

## SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES AFTER 2014

### EUROPEAN UNION

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#### **Résumé**

The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine made leaders of the European Union reconsider its relations with Russia, and the key requirement is respect for international law that envisages the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to think of the strengthening of its own security policy. In June 2014, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated: "I am convinced that we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence matters." (European Union 2012, art. 42). Later, he added that "if Europe does not take care of its own security, nobody else will do it."

Since 2014, the EU has been working on adjusting its regulatory framework in the field of security and defence aimed at developing defence capabilities, enhancing security coordination among the EU member states and developing resilience to withstand hybrid threats, which the EU has linked to Russia and such terrorist organizations as ISIL.

The EU adopted an entirely new strategic document - the EU Global Strategy, which reflected new approaches to European security, developed and started implementing a series of operational and working documents. Practical steps were taken, new security and defence institutions, working bodies and units were established. In order to carry out reviewed security and defence tasks, the EU revised budget spending for these goals and created a separate European Defence Fund. And this work continues today, including activities within the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which is considered a breakthrough solution to strengthen security cooperation in the EU.

While taking security and defence efforts, the EU is steadily moving to a "security union" that will not replace NATO, but will significantly strengthen joint actions to detect and neutralize threats, especially hybrid ones. This will allow the EU to use fully its security and defence capabilities, and complement NATO's military capabilities.

## 1. The revision of strategic documents after 2014

At the beginning of 2014, before the beginning of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP) was framed by the Treaty on European Union (edited by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009) and the EU Global Strategy.

According to the recent changes, a number of the EU executive bodies - the European External Action Service, the Political and Security Committee; the Military Committee; the EU Military Staff, were created, and all types of foreign policies were reorganized into a unitary system of principles, values and goals. The term "external action" was introduced that covered all external directions: economic, political and security.

The key position of the Treaty on European Union is the position on mutual defence, which obliges the EU member states to provide assistance and support "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory". (European Union 2012, art. 42). This article is similar to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but it is important that the European document is more widely formulated than the NATO document, as it previews collective actions not only in the case of a military attack, but also in the case of a terrorist attack, natural or man-made disasters.

The established Political and Security Committee, subordinate to the EU Council, monitors the development of international events in the sphere of the CFSP and helps to identify and monitor directions of this policy. It is assisted by the Politico-Military Group, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management and the Military Committee. Coordination of defence activities is carried out by the European Defence Agency. It performs the following functions: development of defence capabilities; assistance in scientific research and development of new technologies for defence; promotion of cooperation in the field of weapons; creation of a competitive European defence equipment market and strengthening of the European defence, technological and institutional base.

Within the framework of the CFSP, the European Union implements the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the main task of which is to carry out missions outside the EU, in particular peacekeeping, conflict prevention and international security operations. It was envisaged to expand participation of the EU in foreign operations (missions) and improve cooperation with the UN, NATO and the African Union. Civil-military

cooperation will remain the basis for the development of European security processes. It is planned to develop new initiatives within the framework of updating the CSDP concept and to find compromises between member states and the EU institutions in this area.

As a key political document, the European Union Security Strategy “Safe Europe in a Better World” was adopted on December 12, 2003. (European Union 2003a) The main threats were terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, threats to statehood and organized crime. However, among the threats not mentioned were regional conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Russia is listed among the international partners of the EU, along with the United States, the UN and NATO, in particular, to stabilize the situation in the Balkans and the Middle East. (European Union 2003b)

Further, certain changes occurred in the security environment, in particular, the Russian gas war against Ukraine in 2006 and the Russian Federation’s war against Georgia in August 2008, which forced the EU to make some changes to the Security Strategy. As a result, the report to the European Council on the implementation of the Strategy of December 11, 2008 evaluated the implementation of this strategy and highlighted such additional threats as cybercrime, global climate change and energy security, which were classified as key issues in relations with the Russian Federation. There was also mentioned Georgia and Moldova concerning unresolved conflicts. (European Commission 2008) However, Russia was not determined responsible for incitement of the conflicts, and no rigid steps against the perpetrator of security and stability were proposed.

For almost 10 years, the EU Security Strategy remained the only unchanged document that set out the principles of the EU security policy in a comprehensive manner. Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, a number of the EU member states insisted again on reviewing the Strategy. Agreement could not be reached for a long time, and therefore, in May 2013, a report on the need of revision of the Strategy was presented on the initiative of Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain. Changes in the security situation in Europe, caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, made it possible to really move this process apace. In June 2015, the European Council presented assessments of the security environment of the EU and started the preparation of a completely new strategy, which was approved on June 28, 2016, and entitled **the EU Global Strategy for Common Foreign and Security Policy** “Shared Vision, Common Action:

Stronger Europe” (EUGS). It became a new integrated vision of the EU foreign and security policy.

Unlike the Security Strategy, the EU Global Strategy, alongside with the EU’s own security, pays more attention to security in the neighbourhood. For example, the EU Global Strategy clearly states: “To the east, the European security order has been violated.” (EEAS 2016) Of course, this means the aggression of Russia against Ukraine, although it is not clearly indicated there. In the Global Strategy, the EU took into account the current regional situation, sources of new security challenges and threats, permanent and situational allies, and the development of the situation in Eastern Europe. The EU Global Strategy identified five key priorities: 1) EU security; 2) neighbourhood; 3) an integrated approach to conflicts; 4) cooperative regional orders; 5) global governance.

In the Global Strategy, the range of threats has been defined more extensively than had been done earlier in the EU. They are: terrorism, illegal migration, economic volatility, energy threats and hybrid threats. It is important to note that Russia’s violation of international law and destabilization of Ukraine created a new challenge to the core of the European security order. At the same time, the EU-Russia interdependence is highlighted, which prompts the EU to involve it in discussing misunderstandings and cooperation where interests coincide, above all, at the regional level.

In order to counter current threats, the Global Strategy envisages enhancing internal capabilities in the EU, which should lead to European collective security. Along with this, the EU emphasizes the need to deepen cooperation with NATO. Particular importance is attached to the security to the south and east from the European Union, that is, in the immediate surroundings. At the same time, attention is focused on the need to strengthen the resilience of countries and societies, as well as the involvement of these countries into the CSDP. It is foreseen that the EU will respond to conflicts and crises at all stages of their development by preventing, resolving, maintaining stability and avoiding new conflicts.

The EU Global Strategy has become not only a conceptual document in the foreign and security field, but also a basis for the development of other sectoral and operational documents aimed at a specific area of counteracting existing and potential threats.

## 2. Changes in security discourses

In order to implement the EU Global Strategy as the strategic document, a number of other documents have been developed, including the EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan, the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats and the Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on its implementation (EU Council 2017a), the EU operational protocol for countering hybrid threats ‘EU Playbook’, the European Parliament Briefing “Combating hybrid threats: EU-NATO Cooperation”, the EU cybersecurity strategy, Joint Staff Working Document “Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results” and other documents.

The EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence was approved on November 14, 2016, at the joint meeting of the Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of the EU member states, and later on - at the European Council meeting in December 2016. (EU Council 2016) The implementation process itself was shaped in the so-called “defence package” of the European Security and Defence (2016 EU Security and Defence Package). (EEAS 2017a) In addition to the Implementation Plan, it includes a list of financial resources identified in the European Defence Action Plan (European Commission 2016a) and a set of proposals for the implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. The package provided for the creation of a **European Defence** Fund aimed at supporting member countries and the European defence industry in the development of joint effective defensive capabilities. The relevant decision in this regard was approved by the European Commission in June 2017. (European Commission 2017a) The Fund is managed and filled by the European Union and its member countries in order to coordinate and strengthen national contributions to defence research and to improve the interaction between national armed forces. The Fund has two areas: research, which is financed with €90 million until the end of 2019; development, which is financed with €500 million per year after 2020.

Although Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has elevated security issues to a higher level in the European Union, there are some kind of “red lines” in the EU that deter Brussels from creating an independent, powerful defence and security component of the EU. Despite the initiative of the European Parliament to consider the initiative of a European Defence Union (EDU), as it is set out in the relevant resolution of November 22, 2016, and the launch by the European Commission of a relevant discussion in June 2017 (European

Commission 2017b), there is some scepticism among the EU member states about the creation of a “duplicate” of NATO in the European space. In any case, in each of the three scenarios proposed by the European Commission for the further development of EU security and defence – “Security and Defence Cooperation”, “Shared Security and Defence”, and “Common Defence and Security” (European Commission 2017c), an integral component is enhanced cooperation with NATO.

The goals of cooperation between the EU and NATO coincide, and this is based not only on the fact that 22 countries are both members of the EU and NATO, but also on the desire to mutually fill the current gaps in the security capabilities of each other. For the European Union, the Alliance remains a pillar in Europe in terms of confronting military threats, since no EU member state has sufficient military capabilities. As President of the European Council Donald Tusk declared in June 2017, “such cooperation will allow the EU to move towards deepening defence integration.” Declared in the **Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats** of April 2016 (European Commission 2016b) the enhanced EU-NATO cooperation was further enshrined in the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the NATO Secretary General in July 2016. In this document, the first task is to “boost the ability to counter hybrid threats.”

In the Joint Framework, the European Union correctly identified the hybrid threats as a “mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare.” But the question about these “state or non-state actors” remains open. The Joint Framework document states that the main challenges to peace and stability lie in the eastern and southern neighbourhood, but the main source of threats is called the southern direction - the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. (EEAS 2017b)

More precise definitions are made by the European Parliament, which in its resolution in June 2015 clearly named Russia as an aggressor that launched a hybrid war against Ukraine and conducted an aggressive information war against the EU. In March 2017, the Parliament adopted the **Briefing “Combating hybrid threats: EU-NATO Cooperation.”** It clearly states that “the concept of hybrid threat has been revived in relation to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and the ISIL/Da’esh campaigns going far

beyond Syria and Iraq.” (European Parliament 2017) Consequently, in the EU, Russia, along with ISIL, has already begun to be identified as the cause of hybrid threats. At the same time, the EU still has a desire to continue a dialogue with Russia. This, in particular, was confirmed by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini during her visit to Moscow in April 2017. “We always believe in the European Union that dialogue – constructive, open dialogue, frank dialogue – is the way. And this is true also for a relevant – not only neighbour – but a global player as the Russian Federation is,” she said. Although the EU has repeatedly felt Russia’s reluctance to conduct an “open and honest dialogue”, it continues to insist on it so as not to annoy Russia.

In July 2016, the European Commission introduced the EU Operational Protocol for countering hybrid threats “**EU Playbook**”. This document defines the modality of coordination, the processes for obtaining and analyzing data and informing the persons responsible for security, training and cooperation with partner organizations, in particular with NATO.

In addition, in November 2016, the European Commission presented the **European Defence Action Plan**, which was approved by the European Council in December 2016. That document identified several specific initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to hybrid threats, including the European Defence Fund, the promotion of investment in defence, and the strengthening of a single defence market.

Today, the EU positions cybersecurity as one of the key areas for countering hybrid threats, although the conceptual document - the **EU Cybersecurity Strategy**, was developed in 2013, before the emergence of hybrid threats in European terminology. Taking into account the new realities, which arose in the background of Russian offensive behaviour in cyberspace, on September 13, 2017, the European Commission approved a cybersecurity package based on tools and new initiatives to further strengthen cyber resistance in the EU. (European Commission 2017d) In October 2017, the European Council approved a common approach to EU cybersecurity, based on the mentioned strategy and the NIS directive. It envisioned the creation of a powerful cybersecurity agency in the EU, introduction of a common cybersecurity certification scheme for the EU and the rapid implementation of the NIS directive. Such a set of activities, according to the conclusions of EU leaders, should lead to the creation of a single digital market.

The European Commission released its **Energy Security Strategy** in May 2014. The Strategy aims to ensure a stable and abundant supply of energy for European citizens and the economy. EU energy dependency is particularly high for crude oil (90%) and natural gas (69%). Many countries are also heavily reliant on a single supplier, including some that rely entirely on Russia for their natural gas. This dependence leaves them vulnerable to supply disruptions, whether caused by political or commercial disputes, or infrastructure failure. The Strategy proposes actions in five key areas: increasing energy efficiency; increasing energy production in the EU; completing the internal energy market; speaking with one voice in external energy policy; strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms and protecting critical infrastructure.

On December 11, 2017, the EU Council approved the Permanent Structured Cooperation (**PESCO**). (European Council 2017) The intention to participate in this format was announced by the 25 EU Member States. (EU Council 2017b) One of the goals of this format was to determine timely responses to changes in the security situation around the EU. PESCO provides for closer cooperation between the EU member states in the field of security and defence, developing common defence capabilities, investing in joint projects and enhancing the operational readiness and capabilities of national armed forces. Priority projects were identified in the areas of military medicine, logistics, troop transport, training, energy provision, emergency response, mine action, in particular at sea, maritime surveillance and protection, information and cybersecurity, command and control and crisis response.

The European Defence Fund and PESCO, along with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (**CARD**), constitute a comprehensive EU Defence Package. CARD is a process of monitoring the defence plans of the EU member states, aimed at coordinating joint security and defence projects. The review is prepared by the European Defence Agency in co-operation with the European External Action Service. The first full review is expected in 2019.

As one of the sources of hybrid threats for the EU is the East, the views on improving the security situation to the East from the EU borders were set out in the Joint Staff Working Document “**Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results**” in the section “Security”. (European Commission 2017e) This document was approved in December 2016 and revised and amended in June 2017. Given the security situation in Eastern Europe, the document was improved,

and the goals and objectives became more specific. If the first version of the section was entitled “Resilience and civilian security” and the content was more aimed at ensuring human security with an emphasis on the internal dimension, then the final version the section was called “Security”, and it already had wider national and regional security objectives. For example, there were such goals as “solving cybercrime problems”, “estimating cyber-threats”, “enhanced protection of critical infrastructure” and “comprehensive national and regional disaster risk management policies”.

With regard to “countering hybrid threats” in the Eastern Partnership region, the European Union focuses on protecting critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The EU proposes partner countries to adopt cybersecurity strategies and set up computer emergency response teams (CERT). Meanwhile, in countering hybrid threats, there are no other areas which are identified in the EU Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats; they are information, economic and financial spheres. However, in this revised version, the EU did not identify Russia as a source of threats.

Possessing limited military capabilities, the EU focuses on non-military security aspects in the Eastern Partnership region - mainly on cyber defence, society resilience, emergencies, critical infrastructure protection, chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear risks, countering organized crime and illegal arms trafficking. Purely in the military sphere, the EU defined achievements of operational cooperation, participation of partner countries in missions, operations and the EU Battlegroups and their involvement into military training programmes.

### **3. Transformation of security policies**

Since 2014, militarization of approaches to security policy and formation of a set of measures to identify and counter hybrid threats have been taking place in the EU. Thus, the creation of the EU Military Planning Conduct and Capability Facility was a step in the practical implementation of the EU Global Strategy. Although the Facility is not a classic full-fledged military headquarters, it is responsible for EU military operations. At the initial stage, under its control, there are three EU operations: EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EUTM République Centrale Africaine (RCA) and EUTM Mali. The maritime operations “Sophia” in the Mediterranean and “Atalanta” are still outside its powers, but may be in the future.

At the institutional level, the EU has taken a very serious approach to the detection and counteraction to hybrid threats. In 2016, it proposed establishing the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell at the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service. This new structure, which gained full operational capability in May 2017, has responsibilities to collect, analyze and provide open and closed information on hybrid threats. This Cell brings hybrid threats to a single European denominator and provides information about them, including in the form of the “Hybrid Bulletin”, to the EU institutions and the member states. At the same time, it was proposed to set up a Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats that was launched in April 2017 in Finland, which focuses on research on threats of such types and mechanisms to counteract them. (Finish Government 2017)

If to analyze the key areas for countering hybrid threats identified by the EU, in the purely military sphere, the EU limited enhancing intelligence for the timely detection of hybrid threats and reducing the cycles of developing national military capabilities to neutralize hybrid threats and protect critical infrastructure. However, Russian aggression has given rise to a serious discussion of the possibilities of creating a European Army. Even President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, in an interview with the German edition of Salzburg.com in May 2017, acknowledged: “A European army is not a project for the near future. It is, however, a project that would give additional weight to the European foreign and security policy.”

Nevertheless, the *information sphere*, or *strategic communications* in a broader sense, is recognized as a top priority in countering hybrid threats in the EU. The key task is to raise awareness of the public about hybrid threats that should increase its resilience in this dimension. To counteract Russian propaganda, the EU created the East Stratcom Task Force, which launched a website to counteract disinformation.

In terms of *protection of critical infrastructure*, the European Union still defines indicators of infrastructure vulnerability within the framework of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), and works to identify the required security capabilities due to the European Defence Agency’s efforts.

In the *energy sector*, to counteract hybrid threats, the need to diversify sources and routes of energy supply to the EU is identified; first of all, they are the development of the Southern Gas Corridor to transport Caspian gas

and the construction of liquefied gas hubs, mainly in Northern Europe.

While having the developed and interconnected cyber-network, the European Union has already taken a number of measures to counter cyber-threats: creation of a network of 28 (according to the number of member states) Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU). Separately, the European Commission created the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) for countering cyber-threats at the EU level and the NIS Platform for the cooperation of EU bodies with public and private players in cyberspace.

In the financial sector, the EU pays the utmost attention to the resilience of banking and financial infrastructure and counteraction to the financing of terrorism and money laundering. So far, only separate cases of obstructing the financing of hybrid aggression has been fixed in the EU. For example, Estonia closed the bank account of MIA “Russia Today” in 2015.

An important place is devoted to EU cooperation with other international organizations and third countries. First of all, in practical terms, this has resulted in close cooperation at the working level between similar institutions of the EU and NATO, for example: the joint European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and the NATO Hybrid Analysis Branch; CERT-EU and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). The EU and NATO intend to step up cooperation in security planning and interoperability with regard to standardization and joint training.

The EU believes that functional institutions to counter hybrid threats in third countries are a guarantee of protection for the EU itself. Therefore, using the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the European Commission is taking measures to strengthen the stability of partner countries, including Ukraine. However, with regard to EU partner countries, the focus is mainly on cyber defence, increased society resilience, emergencies, neutralization of chemical, biological, radio-biological and nuclear risks, the fight against organized crime and illegal arms trafficking. But the EU task to launch a pilot risk assessment of hybrid threats is implemented in Moldova, and not in Ukraine, which counteracts directly such threats from the East.

Russia’s direct aggression against Ukraine, which became a flagrant violation

of international law and European values, has still forced the European Union to resort to restrictive measures (sanctions) against the Russian Federation. The EU sanctions are divided into five categories: diplomatic measures; individual restrictive measures; restriction of economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol; economic sanctions; restriction of economic cooperation. Diplomatic measures include the abolition of EU-Russia summits and regular bilateral summits, suspension of negotiations on visa issues and new agreements with the Russian Federation, reduction of the G8 to the G7, suspension by the EU of support to talks over Russia's joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency. 150 people and 38 entities are the subject of individual restrictive measures. The EU banned the maintenance of any relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, including investments and tourism. Economic sanctions against Russia are sector-specific and relate to capital markets, sensitive technologies, arms and dual-use goods. The European Investment Bank and the EBRD suspended the financing of new operations with Russia.

### Conclusions

Despite attempts of the EU to address hybrid threats, this security area is still seen as a set of tactical measures to counteract individual risks of mainly terrorist and cyber-information dimensions. Although the European Union notes the emergence of hybrid threats because of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, it does not identify the only source of such hybrid threats, which already, in practice, threaten security in Europe - the Russian Federation. The reason for this is the lack of unity within the EU. Each time the continuation of sanctions against Russia goes problematic. Many EU member states are interested in continuing economic cooperation with Russia, even if it harms other member states. A vivid testimony to this is the dispute on construction of the second line of the North Stream.

However, Russia's destructive policy towards the EU is forcing the European Union to increasingly identify Russia as a source of threats to European security, and every new European security document makes this trend ever clearer. The Association Agreement and the Eastern Partnership initiative are aimed at integrating Ukraine into the EU, including the security sector, while measures are taken against Russia to force it to adhere to international law. At the same time, the EU is not closing a dialogue window for Russia, which is perceived in Russia as a desire of Brussels to resume cooperation,

and not as a channel of influence and stabilization of the situation in Europe.

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