The Russian full-scale invasion of 2022 compelled Ukraine to diversify its diplomacy beyond traditional Euro-Atlantic partners and to establish new political, economic, and cultural footholds across Africa. In this process, South Africa has emerged as the most symbolically and politically significant counterpart on the continent.

This report traces the evolution of the Ukraine-South Africa relationship, from limited Soviet-era links and post-independence stagnation to the new phase of intensified dialogue since 2022. South Africa’s complex positioning as a democratic state, a BRICS member, and a regional leader shapes both the opportunities and constraints of this partnership. Pretoria’s “strategic neutrality” towards the Russia-Ukraine war reflects its preference to balance between Western and non-Western partners. Yet the tone of interaction with Kyiv has shifted markedly from detachment to cautious pragmatism. High-level meetings, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s Africa tours, have initiated a structured political dialogue unprecedented in the bilateral record. Trade and sectoral cooperation remain modest but resilient. The relationship is further supported by growing people-to-people contacts, humanitarian cooperation, and cultural initiatives led by the Ukrainian Association of South Africa and others.

The report argues that engagement with South Africa is central to Ukraine’s Strategy for Relations with African States (2022), followed by the Communication Strategy Ukraine-Africa for 2024-2026. Pretoria’s influence in the African Union, SADC, and BRICS makes it a critical interlocutor in shaping Global South perceptions of the war and of Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Key policy recommendations focus on consolidating high-level political dialogue, leveraging South Africa’s G20 presidency to advance discussions on peace and post-war recovery alongside thematic cooperation on food security and energy transition, promoting “neutral-benefit” economic projects, and expanding humanitarian and cultural diplomacy. The study concludes that sustained, empathetic, and multi-level engagement can transform Ukraine–South Africa relations from tactical interaction into a durable partnership rooted in shared values of sovereignty, justice, and human dignity.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

Ukraine-South Africa relations today stand at the intersection of two defining global transformations: the war that has upended the world’s security order and the ongoing shifts in influence, leadership, and alignment among the countries of the Global South. The erosion of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, brought into sharp relief by Russia’s war against Ukraine, has compelled Kyiv to rereassess its foreign policy priorities and to engage far beyond its traditional Euro-Atlantic orbit. The war has exposed the fragility of the international order, revealing a widening gap between the universal UN Charter-based norms and the uneven willingness of states to uphold them in practice.

For Ukraine, eventual victory and comprehensive post-war reconstruction require sustained engagement with the Global South, where narratives of non-alignment and multipolarity often dilute consensus on accountability for aggression. Bitter experience has shown that the positions taken in distant capitals, whether abstentions at the United Nations or cautious statements in regional organisations, carry tangible consequences for the enforcement of sanctions, humanitarian relief, and the conditions for post-war reconstruction. Just as importantly, cultivating long-term relationships with African partners is essential for Ukraine to counter Russian influence, secure a voice in shaping multipolar governance, diversify economic ties, and ensure that its vision of sovereignty resonates beyond the Euro-Atlantic world.

In January 2022, Ukraine adopted the Strategy for Relations with African States, followed by the Communication Strategy Ukraine-Africa 2024-2026. Both documents reflect a strategic decision by Kyiv to expand its diplomatic and informational presence on the continent, counter disinformation, and build genuine partnerships based on respect, dialogue, and mutual benefit. While the office of the Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa was established in 2011, its role, revitalised in 2022 with the appointment of Maksym Subkh, alongside multiple presidential meetings with African leaders, and the opening of new embassies in Botswana, DRC, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, raising the total number of missions on the continent to 18, illustrate that Ukraine’s pivot to the African continent is a long-term policy priority.

As Africa’s leading diplomatic actor and a recognised voice in multilateral affairs, South Africa has a pivotal role in this effort. Since 2022, South Africa has increasingly positioned itself as a key African voice in global governance. By becoming the first African nation to assume the G20 Presidency in December 2024 and preparing to host the 20th G20 Summit in Johannesburg in November 2025, Pretoria has gained an unprecedented platform to influence debates on global inequality and reform. At the same time, South Africa has sought to balance its ties with BRICS and the West, launching a G20 task force on global wealth inequality, co-leading a coalition defending the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, and engaging with US and EU leaders. These steps obviously signal its potential to act as a bridge between Africa, Europe, and the wider international community. However, South Africa’s ties with Russia and its policy of “strategic non-alignment” have led to abstentions in key UN votes and a reluctance to criticise Moscow directly. 

There are a few underlying realities to consider as entry points when analysing the Ukraine-South Africa relationship. First, it is shared independence and nation-building paths. Ukraine and South Africa both started a new phase of their statehood in the early 1990s. Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, while South Africa’s transition from apartheid culminated with the democratic elections of 1994. Both countries emerged from totalitarian or authoritarian systems, each with its own unique context, and immediately faced the immense task of nation-building, consolidating democracy, and reforming political institutions. For South Africa, these were also years of global reintegration after decades of isolation and sanctions. The country transitioned from being a pariah state to a legitimate actor on the world stage. Key elements of this process included opening its economy to foreign investment, particularly from the United States and Europe; joining new international organisations; and confronting the crimes of apartheid through mechanisms such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This period was foundational for shaping South Africa’s modern identity as a democracy, while also embedding a narrative of moral authority based on its struggle against injustice.

Second, South Africa remains a country of deep internal contradictions, which are reflected in its governance and foreign policy. It is a constitutional democracy with regular elections, a vibrant media, and a multi-party system. At the same time, it faces stark inequalities, corruption scandals, and political instability. South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies globally. The most recent World Bank Country Overview (April 2025) reports a consumption Gini coefficient of 0.67 for 2018, indicating persistent inequality. The World Bank’s Poverty & Inequality Platform (PIP), current through 2024, confirms that this level has remained high. More recent academic analysis estimates a slightly lower Gini of 0.63 for 2023, though wages show even greater inequality (Gini = 0.69). These tensions extend into all areas of government policy, including international relations. As a result, South Africa’s external actions are often a balancing act: projecting a commitment to human rights and democracy while simultaneously navigating domestic pressures, party politics, and competing foreign influences. Its foreign policy decisions are thus complex, sometimes appearing inconsistent or ambiguous to outside observers. 

Third, democratic transformations in the South African governance are a potential bridge between the two countries. Both Ukraine and South Africa have constitutional systems that protect free speech, support political opposition, and value pluralism. In South Africa, there are opposition parties, civil society groups, and independent media voices that have openly expressed solidarity with Ukraine and criticised Russia’s aggression. These actors represent important potential allies for Ukrainian diplomacy. At a societal level, many South Africans identify with Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty and freedom. Public opinion surveys show that a majority of South Africans view Russia’s war as unjustified. This sympathy creates opportunities for people-to-people contacts, cultural exchanges, and civil society cooperation, even when the government’s position is more cautious.

Fourth, South Africa’s foreign policy entanglements, especially its BRICS alignment and enduring ties with Moscow, constrain Ukraine’s engagement. Pretoria’s embrace of multipolarity and insistence on “strategic non-alignment” often translates into reluctance to publicly confront Russia, even amid blatant violations of international norms. Political-economy vectors deepen the grip: The investment arm of the African National Congress, Chancellor House, has been linked to a joint venture with a firm connected to Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg, and the ANC accepted a R10 million donation from a Vekselberg-linked enterprise in 2022, raising questions about influence over the foreign-policy calculus. The Lady R ship saga in December 2022 crystallised these tensions. The covert docking of the sanctioned Russian ship at Simon’s Town, allegations expressed by the US ambassador of weapon transfers, and a subsequent closed inquiry with opaque conclusions have sustained doubts about Pretoria’s impartiality. This ambiguity makes South Africa a partner whose decisions are deeply constrained by structural and historical legacies.

Thus, Ukraine-South Africa relations encapsulate the dilemmas of contemporary foreign policy. For Ukraine, engaging Pretoria is vital: South Africa’s positions in the African Union, the United Nations, BRICS, and now the G20 shape international legitimacy, sanctions resilience, and prospects for post-war reconstruction. For South Africa, the war in Ukraine is a mirror held up to its own claims of moral leadership. Abstentions and ambiguity may preserve tactical flexibility, but they also test Pretoria’s credibility as a principled voice of the Global South. At the same time, the relationship raises a deeper global question: can middle powers reconcile the call for multipolarity with a commitment to universal norms such as sovereignty and democracy?

Furthermore, the trajectory of Ukraine-South Africa relations resonates far beyond the two countries themselves. It reveals whether Pretoria is prepared to translate its historic narrative of justice into concrete positions on contemporary conflicts, and whether Kyiv can build durable partnerships outside its traditional Euro-Atlantic orbit. Above all, it will test the resilience of international law in an age where solidarity, pragmatism, and competing visions of order collide.

Ukraine-South Africa relations have evolved into a genuine partnership anchored in shared democratic values yet responsive to the realities of global inequality, which may not only reshape bilateral ties but also illuminate a path for how the Global South and Europe can engage more honestly in the twenty-first century.

STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY

 

Global Power Dynamics and BRICS Balancing

The architecture of South Africa’s foreign policy is built upon the country’s global alignments, institutional design, and regional responsibilities, which together define the parameters of its diplomatic agency. It is characterised by an effort to manage competing loyalties within an evolving multipolar system. Nowhere is this more evident than in Pretoria’s approach to BRICS (an initiative originally united Brazil, India, China, and South Africa), where it seeks to maintain influence while avoiding open rupture with Western democracies. As host of the 2023 BRICS Summit, South Africa supported the decision to expand the grouping by inviting Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This move was framed as a step toward a “more inclusive and representative world order” rather than an anti-Western realignment. Yet the inclusion of highly authoritarian states created unease among Western partners such as the United States and the European Union, who perceived the enlargement as strengthening anti-liberal tendencies within global governance.

To mitigate these perceptions, Pretoria’s strategy was to intensify dialogue with Western partners through the US-Africa and EU-South Africa summits, reassuring them that its engagement with BRICS does not preclude cooperation with democratic states. Optics-sensitive gestures, such as requesting the postponement of BRICS-related naval drills scheduled for late November 2025, helped avoid diplomatic turbulence during South Africa’s G20 presidency. This triangulation was widely interpreted as an attempt to prevent another diplomatic crisis akin to the Lady R arms-shipment controversy (December 2022) and the Mosi II naval exercise with Russia and China (February 2023), both of which severely strained relations with Washington and Brussels. By postponing provocative military symbolism during its G20 presidency, Pretoria demonstrated an acute awareness that the BRICS theatre carries tangible economic costs for trade preferences under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), foreign investment, and international reputation.

Analysts point out that this balancing act has come at a moral and strategic cost. Polling by the Brenthurst Foundation consistently shows that a majority of South Africans condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, contradicting the claim that Pretoria’s repeated abstentions reflect public opinion. They describe South Africa’s Russia/BRICS posture as a pursuit of “top-table status” achieved at the expense of credibility and economic return. Repeated abstentions on Ukraine, they argue, have eroded the country’s moral capital and strained relations with its principal trade and investment partners in Europe and North America.

Domestically, these tensions are mirrored in party-political debates. The African National Congress, which dominates the governing coalition, frames its stance as “non-alignment” and “progressive internationalism.” Official documents emphasise dialogue, anti-imperialism, and Global South solidarity, interpreting UN abstentions as principled neutrality. In contrast, the Democratic Alliance adopts a pro-Ukraine and pro-Western orientation, openly criticising the ANC’s handling of the Lady R episode and advocating measures such as visa liberalisation for Ukrainians. The Economic Freedom Fighters, by contrast, advance an explicitly pro-Russia narrative, portraying Western support for Ukraine as neo-imperialist interference. Smaller parties such as the Inkatha Freedom Party and ActionSA argue for a values-based foreign policy, urging solidarity with Ukraine and accusing the ANC of abandoning the principles of sovereignty and international law. Academic commentary and think-tank analyses interpret these divergences as evidence of an unresolved conceptual struggle over the meaning of “non-alignment.” In practice, the governing faction’s reading of non-alignment often tilts toward anti-Western sentiment, producing a de facto pro-Russian bias that became only partially corrected under external pressure during 2023-2025.

South Africa’s foreign-policy behaviour is also shaped by its institutional architecture. The Department of International Relations and Cooperation operates within a centralised yet fragmented policy environment dominated by the Presidency. As noted, strategic direction is frequently set by the Presidential advisory unit rather than by DIRCO itself, producing inconsistent messaging and “reactive” diplomacy. Parliamentary oversight remains weak, and coordination across ministries, particularly between trade, defence, and energy portfolios, is limited. This procedural imbalance reinforces a pattern of that kind of diplomacy, where key decisions, such as the optics of BRICS naval exercises, are managed at the executive level without institutional debate. This gap between normative ambition and institutional capacity can be characterised as a structural cause of South Africa’s erratic global positioning.

The informational environment further complicates this calculus. Russian state media and aligned networks such as RT and Sputnik conduct sustained influence operations across Africa, including South Africa. These campaigns propagate narratives portraying NATO as the aggressor, Western sanctions as the cause of food insecurity, and BRICS as the vehicle of anti-colonial emancipation. Investigations by SAIIA, the Africa Defence Forum, Voice of America, and Forbidden Stories have documented how such disinformation ecosystems shape South African discourse. The diffusion of these narratives raises the domestic political cost of any overt shift away from Moscow, helping explain Pretoria’s preference for soft, principle-framed UN texts that invoke dialogue and de-escalation but stop short of assigning responsibility for aggression.

A further determinant emphasised in SAIIA’s analyses is the developmental framing of South Africa’s diplomacy. Since the Mbeki era, mid-1990s – late 2000s, Pretoria has articulated a model of developmental foreign policy that treats international engagement as a tool for domestic economic transformation. BRICS membership is justified as a means of diversifying trade, accessing infrastructure finance, and promoting technology partnerships rather than as an ideological alignment. However, critics argue that this developmental rationale often masks normative compromise, allowing RSA to justify engagement with authoritarian partners in the name of growth.

 

US – South Africa Relations and Conditional Constraints

South Africa’s posture toward the war in Ukraine is also conditioned by the evolving state of its relations with the United States, which involve economic leverage, security concerns, and reputational stakes. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) remains Pretoria’s most tangible vulnerability. The scheme provides duty-free access for a substantial share of South African exports (automobiles, agro-processing, and apparel inputs) and underpins thousands of domestic jobs. With AGOA’s renewal under debate in Washington ahead of its 2025 expiry, Pretoria has strong incentives to avoid actions that could provoke congressional scepticism or presidential pushback. Analysts note that trade preferences have become an informal compliance mechanism: while South Africa abstains on explicit resolutions naming Russia, it has supported humanitarian and nuclear-safety texts aligned with US and EU priorities, signalling “principled neutrality” rather than open defiance.

Security incidents have further shaped the diplomatic tone. The Lady R affair in December 2022 triggered the sharpest US-RSA rift in a decade after allegations of covert arms transfers to Russia. Although a government inquiry later cleared Pretoria of out-loading weapons, the full report remained classified, and residual scepticism in Washington persisted. Combined with criticism over the Mosi II trilateral naval exercise with Russia and China in February 2023, the episode convinced Pretoria of the political cost of visible military association with Moscow. In consequence, as the G20 host for November 2025, South Africa quietly asked Beijing to postpone a follow-up BRICS naval drill that would have coincided with the summit, an optics-sensitive move interpreted as an attempt to prevent new turbulence in relations with Western partners.

A third dimension is multilateral signalling. US and European policymakers closely track South Africa’s voting record on Ukraine at the UN General Assembly, interpreting abstentions as indicators of alignment rather than procedural matters. SAIIA and CSIS analyses note that these votes influence Washington’s perception of South Africa’s reliability as a partner and therefore the broader political climate around AGOA renewal and energy-transition cooperation.

Economic geostrategy adds another layer. The Biden administration’s Africa Minerals and Energy Transition Initiative identifies South Africa as pivotal for platinum-group metals, manganese, and vanadium – as critical inputs for global decarbonisation. Pretoria’s potential gains from US investment and supply-chain partnerships create pragmatic incentives to avoid fresh diplomatic shocks over Russia.

For Ukraine, this US-SA axis offers both constraints and leverage. Market access, minerals cooperation, and summit optics all push Pretoria toward caution with Moscow and open space for incremental engagement with Kyiv. By contrast, spikes in US-SA tension, such as renewed scrutiny over arms or defence links, tend to drive Pretoria back toward performative “non-alignment,” amplified by Russian proxy narratives that depict US pressure as neo-colonial coercion. The net effect is a pendulum: when US-RSA trust stabilises, Ukraine’s diplomatic overtures gain traction; when it deteriorates, Moscow’s influence narratives find fertile ground.

Policy implication: Ukraine can align its outreach with the logic of US-SA incentives. Co-sponsoring UN initiatives on humanitarian access, nuclear safety cooperation, and the protection of children in armed conflict would allow Pretoria to demonstrate normative consistency without appearing to take sides. Framing cooperation around food security and green technology supply chains further complements both South Africa’s development agenda and the US’s strategic priorities, transforming triangular tension into mutually reinforcing diplomacy.

 

Regional and Multilateral Dimensions

Beyond global alignments, South Africa’s foreign policy is deeply shaped by its regional leadership obligations and membership in multilateral institutions that define its diplomatic identity. As a founding member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and a leading voice in the African Union (AU), Pretoria carries both symbolic and operational responsibilities for regional stability. SADC’s emphasis on consensus, sovereignty, and non-interference reinforces South Africa’s preference for mediation rather than confrontation, which is a pattern consistent with its cautious stance on the war in Ukraine. Its leadership in SADC peace missions, from Lesotho to the Democratic Republic of Congo, has entrenched Pretoria’s self-image as a peacemaker, a role that discourages overt alignment with any belligerent party. Within the AU, South Africa champions reform of global governance structures, particularly the UN Security Council, positioning itself as a bridge between Africa and the G20, and aligning its rhetoric on Ukraine with calls for inclusive multilateralism.

This regional diplomacy is complemented by South Africa’s participation in global institutions, including the United Nations, G20, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Commonwealth. Each platform imposes distinct incentives and constraints. In the UN, South Africa seeks to preserve its reputation as a responsible middle power while avoiding votes that could alienate either BRICS or Western donors. In the G20, the RSA 2025 presidency requires a careful balancing of optics and substance, projecting itself as a constructive convenor on development and climate finance while containing reputational fallout from its ambiguous posture toward Moscow. NAM membership sustains the ANC’s historic non-alignment identity but perpetuates ambiguity between neutrality and passive complicity in the face of aggression. The Commonwealth, meanwhile, offers access to Western partners and a normative community that upholds democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, principles South Africa endorses rhetorically but applies selectively in practice.

South Africa’s long-standing advocacy for reform of the United Nations, particularly the expansion of the Security Council to include permanent African representation, further illustrates its pursuit of a more equitable global order. Through the Ezulwini Consensus, Pretoria has argued that global governance must shift from reflecting post-1945 hierarchies to contemporary realities. For Ukraine, with its call for strengthening the UN Charter’s principles and accountability mechanisms, engaging South Africa on this agenda offers common ground: both countries seek to defend international law while adapting multilateral institutions to ensure fairer representation. Supporting Africa’s voice within reformed UN structures allows Kyiv to align more visibly with legitimate calls for inclusivity, reinforcing its image as a partner in the renewal of the existing order.

South Africa legitimises its external activism through the claim to represent Africa in global governance debates. It portrays itself as a norm entrepreneur championing African agency within the UN, G20, and BRICS, leveraging this identity to enhance its global standing. This Pan-African framing enables Pretoria to justify its mediation-first approach, including on Ukraine, as consistent with AU traditions of consensus and peacebuilding. Yet, as noted, appeals to African unity often conceal strategic ambivalence: when principles of sovereignty and non-intervention collide, South Africa’s mediation posture slides into moral relativism, weakening its credibility as a defender of international law.

Economic geography further constrains South Africa’s foreign-policy behaviour. As the dominant economy in southern Africa, the country sustains regional markets and supply chains while avoiding disruptions caused by geopolitical polarisation. Its leadership in SADC institutions and development corridors (e.g., the Maputo Development Corridor) prioritises economic pragmatism over ideological loyalty. Russian influence in southern African neighbours, particularly within the SADC region, through arms trade, energy projects, and media, appears ambivalent: useful for diversification but risky for stability. This regional calculus reinforces South Africa’s preference for strategic ambiguity, maintaining relations with Russia while safeguarding access to Western finance, trade, and investment.

For Ukraine, these multilateral and regional affiliations present both constraints and entry points. South Africa’s diplomatic culture, shaped by SADC consensus and AU proceduralism, makes direct confrontation unlikely but dialogue possible, especially when framed through multilateral reform, food security, and scientific cooperation. Effective Ukrainian engagement, therefore, depends on demonstrating that partnership with Kyiv strengthens, rather than challenges, Pretoria’s role as mediator and regional leader. Highlighting shared principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity within AU and UN frameworks can help realign South Africa’s rhetoric with its constitutional commitments, while offering cooperation consistent with its G20 and SADC development priorities.

THE MAIN STAGES OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS 

 

1991 – 2022: Towards Sustaining Dialogue

Before Ukraine declared its independence in 1991, its engagements with South Africa were mediated through the Soviet Union’s institutions. The Soviet state was a committed opponent of apartheid and a crucial backer of liberation movements, most notably the African National Congress (ANC). Within that Soviet framework, Ukrainian institutions and personnel played a substantive, though often overlooked, role. For example, in 1962, the first cohort of ANC students reportedly enrolled in Kyiv, where many remained for multi-year studies, and between 1963 and 1965, 328 Umkhonto we Sizwe cadres received military training near Odesa. Moreover, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic played a distinct role during the United Nations debates: in 1985, the Ukrainian mission endorsed comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, framing apartheid as a violation of peace and security (a stance reproduced annually in USSR-sponsored resolutions).

Yet in South African political memory, the Soviet contribution is frequently collapsed into a narrative about Russia alone. This conflation is reinforced by Moscowєі dominance in post-Soviet geopolitics and by the selective appropriation of the Soviet legacy by the Russian state itself. The result is that within parts of South Africa’s ruling elite, Russia continues to be viewed as the principal historic ally of the anti-apartheid struggle, while Ukraine’s distinct contributions remain marginal in public consciousness. Such a memory distortion helps explain why South Africa’s policy toward Russia-Ukraine is shaped less by Ukraine’s own historical role and more by symbolic loyalty to Russia.

Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the Republic of South Africa were formally established when Pretoria recognised Ukraine’s independence on 14 February 1992, and the two countries exchanged diplomatic notes on 16 March 1992. Speaking about political engagement and early contacts, the first decade of relations can be seen as primarily consisting of symbolic high-level contacts. Ukraine’s foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, visited South Africa in November 1998, followed by President Leonid Kuchma’s participation in the 2000 Earth Summit in Cape Town. Reciprocal engagement included the official visit of South Africa’s vice president to Ukraine in September 2000, while subsequent meetings on the sidelines of multilateral gatherings, such as the UN General Assembly in 2002 and the BRICS Summit in 2011, kept the dialogue alive, albeit without translating into deep strategic cooperation.

The decade between 2011 and 2021 in Ukraine-South Africa relations was marked by stagnation and growing normative divergence. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in Donbas in 2014 constituted a watershed moment for Ukraine’s foreign policy, compelling Kyiv to seek broader international coalitions in defence of the UN Charter and the principle of territorial integrity. South Africa’s response was notably restrained. In March 2014, Pretoria abstained from the UN General Assembly vote on Resolution 68/262, which affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It was an abstention that signalled a reluctance to attribute responsibility for aggression and effectively positioned South Africa outside the emerging global consensus defending Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Bilateral engagement during this period remained limited. While embassies functioned and trade continued at modest levels, there were no senior-level visits or the establishment of new cooperative frameworks. Ukraine’s diplomacy focused primarily on Europe and its immediate security environment, while South Africa approached Ukraine largely through multilateral structures, typically joining the majority of African states that abstained on Crimea- and Donbas-related resolutions.

Despite the political distance, Pretoria did not challenge Ukraine’s sovereignty directly and continued to endorse, in abstract terms, the principles of territorial integrity and peaceful dispute resolution. The relationship was thus characterised by what may be termed «managed distance»: an absence of hostility but also of normative coherence. For Ukraine, South Africa’s stance highlighted the limits of solidarity within the Global South when universal principles of sovereignty collide with post-colonial notions of strategic autonomy.

This asymmetry underscored South Africa’s tendency to privilege bloc solidarity over balanced engagement, often to the detriment of relations with Kyiv. Yet, even within this context of neglect, Ukraine sought to sustain dialogue. A telephone conversation in October 2021 between Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and his South African counterpart Naledi Pandor symbolised Kyiv’s renewed effort to revitalise ties, a gesture that acquired even greater significance in hindsight as it took place on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since 2022: From Managed Distance to Instrumental Engagement

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a turning point in bilateral relations. Initial caution on both sides gave way to an increase in direct contacts at the presidential, ministerial, and parliamentary levels. For Ukraine, engaging South Africa became part of a wider strategy of outreach to the Global South, an effort to explain the war in terms of universal principles of sovereignty and justice. For South Africa, dialogue with Kyiv offered an opportunity to project a “mediator” image consistent with its diplomatic tradition and its role within BRICS.

Presidents Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Cyril Ramaphosa established direct communication soon after the invasion. They held several telephone calls in 2022 and 2023, and met in person on the margins of the 78th and 79th sessions of the UN General Assembly (September 2023 and September 2024), as well as at the World Economic Forum in Davos (January 2025). Discussions centred on South Africa’s potential contribution to President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula, coordination of humanitarian assistance, and the protection of Ukrainian children forcibly deported by Russia.

During Ramaphosa’s official reception of President Zelenskyy in Pretoria in April 2025, the two leaders described the visit as “historic,” signalling a mutual willingness to reset relations after decades of limited engagement. The talks focused on peace efforts, trade and scientific cooperation, and South Africa’s role as G20 president. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of sovereignty and the UN Charter while recognising their differing approaches to conflict resolution. Their meeting on the sidelines of UNGA 80 (September 2025) continued this agenda, with Ramaphosa briefing Zelenskyy on his recent exchanges with Russian President Putin and both leaders agreeing to explore the possibility of a follow-up meeting in a third country.

At the foreign minister level, the pace of interaction also intensified. In May 2023, Ministers Dmytro Kuleba and Naledi Pandor met in Lisbon and agreed to institutionalise political consultations. Kuleba’s official visit to South Africa in November 2023 marked the first such visit in bilateral history, during which the ministers discussed participation in the Peace Formula, humanitarian cooperation, and countering Russian disinformation in Africa.

Kuleba’s successor, Andrii Sybiha, sustained this engagement. He spoke with the new Foreign Minister, Ronald Lamola, several times, including bilateral talks in New York (September 2024), a ministerial visit to Pretoria (October 2024), and a telephone call in January 2025. These exchanges established a clearer framework for ongoing dialogue, including cooperation on child protection under international law, nuclear safety coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and South Africa’s observer participation in the Peace Formula working groups on food security.

Four rounds of political consultations between the two foreign ministries have now been held, most recently in Pretoria in October 2022, with technical-level follow-up meetings throughout 2023–2024. These consultations provide a modest but steady institutional mechanism for sustaining dialogue beyond symbolic gestures.

Bilateral interaction has also expanded at the parliamentary and civil society levels. In July 2022, the Speaker of South Africa’s National Assembly, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, visited Kyiv as part of an Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation. Additional contacts occurred at the G20 Parliamentary Speakers’ Summit in Indonesia (October 2022). Think tanks, including the Ukrainian Prism, SAIIA, and the Brenthurst Foundation, Truth Hounds, and the CMI have initiated Track 2 discussions on peacebuilding narratives, sanctions, and the role of middle powers. Together, these exchanges contribute to a more nuanced bilateral environment and complement formal diplomacy.

FRAMING OF THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE BY SOUTH AFRICA’S OFFICIALS 

 

DIRCO’s Position: From Explicit Attribution to “Process-first” Neutrality 

To fully grasp the significance of Zelenskyy’s 2025 visit and the evolving dynamics of Ukraine–South Africa relations, it is essential to examine Pretoria’s own official framing of the war. As the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) serves as the primary custodian and articulator of South Africa’s foreign policy, its statements and explanations of vote provide the clearest window into how Pretoria has positioned itself.

DIRCO’s earliest reaction to the invasion of Ukraine was unusually direct: on 24 February 2022, it “called on Russia to immediately withdraw its forces from Ukraine,” anchoring the appeal in the UN Charter’s principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This was the most direct point at which DIRCO held Moscow responsible. 

Within days, however, the register shifted. In its 2 March 2022 “explanation of vote” at the UN General Assembly Emergency Special Session, South Africa announced an abstention, recentering the discourse on the process of dialogue, mediation, and de-escalation, and on universalist references to the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, without naming Russia as an aggressor. The text justifies abstention as creating space for diplomacy rather than polarisation. Minister Naledi Pandor’s media briefing (8 April 2022) consolidated this pivot. She defended the sequence of UN abstentions as consistent with non-alignment, insisted that non-alignment “does not mean condoning” intervention, and argued for principled consistency across crises. This briefing maintained a neutral stance where South Africa emphasised international rules and humanitarian principles, but carefully avoided siding with Western condemnations of Russia, framing this as principled non-alignment rather than tacit support. Read together, these texts mark a rapid evolution from event-specific censure to a durable, procedure-oriented neutrality that avoids direct blame assignment while emphasising rules, humanitarian access, and dialogue.

 

Under the Pull of Russian Influence: Explaining Pretoria’s Retreat from Normative Consistency

The shift in South Africa’s stance illustrates how Russian influence, operating through multiple diplomatic and structural channels, gradually eroded Pretoria’s initial normative clarity. Several interconnected factors, both external and domestic, underpin this transformation.

First, through elite-level diplomacy and BRICS solidarity, Russia has consistently secured privileged leader-to-leader access to South Africa. Presidents Cyril Ramaphosa and Vladimir Putin held repeated phone calls in 2023-2025, often centred around Africa’s “peace initiative” and food security. These conversations, along with Minister Lavrov’s high-profile visit to Pretoria in January 2023, allowed Moscow to project South Africa as a friendly interlocutor rather than an impartial actor, effectively muting Pretoria’s earlier condemnation and aligning it more closely with Russia’s preferred narratives. The BRICS framework compounded this effect. Explicit condemnation of Russia as one of the founding members would have undercut South Africa’s positioning as a Global South leader. The diplomatic wrangling over whether to host Putin at the 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg despite the International Criminal Court arrest warrant exemplified how Pretoria’s calculus was shaped by bloc loyalty rather than a universal principle. In effect, BRICS solidarity provided Moscow with structural protection, encouraging South Africa to retreat into a discourse of mediation.

Second, defence cooperation created strong incentives for Pretoria to preserve ties. South Africa hosted joint naval exercises with Russia and China in February 2023, timed deliberately to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion. Rather than acknowledging the reputational cost of such symbolism, DIRCO insisted the drills were “routine among friends,” reinforcing an image of complicity. The Lady R vessel affair underlined this vulnerability. In December 2022, the sanctioned Russian vessel Lady R docked at Simon’s Town naval base; in May 2023, the US ambassador alleged that weapons had been loaded onto the ship for Russia. Although a subsequent South African inquiry declared there was “no evidence” of arms exports, it admitted that Russian equipment had been offloaded. This episode cast doubt on Pretoria’s credibility, but also underscored the cost of transparency: acknowledging illicit military cooperation with Moscow would have invited sanctions and diplomatic isolation from Western partners. The incentive, therefore, was to double down on process-heavy neutrality as a rhetorical cover for maintaining defence entanglements.

Third, economic dependencies help explain Pretoria’s rhetorical caution. From DIRCO’s perspective, economic ties with Russia, while not dominant in trade figures, touch strategic sectors that directly affect South Africa’s stability. Russia is seen as South Africa’s largest supplier of mixed mineral and chemical fertilisers, a dependency that becomes politically sensitive in a context of rising food prices and inflationary pressures. Pretoria has also highlighted opportunities in energy cooperation: in December 2023, state-owned PetroSA announced a financing deal with Gazprombank to revive the Mossel Bay gas-to-liquids refinery, underscoring the official willingness to engage Russian partners in critical infrastructure. The historical shadow of Russia’s Rosatom nuclear bid under former President Jacob Zuma, although struck down by the Constitutional Court in 2017 as unconstitutional (Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Energy, 2017 (5) SA 227 (WCC)), continues to be cited as an example of potential Russian technological contribution to South Africa’s long-term energy security. Seen from this angle, ties with Moscow are cast as pragmatic, sector-specific engagements that justify a careful diplomatic tone.

However, Russia’s actual weight in South Africa’s economy can be considered as limited. Overall, bilateral trade remains modest compared to South Africa’s exchanges with China, the EU, or the United States. Fertiliser imports from Russia, while strategically important, represent only a slice of the agricultural input market and expose South Africa to reputational risk by deepening reliance on a sanctioned state. The deal was reported as near collapse or terminated in 2025 after financing failed to materialise, underscoring the fragility of such ventures. Analysts argue that Russia’s African footprint often relies less on broad-based economic integration than on elite networks, opaque agreements, and corruption-friendly arrangements, which enrich narrow actors while exposing states to political vulnerability. Similar concerns surround mining linkages, such as Norilsk Nickel’s ventures, and high-profile incidents like the docking of a sanctioned oligarch’s yacht in Cape Town, which fuel perceptions of complicity. From this angle, South Africa’s reluctance to criticise Moscow cannot be explained by deep economic dependency, but rather by the political economy of elite entanglement and the costs of exposing opaque ties.

Finally, Russia has exploited South Africa’s ideological narratives. By positioning itself as the heir to Soviet support for the African National Congress during the anti-apartheid struggle, Moscow taps into historical memory that blurs the distinction between Soviet solidarity and present-day Russian imperialism. DIRCO’s frequent references to “consistency” across global crises, including Palestine, allow Pretoria to equate Russia’s aggression with other conflicts, thereby diluting the specificity of Ukraine’s plight. This amounts to moral relativism: while condemning colonial legacies in principle, Pretoria effectively shields a neo-imperialist war of aggression in Europe.

 

African Peace Mission 

In June 2023, RSA President Cyril Ramaphosa led a delegation of African leaders (including Senegal, Zambia, Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Comoros) to Kyiv and Moscow, with the initiative addressing legitimate African concerns about food and energy insecurity. The leaders proposed so called Africa Peace Initiative which outlined ten broad principles: calling for de-escalation and cessation of hostilities, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, security guarantees for all parties, unhindered grain and fertiliszer exports through the Black Sea, release of prisoners of war and return of displaced children, post-war reconstruction and humanitarian support, and the promotion of dialogue through confidence-building measures and diplomacy. The proposal emphasised multilateral engagement under the UN Charter and sought to position Africa as an independent actor advocating for peace rather than alignment. Yet its balanced language, appealing to “both sides” and avoiding explicit attribution of responsibility, blurred the distinction between aggressor and victim, inadvertently echoing Russia’s preferred framing of the war. This approach, alothough presented as mediation, risked undermining the very principles of accountability and sovereignty central to Ukraine’s position.

Kyiv welcomed the delegation as a gesture of African engagement, but the mission’s outcomes confirmed Pretoria’s process-first diplomacy: an emphasis on access and dialogue that often substitutes procedure for substance. South Africa’s aspiration to act as a bridge in global governance remains constrained by defence, economic, and ideological linkages that limit its flexibility. The Initiative demonstrated that Pretoria’s mediation strategy, while couched in the language of dialogue and balance, ultimately reflects a deeper discomfort with confronting aggression and defending the principles at the core of the UN Charter. It thus offers insight into how Russia’s narratives continue to shape parts of the Global South’s diplomatic vocabulary.

The episode highlights a broader challenge for South Africa’s foreign policy identity. A country whose moral authority rests on opposition to injustice now faces the test of applying the same principle universally. Finding a balance between non-alignment and the protection of international law will determine whether Pretoria can play the principled mediating role it seeks – and whether partners such as Ukraine can view it as a consistent defender of sovereignty and justice.

MAINTAINING UKRAINE-SOUTH AFRICA COOPERATION

 

Trade and Economic Cooperation Between Ukraine and South Africa

While the factors discussed above define the framework within which Ukraine and South Africa interact diplomatically, their impact is mediated by practical cooperation in trade, culture, science, and other spheres. 

Bilateral trade between Ukraine and South Africa has historically remained modest, reflecting structural asymmetries typical of exchanges between reform-oriented Eastern European economies and established Global South markets. According to Ukraine-reported UN Comtrade data, total trade in goods reached USD 113.9 million in 2024, showing an upward trend compared to 2023. Ukraine exported USD 12.5 million worth of goods to South Africa (up 30%), while imports totalled USD 101.4 million (up 1.8%), leaving Ukraine with a trade deficit of USD 88.9 million. Although limited in scale, this upward trend signals cautious recovery in bilateral trade amid the disruption of global logistics and wartime constraints on Ukraine’s export capacities.

The structure of trade illustrates both constraint and adaptation. Ukraine’s exports are now concentrated in niche agro-industrial and processed food such as vegetables, cereals, sugar confectionery, bakery items, and packaging materials (e.g., corks and lids). This composition diverges sharply from Ukraine’s pre-2022 export profile, dominated by bulk commodities such as wheat, sunflower oil, and steel. The shift underscores the impact of Russia’s war, which has restricted Ukraine’s ability to supply large cargoes to distant destinations such as South Africa, while also highlighting Ukrainian exporters’ flexibility in finding higher-value, lower-volume market segments accessible through existing transport routes.

South Africa’s exports to Ukraine display a dual structure: manufactured consumer goods, led by vehicles (≈USD 33.6 million in 2024), and agro-mineral commodities, notably citrus, hides/leather, chromium ore, and coal. In 2024, vehicle exports reached USD 30.1 million, followed by citrus fruits (USD 22.7 million), leather (USD 18.6 million), chromium ore (USD 2.9 million), and coal (USD 2.6 million). This configuration mirrors South Africa’s established trade pattern with Europe and Asia, where industrial products and minerals play complementary roles. The growing share of vehicles reflects Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction demand, particularly for replacing destroyed civilian fleets and transport infrastructure, positioning South African exporters as pragmatic partners in Ukraine’s economic recovery.

Statistical discrepancies remain a challenge. As recorded by Ukraine’s customs, imports from South Africa totalled USD 101.4 million in 2024, while South Africa’s reported exports to Ukraine were approximately USD 5.2 million. Such variation likely stems from transhipment through third countries, reporting lags, or re-exports, and demonstrates the importance of specifying data sources in economic analysis to avoid misrepresentation of trade flows.

Investment relations remain negligible. Neither Ukrainian foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Africa nor South African capital in Ukraine has reached significant levels. One explanatory factor is South Africa’s Protection of Investment Act of 2018, which replaced bilateral investment treaties with a domestic legal framework that provides less predictability for foreign investors. Combined with Ukraine’s wartime risk environment and the absence of a bilateral investment treaty, these conditions have effectively constrained potential FDI flows. However, Ukraine’s ongoing regulatory convergence with EU standards, particularly within the framework of its EU candidacy status and the adaptation of investment protection norms, offers a prospective foundation for future cooperation once stability returns.

Although Ukraine and South Africa have no free-trade agreement or bilateral investment treaty, their trade currently occurs under WTO Most-Favoured-Nation rules, complemented by other instruments such as a double-taxation treaty. Negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty were explored in the early 2010s but did not progress following South Africa’s 2015 decision to phase out its BIT network in favour of the Protection of Investment Act, which came into effect in 2018. This institutional gap limits the predictability of the bilateral investment environment, constraining private-sector engagement despite political goodwill. At the same time, both countries participate in multilateral economic frameworks, the WTO, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which provide a normative basis for cooperation, while South Africa’s membership in the G20 and Ukraine’s regular participation as an invited partner provide an additional platform for dialogue and coordination. The absence of bespoke economic agreements thus places greater emphasis on sectoral diplomacy, including agriculture, education, and renewable energy, where pragmatic, project-based cooperation remains possible.

Overall, the asymmetry in trade and investment reflects enduring connectivity gaps between Ukraine and African markets, shaped by geography, logistics, and the global distribution of trade infrastructure. Yet these asymmetries should not be interpreted as permanent limitations. Ukraine’s renewed economic diplomacy, anchored in diversification beyond traditional Euro-Atlantic partners and guided by transparency, competitiveness, and a rules-based framework, seeks to integrate African economies into a modernised, post-war vision of global partnership. Within this strategy, South Africa stands out as a key interlocutor: a country capable of linking Ukraine to continental supply chains, multilateral trade forums, and the broader network of Global South economic cooperation.

In April 2025, a Ukrainian delegation visited South Africa (including Ukrainian agrarian and infrastructure ministers and business representatives) to explore cooperation across agriculture, logistics, digitalisation, and energy. Although primarily exploratory, the mission signals a willingness to develop business and cultural ties beyond crisis diplomacy. 

 

Soft-power and Knowledge Diplomacy

The new era of Ukraine-South Africa relations is characterised by cultural, educational, and scientific ties that serve as channels of engagement between Ukraine and South Africa, compensating for the limitations of political alignment. Ukraine’s modern public diplomacy took institutional shape in 2017, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a dedicated funding program for cultural projects abroad and created the Ukrainian Institute, an institution tasked with promoting Ukrainian culture, fostering international dialogue, and advancing foreign policy goals through creative and educational exchange. Since then, cultural interaction with South Africa has become progressively more structured. Early collaborations started with a 2019 memorandum between the Centre for Creative Arts (University of KwaZulu-Natal) and the Lviv Book Forum, enabling annual Ukrainian participation in major festivals such as Poetry Africa and Time of the Writer. This and other initiatives signalled the emergence of culture as an autonomous track of diplomacy, one able to sustain dialogue independent of political turbulence.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, cultural diplomacy entered a new, more dynamic phase. It is marked by integrating Africa into the strategic priorities of the Ukrainian Institute, including the coordination of festival participation and the promotion of Ukrainian creative content across African media and cultural circuits. This institutional focus has made possible new initiatives, including the residency The Shared Ground: Ukraine–South Africa Dialogues at the NIROX Sculpture Park (2025), where artists from both countries collaborated on themes of ecology, displacement, and memory. The involvement of the Ukrainian Institute opens for Kyiv a promising avenue for engagement with networks of international cultural organisations, such as the EU National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC). This international engagement has been further reinforced by the EU’s “Stand with Ukraine” external action, under which numerous public events sharing the Ukrainian perspective have become possible, including film screenings, exhibitions, performances, and collaborative art projects, supported by the EU Delegation and cultural networks as well as European embassies. Ukrainian Institute’s 2025 research, “South Africa: Cultural Environment and Local Contexts”, conducted with the Ukrainian Association of South Africa, mapped the country’s creative ecosystem and revealed high receptivity among South African institutions to Ukrainian cooperation, particularly in literature, education, and performing arts. The study emphasised that culture can counteract limited political engagement and Russian informational presence by grounding Ukraine’s image in shared values of freedom, resilience, and creativity. In this sense, cultural diplomacy now operates as both a corrective to asymmetrical politics and a forward-looking platform for expressive partnership within the Global South.

A key new dimension in Ukraine-South Africa engagement is the development of the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studies, which is a worldwide network initiated in 2024 by the Ukrainian Institute and other Ukrainian education and foreign policy actors to promote Ukrainian culture, language, history, and research across partner universities. In April 2025, a landmark agreement was signed with the University of Pretoria in South Africa to establish a Centre for Global Ukrainian Studies on the African continent, anchoring the network in Pretoria. Through this mechanism, Ukraine gains a platform for sustained academic exchange, joint curricula, student mobility, and research output that reaches into Africa. For South Africa, the initiative provides access to new thematic streams, such as post-colonial memory, sovereignty studies, and Ukrainian reconstruction, which complement its own academic and regional leadership ambitions. In effect, the network serves as a bridge: it elevates Ukraine’s soft-power presence in Africa, while embedding cooperation in the long-term institutional architecture of higher education rather than episodic exchange.

Scientific diplomacy complements this cultural and educational outreach, following a trajectory of institutionalisation and diversification. The Intergovernmental Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation (2003, in force since 2004) provides the legal foundation for research partnerships, supplemented by memoranda on space research (2016) and Antarctic fisheries science (2018). Collaboration involves the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, and Odesa Maritime University with counterparts such as the University of Pretoria, the University of the Witwatersrand, and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). Priority fields include agricultural innovation, renewable energy, materials science, and satellite monitoring through cooperation between the State Space Agency of Ukraine and SANSA. These partnerships, while small in scale, demonstrate a pragmatic, problem-solving approach that aligns technological expertise with shared global interests.

A particularly symbolic bridge of scientific diplomacy is the legacy of Professor Boris Balinsky (1905–1997), a Kyiv-born embryologist who became a founding figure of South African experimental biology. The Balinsky Symposium, co-organised by the University of the Witwatersrand and the Embassy of Ukraine in April 2024, celebrated his dual legacy and explored avenues for renewed cooperation in developmental biology, genetics, and environmental sciences. By transforming historical connection into a platform for contemporary collaboration, the symposium illustrated how shared intellectual heritage can underpin trust and co-authorship in research.

Together, these soft-power and knowledge-diplomacy efforts reveal the depth of Ukraine’s adaptive engagement with South Africa. The result is a layered architecture of cooperation, modest in scale but positioning Ukraine as an active contributor to Africa’s creative and scientific landscape.

 

Ukrainian Association of South Africa (UAZA):
Multifaceted Advocacy Presence

In the absence of a large Ukrainian diaspora across Africa, the Ukrainian Association of South Africa (UAZA) has assumed a pioneering role as the only structured Ukrainian community organisation on the continent with advocacy capacity and institutional continuity. Established in 2017, UAZA functions as an informal extension of Ukraine’s limited diplomatic infrastructure, simultaneously performing representational, informational, and credibility-building roles that amplify Kyiv’s visibility in African policy spaces. Originating from grassroots protests against Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Association has since evolved into a recognised civic intermediary connecting Ukrainian governmental diplomacy with South African political, academic, and cultural institutions.

One of the main UAZA’s activities is policy advocacy. It has coordinated thematic policy briefs on UN reform, nuclear safety, and children’s protection in war, presented some of them during the 2024 African Union Mid-Year Coordination Meeting, and continues to mobilise civil society through the #StandWithUkraine and #BringOurKidsBackUA campaigns. Its public demonstrations in major South African cities and consistent engagement with national media outlets, including Daily Maverick, have ensured that Ukraine’s struggle remains part of South Africa’s public debate on neutrality and justice.

Beyond advocacy, UAZA has become a key cultural facilitator: it initiated Ukraine’s participation in the Poetry Africa and Time of the Writer festivals (2017), launched the annual Ukrainian Festival in South Africa, and in 2025 supported the dance production The Forest, which received an Ovation Award at the National Arts Festival in Makhanda. The Association also manages the Ukrainian Saturday School network in Cape Town and Pretoria, aligning with Ukraine’s global education policy for its diaspora.

One further domain in which UAZA complements Ukraine’s official diplomacy is the international recognition of national memory and identity. A central aspect of this work involves advancing awareness of the Holodomor as a crime against humanity, which is an essential element of Ukraine’s state memory policy. Within South Africa, these efforts unfold amid competing historical narratives, where the legacies of colonialism, apartheid, and African genocides dominate public remembrance. Against this backdrop, UAZA’s organisation of Holodomor exhibitions in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban, its partnerships with local Holocaust and genocide centres, and its initiatives such as candle-lighting ceremonies, memorial benches, and petitions to the South African authorities for formal recognition acquire significance beyond symbolic commemoration. 

UAZA’s engagement with collective memory extends to the domain of knowledge production. In 2022, the Association published a community-research volume combining migration biographies, identity surveys, and institutional histories under the title “Ukrainians of South Africa: Society, Identity and Future”. Through such epistemic work, UAZA consolidates its authority as both a custodian and interpreter of Ukrainian identity in Africa, shaping the intellectual and symbolic terrain on which its cultural, advocacy, and remembrance projects operate.

STRENGTHENING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGH NARRATIVES

 

Strategic Communications and Countering Russian Narratives in Africa

In response to the 2022 Russian invasion, Ukraine’s outreach to the African information space has become a critical pillar of its foreign policy. For Kyiv, strategic communication is a matter of visibility and defending the truth in a region where Moscow continues to wield its ideological influence. Though South Africa’s media landscape remains institutionally independent, the region is nonetheless vulnerable to the penetration of Russian-aligned narratives and propaganda. 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine launched an Africa-focused communication campaign in mid-2022 to counter disinformation and expand informed engagement with the African audience. Presidential and ministerial interventions provided unprecedented access to Ukrainian messaging at the continental level. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s addresses to African audiences, including an online meeting with journalists from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana, and his statements to the African Union Bureau (20 June 2022) and the Francophonie Summit (20 November 2022), placed Ukraine’s perspective firmly on Africa’s diplomatic agenda. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba’s three dedicated briefings for African media and his interviews with journalists from South Africa, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, Egypt, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria established direct communication channels with key information actors. As a result, Ukraine secured sustained visibility across African media. 

In South Africa, Ukrainian communication policy has successfully combined two objectives: disrupting Russian propaganda ecosystems in print and online media, and articulating Ukraine’s own narrative through trusted local voices. Press tours for South African journalists to Ukraine, jointly organised by the MFA, the Ukrainian Institute, and local partners, have enhanced empathy in reporting about the war. Ukrainian perspectives now appear regularly in Daily Maverick, Mail & Guardian, and SABC News, supported by op-eds and interviews from Ukrainian officials, academics, and representatives of the Ukrainian Association of South Africa. Between 2022 and 2025, Ambassador Liubov Abravitova strengthened this engagement through her regular blog on Daily Maverick, where she contextualised Ukraine’s position, countering Russian narratives. 

At the same time, Russian state-funded media outlets RT and Sputnik continue to exploit anti-colonial sentiment by portraying Russia as the legitimate heir to Soviet solidarity and by equating Western support for Ukraine with neo-imperial coercion. The MFA’s statements since 2022 have repeatedly warned that such narratives distort history, denying Ukraine’s own anti-imperial struggle and misrepresenting the nature of Russian aggression. Ukrainian diplomacy now seeks to reframe this discourse by reclaiming historical truth: emphasising that the Ukrainian people, long subjected to imperial domination by Moscow, share Africa’s experience of resistance to domination.

Ukraine’s communication and counter-disinformation policy is a structural component of its bilateral relationship with South Africa, as countering Kremlin narratives allows Ukraine to rebalance the informational asymmetry that long distorted South African perceptions of post-Soviet realities. This undoubtedly strengthens mutual understanding between Kyiv and Pretoria.

 

Ukraine’s Strategies on Africa In the Context of The South African Vector

The Strategy for the Development of Ukraine’s Relations with African States, adopted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 January 2022, and the subsequent Communication Strategy “Ukraine-States of Africa” (2024) together define the conceptual and operational parameters of Kyiv’s renewed diplomacy on the African track. When applied to the South African vector, these two documents suggest a possible trajectory from wartime instrumentalism toward long-term normative foreign policy. The 2022 Africa Strategy constitutes Ukraine’s first policy framework for relations with the continent, setting out pragmatic objectives: expanding diplomatic representation, strengthening political dialogue, boosting trade and investment, engaging multilaterally within the United Nations and African Union, and promoting educational, humanitarian, and cultural ties. The document also emphasises cross-government coordination and the opening of new missions in Africa.

In relation to South Africa, this Strategy provides the policy skeleton within which Ukraine–South Africa relations can be situated: a pragmatic, multidimensional agenda that aligns national interests with continental engagement. Its goals translate into the next relevant dimensions: 

• First, the Strategy’s call for intensified political dialogue, which is evident in a series of recent high-level contacts at the presidential and ministerial levels. These gestures align with the Strategy’s ambition to secure African voices in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty within multilateral fora. 
• Second, the Strategy’s economic pillar, centred on diversification and technological partnership, resonates with the rising trade ambitions. Applying the Strategy here means moving from transactional trade recovery toward co-investment and knowledge exchange, areas still underdeveloped in bilateral cooperation. 
• Third, the Strategy’s emphasis on multilateral coordination underscores Pretoria’s significance as an agenda-setting actor in the African Union, BRICS, and the UN. Ukraine’s objective of securing principled support on territorial integrity issues necessarily passes through South Africa’s diplomatic calculus. The mixed record of Pretoria’s abstentions and mediation attempts illustrates both the importance and the difficulty of achieving alignment under this strategic goal.
•  Fourth, the educational and humanitarian dimension of the Strategy signals a new, policy-driven phase in bilateral engagement. Together with invoking historical precedents, Ukraine now treats education as a strategic channel for presence and partnership, integrating academic cooperation into its broader framework of knowledge diplomacy. Through such initiatives, Kyiv aims to foster lasting societal linkages and position itself as a credible contributor to South Africa’s dynamic academic and intellectual environment.
• Finally, the Strategy’s institutional pillar, the expansion of Ukraine’s diplomatic presence, suggests that Pretoria could serve as a southern anchor for Kyiv’s continental diplomacy. The existing embassy, if upgraded into a regional coordination hub, could link sub-Saharan outreach with multilateral activity in Addis Ababa and Nairobi.

If the 2022 Strategy provides the structural logic, the 2024 Communication Strategy “Ukraine–States of Africa” supplies the tone and narrative form through which this logic is conveyed. This document centres on several communicative pillars highly relevant to the South African context. It frames Ukraine’s struggle as one of anti-imperial resistance, drawing explicit analogies between Russian aggression and colonial domination. This rhetoric resonates with South Africa’s post-apartheid identity and its own emphasis on decolonisation. It brands Ukraine as a “reliable partner” whose humanitarian initiatives, notably the Grain from Ukraine, contribute to continental food security. It calls for strategic engagement with African media, digital platforms, and youth audiences, portraying Ukraine as a modern and technologically skilled society rather than merely a conflict zone.

Applied to South Africa, these communication principles aim to mitigate geopolitical ambivalence and differentiate Ukraine from Western powers with a colonial legacy. Yet they also encounter the limits of Pretoria’s strategic autonomy: South Africa’s solidarity with the Global South often translates into cautious neutrality, which restricts the uptake of overtly anti-Russian messaging. Still, the Communication Strategy provides a vocabulary through which Ukraine can appeal to shared values, sovereignty, equality, and non-aggression that underpin South Africa’s own diplomatic tradition.

Both documents represent a new type of foreign-policy document for Kyiv, which elevates Africa to a structured regional priority. No previous Ukrainian administration had produced an Africa-specific strategy; thus, its adoption aligns Ukraine with a growing European trend in which governments formalise their engagement with the continent through integrated, cross-ministerial frameworks. Comparatively, Ireland’s Strategy for Africa to 2025, Denmark’s 2024 Strategy for Stronger Engagement with Africa, and Germany’s Africa Strategy: Shaping the Future with Africa (2023) all combine diplomacy, trade, development, and public diplomacy under single institutional umbrellas. Similarly, Ukraine’s framework emerged from the recognition that fragmented bilateral contacts were insufficient for geopolitical influence or economic diversification. Yet Ukraine’s entry point is distinctive. Whereas former colonial powers must recalibrate their Africa policies to overcome historical asymmetries, Ukraine, like Ireland, approaches the continent without colonial baggage, able to deploy a narrative of solidarity rooted in shared experiences of domination and recovery.

CONCLUSIONS 

 

Finalised on the eve of the 2025 G20 Summit in Johannesburg, this report assesses Ukraine-South Africa relations at a moment when much of the cooperation so far has been visible but not yet sufficiently institutionalised. For an effective long-term partnership, both countries need to cement mutual interests, translating diplomatic goodwill into structured collaboration. While political dialogue, characterised by high-level visits, parliamentary exchanges, and participation in multilateral forums, has intensified since 2022, concrete frameworks for cooperation remain limited.

Three themes now define the current stage of Ukraine-South Africa relations. First, peace and mediation: South Africa’s participation in the Peace Formula working groups and its contacts with both Kyiv and Moscow have positioned it as a potential conduit for communication, albeit one constrained by internal and external pressures. Second, humanitarian and legal cooperation: Pretoria’s willingness to engage on issues such as the deportation of Ukrainian children, nuclear safety, and humanitarian access marks a shift from rhetorical neutrality to selective engagement on principle-based issues. Third, science, education, and cultural exchange: the 2024 Boris Balinsky Symposium at the University of the Witwatersrand, co-organised by Ukraine, has become a new focal point for scientific cooperation.

The pattern of contact since 2022 reflects a transition from long-standing managed distance to what may be described as instrumental engagement. South Africa approaches this relationship primarily through the lens of mediation and reputation management, balancing BRICS solidarity, domestic ideological constraints, and economic interdependence with Western markets. Ukraine, in turn, recognises South Africa’s influence in African and multilateral forums and views sustained dialogue as a way to counter Russian narratives and broaden its coalition of support within the Global South. Although breakthroughs remain unlikely in the short term, the proliferation of political, ministerial, and face-to-face contacts demonstrates that both sides have moved beyond symbolic diplomacy.

Amid preparations for South Africa’s G20 presidency and during it, Kyiv has consistently framed its engagement around the pursuit of a just and sustainable peace. Ukrainian officials have urged G20 members “to keep Ukraine in focus” and to ensure that discussions on global recovery, energy transition, and financial reform are inseparable from efforts to end Russia’s aggression. The G20 provides a multilateral platform through which Ukraine can link its recovery agenda to broader questions of peace and stability, while encouraging Pretoria to use its credibility within the Global South to advance dialogue on cease-fire conditions consistent with international law. By approaching the G20 process through this dual framework – peace facilitation and post-war reconstruction – Ukraine signals that sustainable development cannot proceed without security and that South Africa’s mediation experience and global standing make it a valuable partner in shaping both.

In the medium term, Ukraine-South Africa relations can evolve into a durable partnership if the current shift from tactical and reactive engagement toward a more principled and consistent approach continues. For Kyiv, the task is to engage with Africa not merely as a wartime necessity but as a lasting pillar of foreign policy, anchored in equality, respect, and shared responsibility for global stability. For Pretoria, renewed engagement with Ukraine presents an opportunity to reaffirm its constitutional commitment to justice and human rights, restoring credibility that has been eroded by selective neutrality.

Ukraine-South Africa relations serve as a broader test of international cooperation: whether states from different regions and historical experiences can work together to uphold international law and advance a just peace. Both Kyiv and Pretoria emphasise dialogue, sovereignty, and respect for international norms as the basis for stability, and their partnership shows that principled engagement and strategic pragmatism can reinforce rather than contradict one another. In aligning efforts within multilateral forums such as the G20 and the United Nations, both countries can demonstrate that solidarity is achievable when rooted in mutual respect and a shared commitment to justice and human dignity. 

 

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

 

1. Consolidate political dialogue and follow-up mechanisms. Preserve the “effect of the Zelenskyy visit” (April 2025) through scheduled high-level calls, thematic forums, and follow-up visits by deputy ministers, parliamentarians, and city mayors. Institutionalise political dialogue by formalising a Joint Commission on Political and Economic Cooperation, meeting annually with rotating venues and civil-society participation.
2. Integrate peace facilitation into multilateral cooperation. Even after South Africa’s G20 presidency, Ukraine can propose a working-level dialogue linking the Peace Formula with the G20’s themes of recovery and sustainability. This would demonstrate that peace and development are mutually reinforcing, while encouraging Pretoria to channel its mediation potential through structured, lawful mechanisms under the G20 and the African Union.
3. Advance humanitarian and justice cooperation. An important avenue for broadening humanitarian partnerships could involve inviting South Africa to join the coordination framework of “Grain from Ukraine 2.0,” thereby positioning Pretoria as a regional partner in food security and reinforcing Ukraine’s inclusive humanitarian diplomacy. At the same time, South Africa’s engagement with the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice provides space for joint advocacy on protecting civilians, ensuring accountability for war crimes, and supporting the return of deported Ukrainian children – issues compatible with South Africa’s constitutional values and justice-oriented foreign policy.
4. Deepen economic and reconstruction cooperation. Building on the momentum generated by the April 2025 and earlier business and governmental missions, Ukraine should establish clear preparatory milestones, such as a Durban–Odesa logistics feasibility study and a pilot agro-exports framework. Both sides should accelerate the establishment of a Ukraine-South Africa Business Council under their respective chambers of commerce to coordinate trade missions, regulatory alignment, and post-war reconstruction opportunities.
5. Strengthen strategic communications and soft power. Developing a healthy and transparent information relationship requires countering Russian influence through sustained monitoring of disinformation ecosystems, particularly narratives exploiting anti-colonial sentiment and portraying Western support for Ukraine as neo-imperial coercion. Ukrainian messaging should frame the war not as a European tragedy but as part of a global struggle against imperial domination, using language that resonates with South Africa’s anti-apartheid legacy. Ukraine should resume investing in South African media presence through regular op-eds, interviews, and co-produced documentaries. Leveraging academic diplomacy, the Centre for Global Ukrainian Studies in Pretoria can serve as a hub for dialogue on historical justice, peacebuilding, and reconstruction, anchoring Ukraine’s intellectual visibility in Africa.

For deeper mutual understanding, Ukraine should also expand public diplomacy, including cultural and sports exchanges, to build trust at the societal level. Cultural exchanges should preferably be focused on civil-society partnerships and niche, dialogue-driven initiatives that highlight shared experiences of resilience, creativity, and transformation.

6. Leverage regional and institutional frameworks. With Ukraine’s existing observer status in the African Union and accreditation to SADC, Kyiv should propose partnership initiatives focused on resilience, de-mining, and post-conflict reconstruction, areas that align with Africa’s Agenda 2063 and allow Ukraine to share its practical expertise in recovery and humanitarian logistics

 

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The publication is prepared within the project the “Global Partnerships: Expert Diplomacy 2.0”. This publication was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.