Score B+ for Innovation and Practiveness in an Unfavorable Environment
We are pleased to present the latest edition of our annual study of Ukrainian foreign policy. The Ukrainian Prism expert team continues its tradition of reviewing outcomes across 47 directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy. For a country at war, foreign policy matters as much as defence policy. Ukraine’s efforts on the international stage are directed at ensuring the Defence Forces have everything they need, and at supporting the resilience of the state and its citizens with the backing of our international partners.
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Beyond the ongoing war of attrition, 2025 brought two particularly painful challenges. A strategic partner on whom Ukraine has long depended decided to change its approach to settling the Russo-Ukrainian war, increasing pressure on Kyiv. At the same time, attempts within the country to revise anti-corruption policy, alongside a series of corruption scandals, dealt a significant reputational blow to the Ukrainian authorities and threatened to complicate the EU accession negotiations.
These challenges compelled the political leadership, government, and diplomatic teams to shift towards proactive communication and cooperation with international partners, demonstrating the art of risk management. Despite the scale of the threats facing the country this year, Ukraine managed to sustain partner support across all strategic priorities. New coalitions were formed, new instruments adopted, and the capacity of negotiating teams was strengthened.
We hope this study proves useful for understanding the complexity of the foreign policy challenges currently facing Ukraine and for assessing the effectiveness and appropriateness of the policies chosen to address them.
Sincerely,
The Ukrainian Prism team
Overall rating: B+
Across all indicators combined, the directions receiving the maximum rating of ‘A’ or ‘A-’ in 2025 were Australia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Germany, Poland, France, the Czech Republic, Japan, the Baltic states, Northern Europe, the EU, NATO, Minilateral Alliances, the UN, International Coalition for Ukraine’s Recovery, Peace Process, Military Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Sanctions Policy, and Human Rights and Restoration of Justice.
A number of directions improved their rating compared with 2024, namely Canada, Australia, Azerbaijan, Israel, the Middle East, the OSCE, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation.
Directions whose ratings declined were India, Sub-Saharan Africa, Economic Diplomacy, and Energy Diplomacy.
Political interest/engagement: B+
In 2025, Ukraine’s foreign policy was directed towards creating the international and domestic conditions needed to counter Russian aggression, advance the peace process, and secure the country’s reconstruction. The priorities articulated at the level of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada were broadly coherent in their definition and implementation. At the same time, political interest often remained somewhat general in character, with the main focus on cooperation with G7 countries, the development of minilateral alliances, and the building of international coalitions aimed at mobilising military and financial support, strengthening Ukraine’s defence capacity, holding Russia accountable, and restoring justice.
In his public addresses, the President of Ukraine outlined several foreign policy priorities. In his address to Ukrainian diplomats (21.07), President Zelenskyy identified five priorities: ensuring the Defence Forces of Ukraine are supplied with weapons; the transfer to Ukraine of frozen Russian assets; coordinating work on sanctions and the architecture of Russian accountability; sustaining the momentum of peace negotiations; and protecting the interests of Ukrainians and Ukrainian communities abroad.
In fulfilment of the President’s directives, Prime Minister Y. Svyrydenko presented the key priorities for 2025-2026 (18.08), a number of which relate directly to international activity: attracting additional partner financing for weapons production; European integration; securing macro-financial assistance from partners for 2026-2027; developing joint investment funds with the EU, international financial institutions, and partner governments; creating and implementing a comprehensive Ukraine Recovery Plan; and protecting critical infrastructure against drone and missile strikes.
Foreign Minister A. Sybiha set out seven priorities at the Annual Ambassadorial meeting (25.07): strengthening Ukraine’s defence capacity; intensifying pressure on Russia; holding Russian war criminals to account and bringing back our people; attracting resources for Ukraine’s reconstruction and development; advancing Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration; public diplomacy and communications; and protecting and supporting the millions of Ukrainians living abroad.
The Verkhovna Rada leadership, in the context of parliamentary diplomacy, stressed the importance of synchronising with the President and the Cabinet of Ministers on further tightening sanctions pressure, using frozen Russian assets, advancing Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership, launching international accountability mechanisms, and returning unlawfully deported Ukrainian children. Emphasis was also placed on coordinating the Verkhovna Rada and the MFA to consolidate the international parliamentary dimension of support for Ukraine at the level of G7 countries, the US Congress, the European Parliament, and the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and NATO.
Depending on the target audience, the priority of military assistance and defence cooperation encompassed a wide range of issues: acquiring air defence systems, scaling up drone production, developing joint defence manufacturing, engaging foreign partners in the NATO PURL programme, and shaping joint initiatives within the EU’s SAFE programme.
Efforts to achieve a lasting and just peace included developing a peace plan together with international partners, as well as effective security guarantees, strengthening the role of the Coalition of the Willing, and increasing pressure on the aggressor state, including through sanctions. The humanitarian dimension also received consistent attention.
Securing financial support for Ukraine in the coming years was also among the political priorities, with primary focus on the possibility of transferring to Ukraine the immobilised sovereign Russian assets held in Europe, the terms of new EU financial instruments, the IMF, and other international initiatives.
The United States, the European Union, and NATO featured prominently in public statements by the President, government leaders, and MPs, reflecting the consistency of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic course. European integration remained a priority in 2025, both in the context of advancing towards the opening of negotiating clusters and as a potential EU membership perspective, viewed as one element of the security guarantees framework.
Alongside developing multilateral and bilateral formats with Western partners, the President and the Foreign Minister also stressed the importance of building global support for Ukraine through cooperation with states in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and other regions, particularly in the context of Ukraine’s work at international organisation platforms, where broad support enables the advancement of political initiatives and the strengthening of diplomatic positions.
All G7 countries, Australia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Latin America, Northern Europe, the EU, NATO, Minilateral Alliances, International Coalition for Ukraine’s Recovery, Peace Process, Military Diplomacy, Economic Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Sanctions Policy, Human Rights and Restoration of Justice scored the highest rating for “Political interest” in 2025.
Strategic communications: B+
2025 saw the President of Ukraine actively promoting and explaining the state’s foreign policy priorities on the international stage. A number of platforms that V. Zelenskyy has used consistently and extensively since 2022 were once again deployed. Despite a certain decrease in the number of addresses to foreign parliaments, the President spoke, among others, before the PACE (26.06), the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (13.10), the Parliamentary Summit of the International Crimea Platform (24.11), the Seanad and Dáil of the Irish Parliament (2.12), and the House of Representatives and Senate of the Dutch Parliament (24.06, 16.12), demonstrating that the parliamentary track remains a key instrument for mobilising international support for Ukraine.
Given the strategic nature of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU, Ukraine’s senior political leadership devoted significant attention to engaging with key European institutions. Ukraine simultaneously conducted several communications campaigns at the European level aimed at securing financial assistance, integrating Ukraine’s defence industry into European programmes, intensifying sanctions pressure on Russia, transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, and advancing the cause of justice. V. Zelenskyy systematically conveyed Ukraine’s position at the EU level, including at European Council sessions (6.03, 20.03, 26.06, 1.10, 23.10, 18.12). The Foreign Minister maintained a consistent diplomatic presence, attending all EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings in 2025. Informal EU ministerial meetings at the level of ministers for European affairs and foreign ministers became an established communications format. Ukraine made active use of prominent international expert forums to deliver its core messages: during the year, President Zelenskyy addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos (17.01), the Munich Security Conference (15.02), the Global Security Forum (12.06), the Yalta European Strategy (12.09), the Fifth Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen (12.09), the conference marking the 50th anniversary of the OSCE Helsinki Final Act (31.07), the Warsaw Security Forum (29.10), and the European Political Community summits (14.05, 2.10), among others.
Participation in the opening of the UN General Assembly session in New York (September) remained a traditionally important communications instrument. This year, Ukraine ensured a comprehensive presence at that platform. In addition to the President’s addresses at the UNGA General Debate (24.09) and the high-level UN SC meeting (24.09), two thematic events were organised on the sidelines: the leaders’ summit of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children (23.09) and the Fifth Summit of the International Crimea Platform (24.09), reinforcing international attention to Ukraine’s key humanitarian and security priorities.
The leaders’ meeting format and the parliamentary dimension of the International Crimea Platform were also actively used to communicate with representatives of Global South countries.
In the second half of 2025, the anti-corruption scandal surrounding the Ukrainian authorities’ attempt to legislatively restructure NABU and SAP negatively affected strategic communications with partners. Poorly managed communications around these actions triggered a wave of criticism from a number of international partners, including EU leaders.
In 2025, strategic communications became a priority for the MFA. The Ministry and Ukrainian diplomats were involved in organising the Fifth Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen and in promoting initiatives such as the “Ukrainian Bookshelf” and the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studies. Overall, the MFA reported the implementation of over 15 communications campaigns with a combined reach exceeding 150 million.
Throughout the year, the President, the Foreign Minister, and ambassadors maintained a regular presence in international media through interviews, though overall foreign media interest declined somewhat amid significant coverage of developments in the Middle East. The most active in strategic communications were the ambassadors to Australia, Germany, South Africa, and the United States, the countries of the Middle East, and the Head of Mission to NATO, among others.
In 2025, a large number of parallel events were held, including alongside the annual high-level events of the UN, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, most of them dedicated to human rights, the consequences of Russian aggression, the restoration of justice, and the return of Ukrainian children.
The Ukrainian Institute, together with diplomatic missions abroad, continued actively promoting Ukrainian cultural content at international platforms. In 2025, Seasons of Ukrainian Culture were held in France.
As in the previous year, civil society organisations and think tanks played an important role in advancing the Ukrainian agenda, particularly in Global South countries, through active advocacy and the development of international partnerships.
Australia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Poland, South Africa, France, Japan, the Baltic states, Latin America, the EU, the UN, the OSCE, International Coalition for Ukraine’s Recovery, Military Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Sanctions Policy, Human Rights and Restoration of Justice scored the highest rating for “Strategic communications” in 2025.
Activities: B+
Aggregate data on the President of Ukraine’s foreign policy activities show that in 2025, he made 59 visits to 25 countries, predominantly to European capitals. Ukraine, in turn, received 99 high-level foreign delegations, including heads of state and government, parliamentary representatives, and representatives of international organisations, including the EU, NATO, the UN, the IAEA, the EBRD, and the EIB. Intensive high-level dialogue was sustained throughout the year through numerous telephone calls and in-person meetings at the level of presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers. A significant share of contacts took place on the sidelines of major international events, notably the annual UNGA session in New York, the NATO Summit in The Hague, and various international expert forums.
Throughout the year, Ukraine conducted active negotiations with representatives of the United States, the EU, and Middle Eastern states on the modalities for ending the war. A number of meetings with the Russian side also took place, facilitated by the United States and Saudi Arabia (23.03) and Türkiye (16.05, 3.06, 23.07). Given the emergence of several pro-Russian proposals, Ukraine and its European partners repeatedly engaged in crisis management through diplomatic channels to prevent unwanted negotiating scenarios.
A defining milestone of 2025 was the establishment and continued institutional development of the Coalition of the Willing, which operated at the political and military-expert levels on issues of security guarantees, European partners’ participation in monitoring arrangements, and the conditions for a just end to the war.
Simultaneously, the President and the government team focused on shaping financial support for Ukraine’s defence industry and ensuring the Defence Forces are supplied with the necessary weapons. The Third International Defence Industries Forum (DFNC³) was held with the President in attendance, bringing together approximately 2,000 participants from over 20 countries (8.10). Similar forums were held at the Ukraine-EU level and bilaterally with key defence partners.
The Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the Ramstein format) remained the key coordination mechanism for defence cooperation, with Germany and the United Kingdom taking over its coordination (12.02). An important step was the approval of roadmaps for eight Capability Coalitions for 2025-2027, adding planning and predictability to the partner military support process. A total of eight meetings were held during the year, at which partners decided on new rounds of support for Ukraine.
In June, Ukraine launched a new international initiative – Build with Ukraine – aimed at the joint production of Ukrainian weapons on the territory of partner countries. By year’s end, the first joint manufacturing operations had appeared in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. The economic dimension of cooperation included preparing joint action plans, organising investment forums, and concluding agreements on foreign business participation in reconstruction.
On the Euro-Atlantic track, the government team implemented the measures outlined in the 2025 adopted Annual National Programme (aANP). At Ukraine-NATO Commission meetings attended by the responsible Deputy Prime Minister, Ukraine presented its key aANP priorities for 2025 (29.01) and reported on the progress of reform implementation (11.11). In 2025, two important structures in the Ukraine-NATO relationship became operational: the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) (17.02) and the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), strengthening the institutional interaction between the parties.
On sanctions pressure against Russia, the President of Ukraine signed 61 decrees imposing sanctions on 2,021 individuals and 1,745 legal entities. The decisions synchronise Ukraine’s measures with the sanctions packages of international partners, including the EU, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. Among the coordination measures with international partners in 2025, the Kyiv Sanctions Summit (27-28.11), attended by high-level representatives from 20 countries and international organisations, deserves particular mention.
In 2025, Ukraine’s foreign policy activity prioritised security cooperation, obtaining security guarantees, reconstruction cooperation (attracting investment, humanitarian assistance, and joint production), sanctions policy against Russia, and humanitarian initiatives. Diplomatic efforts combined high-level contacts with key partners (the US, the UK, Germany, France, Canada, Japan, Türkiye) and active engagement in multilateral formats (the EU, NATO, the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE). At the same time, engagement with the Global South was less active than in 2024.
Systematic engagement with G7 members resulted in 18 meetings with Ukrainian participation and the adoption of 17 supporting statements.
In 2025, Ukraine maintained selective but consistent engagement with Indo-Pacific states, primarily Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which provide substantial financial, military, and humanitarian support. A slowdown in bilateral relations with the Republic of Korea was nonetheless observed. In the absence of visits to Indo-Pacific countries in 2025, President Zelenskyy conducted active diplomacy at the sidelines of multilateral events.
In the Middle East region, Ukraine’s political activity focused on the Gulf states and Egypt, while other Middle Eastern and North African states remained largely on the periphery of attention.
Engagement with the Western Balkans took place through bilateral and multilateral formats but was largely limited in scope (telephone contacts, meetings on the sidelines of international events). Two Ukraine-South-East Europe Summits served as an important regional engagement instrument.
Ukraine continued to deepen its cooperation with the Baltic states, particularly in the areas of security, European integration, and cybersecurity.
Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean was characterised by moderate political dialogue intensity alongside a gradual expansion of Ukraine’s presence in the region. Cultural and expert diplomacy was notably more active, including through the work of the Ukrainian Institute and the implementation of educational and humanitarian projects. At the same time, the positions of regional states at multilateral platforms remained varied, and economic interaction retained structural imbalances.
Engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa was characterised by a high intensity of strategic communications and the maintenance of a stable basic diplomatic presence, delivering moderate but measurable results. The absence of institutionalised cooperation mechanisms, however, constrained the transition to long-term partnerships. Priority was placed on South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana.
Relations with the Central Asia region remained generally passive, though contacts with Kazakhstan intensified and the first presidential meeting between the two countries since 2019 took place.
Beyond traditional multilateral formats, the Ukrainian diplomatic team stepped up participation at the highest and government levels in the following regional minilateral formats: the Odesa Triangle, the Lublin Triangle, the NB8+Ukraine, and the Ukraine-South-East Europe Summit. In August, a new format – Ukraine+Benelux – was launched at the level of foreign ministers. UN system activity remained particularly robust, especially in New York and Geneva. The Geneva Mission focused on all human rights protection mechanisms and the WHO, while the New York Mission maintained an active Ukrainian position within the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and the relevant committees. Cooperation with UNIDO intensified in 2025. The appointment of a new Head of Mission to the OSCE reinvigorated Ukraine’s Mission’s political work and public diplomacy.
Parliamentary diplomacy gained fresh momentum in 2025: individual MPs and friendship groups organised joint sessions with British, Canadian, and German counterparts, and participated in parliamentary summits and assemblies of the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and ASEAN. Inter-parliamentary contacts served as an instrument for consolidating political support and advocating for Ukraine’s interests.
Work began on updating Ukraine’s strategic documents, including the revision of the Foreign Policy Strategy of Ukraine, the current version of which was adopted in 2021. Efforts commenced to develop typologies and criteria for Ukraine’s partnerships with foreign states, as well as a draft law “On international treaties of Ukraine”. Fifty international treaties were submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for ratification, including in the security and financial sectors. In 2025, Ukraine took practical steps to strengthen ties with Ukrainians abroad, a key move being the authorisation of dual citizenship with a number of states. Consular services were expanded, and new communication instruments with Ukrainians abroad were introduced.
In public diplomacy, the cultural, academic-educational, and expert dimensions remained the most visible, with the MFA, the Ukrainian Institute, the First Lady, diplomatic missions abroad, universities, expert centres, and the diaspora all playing significant roles. Despite geographic expansion and a growing international presence, insufficient funding and dependence on individual initiatives by specific actors remain considerable domestic challenges.
All G7 countries, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Türkiye, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, Northern Europe, the EU, NATO, Minilateral Alliances, the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, International Coalition for Ukraine’s Recovery, Peace Process, Military Diplomacy, Economic Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, Sanctions Policy, Human Rights and Restoration of Justice, and Ukrainians Abroad scored the highest rating for “Activities” in 2025.
Results: B+
Through active diplomatic efforts in 2025, Ukraine succeeded in attracting approximately USD45.8bn in direct budget support, with the key donors being the EU, the IMF, the World Bank, and Japan.
Significant progress was made on sanctions, helping limit Russia’s revenues from energy exports. US sanctions targeting Russian oil companies Rosneft and Lukoil struck a particularly significant blow to Russia’s energy potential. Coordinated measures by the sanctions coalition against the shadow fleet further reduced Russia’s oil export transport capacity. In addition to the EU, G7 partners (the UK, the US, Japan, and Canada) joined these efforts. The EU remained the leading force in building sanctions pressure, adopting four sanctions packages during the year.
Noteworthy results were achieved in cooperation with the European Union. Ukraine and the European Commission completed the bilateral screening of all negotiating chapters in unprecedentedly short timescales (30.09). The Commission provided an assessment of readiness to open all six clusters by the end of 2025. Importantly, Ukraine and Moldova coordinated their approaches to a joint path towards EU membership, despite attempts by certain political forces within the EU to separate the two onto different tracks. Hungary’s obstructive stance at the EU level, however, prevented the realisation of a number of strategic decisions for Ukraine, most notably it blocked the opening of negotiating clusters and the EUR90bn loan for macroeconomic and defence purposes for 2026-2027.
In 2025, Ukraine was compelled to step back from further implementation of the Peace Formula due to the United States’ unwillingness to participate in that format. Through intensive consultations in November and December, Ukraine and the US agreed on most parameters of a 20-point draft peace agreement, along with accompanying documents on security guarantees and Ukraine’s economic recovery. The Ukrainian side maintained its principled position on non-recognition of territorial concessions.
At the NATO Summit in The Hague (June), Alliance members confirmed their commitment to include contributions to Ukraine’s defence when calculating the increased defence spending of NATO members. At the same time, a new challenge for the Ukrainian diplomatic team was filling the PURL programme, initiated by NATO and the US to maintain the supply of American weapons to Ukraine through funds from other partners, including non-NATO members. By the end of 2025, Ukraine had attracted over USD4bn and secured eight military assistance packages. Although 24 countries made commitments, the main burden was shouldered by six to seven states. In 2025, Ukraine and Germany launched a new Electronic Warfare Coalition (11.04), to which 10 states have joined. In November, a Memorandum on Enhanced Partnership between Ukraine and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) was signed. In addition, 15 of the 19 EU member states participating in the SAFE programme included Ukraine as a potential partner in joint defence projects submitted to the European Commission for consideration. By year’s end, nine agreements had been signed under the Build with Ukraine initiative.
The planned annual investment target for Ukraine’s defence industry under the Danish model was EUR 1.3 bn. Throughout the year, the Czech Initiative on supplying Ukraine with artillery ammunition operated dynamically. Active communications with partners enabled Ukraine to receive additional air defence systems (Patriot, NASAMS, SAMP/T), radar systems, and interceptor missiles. Letters of intent on cooperation in developing Ukraine’s air capabilities were signed with Sweden and France.
In 2025, Ukraine continued to use multilateral diplomacy to build international support. Through active diplomatic work, Ukraine secured election to the governing bodies of a number of international organisations within the UN system (including UNESCO, ECOSOC, the FAO Council, the OPCW, and others) and simultaneously organised opposition to Russia’s election to several institutions.
Four UNGA resolutions on Ukrainian issues were adopted during the year under unprecedentedly difficult conditions. The adoption of the resolution “Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine” (24.02) was significant. The resolution “Return of Ukrainian children” (03.12) was adopted for the first time. Equally important was the Ukraine-initiated resolution “Strengthening of international cooperation and coordination of efforts to study, mitigate and minimise the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster” (10.12), which not only condemned Russian strikes on the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant but also officially adopted the Ukrainian spelling “Chornobyl”.
The MFA also focused on expanding Ukraine’s diplomatic presence, primarily in African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries. Diplomatic relations were restored with Syria and established with Somalia and Papua New Guinea. Ukrainian embassies were opened in Panama and Ecuador. The consular network was also expanded through the opening of General Consulates in Prešov (Slovakia) and Mumbai (India), a Vice-Consulate in Rzeszów (Poland), and the establishment of 10 new honorary consulates of Ukraine.
With a view to expanding political and economic ties with Global South countries, a strategic Ukraine-Gulf Cooperation Council Dialogue was launched, and a corresponding Joint Action Plan for 2025-2030 was concluded (28.09). A significant number of international agreements and memoranda were concluded during the year, including: a trilateral memorandum on digitalisation cooperation between Ukraine, Estonia, and the United Kingdom; a memorandum on Ukraine’s access to Italian financial mechanisms; a memorandum on attracting export-credit financing for industry, energy, transport, and construction; a memorandum on cooperation to strengthen European energy security; a memorandum on humanitarian demining cooperation with Japan; a memorandum between Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation and Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Digital Development and Transport on technical cooperation in the field of electronic signature; a memorandum of cooperation between the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and ANAMA (Azerbaijan); a memorandum on establishing a Joint Working Group on Unmanned Systems and a Declaration on Enhanced Defence Cooperation; a memorandum on regional policy and recovery cooperation between Ukraine and Poland; a memorandum on engaging Turkish companies in the reconstruction of Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts; a memorandum of cooperation between the veterans’ affairs ministries of Ukraine and Croatia; a memorandum on coordination of cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Korea; a memorandum on launching a new initiative for the training and equipping of the Ukrainian army involving nine countries (NB8+Poland); a Memorandum of Understanding with the World Intellectual Property Organization; and a Memorandum of Understanding between the IAEA and the Government of Ukraine on cooperation in support of Ukraine’s recovery.
In the 2025 Global Soft Power Index, Ukraine ranked 47th, one position lower than in 2024. One hundred foreign universities expressed readiness to join the Global Coalition of Ukrainian Studies; memoranda were signed with 44 universities in 15 countries.
According to State Customs Service data, Ukraine’s total trade turnover in 2025 amounted to USD125.1bn, an increase of 11.39% on the previous year. Goods exports declined by USD1.3bn to USD40.3bn. Imports grew by USD14.1bn to USD84.8bn. In aggregate terms, the EU remains Ukraine’s main trade partner (58% of exports and 46.6% of imports).
The top 10 trade partner countries (goods trade) were China (USD21.04bn), Poland (USD13.02bn), Germany (USD9.06bn), Türkiye (USD8.95bn), the United States (USD5.69bn), Italy (USD5.02bn), the Czech Republic (USD3.41bn), Romania (USD3.31bn), Hungary (USD3.30bn), and Slovakia (USD3.27bn).
Ukraine’s largest import sources were China (USD19.23bn), Poland (USD7.96bn), Germany (USD6.62bn), Türkiye (USD6.22bn), the US (USD4.63bn), Italy (USD2.74bn), the Czech Republic (USD2.41bn), Slovakia (USD2.24bn), France (USD2.14bn), and Hungary (USD2.03bn).
The largest export flows went to Poland (USD5.06bn), Türkiye (USD2.73bn), Germany (USD2.44bn), Italy (USD2.29bn), the Netherlands (USD1.92bn), China (USD1.82bn), Spain (USD1.73bn), Egypt (USD1.52bn), Romania (USD1.41bn), and Hungary (USD1.28bn).
The UK, Italy, Canada, Germany, France, Japan, Australia, Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, the Western Balkans, Northern Europe, the EU, NATO, Minilateral Alliances, the UN, the Council of Europe, International Coalition for Ukraine’s Recovery, Peace Process, Military Diplomacy, Sanctions Policy, Human Rights and Restoration of Justice scored the highest rating for “Results” in 2025.