The “Ukrainian Prism” team is honoured to present the tenth annual foreign policy analysis. Every year, dozens of experts scrutinise how Ukraine developed and implemented its foreign policy in almost 50 functional and geographical areas. This analytical work is a significant contribution dedicated not only to analysing current foreign policy trends but also to forming the basis for a thorough study of the long-term foundations for shaping Ukrainian idea and interests in the international arena.
Download the research:
2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015
When we started our work in 2015, obviously, we could not have imagined the tragedies that would befall the Ukrainian state. Out of the ten cycles of the study, the last three issues have been based on an adapted methodology that allows us to understand the peculiarities of wartime diplomacy. Every year, we adjust the study structure, removing irrelevant and adding new priority areas. In 2024, Ukraine continued to refine its approaches to building relations with partners in the midst of a full-scale war and confrontation with the coalition of evil, to which Russia has also added Belarus, North Korea, and Iran.
Ukraine has managed not only to repel the advance of a much larger enemy but also to maintain international isolation of the aggressor state by initiating and introducing new sanctions, creating mechanisms of compensation for aggression, and moving towards establishing a special tribunal. 2024 also became a time to develop political and diplomatic tools to ensure a just and lasting peace. With the support of its partners, Ukraine has made significant progress on the content of the Peace Formula and is building an international coalition to support Ukraine’s position. The foreign policy team continued the strategic movement towards EU membership by opening the negotiation process and conducting legislative screenings. The focus on completing the tasks set on the way to opening the clusters demonstrates confidence in Ukraine’s readiness to start membership negotiations.
At the same time, in certain areas, Ukraine’s foreign policy ambitions encountered internal and external obstacles in the decision-making process. In 2024, Ukraine’s relations with its partners were subject to turbulence caused by election cycles in key countries and organisations. Against this backdrop, the effectiveness of Ukraine’s foreign policy work in some areas has somewhat lost momentum. This was especially noticeable during the US election campaign, where the issue of assistance to Ukraine became a hostage to political struggle. However, even under such circumstances, Ukrainian politicians and diplomats have done a significant job keeping Ukraine on the agenda.
The overall evaluation of foreign policy implementation was maintained at B+, similar to the previous two years. This may indicate that Ukraine’s foreign policy team has already gained positive diplomatic experience communicating with partners and finding ways to communicate productively with non-EU and non-NATO countries.
The fight of the Ukrainian people for freedom and independence continues. This means that our foreign policy should not only remain resilient and efficient but also demonstrate to our partners and the world our proactivity and values. The joint efforts of the state and society will undoubtedly lead to victory over the enemy.
Glory to Ukraine!
Glory to heroes!
Hennadiy Maksak, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
FOREIGN POLICY IN 2024
| 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
| Political interest/engagement | B+ | B+ | B+ |
| Strategic communications | B+ | B | B+ |
| Activities | B+ | B+ | B+ |
| Results | B | B | B |
| Total score | B+ | B+ | B+ |
Political interest/engagement
For Ukraine, the year 2024 in foreign policy was built upon the foundations of wartime diplomacy started in 2022-2023.
In his directives to the heads of Ukraine’s foreign diplomatic missions, formulated in his keynote speech “Wartime Diplomacy: Resilience, Weapons, Victory”, the President outlined several priorities: lifting existing restrictions on the use of weapons in Russian territory; strengthening sanctions against Russia and its allies; securing long-term support from partners; supporting Ukrainians abroad; and promoting international backing for the Peace Formula. He emphasised Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO as a key priority. Regarding regional cooperation, the head of state highlighted the importance of the Black Sea region, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific.
The President’s public speeches and addresses to the Parliament serve as important indicators of Ukraine’s foreign policy course. Notable examples include the President’s presentation of the Victory Plan to the VRU (16.10) and his Annual Address (19.11). The Annual Address outlined Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities: consolidating government communications to counter disinformation; holding Russia collectively accountable; ensuring strategic deterrence of Russia, cooperating with partners in arms production; enhancing energy security and cooperation; securing international support for Ukrainian communities; introducing multiple citizenship; developing international cultural partnerships; and reforming and strengthening the diplomatic service, etc.
The Government’s Action Plan for 2024 further detailed these foreign and security policy priorities, with European integration as the top one. The plan also focused on Ukraine’s NATO accession, sanctions mechanisms, and establishing new diplomatic missions abroad. The President, the Prime Minister and the VRU’s Speaker (25.06) addressed the opening of EU negotiations with Ukraine in a joint statement to Ukrainians.
In 2024, political interest primarily focused on traditional areas of Ukraine’s foreign policy, such as G7 and EU member-states. There was a notable increase in engagement with Latin America and Africa, while interest in the Indo-Pacific region declined, with the exception of India.
The core strategic objective remained to provide the Ukrainian Defence Forces with the necessary resources to maintain the front line, secure military equipment and ammunition, form international coalitions for capability development and Ukraine’s reconstruction, and engage partners in specific aspects of the Peace Formula. In terms of military-technical and defence partnerships, Ukraine placed particular emphasis on strategic relations with G7, NATO, and EU members. Northern Europe featured prominently in regional contacts. Significant attention was also given to supporting Ukrainian communities abroad.
As in previous years, the President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs representatives showed the highest level of engagement. Notably, 2024 saw increased involvement from MPs, who expanded their focus beyond European partners to include Latin America and Asia. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministries showed considerably less engagement with international affairs compared to previous years.
Total score for the indicator – B+
Strategic communications
In 2024, Ukraine’s strategic communications were aimed at actively engaging not only partners from the G7, EU, and NATO in assistance and solidarity with Ukraine. It was also about establishing or strengthening cooperation with states of the so-called Global South, especially in the context of building international support for a just and lasting peace. Depending on the country or region, communication focused on providing military support to Ukraine, maintaining or introducing new sanctions against Russia, macro-financial assistance, international accountability, and Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Visits by the President of Ukraine to partner state capitals and his participation in joint events within international organisations were important for communication impact on foreign political forces and societies. These efforts also included speeches at parliamentary plenary sessions, addresses to students and faculty at universities, and participation in international expert forums that received broad media coverage.
Compared to previous years, the number of countries where the President or the Foreign Minister addressed parliaments decreased significantly, but the number of interviews with leading global media and regional media in Africa and Latin America increased. Press tours were organised for media representatives from various countries of the Global South and Europe, with NGO involvement in organising some of them. The President, the Prime Minister, Vice-Prime Ministers, government team members and MPs were active in communicating with foreign media throughout the year.
In 2024, several previously launched communication initiatives were developed and continued, including the Peace Formula, military capability coalitions, and security guarantee agreements for Ukraine. These served as important tools for conveying Ukrainian interests and received widespread media coverage.
The first Global Peace Summit in Switzerland (15-16.06), preceded by intensive political and diplomatic consultations at various levels, became one of the main platforms for building international support for Ukraine. The summit and the signing of the final communiqué laid the groundwork for further active collaboration with partners on the thematic content of the nine points of the Peace Formula, as well as for communicating the provisions of the communiqué and the Peace Formula both in signatory countries and beyond.
Based on the previous year’s Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, in 2024, Ukraine actively concluded bilateral security guarantee agreements. Beyond the significant practical dimension of these agreements, their communication component played an important role. Ukraine included strategic issues of military support, long-term financial and material assistance, and support for Ukraine’s NATO membership in almost every agreement. Parallel communications emphasising that security agreements are not a substitute for Alliance membership were also successful, as they presented Ukraine’s clear position on future NATO membership.
Given Ukraine’s close partnerships with the EU and NATO, the President and government team members participated in European Council meetings and EU thematic councils. This allowed the officials to directly convey facts about the war and Ukraine’s current need for international support. Regional initiatives that helped maintain international focus on Ukraine should also be highlighted. These include periodic North Europe-Ukraine and Southeast Europe-Ukraine summits, meetings in the Ukraine-Weimar+ format, and the Africa-Ukraine 2024 Agricultural Forum. The institutionalisation of the military capabilities’ coalition within the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format) added communication value. Ukraine continued engaging foreign partners in the “Grain from Ukraine” initiative, the International Conference on Ukraine’s Recovery, and the International Crimea Platform.
Parliamentary diplomacy was active in 2024. MPs effectively used the platforms of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and NATO and developed groups for interparliamentary relations (friendship groups). The adopted statements and resolutions helped draw international partners’ attention to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada leadership’s visits to foreign countries and international organisations were accompanied by media contacts. The first Parliamentary Conference, “Ukraine – Latin America and the Caribbean: Cooperation for the Future” (30.11) became a significant communication platform. At the same time, communication capacities were negatively affected by the VRU Speaker’s restrictions on foreign travel for MPs representing opposition political parties.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented its first Communication Strategy, “Ukraine – Latin America and the Caribbean” for 2024-2026. An important development at the beginning of the year was the launch of the Arabic-language version of the MFA website and an account on the X social network. The Ukrainian Institute (UI) continued its active work. Despite wartime challenges, the UI team carried out more than 180 cultural diplomacy projects in 61 countries, including in “new” countries, such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa, thus strengthening diplomatic and political communications.
Civil society organisations were active, organising online and offline campaigns supporting key initiatives, such as holding Russia accountable, securing prospects for EU and NATO membership, and expanding communications and expert diplomacy with the so-called Global South, particularly in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Total score for the indicator – B+
Activities
In 2024, Ukraine conducted an active foreign policy both towards its key partners and new areas. While most contacts focused on securing international support against Russian aggression, Ukraine devoted considerable efforts to a bilateral agenda and expanding its geographical presence. At the same time, attention to different world regions remained somehow imbalanced.
In thematic areas of wartime diplomacy, foreign policy developers and implementers actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Maximising G7 members’ assistance to Ukraine remained a priority. Ukraine prioritised deepening integration and cooperation with the EU, as well as intensifying dialogue with NATO.
President V. Zelenskyy remained highly active. In 2024, he paid two visits each to the USA, the UK, and Italy and four visits each to Germany and France. The President visited EU institutions in Brussels three times and led the Ukrainian delegation to the NATO Summit in Washington.
Additionally, bilateral and multilateral contacts at the highest level continued on the side-lines of UN General Assembly sessions, G7 summits, the Global Peace Summit for Ukraine, the NATO Summit, and the European Community Summit. For example, President Zelenskyy met Japanese Prime Minister F. Kishida twice (G7 Summit, UN GA) and Canadian Prime Minister J. Trudeau three times (G7 Summit, NATO Summit, UN GA).
Relations with the United States remained under constant attention throughout the year, with military assistance as the main focus. Ukrainian diplomats and the presidential team directed significant efforts towards unblocking financial and military aid. Ukraine agreed to launch joint inspections of the weapons the US supplied to its Defence Forces, with the first inspection taking place in January. President V. Zelenskyy visited the USA twice and held several telephone conversations with President J. Biden and presidential candidate D. Trump.
High-ranking officials from partner countries visited Ukraine, including Prime Ministers of the UK, Poland, and India – R. Sunak, D. Tusk, and N. Modi, respectively. In February, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, G. Meloni, Canadian Prime Minister J. Trudeau, and European Commission President U. von der Leyen participated in events marking the second anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion. NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg visited Kyiv in April. December saw the first bilateral visits to Ukraine since the start of the full-fledged war by German Chancellor O. Scholz and the newly elected European Council President A. Costa, accompanied by EU Commissioners.
Securing military assistance for Ukraine was a priority task set for Ukrainian high officials and diplomatic corps in 2024. The Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein format), which brings together over 50 foreign partners, coordinated most military aid. The group held seven meetings during the year to address military assistance volume and types. Ukraine actively facilitated the creation and institutionalisation of eight military capability coalitions, each focusing on specific aspects of strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities under foreign partner leadership. The number of countries that joined these coalitions reached 34.
Ukrainian diplomats actively promoted Ukrainian defence industry integration into European structures during the preparation of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), adopted in March 2024. They also sought alternative arms supply options due to depleting stockpiles in certain countries. This led to the emergence of the “Danish model”, providing for direct investments and purchases from Ukrainian manufacturers.
The government continued expanding thematic forums geographically to support Ukraine’s defence industry. Examples include the launch of the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum in May, the NATO-Ukraine Defence Innovators Forum in June, and the second International Defence Industry Forum DFNC2 in October, alongside the German-Ukrainian Defence Industry Session. Ukrainian companies signed numerous agreements with foreign companies during these forums regarding the production of ammunition, electronic warfare equipment, aerial and naval drones, and Western weapons repair, among others. JSC Ukroboronprom opened its first foreign representative office in Washington, DC, in July, and the EU decided to open a Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv in September.
Sanctions pressure on Russia and attracting financial resources and investments remained important activity areas. The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions continued operating actively in 2024, formulating systematic proposals and specific recommendations for implementing and supporting sanctions policy. In May, the group presented its third comprehensive action plan to further strengthen sanctions pressure on Russia.
Within European partnership cooperation, Ukraine focused on forming regional approaches. Building long-term relations with Northern European and Baltic states held strategic importance for Ukraine at this stage. Ukraine held two Northern Europe-Ukraine summits with the President’s participation in 2024. In November, Ukraine launched a new military cooperation format with the Northern Group, uniting 12 countries: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK. Ukraine maintained contacts with the Western Balkans in a multilateral format. During the Southeast Europe-Ukraine summit (28.02), President Zelenskyy met North Macedonia’s President S. Pendarovski, Croatia’s Prime Minister A. Plenković, Albania’s Prime Minister E. Rama, and Montenegro’s President J. Milatović.
Ukraine maintained a dynamic dialogue with neighbouring countries, though not always productively. There were constant active contacts with Moldova, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Dialogue proved more difficult with Hungary and Slovakia due to their position on energy cooperation with Russia and sanctions pressure. Foreign Minister A. Sybiha visited Moldova, Romania, and Poland during his first working visit after his appointment.
In European integration, the Ukrainian government team began pre-accession negotiations for EU membership. Ukraine formed its delegation for negotiations on the EU Accession Agreement in June. The government established an interagency working group for the negotiation process and 36 working (negotiation) groups in August. Ukrainian negotiators actively participated in the external screening of Ukrainian legislation for compliance with European law. The government prepared draft roadmaps as required by the negotiation framework.
NATO-Ukraine cooperation maintained high inter-institutional coordination. Officials regularly discussed the NATO bid at internal meetings with the President and relevant government members. The Commission on Coordination of Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine met in March to discuss the implementation of the adapted Annual National Programme (ANP) for 2024 and the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine projects. The NATO-Ukraine Council emerged as an important new format serving as a platform for discussing bilateral relations and strengthening international support. Throughout the year, Ukraine initiated several NUC meetings in response to the Russian escalation.
In June, Berlin hosted the first ministerial-level meeting of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine during the Ukraine Recovery Conference. It brought together representatives from 23 countries’ governments and seven international financial organisations. The Steering Committee of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform met in June and October. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal led a Ukrainian delegation to Tokyo in February for the joint Japanese-Ukrainian conference on economic development and reconstruction.
Ukraine devoted significant attention to establishing institutional and procedural prerequisites for the Peace Summit and implementing President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula. Domestically, coordinating the first summit organisation involved active joint work between the Presidential Office, relevant ministries, and the Verkhovna Rada. The first Global Peace Summit for Ukraine in June laid the foundations for thematic conferences, which, with the Summit’s final communiqué, would form the international community’s main peace proposal. Between August and November, nine thematic conferences took place with organisational support from states co-chairing the Peace Formula thematic groups.
Ukraine intensified political and diplomatic contacts with the so-called Global South regions and states while implementing the Peace Formula, primarily with major international actors like India and China. Indian Prime Minister N. Modi visited Ukraine for the first time since independence. President Zelenskyy also met Modi twice during major international events. Foreign Minister D. Kuleba visited India for the first time since 2017. Thus, 2024 marked a significant strengthening in Ukraine-India political relations. The President’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Qatar played an important role in strengthening bilateral relations and encouraging regional partners to engage actively as mediators.
In relations with China, Ukraine focused on finding ways to neutralise Beijing’s active role in promoting an alternative resolution model. The Foreign Ministers held three meetings during international events and visits to China.
The Middle East region had a prominent place in foreign policy activities primarily due to humanitarian projects, three Gulf countries’ participation as mediators in negotiations with Russia, and business contacts. Apart from the President’s visits, Foreign Minister A. Sybiha travelled to Cairo to present a bilateral cooperation roadmap and Syria after B. Assad’s regime overthrow, jointly with the Agrarian Policy Minister. Ukraine continued implementing the “Grain from Ukraine” humanitarian programme, which became a strategic tool for cooperation with Africa and the Middle East.
Parliamentary diplomacy beyond Europe intensified. MPs participated in the ASEAN Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Laos and visited several Latin American countries. Officials maintained high-level contacts. VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk attended Mexican President C. Sheinbaum’s inauguration and met the Senate Speaker, among others.
Ukraine maintained active engagement with Indo-Pacific countries at bilateral and multilateral levels. High-level meetings and consultations were held throughout the year with Singapore, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Vietnam. An interesting format of a five-party meeting with Indo-Pacific NATO partners – Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, and Japan – emerged on the sidelines of the NATO Summit. President V. Zelenskyy also paid the first bilateral visit to the Philippines (03.06), meeting President B. Marcos.
The MFA developed strategic approaches to the regions and strengthened its diplomatic presence. Officials visited several Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, maintaining active political dialogue to mitigate the Sino-Brazilian peace initiative’s consequences. Foreign Minister D. Kuleba conducted his fourth African tour in August, visiting Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius for the first time in Ukraine’s history. Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, M. Subkh, was highly active. Ukraine significantly strengthened its Sub-Saharan Africa diplomatic presence in 2024, opening embassies in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Botswana, Rwanda, and Mauritania, increasing its continental representation to 17 countries. The MFA discussed plans to increase Latin American and Caribbean diplomatic presence but opened no new diplomatic missions by year-end.
The G7, the EU, India, Poland, Türkiye, the Czech Republic, the Baltic and Northern European regions, the UN, the international coalition for Ukraine’s recovery, the Peace Formula, military diplomacy, public diplomacy, and sanctions policy scored the highest in terms of activities during the year.
Total score for the indicator – B+
Results
Efforts to build a stable foundation for international cooperation yielded significant results. Relations with the G7 and the EU, which form the basis of Ukraine’s current resilience and defence capability, confirmed their strategic status in 2024.
As of 31 December, Ukraine had signed 26 bilateral security agreements with the G7 countries and signatories of the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine, as well as an agreement with the EU. These bilateral documents provide for specific forms and areas of long-term support for Ukraine, mechanisms for consultations and assistance in the event of war escalation, and partner support for Ukraine’s strategic political and security initiatives.
Significant results were achieved in providing financial and security assistance. According to NATO, in 2024, allies provided Ukraine with military assistance worth USD 50bn, of which 60% came from European members of the Alliance and Canada.
In May, the EU authorised the use of windfall profits from frozen Russian assets towards Ukraine’s defence needs through the European Peace Facility. By July, Ukraine had received the first tranche of EUR 1.5bn, including EUR 400mn earmarked for the purchase of weapons from Ukrainian manufacturers. Thanks to the “Danish model” of support for the Ukrainian defence industry, the Armed Forces received weapons worth nearly EUR 538mn. Under the EU Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM), approximately 32,000 Ukrainian service personnel were trained across various areas.
The official launch of the EU’s Ukraine Facility was critical for ensuring Ukraine’s financial stability. The programme allows Ukraine to receive EU financial and technical assistance totalling EUR 50bn over four years. Total international financial assistance to Ukraine for covering priority social and humanitarian expenditures in the state budget in 2024 amounted to USD 41.7bn. Ukraine received USD 5.4bn under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility programme. In addition to the EU and the IMF, support from the US, the World Bank, Japan, and Canada was also significant.
In May, the EU Council approved the Ukraine Facility Plan, which was developed by the Ukrainian government team together with European partners. The plan identifies 69 reforms covering 15 areas and 10 investments. Implementation of these structural reforms will ensure progress on Ukraine’s path towards EU membership. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the Framework Agreement between Ukraine and the EU on special mechanisms for allocating EU funding to Ukraine under the Ukraine Facility.
Although in 2024, Ukraine failed to persuade Western partners to transfer Russian assets frozen in Europe to Ukraine, significant positive progress was made in this direction. The EU and G7 countries agreed to provide Ukraine with up to EUR 45bn in an extraordinary macro-financial assistance loan and corresponding bilateral loans from G7 partners through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration initiative to increase Ukraine’s budget revenues. Proceeds from immobilised Russian assets will be used to repay the loans provided.
In June, a new chapter in Ukraine’s relations with the EU opened with the actual commencement of membership negotiations. Active bilateral cooperation allowed the European Commission to complete the screening of Cluster 1 “Fundamentals” in November.
At the sectoral level, the Agreement on the Carriage of Freight by Road (road freight transport liberalisation) and autonomous trade preferences for EU imports of goods originating from Ukraine were extended. Ukraine continued to benefit from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which enabled the delivery of more than 150,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid by year-end. The EU Council extended the temporary protection mechanism for Ukrainian citizens until March 2026.
During the year, the EU Council adopted three new sanctions packages against Russia: the 13th, 14th, and 15th. The process of adopting new sanctions packages slowed with the start of Hungary’s presidency of the EU Council in the second half of 2024.
Although Ukraine was not invited to join the Alliance, the NATO Summit in Washington produced several positive results. In particular, the NATO-Ukraine Interoperability Roadmap was approved. Another key decision was the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC). Additionally, the Washington summit established the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), which in December began to assume responsibility for coordinating the supply of military assistance to Ukraine by Allies and partners, training the Armed Forces, and formulating strategies and plans for the further development of Ukraine’s security and defence sector. However, by year-end, an adapted Annual National Programme for 2025 had not been presented.
In terms of building an international support coalition, the Ukrainian team’s efforts to implement the Peace Formula yielded positive results. The first Global Peace Summit (15-16.06) in Switzerland gathered 101 participants representing foreign states and international organisations. The Summit’s joint communiqué on the foundations of peace, which was based on the developed vision for addressing global issues, including nuclear and food security, and the release of prisoners and deportees, including children, was signed by 80 participants. However, the desire of Ukraine and its partners to ensure the maximum presence of foreign states and international organisations at the event affected the content of the summit’s final document, which was limited to only a few points of the Peace Formula.
Important results were achieved on the bilateral track. Thanks to strengthened interparliamentary cooperation, Italy launched a joint project to rebuild Ukraine under the auspices of the Italian parliament. In 2024, the governments of Ukraine and France signed four agreements covering grants, energy, defence capabilities, and financial and technical support. During the February Conference on Economic Growth and Recovery in Japan, 56 documents were signed, including memoranda with the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). During Indian Prime Minister N. Modi’s visit to Kyiv, four agreements were signed in the fields of agriculture, pharmaceuticals, cultural cooperation, and Indian humanitarian aid. Ukraine signed a Memorandum on countering disinformation with Moldova and Romania, a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with the UAE, and a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with Albania.
The UAE and Qatar continued their efforts to secure the return of Ukrainian citizens from Russian captivity.
At the multilateral level, it is worth noting the adoption of the Strategy for the Development of Ukraine’s Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and the submission of draft free trade agreements to 10 CELAC countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay). However, despite plans announced at the beginning of the year, none of the five anticipated embassies have been opened in the region by the end of 2024. The Ukraine-Latin America Summit, announced in December 2023, did not take place either.
The Southeast Europe-Ukraine summit resulted in a declaration condemning Russian aggression and calling for increased military support for Ukraine and support for its European integration. In Copenhagen, a new cooperation format bringing together 12 countries – the Northern Group-Ukraine – was launched.
The fourth African tour of Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs resulted in five international agreements signed with Malawi, Zambia, and Mauritius. A negative development was the severance of diplomatic relations with Ukraine by Mali and Niger, which, along with Burkina Faso, also addressed the UN Security Council President with accusations of Ukraine supporting terrorism.
The UN General Assembly adopted for the first time a resolution on “Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant”, which emphasises the need for demilitarisation and de-occupation of the NPP due to Russia’s non-compliance with IAEA governing body resolutions. The International Court of Justice ruled on the merits of Ukraine’s case against Russia regarding the application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, finding that Russia had violated both international documents. At Ukraine’s initiative, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe member states officially activated the Moscow Mechanism regarding Ukrainian civilian hostages held by Russia in occupied territories. An important achievement was the announcement of the first decisions on applications to the Register of Damage (RD4U) caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, established under the Council of Europe.
The total reach of the Foreign Ministry’s communication campaigns in 2024 grew to over 1 billion, with the Ministry’s team receiving 46 international creative awards. The Ukrainian Institute expanded its presence abroad, increasing the number of projects implemented in “traditional” countries while entering “new” markets (for example, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa). The draft law on multiple citizenship submitted by the President of Ukraine, which the Verkhovna Rada gave the first reading in December, had a significant impact on diaspora relations.
There were several foreign economic achievements. Notably, the updated Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Canada came into force. The government drafted a bill to ratify the FTA with Türkiye. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Ukraine. Negotiations on modernising the Free Trade Agreement with European Free Trade Association member-states were completed.
According to the State Customs Service, Ukraine’s total trade turnover in 2024 reached nearly USD 112.3bn, 13% up on the previous year. Exports of goods gained momentum, reaching USD 41.6bn, while imports totalled USD 70.7bn. In aggregate terms, the EU remains Ukraine’s main foreign trade partner, accounting for 60% of exports and 50% of imports.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Service of Ukraine on Food Safety and Consumer Protection actively sought new trade opportunities and secured access to 16 new foreign markets for Ukrainian exports. The expansion of the logistics capabilities of the Ukrainian sea corridor further facilitated this.
The top five trading partners (in goods) were China (USD 16.75bn), Poland (USD 11.7bn), Germany (USD 8.2bn), Türkiye (USD 6.4bn), and Italy (USD 4.5bn). Ukraine imported most from China (USD 14.4bn), Poland (USD 6.97bn), Germany (USD 5.4bn), Türkiye (USD 4.24bn), and the United States (USD 3.5bn). The largest exports went to Poland (USD 4.7bn), Spain (USD 2.9bn), Germany (USD 2.8bn), China (USD 2.4bn), and Türkiye (USD 2.2bn).
In terms of results, the highest scores were awarded to European Integration, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Northern Europe, the Baltic states, the Western Balkans, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, the UN, the International Coalition for Ukraine’s recovery, the Peace Formula, Military diplomacy, Economic diplomacy.
Total score for the indicator – B
Total score – B