beginning of the war, outlined the conditions for starting negotiations.
It is important to emphasize that these are negotiations, not the end of the war. Russia has put forward three main demands, two of which remain unchanged in its maximalist position:
- Annexation of all territories of the four Ukrainian regions within their administrative borders (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia).
- Ukraine’s legal renunciation of its aspirations to join NATO.
- The lifting of all sanctions — a demand that was previously emphasized but is now no longer a primary focus.
Since their initial announcement, Russia’s demands have only become more stringent.
The second key factor in Russia’s current strategy is an attempt to establish positive relations with the Donald Trump administration. For this purpose, Moscow is offering a number of initiatives in the field of economic cooperation, hoping that these proposals will shift U.S. attention from war resolution efforts to bilateral economic projects. In this way, the Kremlin seeks either to completely exclude political issues related to peace settlement or to use economic cooperation as leverage to secure political concessions. The essence of this strategy is to push the Trump administration into accepting Russia’s maximalist demands, and to begin exerting serious political pressure on both Ukraine and a number of European countries that support the Ukrainian peace agenda.
In addition, Moscow has expanded its rhetoric beyond the war with Ukraine and has once again started talking about the necessity of a global security agreement. Since November–December 2024, Russian officials have effectively reintroduced the ultimatum that Moscow presented to the U.S. and NATO at the end of 2021. This ultimatum included demands for the withdrawal of all NATO forces and infrastructure to the 1997 borders, as well as legal guarantees that NATO would not accept new members. Generally speaking, over the past six months, Russia’s negotiation terms have become completely unacceptable for Ukraine, and with Donald Trump’s return to power in the U.S, this situation is only getting worse. Currently, Russia’s main demands include:
- Annexation of four Ukrainian regions and legal recognition of this fact by Ukraine.
- Ukraine’s neutral and non-nuclear status.
- Implementation of the provisions contained in the so-called “Istanbul agreements” from the early months of the war.
Two aspects stand out in particular: military and political. The first involves severe limitations for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The second is the provision of long-term mechanisms for Russia to influence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy.
Later in this paper, we will analyze in detail the possible scenarios that Russia is likely to pursue in the framework of peace negotiations.
Formation of the Russian position on negotiations before November 2024
As noted above, the final shaping of Russia’s position on a peace settlement has taken place over the past six months. The return of Donald Trump to power in the U.S. only accelerated the radicalization of Moscow’s demands. Before this, for nearly the entire period since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Russia lacked a clear stance on the conditions for ending the war. Russian rhetoric was based mainly on Putin’s public statements made at the beginning of the war. These statements focused on the so-called goals of the “demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine,” as well as the later-developed narrative of “realities on the ground”. The latter factor played a key role in Moscow’s justification of its current position. However, at different stages of the war, Russia interpreted this concept differently. First and foremost, this concerned its territorial ambitions: over three years, they evolved from a desire to maintain control over the already occupied territories to a desire to annex four Ukrainian regions within their administrative borders.
In addition, even before Donald Trump’s return to power in the U.S, the Russian authorities had formed a narrative about the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian leadership, particularly that of President Volodymyr Zelensky. This aspect is one of the key to understanding the prospects for any future negotiations. Initially, Moscow used the illegitimacy of the Ukrainian government to justify its refusal to negotiate with Kyiv. However, over time, such statements turned into not only a tool for delaying a peaceful settlement, but also an attempt to influence Ukraine’s domestic politics. As part of this strategy, Moscow has repeatedly stated — and continues to claim — that the only legitimate governing body in Ukraine is the parliament. In doing so, Russian authorities have sought and continue to seek to divide Ukraine’s political elite. Currently, Russia is using this factor in its talks with Donald Trump to justify its demand for general elections in Ukraine. However, this aspect has changed and is now seen by Moscow as a tool for direct influence on the Ukrainian political environment. At the same time, one of Russia’s core demands throughout the war has remained unchanged: its insistence on preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and obtaining legal guarantees that Kyiv will never become a member of the Alliance. Another important element of Russia’s position has been the gradual strengthening of rhetoric surrounding the so-called “Istanbul Agreements,” which significantly limit Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2022–2023, Russian authorities used these agreements primarily as an argument to justify their reluctance to negotiate from scratch. However, by mid-2024, these agreements had become Moscow’s basic condition for any dialogue. This refers to the most threatening provisions of these agreements for Ukraine, in particular:
- Limitations on the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
- The abolition of so-called “restrictions on the Russian language” (a broad term referring to a series of measures aimed at integrating pro-Russian forces into Ukraine’s internal politics).
- Granting Russia a veto right over any military assistance to Ukraine from third countries in the event of renewed aggression.
Changes in the public rhetoric of the Russian authorities
| Positions and involvement of international actors in the negotiations | Before November 2024 | After November 2024 |
| United States | Public statements about willingness to engage in dialogue on “global security issues,” though these remained rhetorical and did not translate into practical steps. | Continuation of this rhetoric, but without its current implementation in practice. At the same time, there is a significant potential for signing a number of agreements on global security issues, such as the settlement of the war and the presence of both US and NATO troops on the borders with Russia. |
| Recognition of the U.S. as the only actor with whom Russia is willing to discuss European security and war resolution. | Maintaining this position as opposed to increasingly negative rhetoric towards the EU as a potential negotiator on the war. | |
| Existence and acknowledgment of informal, bilateral intelligence contacts regarding war-related restrictions, especially concerning the “nuclear factor.” | Direct intensification and initiation of bilateral contacts with the Trump administration to end the war. Active efforts to practically separate the issues of war settlement and bilateral cooperation with the United States. | |
| A direct acknowledgement that any contacts regarding the end of the war are possible only after the US position changes to a “constructive” one (i.e., cessation of accusations against Russia and acceptance of its terms for war resolution). | Limited positive attitudes toward the start of a dialogue with the Trump administration on ending the war, supported by a lack of criticism of the United States. However, there is no rhetoric suggesting that Moscow genuinely believes these talks will lead to the war’s conclusion. | |
| European Union | A completely negative perception of the EU’s participation in possible negotiations to end the war. | Escalation of this rhetoric. A public demonstration that Russia does not perceive the EU as a subject for dialogue and is not going to engage the EU in peace negotiations. |
| Rhetoric and actions indicating Moscow’s willingness to negotiate at the level of individual EU member states, as seen in the case of Hungary. | This rhetoric potentially persists. | |
| Radical rejection of the possible participation of EU member states in a potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. | ||
| China | Public support for the China-Brazil peace initiative “Friends of Peace,” though not actively promoted by Russia. This suggests that Moscow supports the initiative only to maintain relations with Beijing while using the platform to discredit Ukraine as allegedly unwilling to pursue peace. | Continuation of formal support for the “Friends of Peace” initiative, but only in response to Beijing’s increasing public statements on the group’s meetings, as well as Russian-Chinese contacts following the first US-Russian meeting in Saudi Arabia. |
| Putin has explicitly stated his willingness to consider China, India, or Brazil as mediators in the peace talks. | Shortly after the first meeting of the Russian and US delegations on February 18 in Riyadh, Russia declared that it does not need mediators for talks with the U.S. | |
| Superficial support for China’s first “peace plan,” published on the first anniversary of the outbreak of the war, solely to avoid conflicts with Beijing, without any Russian efforts to advance the plan.
The same goes for the Sino-Brazilian peace initiative published in September 2024. |
No direct comments on the Chinese peace plan. However, Russia’s statements regarding a ceasefire already demonstrate discrepancies with this document, as Russia refuses to take such a step without fulfilling its conditions, contradicting China’s proposal. | |
| No direct response to China’s statements about the necessity of the EU’s participation in peace negotiations, likely to maintain positive relations with Beijing. | ||
| Brazil | Similarly to the situation with China, with whom the Sino-Brazilian peace plan was developed, Russia formally supported it but did not develop it in any way. | Russia continues to avoid commenting on or mentioning this initiative. |
| Russia did not directly respond to Brazil’s statements about the country’s readiness to deploy its own peacekeepers. At the same time, Moscow’s general position on the deployment of peacekeepers in Ukraine is not fully understood, except for the fact that Russia is against the European contingent. | ||
| India | With regard to India, Russia’s position on involving the country in the talks has been rather inconsistent. Back in July 2024, Moscow stated that India was not seeking a mediator role. But in September, their position changed to the opposite. | Since the beginning of active contacts between the United States and Russia, Moscow has not mentioned the prospects of India’s mediation in the talks. There has also been no response to the latest statements from the Indian Prime Minister hinting at his willingness to mediate in Russia-Ukraine talks. |
| Before November 2024 | After November 2024 | |
| Timeframe for entering peace negotiations and their duration | They could not be determined due to the political and military situation. | The timeframe for this issue is difficult to predict. At this stage, the start of negotiations depends on how quickly the ceasefire is initiated. Given Russia’s unwillingness to give up its “maximalist” conditions for resolving the war, negotiations are expected to be protracted, with the potential for renewed hostilities. The most optimistic scenario is that the war will end and the agreements will be formalized in the summer and fall of 2025. |
| Before November 2024 | After November 2024 | |
| Kremlin’s red lines | Until June 2024, Russia’s negotiating position was not detailed in any way and consisted solely of rhetoric, based on statements about the need to return to the so-called “Istanbul agreements” and to take into account “realities on the ground.” | The Russian conditions have been effectively formed in recent months. It is unlikely that compromise options will be possible on the following points: |
| The issue of Ukraine’s membership in NATO; | ||
| A specific format for legalizing the Russian occupation of the territories currently under Russian control; | ||
| Conditions that Russia could interpret as “saving face” on the issue of the territories it has incorporated into its constitution as Russian territory (four Ukrainian regions). This factor will depend entirely on Moscow’s willingness to make concessions. |
| Before November 2024 | After November 2024 | |
| Conditions for entering into negotiations | Until June 2024, the main condition for Russia to start negotiations was Ukraine’s agreement to negotiate exclusively from the standpoint of the continuation of the Istanbul Agreements, as well as to publicly express Russia’s main positions: rejection of NATO membership and recognition of the so-called “realities on the ground,” i.e., agreement that Russia will retain the occupied territories. | After the U.S. presidential elections and Russia’s June 2024 announcement of exclusive conditions for resuming talks (Ukraine’s NATO renunciation, annexation of four Ukrainian regions, and sanction removal), Moscow’s demands have become more radicalized. Moscow is expected to enter negotiations only upon public acknowledgment of its core demands—Ukraine’s NATO renunciation, annexation of four regions, withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from them, and explicit willingness to discuss additional conditions, including military limitations on Ukraine and Russian influence over its internal politics.
Given the unrealistic nature of these conditions, the option of focusing on contacts with the United States, which is capable of exerting appropriate pressure on Russia to start negotiations without preconditions, remains valid. |
| Before November 2024 | After November 2024 | |
| What concessions Russia is willing to make | Moscow’s public rhetoric showed no readiness for concessions. | With Russia’s increasingly rigid position, there are no apparent signs of willingness to compromise. However, with U.S. mediation, some areas could see potential agreements: |
| The most likely concession is the option of exchanging prisoners of war under the “all for all” formula. | ||
| The issue of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), which has been raised by the Trump administration. There is potential for an agreement to use the plant to provide electricity to both Ukraine and the occupied regions, but only if U.S. personnel are stationed at the ZNPP or other options for U.S. involvement. | ||
| Given the unrealistic nature of Moscow’s current demand for the annexation of all the territories of the four Ukrainian regions, it is possible to obtain Russia’s rejection of this demand in exchange for a certain format of “legalization” of the territories currently under occupation. | ||
| Similarly, there is a potential to nullify Russia’s demand for Ukraine to halt mobilization as a precondition for a ceasefire. |
What to expect in the near future? What changes might occur?
The current situation regarding peace negotiations largely depends on how willing the Russian side is to move away from its “ultimatum” stance on key negotiation conditions. Additionally, the readiness of the U.S. administration to exert real pressure on Moscow to advance this goal remains in question. So far, there is no evidence that Washington is prepared to go beyond rhetoric. To a large extent, the future of the peace negotiations also depends on the topic of a full-fledged ceasefire. There is a high likelihood that in this case, the U.S. may partially accommodate some of Russia’s declared conditions, specifically by halting the supply of American weapons. Another Russian demand that could potentially gain support from a Trump administration is imposing limits on the Ukrainian military. In a negative scenario, every effort must be made to prevent limitations on the drone sector at any cost.
It is expected that Russia will continue its active attempts to divide the topic of a peaceful settlement into the issue of Ukraine itself and the topic of exclusively bilateral Russian-American relations. In this way, Moscow will try to draw the Trump administration’s attention to the economic component, trying to exchange its own resources in exchange for political concessions in the talks.
One of the aspects that has not been present in Russian rhetoric so far, but which should be expected, is the topic of Patriot air defense systems. There is an extremely high probability that Moscow will demand their removal from Ukraine, using the argument that these systems could be converted into an “offensive” format (surface-to-surface). Russia has already used this rhetoric in the past. The same logic, though in a less predictable manner, may apply to a range of other Western weapons. In this situation, Ukraine must preemptively demonstrate to the Trump administration the futility of Russia’s anticipated demands.
Potential behind-the-scenes Russian conditions regarding sanctions should also be expected. It has already been observed that Russia is collecting relevant information from its own business about the most damaging restrictions. It is possible that lifting certain sanctions will become a prerequisite for Russia to enter full-fledged negotiations. These conditions could potentially include lifting financial restrictions on international transfers and sanctions against the Russian aviation sector.
If a full-fledged ceasefire is announced there is a high likelihood that Moscow will begin to actively promote the necessity of holding presidential elections in Ukraine in its negotiations with the United States. Given that Washington has already hinted at a willingness to support such a scenario, there is a direct risk that Russia will insist on the participation of pro-Russian forces in the elections. A particular threat is the potential for a situation in which Moscow, in conversations with U.S. representatives, will promote the participation in the elections of those puppet forces located in the Russian Federation. First and foremost, this refers to Viktor Medvedchuk’s political project, “The Other Ukraine,” although this scenario is the most radical. Instead, a more realistic option would be to focus on allowing those political forces that advocate so-called “coexistence” with Russia, the “protection” of the Russian language, the “Orthodox Church” of the Moscow Patriarchate, or that oppose the further Eurocentrism of Ukraine’s foreign policy course.
The set of policy briefs is prepared within the framework of ‘Strengthening Ukrainian expert voice in the European Union and EU member states and partners’ project, supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations