Publications

Subscribe for Newsletter

Georgia: Disinformation Resilience Index

Introduction After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the proclamation of independence by Georgia, the Kremlin continued to actively meddle with the domestic politics of the country. Russia supported separatist forces in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2008, Russia undertook military intervention on the territory of Georgia, followed by war with Georgia. […]

Estonia: Disinformation Resilience Index

Introduction Estonia has been in the orbit of Russia’s strategic interests for many years and for many complex historical reasons. As a result, Estonia has experienced various types of influence activities on different scales. Since regaining independence in 1991, Russia’s so-called ‘soft power’ in Estonia is both traceable and observable in several domains, such as the […]

Czech Republic: Desinformation Resilience Index

Introduction After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, Czechoslovak officials started the process of orienting the country’s foreign policy towards the West. The stress was on building good relations with neighbouring countries, those in the EU and NATO. On January 1, 1993, the federation split, and the Czech Republic was established. During the […]

Belarus: Desinformation Resilience Index

Introduction Belarus gained independence in 1991 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Nations in Transit 2017 report defines the political regime in Belarus as consolidated authoritarianism. The president of the country, Alexander Lukashenka, has ruled since 1994. Belarus is heavily dependent on Russia economically, politically, militarily, culturally, and ideologically. However, a well-functioning bureaucracy, the […]

Azerbaijan:Desinformation Resielience Index

Introduction The geopolitical location of Azerbaijan, the only route for the Caspian oil and gas resources to reach the world markets avoiding both Russia and Iran, makes it an alluring destination for Kremlin-inspired propaganda. This is because the Kremlin tries to monopolise all energy and transit routes to and from Europe, hence making it essential […]

Armenia:Desinformation Resilience Index

Introduction For Armenia, the onset of independence in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union came as an abrupt shock. Even prior to independence, Armenia faced the dual and daunting challenges of outright war over Nagorno-Karabakh with neighbouring Azerbaijan that erupted in February 1988, and was struggling to recover from a devastating earthquake […]

Systemic Response to Kremlin-Led Disinformation in the EaP countries Discussed at the Disinformation Resilience Index Launch Event

On 16 July 2018, the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum held the launch event of the Disinformation Resilience Index in Brussels. The event was hosted by the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union and saw the presentation of the results of the Disinformation Resilience Index and the report for the Eastern Partnership Region. Speakers […]

ROMANIA: SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES AFTER 2014

The general approach to security in Romania went through a process of significant evolution in the last century although the events of 2008 in Georgia and 2014 have accelerated the process of such evolution. Strengthening Trans-Atlantic bonds, perceiving the security situation in the wider Black Sea region as a challenge to Romania’s national security and […]

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT CHANGED: IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE

The year 2014 became a watershed for changes in the security discourse in Ukraine, which resulted both in the adoption of new strategic documents and practical steps for enhancing national security and defence. The article presents the evolution of strategic documents in Ukraine since 2010, underlines the main differences between the National Security Strategies adopted […]

EUROPEAN UNION: SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES AFTER 2014

The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine made leaders of the European Union reconsider its relations with Russia, and the key requirement is respect for international law that envisages the restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to think of the strengthening of its own security policy. In June 2014, the […]

EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN STRATEGIES AND THEIR APPLICATION – A GAME CHANGER OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 took place in the situation of autocratic decision-making, to be more precise, this military and political decision was made by one person, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. All procedures and documents legitimizing this decision were adopted post factum in retrospect. Those Russian strategic documents that were in […]

UNITED KINGDOM: SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES AFTER 2014

Russian aggression against Ukraine was one of the major drivers of the UK security reassessment in 2015, which aimed to put an end to the period of defence spending cuts and openly acknowledged the resurgence of state-based threats. Moreover, the 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review introduced a whole range of steps to counter this aggression, […]

1234...9