This publication is an analytical study that represents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian foreign policy in 2022. Forty-seven directions were analysed — from cooperation with key partners and international organisations to public diplomacy and nuclear non-proliferation. Four evaluation criteria – indicators based on the new model of research methodology, were applied. The experts have studied and assessed activities of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Parliament, and other governmental institutions of Ukraine involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine. This research is the eighth annual study. Previous years’ analysis can be found at http://prismua.org

The reference to the author and the analytical study is obligatory in the cases of complete or partial use of its materials.

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Dear colleagues,

We are glad to present a special issue of the annual analysis — Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2022. We focus on annual assessments of Ukraine’s foreign policy accomplishments and failures on a regular basis. However, this issue is special for many reasons.

Firstly, this report may not have appeared. The decision to prepare it was difficult for the Ukrainian Prism team as the war affected each of us. Some of our experts survived the horror of a full blockade, massive shelling and air strikes against their cities in Ukraine. Some were forced to leave their homes and become displaced persons. Some experts prioritised advocacy of Ukraine’s interests internationally for the duration of the war. It was not until the second half of 2022 that the Ukrainian Prism managed to resume its full-fledged program work. It was then that we decided to continue the analytical work on this annual publication that has been issued since 2016 while adjusting it to the present time and the challenges Ukraine’s diplomacy was facing in 2022.

Secondly, our methodology for assessing foreign policy in a relatively peaceful time had to be updated in order to cover all the nuances and specifics of the work of Ukrainian diplomats, politicians and civic activities who are fighting for our freedom and the right to peaceful and just existence through communication with the outside world. Wartime diplomacy is complex politics with its objectives and a specific toolkit. With this in mind, we had to adjust the research methodology to the new functional and geographic requirements of the present time. This special issue features new countries and thematic elements of Ukraine’s bilateral and multilateral foreign policy agenda. The indicators of the assessment changed, too.

Thirdly, despite our scores, we are aware that victories over the Russian aggressor on the diplomatic front are as critically important as the progress of Ukraine’s Armed Forces on the battlefield. Every decision in favour of Ukraine is invaluable. Therefore, our indicators serve as hints as to where and how the work for victory over the enemy can be strengthened.

Finally, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated again that Ukraine’s victory and resilience in the fight against the aggressor lie in the unity of Ukrainian society and joint efforts on the political, diplomatic, and civic levels. This special issue shows how vitally important, proactive and creative our joint political and diplomatic efforts were in 2022.

Glory to the Armed Forces of Ukraine!
Glory to Ukrainian diplomats!
Glory to Ukraine!
Methodology of Research
In the course of its own methodology development, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” carefully studied the experience of evaluation of the foreign policy of separate countries and international institutions done by other foreign analytical centres. Special attention was paid to the projects of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Czech Association for International Affairs (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO), which reflect either peculiarities of particular member states in the EU foreign policy (ECFR) or internal aspects of the Czech Republic governing (AMO). None of these methodologies is multi-purposed, and their principles directly depend on the peculiarities of the object under research. That is why after the methodological consultations with the ECFR experts, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” decided to develop their own methodology, taking into account Ukrainian conditions and some elements of the existing methodologies of the Western colleagues. This methodology was applied in 2015–2021 and has been constantly improved.

However, the 2022 issue is special. Ukrainian foreign policy, as well as other spheres of the country’s life, are guided by war-time. Therefore, a methodology for evaluating the Ukrainian foreign policy in 2022 has been elaborated to consider the current foreign policy and security conditions. This methodology retains most of the indicators used for the analysis during previous years (political interest, activities, and results) but expands the empirical basis for the evaluation. Besides, the indicators of inter-institutional cooperation and strategic vision have been replaced with a new one — strategic communications, which have gained particular importance during the war.

As in previous years, the analysis focuses on the actions of the Ukrainian actors (representatives of the executive and legislative branches, the President and his Office, as well as individual actors involved) rather than the state of bilateral relations with the respective country. At the same time, the present study covers only the period of 2022 and does not include the traditional for the previous issues part dedicated to comparing the current results with the previous year’s ones.

In addition, this time, we revised the studied directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy. New areas for evaluation were added (Australia, Estonia, India, and Latvia, building an international coalition for the recovery of Ukraine, sanctions policy, and military diplomacy). At the same time, some were excluded (Austria, climate issues, human rights, consolidation of international support on countering Russian aggression, Eastern Partnership, Baltic states, Visegrad Four (as a region) and the Black Sea region, international security); the sections on South Asia and the Asia-Pacific region were merged into the Indo-Pacific region.
Foreign policy directions of Ukraine

For the evaluation of the foreign policy of Ukraine in 2022, 47 directions were selected and divided into the following thematic blocks:

— Relations with the G7 states (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the USA);
— European integration and relations with the EU;
— Euro-Atlantic integration;
— Bilateral relations (Australia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Israel, Iran, China, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Türkiye, Hungary, and the Czech Republic);
— Belligerent countries (Belarus, the Russian Federation);
— Regional cooperation (Indo-Pacific Region, the Middle East, Western Balkans, Visegrad Four, Northern Europe, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia);
— International organisations (OSCE, the United Nations, Council of Europe);
— Nuclear non-proliferation;
— Building an international coalition for the recovery of Ukraine;
— Economic diplomacy;
— Public diplomacy;
— Military diplomacy;
— Energy diplomacy;
— Sanctions policy;
— Ukrainians abroad.
Evaluation indicators of Ukraine’s foreign policy in particular directions:

Given the above, four assessment indicators for foreign policy implementation in each of these directions were developed:

(1) Political interest or engagement of political actors in particular directions of the foreign policy.

(2) Strategic communications for a specific direction.

(3) Specific activities regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.

(4) Results and achievements regarding a particular direction during the evaluated year.

Each of the four key indicators shall be assessed using a five-point system, where 1 point is the minimum score, and 5 points is the highest possible score. Each point in the assessment of a relevant direction by a specific indicator is linked to the presence or absence of a certain condition, which can be documented. The regulatory and evidence basis required to calculate a score has been set for each indicator.

1. Political Interest / Engagement

The basis for analysis: speeches and interviews of the President, the Prime Minister and Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministers, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statements of parliamentary factions, statements of political party leaders, interviews with the leadership of the Presidential Office, the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada and the Analytical Report to it, the Agenda of the Verkhovna Rada Foreign Affairs Committee and available parliamentary hearings on the topic, hearings of relevant Verkhovna Rada committees.

Points:

1 point — lack of references to a foreign policy direction in official or unofficial statements, policy documents, and manifestos of the main political actors;

2 points — the existence of an informal reference to a foreign policy direction that has not acquired the form of a political position, interviews, blogs, tweets, or articles in the media on the respective topics;
3 points — there are individual official statements concerning events or certain aspects of activity regarding the direction under research among some political parties, mentioning in the speeches by the President, Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs;

4 points — there are official positions of various political entities represented in the higher authorities, but they are not mutually agreed upon, mentioning in the Presidential Annual Address, inclusion to the Agenda of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, organisation of the parliamentary hearings and round tables;

5 points — the existence of a political consensus on Ukraine’s activities in the chosen foreign policy direction, regular reference to the area under study, joint official statements, parliamentary hearings or thematic conferences.

2. Strategic Communications

The basis for the analysis: speeches by the President, the Prime Minister, and Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and other relevant ministers to foreign audiences, major publications in foreign media, etc.

Points:

1 point — interviews with high-ranking Ukrainian officials or the ambassador for the country's media, ad hoc information;

2 points — speeches by high-ranking officials (except for the President) to various target audiences;

3 points — joint statements, special (targeted) information campaigns, setting up a visit of a representative of a country or organisation to the de-occupied territories (except for an ambassador accredited in Ukraine);

4 points — all of the above and speeches by the President or other high-ranking officials at major international venues (conferences, public events), speeches by the foreign country’s top officials/organisations to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;

5 points — all of the above and the President’s speech in the parliament of the country concerned or at major international events (such as international organisations or meetings of initiatives chaired by the country under assessment, excluding non-governmental conferences).
3. Activities

The basis for the analysis: information and reports provided by the MFA of Ukraine and other ministries involved in the activities in this direction, statements and press releases of the Office of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, bilateral committees and working groups, publicly available information on activities in this direction.

Points:

1 point — the de-facto absence of activities connected with the implementation of the relevant direction of the foreign policy, the absence of other forms of cooperation or official contacts; documented facts of the opposition of some institutions to others in policy-making or conflicts between Ukrainian authorities or different branches of power in the implementation of policy in a particular foreign policy direction, disruption of the work of coordinating bodies;

2 points — individual non-systematic activities, which are not based on current strategic or operational documents for implementing a relevant direction of the foreign policy, maintaining dialogue exclusively through available diplomatic missions of Ukraine, absence of a Ukrainian ambassador in the respective country for more than half a year;

3 points — non-systematic cooperation or contacts only in certain areas without systematic cooperation; meetings within multilateral formats or “on the side-lines” along with maintaining diplomatic, trade and economic relations; reactionary approach to the implementation of the relevant direction of foreign policy;

4 points — visits of the MFA leadership, the parliament chairperson, prime minister of Ukraine to the respective country or organisation of visits of foreign representatives to Ukraine; operation of interdepartmental and other committees and working groups, joint military exercises, cooperation at the interdepartmental level;

5 points — there are activities in all areas (financial and economic, political, military, humanitarian), joint international initiatives, visits at the level of heads of state and heads of international organisations, chairmanships in international organisations or initiatives, and holding joint bilateral or multilateral forums.
4. Results

The basis for the analysis: International agreements and memoranda signed for a relevant direction of the foreign policy, information on activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Office of the President of Ukraine, MFA of Ukraine, and other relevant ministries and institutions, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statistics of trade and economic relations, information and analytical materials on the results of the meetings, sittings, etc.; aid ratings, information from foreign partners.

Points:

1 point — severance of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from an international organisation, termination of cooperation within an initiative’s framework, open military aggression or official support of the aggressor; trade, energy wars against Ukraine, obstruction of initiatives of international organisations aimed at supporting Ukraine;

2 points — reducing the level of a diplomatic mission or existing discriminatory policy in the field of trade, lack of significant joint projects in the economic and energy field, lack of dynamics in political dialogue;

3 points — slight positive dynamics at the level of political dialogue, economic contacts, and cooperation at the interdepartmental level; signing action plans for cooperation at the interdepartmental level, supporting political statements and sanctions regimes, but without significant initiatives to provide military, financial, and humanitarian assistance;

4 points — active political dialogue, support for Ukraine in certain areas (for example, only humanitarian or only economical, without military), signing bilateral and multilateral agreements, implementing decisions to support Ukraine made during high-level visits, participating in international coalitions to support Ukraine;

5 points — full support of Ukraine’s position, provision of financial, political, and military support, allocation of aid (humanitarian, financial, or for reconstruction), large-scale projects in the economic, energy, and military fields, creation and operation of special coordinating bodies to implement foreign policy in a particular direction, voting in parliaments to support Ukraine.
*Note:*

In 2022, we analysed but did not score Ukraine’s foreign policy regarding the Russian Federation and Belarus, as the full-fledged aggression did not allow us to use a standard methodology for assessment.
General scoring of a relevant direction of the foreign policy (direction’s rating)

After giving points for all the indicators, a direction’s general score will be identified by calculating the arithmetic mean value. The general score (rating) will be then reflected in the form of Latin letters (A, B, C, D, E) with arithmetic signs (+/-) depending on the obtained value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATING SCORE</th>
<th>Indicator value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-</td>
<td>4.6-4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>B+</td>
<td>4.1-4.5</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-</td>
<td>3.6-3.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>C+</td>
<td>3.1-3.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-</td>
<td>2.6-2.9</td>
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</table>
Overall scoring of Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation during the year (overall rating of Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation for the relevant year)

The overall scoring of successful implementation will be calculated by obtaining the arithmetic mean value of the general scores in all the directions of foreign policy under the research. The overall rating will be calculated similarly to the assessment of relevant directions of foreign policy.
# FOREIGN POLICY IN 2022

<table>
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<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Score</strong></td>
<td><strong>B+</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political interest/engagement

While the war with Russia began in 2014, the full-scale invasion in 2022 drew the attention of Ukraine’s political leadership on diplomatic work with foreign and international partners. Proactive efforts to expand the areas where partners can show solidarity with Ukraine began in January. In addition to the conventional work on strengthening preventive pressure on Russia through sanctions in an attempt to minimise the risks of wide-scale aggression, top Ukrainian officials and diplomats were focused on strengthening Ukraine’s military capabilities, as manifested in their statements and political position.

However, February 24, 2022, became a new starting point in building comprehensive war-time diplomacy. From the first hours of the full-scale invasion, diplomatic communication switched to the format of 24/7 crisis management with intense contacts with partners and an extensive agenda.

Ukrainian top officials focused on the following issues: seeking the terms for political and diplomatic de-escalation and stopping the war; provision of defence assistance to Ukraine in its resistance against the aggressor; minimising the scale of humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine; recording and documenting war crimes and other serious crimes committed by the Russian occupiers; increasing sanctions against supporters of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; building mechanisms to hold Russia’s leadership accountable for the crime of aggression; financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine from international partners and international organisations amid staggering losses and risks of Ukraine losing financial stability; ensuring proper conditions for Ukrainian refugees abroad; engaging foreign funding in reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in Ukraine; establishing the necessary institutional framework; confiscation of Russian assets abroad and elaborating mechanisms to further channel these resources for the restoration of Ukraine; drafting and promotion of the President’s peace formula; security guarantees for Ukraine and more.

Geographically, Ukrainian politicians and top officials focused the most on cooperation with the partners that are part of the G7, EU, and NATO. The priority tasks of the Ukrainian political leaders and diplomats were the political focus on consistent diplomatic work with these countries and building parallel solution tracks with member-states of these alliances through international organisations and bilaterally.

Ukraine’s key foreign policy decision-makers highlighted the importance of exploiting the available universal international mechanisms, such as the UN and its agencies and...
institutions, to stop Russia’s war on Ukraine and minimise the humanitarian crisis for Ukraine and the world. Ukrainian politicians and diplomats grew more interested in the so-called Global South in an effort to seek wide international support for pro-Ukrainian decisions.

Speeding up Ukraine’s EU and NATO integration was met with strong political consensus and interest from various political parties and actors in Ukraine. Joint statements on this matter came from the President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister and Verkhovna Rada’s Speaker. Individual countries and regions in focus included the US, UK, Baltic States, Poland, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Building an international coalition for the reconstruction of Ukraine, sanctions policy, and military diplomacy were the top priorities for all political actors in Ukraine.

Total score:

Strategic communications

Strategic communications with partners were the foundation for establishing international coalitions to counter Russia’s aggression in 2022. Ukraine needed to keep foreign states constantly focused on its developments and have decisions passed quickly on various issues. President Zelenskyy’s telephone diplomacy since the first hours of the full-scale invasion, regular addresses to parliaments of other countries and events along with online campaigns on social media and regular interviews for international media allowed Ukraine to promote its national interests and stay in the spotlight of international audiences at the level of institutions in charge of foreign policy and beyond.

The President’s addresses to the parliaments of other countries and official meetings of international organisations proved to be an efficient tool of strategic communication. Parliaments became a successful platform for the President’s addresses for a number of reasons. Firstly, parliaments, as political institutions, are directly connected to voters in their countries. Secondly, many parliaments appoint governments and play an important role in approving decisions on assistance to Ukraine. This communication format with Western audiences became quite popular and drew a lot of interest. Foreign
Communication experts analyse President Zelenskyy’s addresses while publishers print collections of his speeches. In 2022, President Zelenskyy spoke 35 times to parliaments across Europe, Asia and North America, as well as the parliaments of Israel, Australia, and New Zealand.

Visits to the liberated towns of Kyiv region were a powerful instrument for drawing the attention of the EU, NATO, and partner-state leaders to Ukraine and showing them the depth of the human tragedy caused by the Russian aggression. Foreign partners could witness the war crimes of the Russian military there. The leaders of the EU institutions, among others, visited Bucha, Irpin, and Borodianka.

The engagement of First Lady O. Zelenska in information campaigns and international humanitarian campaigns was helpful in terms of putting Russia’s war against Ukraine and Ukraine’s needs in the spotlight. Her addresses to US and UK lawmakers, major international conferences, and interviews strengthened Ukraine’s communication abroad.

Exclusive interviews of President Zelenskyy, First Lady Zelenska, Foreign Minister Kuleba, Defence Minister Reznikov, and Commander in Chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces Zaluzhnyi were conventional in terms of the format yet impactful in terms of their sense.

Verkhovna Rada’s leadership and MPs were engaged in advocating decisions that required the approval of national parliaments or the European Parliament and parliamentary assemblies of international organisations.

Massive awareness-raising campaigns in foreign capitals and cities and advocacy campaigns on social media on behalf of the Ukrainian State and Armed Forces, supported by the citizens and NGOs, contributed too.

At the same time, Ukraine’s strategic communication sometimes lacked uniformity; clarity on who is authorised to comment on matters of war, peaceful resolution and relations with partners. It also lacked an individual approach to some countries and regions.

Total score:
Activities

Ukraine’s activity was mostly focused on building an international coalition to counter Russia’s aggression, receiving the necessary security and humanitarian assistance, and dealing with the impact of war throughout 2022. While some conventional diplomacy tools could not be used because of martial law and a change of priorities, Ukrainian foreign and domestic political actors — including the President, the President’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Verkhovna Rada and others — exploited the available toolkit and intensified their efforts in many areas. Many diplomatic missions abroad intensified their efforts, too.

Ukraine was permanently in the closest possible and top-level contact with the US, the UK, Poland, Baltic States and Central European states. Their leaders visited Ukraine repeatedly. This was illustrated by the fact that a number of Central European partners quit purely nationalist ideas and slogans in favour of stronger practical sectoral cooperation. Overall, presidents and government leaders of 39 countries in Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America, and Australia visited Ukraine in 2022.

Seeking to build long-term security guarantees, Ukraine launched an international working group led by the Head of the Office of the President, A. Yermak, on behalf of Ukraine, and former NATO Secretary General, A. F. Rasmussen, on behalf of the international community. With over 20 foreign experts, the group designed the Kyiv Security Compact plan. The Compact was to offer security guarantees for Ukraine until its membership in NATO. It was met with varying political and expert reactions. Ukraine’s leadership then decided to push for the security guarantee track along with Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s 10-point Peace Plan proposed later in 2022.

The Yermak-McFaul working group was established to keep close contact with partners on the preparation and implementation of sanctions. It was tasked with delivering comprehensive solutions for pressuring Russian entities linked to the war against Ukraine with sanctions. The group shared its recommendations on important steps regarding sanctions with representatives of the US, EU and other partners.

President Zelenskyy was constantly in contact with the leaders of all partner states through telephone conversations and tried to garner the support of more countries. His numerous addresses to the parliaments of various countries resonated with societies. Amid his usual online addresses, President Zelenskyy’s appearance in person in the US Congress in December helped strengthen the positive impact on the audience of the US lawmakers and minimise the threats of losing bipartisan support for Ukraine.
Proactive high-level political dialogue and intense advocacy by Ukrainian politicians and civil society led to progress in Ukraine’s EU integration. While Ukraine and the EU did not manage to have the EU-Ukraine summit in 2022, the parties worked intensely through the bilateral entities established under the Association Agreement. For example, a number of important bilateral agreements were signed to strengthen Ukraine’s sectoral integration with the EU’s internal market during the EU-Ukraine Association Council in Brussels in September. Moreover, Ukrainian officials have participated in Council of the European Union meetings since Ukraine became an EU candidate.

Ukraine’s political move of applying for NATO membership in the fall of 2022 was not met with the same response from its members. Work with individual NATO member-states did not become systemic in 2022.

The consistent work of Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and state defence companies allowed Ukraine to ensure supplies of weapons and move to joint projects of ammunition production on the territory of EU countries. These are primarily Central European states. The meetings of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein group, seriously positively impacted security cooperation with over 54 countries.

Ukraine had an intense dialogue with its foreign partners on building a platform for recovery and engaging international donors and investors in post-war reconstruction. Supported by its foreign partners, Ukraine was present at a high political level in the respective international conferences in Warsaw in May, Lugano in June, Berlin in October, and Paris in December, as well as in other fora in support of Ukraine. Ukraine was working proactively within the international organisations where it is a member and within partner organisations, such as G7. Work and advocacy within the UN got a new impetus and engaged all branches of government.

Ukraine’s MFA intensified its work with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America despite Russia’s extensive political and economic influence there. The African tour of Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba was important in this context. Also, the MFA appointed a Deputy Minister responsible for developing relations with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in the fall of 2022. He was tasked with developing a strategy for the MFA to work with the LAC region. Also, a Special Representative was appointed for the Middle East and Africa in 2022.

Overall, 2022 saw a serious replacement of ambassadors in the countries of importance for Ukraine. While this was mostly a scheduled rotation of Ukrainian ambassadors, some changes resulted from poor delivery in war-time diplomacy.
New ambassadors were appointed to Australia, Egypt (March); the UAE, Cuba, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, and Montenegro (May); Tajikistan (June); Mongolia and Germany (September); Morocco and Slovakia (October); Switzerland (November); Argentina, Bulgaria, Latvia, Nigeria and Peru (December). Also, ambassadors with concurrent accreditation were appointed to Bahrain, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and New Zealand. Still, embassies in Algeria, Angola, Belgium, Brazil, Armenia, Georgia, Ethiopia, Iraq, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, China, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Thailand, Hungary, and the Czech Republic remained without ambassadors by the end of 2022.

Civil society made an important contribution to Ukraine’s foreign policy activity. Their advocacy visits to important capitals across the world complemented Ukraine’s official agenda.

**Total score:**

**Results**

In the political and diplomatic dimension, Ukraine’s partners condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion both within international organisations and nationally. Giving Ukraine the status of an EU candidate country was the political breakthrough of 2022.

The ongoing coordination of decisions on Ukraine by G7 and the EU enabled serious progress in approving sanctions, financial and humanitarian assistance, and shaping the foundation of the future mechanism for reconstructing Ukraine and attracting investment. The scale of sanctions imposed by Ukraine’s partners turned out to be unexpected for the Kremlin. EU member-states mastered political will and consensus for nine sanction packages against Russia. They covered energy, banking, the defence industry, media in Russia, and many legal entities and individuals. Other European countries that are not EU member-states, Australia, Japan, etc., joined the sanctions.

The political leadership of partners in some areas allowed Ukraine to strengthen advocacy in communication with the states that are hesitating about clear support for Ukraine.

The US and the UK remained the key partners in strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities and shaping military-political coalitions. The launch and active work of the
Ramstein format, a platform for military assistance for Ukraine and strengthening the capacity of its Armed Forces, is an important accomplishment of Ukrainian war-time diplomacy. Its political and practical components are equally important. With the US leadership, the format united over 50 of Ukraine’s partners on the political level, allowing countries to agree and coordinate the supplies of weapons and ammunition on the practical level. Overall, over 30 countries provided lethal and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine.

The EU’s decision to allow the use of the European Peace Facility funds to reimburse the EU member-states for the necessary armaments and munitions they provide to Ukraine is another important political accomplishment. EUR 3.1bn was allocated for Ukraine as of the end of 2022 out of the European Peace Facility’s total budget of EUR 5.7bn.

Besides military equipment and munitions, Ukraine is vitally interested in training its military in the territory of partner-states. The UK was leading in this in 2022. Together with partners from NATO member-states, it launched massive training of new Armed Forces of Ukraine units. By the end of 2022, the long-awaited official launch of the EU Military Assistance Mission took place. The mission has a two-year mandate to train the Ukrainian military in the territory of EU member-states.

Approving the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine at the NATO summit in Madrid was another important sign of solidarity with Ukraine from NATO member-states, even if this support was non-lethal.

Representatives of Ukraine were active on various UN platforms in an effort to draw attention to Ukraine and increase international legal pressure on Russia. With the UN’s mediation, the Grain Deal was signed in July to export Ukrainian grain by sea. It was extended in November. Ukraine enjoyed unprecedented support for its resolutions at the UN General Assembly. Over 140 countries voted in favour of condemning the Russian aggression, the annexation of Ukrainian territory, reparations, the suspension of the Russian Federation from the UN Human Rights Council and more.

While Ukraine received uneven and sometimes insufficient monthly assistance, grant and lending support from international financial institutions throughout 2022 allowed Ukraine to stay solvent and keep its financial system stable. After February 24, Ukraine’s international partners channelled over USD28bn to the Ukrainian budget. The US, EU, Germany, Canada, and the UK made the biggest contributions.

Ukraine was offered a range of trade preferences in relations with its partners. This allowed Ukraine to increase its export revenue amid a crisis in its economy. The EU, the UK, and Australia suspended import duties for Ukrainian exports.
Despite the war and the damage caused by it, Ukraine managed to avoid a catastrophe in international trade. It exported USD 44.17bn worth of goods, or 64.9 per cent of the 2021 amount, and imported USD 59.51bn worth of goods or 81.7 per cent of the 2021 amount.

As part of the Grain from Ukraine initiative supported by its Western partners, Ukraine delivered grain to a number of Middle East countries, including Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman.

Total score:

Total score for Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2022:
G7 COUNTRIES

UNITED KINGDOM A
ITALY B+
CANADA A
GERMANY A
USA A
FRANCE A-
JAPAN A-
In 2022, The UK provided security and economic support to Ukraine and implemented increasing pressure of sanctions on Russia. It was the UK that initiated and sponsored new assistance packages and supply of new types of armaments within different formats of this flagship support.

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<th>POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS</td>
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<td>ACTIVITIES</td>
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<td>RESULTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL SCORE:</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political interest/engagement

After the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the formats of cooperation established earlier — including the Political, Free Trade, and Strategic Partnership Agreement — allowed the two countries to move to new formats of crisis cooperation. Respectively, the Ukrainian leadership and diplomacy invested a strong political interest and engagement in the UK track.

In 2022, political interest in the UK was high. The key aspects were the supply of armaments, macro-financial support for the Ukrainian economy, and stronger political support from London to strengthen the pro-Ukrainian coalition of Western states.

President Zelenskyy repeatedly spoke about cooperation with the UK and its assistance to Ukraine in his official statements and numerous interviews. He focused on the UK in his Address to the Verkhovna Rada on the occasion of the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s visit (3.05), address to G7 leaders (12.12), Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada (28.12), and the Analytical Report to the Address.

The theme of cooperation with the UK and comprehensive assistance were repeatedly the focus of addresses and comments by Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, and MPs L. Vasylenko, Y. Cherniev, D. Natalukha, O. Goncharenko, V. Halaychuk and others.

Apart from that, Ukrainian speakers frequently highlighted the importance of further developing the UK-Poland-Ukraine triangle. President Zelenskyy spoke about this in some of his addresses to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President mentioned this too. At the same time, the operational framework of the triangle and potential tools remain formulated quite vaguely.
Strategic communications

The President’s Address to the UK Parliament (8.03) merits special attention as one of that level’s first public online addresses since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, which planted the key messages of further Ukraine-UK cooperation in 2022.

The Ukrainian President, the President’s Office, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Embassy in the UK and the First Lady were active in the UK media. The Ukrainian establishment was present consistently and synergically in the UK media throughout 2022. Regular long interviews for the BBC and SKY, including an exclusive interview (14.04), and other TV channels, as well as the UK’s top print outlets (The Guardian, The Economist, etc.) by the Ukrainian President and other top officials had a significant impact on the audience in the UK and were widely spread and quoted in the English-speaking world.

Every meeting of the Ukrainian President with representatives of the UK finished with a press conference for a wide range of media. The First Lady also gave exclusive interviews to the British media, such as BBC (24.11).

The visits of the UK Prime ministers, especially Boris Johnson, to Ukraine, had a serious effect as they were in the spotlight of international media.

Activities

2022 saw many mutual visits. Some of the visits that received the most media coverage included the top-level visits of the UK representatives to Ukraine, primarily prime ministers B. Johnson (1.02, 9.04, 17.06, 24.08) and R. Sunak (18.11), ministers of defence (10.06, 18.08, 29.09), and foreign affairs (17.02, 25.11). Every meeting resulted in a new impetus for bilateral relations and served as a strong informational push for the friendly audience and against the aggressor state.

From Ukraine, First Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko visited the UK to discuss trade liberalization (27.05) and to sign a digital trade agreement (29–30.11). Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs M. Akopian visited the UK to discuss cooperation on demining, investigation of Russian crimes, reconstruction of Ukrainian infrastructure, and reform of Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (14–15.07).

In the framework of the First Lady’s visit to the UK (November), O. Zelenska addressed the British Parliament, where she talked about victory in the war and
justice for the victims of aggression. She also met with the House of Commons Speaker, participated in the conference on preventing sexual violence during the conflicts, and was a guest at the Queen Consort’s reception, organised on the Day on Elimination of Violence against Women. In addition, the presentation of the Olena Zelenska Foundation took place in London, accompanied by fundraising to reconstruct a hospital in Izuym.

Cooperation with the UK was in the focus of the respective committee of Ukraine’s Parliament. The Verkhovna Rada expanded the range of themes and added new aspects of bilateral dialogue to its agenda. As part of these efforts, MP L. Vasylenko participated in the Strengthening the international response to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence conference (10–14.05) and visited the UK repeatedly; MP Y. Zhelezniak attended the Ukrainian Reconstruction Forum (24–29.05); MP Y. Kamelchuk met with Ukrainian refugees and local politicians in Bristol (20–27.07); MP H. Vasylenko had two visits to the UK to organise bilateral humanitarian cooperation and attend fundraising events (8–12.08 and 12–16.09); and MP K. Rudyk visited the UK for a series of parliamentary meetings (27.07–2.08). UK MPs visited Ukraine, too. Among others, a multiparty group of MPs visited Ukraine (10.09), and a UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee delegation was in Ukraine (16–19.10).

The bilateral 2022 UK-Ukraine Season of Culture was approved in 2021 to mark 30 years of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the UK. While the Russian invasion undermined the full benefit of this socio-cultural cooperation, artistic exchange and projects did take place and were extended to 2023.

Results

Ukraine significantly increased cooperation with the UK in foreign policy despite the war. Unfortunately, the war seriously undermined economic cooperation in quantitative terms. Qualitatively, however, Ukrainian diplomacy initiated the signing of a range of documents that will create the framework for further development of bilateral economic relations in the restoration of Ukraine and conventional economic cooperation. Total trade was USD 1.24bn in 2022, down from USD 2.2bn in 2021. Services accounted for half of the total trade between Ukraine and the UK in the past. The war hit this segment of trade the hardest.
The UK partners provided unwaning support in security and political dialogue to Ukraine, backed by the respective diplomatic communication of Ukraine and the UK. The UK provided over GBP 2.3bn worth of military assistance to Ukraine between February 24 and December 31. The same amount is planned for 2023. Also, the UK prepared and trained over 27,000 servicemen and servicewomen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In order to support Ukraine’s economy, the UK announced the abolition of import duties and tariff quotas for Ukrainian goods (4.05) along with the signing of Agreement No.1 to amend the Political, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership Agreement. On August 18, Ukraine and the UK signed Agreement No.1 to amend the above-mentioned Agreement regarding an increase in thresholds for contracts signed in the framework of new forms of cooperation.

The UK-Ukraine Digital Trade Agreement was signed (30.11). Among other things, it provides no duties and freedom of taxation in digital trade and supports the overall legal framework for e-transactions, e-contracting, electronic identification, paperless trade, protection of personal data and more.

The additional measures implemented for Ukrainian refugees in the UK merit special attention. These included a visa extension scheme that allows Ukrainian citizens to live, work and study in the UK and access public funding. The UK introduced an additional Homes for Ukraine scheme, a sponsor program that allows Ukrainian citizens and their family members to come to the UK for the duration of the war and receive shelter there. Ukrainian refugees can stay in the UK for three years under this support scheme.
Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine changed Italy’s perspective of Ukraine. Both Italian governments of 2022 supported Ukraine through political, economic, financial, social, defence and humanitarian cooperation. However, the domestic political debate on further military assistance to Ukraine and many pro-Russian influences often undermined deeper societal cooperation and understanding. Italy confirmed that the rule of law remains a priority for her, as does holding Russia accountable for its crimes in Ukraine.

### Italy 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Interest/Engagement</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications</td>
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<td><strong>Total Score:</strong></td>
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### Ukraine Prism: Foreign Policy 2022

- **POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT** 4
- **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS** 5
- **ACTIVITIES** 4
- **RESULTS** 4

**TOTAL SCORE:** B+
Political interest/engagement

Political interest was determined by Ukraine’s interaction with Italy in the context of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the debate over Italy’s support for Ukraine’s EU candidacy, peace formula, and defence, economic, humanitarian and cultural support for Ukraine. Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy did not mention Italy individually in his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada and at the Ambassadorial. However, given the importance of Italy’s membership in the EU, G7, G20, and NATO, it was consistently on Ukraine’s political agenda.

Strategic communications

Ukraine used different forms of communication in and with Italy. In his online address to the Italian Parliament, President Zelenskyy focused on Russia’s crimes against Ukrainians (22.03) and called on solidarity with Ukraine in his address to the people of Italy (12.03). President Zelenskyy gave a long interview with Italy’s top newspaper Corriere della Sera explaining the challenges faced by Ukraine, the peace formula, the food crisis and Ukraine’s need for new equipment and armaments (27.10). Ministers and representatives of the President’s Office gave many interviews for various Italian media outlets, including Italy’s biggest broadcaster RAI.

First Lady O. Zelenska addressed the Italian people personally in Gr1 on RAI (8.04) and was interviewed by Corriere della Sera (16.07).

Italy’s Prime Minister, M. Draghi, visited Ukraine in June together with the leaders of France, Romania, and Germany.

Activities

Bilateral dialogue remained intense throughout 2022. Volodymyr Zelenskyy spoke to Italy’s prime ministers Mario Draghi and Giorgia Meloni five times officially alone. He addressed the Parliament of Italy (22.03), and welcomed in Kyiv Prime Minister Draghi (16.06), Foreign Minister Di Maio (20.06), Defence Minister Guerini (23.09) and Carlo
Bonomi, President of Confindustria, the General Confederation of Italian Industry (20.06). Apart from that, Italy’s Defence Minister Guerini visited Ukraine on September 23 to continue the discussion of military assistance to Ukraine.

The most important was the visit of Italian Prime Minister Draghi as part of the delegation with presidents of France and Romania and the chancellor of Germany (16.06). It was then that Italy declared unwavering support for Ukraine's candidacy for the EU, and the peace formula was discussed.

Representatives of Ukrainian energy and finance ministries met with Italy's big businesses to discuss the prospects of strengthening cooperation, including financial and lending cooperation, and engagement of Italian businesses in funding Ukraine's post-war reconstruction.

D. Volodina, head of the Ukraine-Italy group of friendship at the Verkhovna Rada, visited Italy and met with the representatives of the Italian MFA, Chamber of Deputies and Ministry of Defence (29.03–04.04). A. Urso, President of the National Security Committee of Italy’s Senate, visited Kyiv (9.09). An Italian delegation led by U. Cappellacci, chair of the Italy-Ukraine parliamentary contact group, visited the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for an official visit (19–20.05).

**Results**

Italy contributed significantly to strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The Italian government led by M. Draghi approved five shipments of weapons to Ukraine, and the government led by G. Meloni approved the sixth delivery. Italy is currently one of Ukraine's top ten assistance providers, worth nearly EUR 800m. This includes economic, humanitarian, and military assistance. The new government led by G. Meloni approved the resolution to continue the supply of weapons to Ukraine through December 31, 2023, unanimously.

Italy joined over 40 partners in the call for the International Criminal Court prosecutor to speed up the investigation of war crimes Russia committed in Ukraine and made a voluntary donation of EUR 500,000 to the Trust Fund for Victims to support the work of the International Criminal Court, while also engaging experts in supporting ICC’s investigations.
As a result of the talks with Ukraine’s Ministry of Agricultural Policy and Food, Italy allocated EUR 2m for the Grain from Ukraine initiative and pledged to help Ukraine analyse and assess the environmental damage caused by Russia’s aggression.

Also, Italy provided a bilateral loan worth nearly EUR 310m to Ukraine. It allocated a total of EUR 40m for humanitarian assistance and nearly EUR 390m for military assistance, partly funded through the European Peace Facility.

Ukrainian doctors and medical personnel had an opportunity to practice in Italy temporarily from March 22, 2022, to March 4, 2023. 10,064 Ukrainian children forced to leave Ukraine due to the Russian invasion were enrolled in schools and kindergartens in Italy.

Bilateral trade amounted to USD 3.44bn in 2022, down from USD 6.14bn in 2021, with almost equal exports and imports.
The main focus of Ukrainian foreign policy towards Canada was aimed at military, financial and humanitarian resources obtained to counter the Russian Federation’s aggression. Canada has become a reliable partner (though not the most active in terms of assistance). Taking into account the cordial relations established within the previous years, Ukrainian authorities managed to promote some truly unique initiatives. Canada was one of the first to announce new sanctions packages, adopt radical legislation enabling the seizure of Russian assets, recognize Russian aggression as an act of genocide against Ukrainians, abolish duties on Ukrainian export, and take commitment to engage in Ukraine’s recovery projects.
Political interest/engagement

Unlike the previous years, in 2022, the President of Ukraine mentioned Canada in his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada. In addition to security and economic assistance from NATO and G7 member states, Canada was specifically mentioned in the context of humanitarian aid and grain corridor launch. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address also refers to Canadian contribution, in particular, the training mission for the Ukrainian military launched in the United Kingdom at the end of June. Canada’s significant macro-financial and credit assistance, as well as leadership to retain and enhance the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation, are noted together with Canada’s exemplary recognition of the Russian Federation’s aggression as an act of genocide against Ukrainians. However, trade, educational, or cultural initiatives weren’t mentioned, although less significant measures and projects promoted by other countries were.

The President didn’t mention Canada in his speech at the Ambassadorial. But V. Zelenskyy, in his public statements, frequently referred to a “special partnership” with Canada, expressing gratitude for the assistance provided and requests to counteract the Russian Federation. In particular, the abovementioned references can be found in the President’s address in connection with the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation (25.02), the President’s speech given to the Canadian Parliament (15.03) and statements made at the G7 summits (8.05, 27.06, 11.10, 12.12), daily messages (sixteen times).

The need to strengthen cooperation with Ukraine’s key partners of Ukraine was noted by Minister D. Kuleba at the Ambassadorial as one of the crucial tasks for the diplomatic activities, without Canada being specifically outlined (23.12). D. Kuleba often stressed the significance of Canadian support in his speeches, but mostly at joint briefings (18.01, 12.11) and in telephone conversations with his Canadian counterpart M. Joly.

Minister of Defence O. Reznikov repeatedly mentioned Canadian military and technical assistance, mostly after meetings of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (Ramstein group) and at joint briefings with the Canadian counterpart A. Anand.

Cooperation with Canada wasn’t the subject of discussions and plans at the meeting of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation Committee except for the drafting of appeals to governments and parliaments of different states due to escalation at the borders (24.01, 15.02) and the aggression of the Russian Federation (3.03, 21.03, 12.04, 28.04).
Strategic communications

Before the start of the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukraine and Canada communicated mostly in the context of a “special partnership”, duration and expansion of the UNIFIER training mission for the Ukrainian military, a joint investigation of UIA PS752 flight crash over Tehran and compensations for the families of victims, as well as Canada’s lobby for Ukrainian integration in NATO.

Obviously, these issues became secondary and remained unresolved in the conditions of a full-scale war with the Russian Federation. The priority was given to the supply of weapons, financial and humanitarian assistance, and sanctions against the aggressor. It is clearly demonstrated by the Ukrainian messages — in January, President V. Zelenskyy had a conversation with PM J. Trudeau (11.01), pointing at the need to update the Joint Declaration on Special Partnership and Expansion of Economic Cooperation, but in his online address to the Canadian Parliament (15.03) the President emphasised exclusively the demand for Canada’s proactive position regarding the weapons supply. J. Trudeau’s visit to Kyiv and de-occupied Irpin (8.05) was paramount to accelerating the Canadian assistance provision.

The President mentioned the importance of Canadian support at numerous platforms in 2022, in particular, while delivering a speech to Canadian students (22.06), at the Second Crimean Platform Summit (23.08), at the Halifax Security Forum (19.11), at the launching of Grain from Ukraine initiative (28.11). In addition, Canada had been mentioned regularly in various interviews and press conferences: with foreign journalists (23.04), Canadian media CTV and CBC (19.10), Italian RAI (13.05), etc. In general, during the year, high-ranking Ukrainian officials were interviewed intensely by several major Canadian media (Globe and Mail, CBC, CTV), although Canadian media mostly cited statements and interviews in other publications.

Special attention should be given to the government’s response towards excluding Russian turbines, kept under repair in Canada, from the sanctions lists due to Germany’s pressure. V. Zelenskyy, in his address (11.07), rightly claimed this decision to be a consequence of Russian manipulation that did not prevent the gas supply reduction but with the potential to create a threatening precedent for Ukrainian partners. However, these messages given by Ukrainian officials had been reactionary to a certain extent since such intentions of the Canadians were known in advance.
Activities

The President of Ukraine had one meeting with the Prime Minister of Canada (8.05) during his visit to Kyiv and liberated parts of the Kyiv region. At this meeting, J. Trudeau committed to provide Ukraine with weapons, assistance in demining activities, financial contributions and loans, and participation in recovery projects. Canadian Prime Minister noted that his state would remain close to Ukraine “for years, decades, and centuries” and announced the resume of the embassy’s functioning. It is important that during this visit, the President and the Prime Minister jointly participated in the G7 meeting. All telephone conversations with J. Trudeau (11.01, 12.02, and 28.09) covered the security environment right before and in the course of the Russian attack, the need for military and financial assistance to Ukraine, sanctions pressure against the Russian Federation and recognising it as a state sponsor of terrorism.

A similar range of issues was raised by OPU representatives A. Yermak and I. Zhovkva at meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, M. Joly (17.01) and in dialogue with the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Ch. Freeland (22.01).

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba held many meetings and telephone conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada M. Joly (12.01, 18.01, 3.07, 3.10, 10.10, 4.11) concerning military and economic support for Ukraine and resistance to Russian aggression. D. Kuleba also used international meetings to organise joint briefings with his Canadian counterpart, e.g. G7 meeting (14.05), ASEAN (12.11), and NATO (30.11).

During his visit to London, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal met with J. Trudeau (19.09), where they discussed the introduction of sanctions against Russian energy resources and the establishment of the tribunal to hold the Russian leadership liable for crimes committed in Ukraine. In addition to security issues, Ukraine was promoting economic assistance and post-war recovery, particularly at the jointly organised Rebuild Ukraine business conference in Canada with the participation of D. Shmyhal and Ch. Freeland (23.11).

Minister of Defence O. Reznikov regularly contacted his Canadian counterpart A. Anand. In particular, she visited Kyiv (31.01) to discuss the core issues — the situation at the borders and cooperation with NATO. Regular telephone conversations were held at the level of MoD leaders, emphasising various military and humanitarian assistance. Similarly, the AFU Commander-in-Chief, V. Zaluzhnyi, constantly communicated with the Chief of Defence Staff of the Canadian Armed Forces, General W. Eyre, regarding the ongoing situation at the front line (27.07, 17.08).
The Ukrainian delegation, headed by Vice PM O. Stefanishyna, took part in one of the largest world security forums in Halifax (18–20.11). It is interesting that Canadian Defence Minister A. Anand personally joined the protest in support of Ukraine organised by the Ukrainian diaspora during the forum.

The Speaker of the VRU, R. Stefanchuk, held several online meetings with the Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons A. Rota regarding the seizure of Russian assets and recognition of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (22.06, 18.08). Parliamentary delegation of the VRU had several visits to Canada to meet their counterparts (1–2.04), government officials and the Chamber of Commerce (3.05).

Ukrainian Embassy, led by the newly appointed Ambassador Y. Kovaliv, played an important role in keeping continuous dialogue with the Canadian authorities and the Ukrainian diaspora at various levels, especially in the context of military and financial assistance.

**Results**

In 2022, the greatest achievements were measured by the amount of military, humanitarian and financial aid provided to Ukraine. However, due to active lobbying by Ukrainian authorities and extended public and multiparty support, Canada has often acted as an exemplary behavioural model for other partners, being one of the first states to announce sanctions packages against the Russian Federation and Belarus. Since February 24, over 1,500 individual sanctions have been introduced against individuals and legal entities involved in aggression (2,100 individuals and organisations have been covered by sanctions since 2014).

Another important step was adopting quite radical legislation enabling the confiscation of Russian assets — the Senate of Canada approved the relevant amendments to the law “On special economic measures” (23.06).

Canada was among the first to recognise the aggression of the Russian Federation as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian population (27.04).

In addition, a decision was made to extend the UNIFIER military training and capacity-building mission to 400 individuals on a permanent basis by 2025. In particular, Canada sent 225 instructors for the Ukrainian military to a training base in the United Kingdom in the summer of 2022.
Canada has traditionally been a centre for disseminating Ukrainian culture due to the active influence of the Ukrainian diaspora. The largest Ukrainian festival in North America — The Bloor West Village Toronto Ukrainian Festival — was held in September (with more than 200,000 visitors), backed by increasing global attention to Ukraine.

One of the important achievements was Canada’s unilateral decision to cancel trade restrictions for Ukraine and open its markets temporarily for the duty-free import of Ukrainian goods. It had been a significant compensation for the urge to update and expand the Free Trade Agreement (Joint Commission had to suspend this activity due to the war).

There were also negative moments, including Canada’s decision to unblock and remove Gazprom’s turbines, kept under repair, from the sanctions list (initiated by the German government).

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, in 2022, the bilateral trade operations amounted to approximately USD 272.6m (15.3% less compared to 2021). Commodity export reached USD 105.8m, import — USD 166.7m. Although negative balance traditionally prevails, in war conditions, these results may be considered rather successful.

In 2022, Canada provided Ukraine with over USD 1.2bn of direct and USD 1.6bn of credit assistance in terms of weapon supply and humanitarian goods, energy and nuclear security, budget support, etc. This flow of support is already secured for the following years by a special section of Canada’s budget titled “Canada’s Leadership in the World”.
An active political dialogue between top officials, ministries, and local authorities characterised relations between Ukraine and Germany. In 2022, Ukraine’s main goal was to ensure that Germany provided heavy weapons and abandoned Russian energy supplies, which was almost achieved except for the supply of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks. The era of changes in German foreign policy has also led to a more favourable attitude of the country’s leadership toward Ukraine’s EU accession. Ukraine developed an active communication campaign in Germany during the year. The Bundestag voted to recognize the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people.
Political interest/engagement

With the outbreak of Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine, the main political actors’ focus on Germany concerned obtaining weapons, including heavy guns, which Germany had delayed delivering. There was complete consensus among Ukrainian officials on the priorities of Ukrainian-German relations: the supply and repair of heavy weapons, generators, and power equipment to restore Ukraine’s energy system, the introduction of new sanctions against Russia, and the refusal to buy Russian energy.

In his address in March, the President of Ukraine called on Germans not to sponsor Russia’s military machine, close ports, stop supplying goods, and stop buying Russian energy. In their contacts with German colleagues, the President of Ukraine, the Government and MPs also emphasised the importance of bringing the occupiers and the aggressor state of Russia to justice and establishing a special tribunal. Germany was not mentioned in the main foreign policy speeches but was regarded among the EU and NATO partners, as well as the G7.

Strategic communications

Kyiv’s strategic communications in Germany were designed to help Ukraine achieve its foreign policy goals — military, economic, and humanitarian support for Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale war. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy’s address to the Bundestag at the beginning of the war (18.03) was a significant achievement of Ukrainian stratcom.

During the year, President V. Zelenskyy, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada R. Stefanchuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba, and Ambassadors of Ukraine to Germany A. Melnyk and O. Makeiev gave interviews to influential German media (Die Welt, FAZ, ZDF, etc.). Special emphasis in strategic communications was placed on Russia’s crimes against civilians.

Chancellor O. Scholz visited the de-occupied territories of the Kyiv region in June.

The German side was critical of Ukraine’s unwillingness to host Federal President F.-W. Steinmeier in spring. Commenting on the case, Minister D. Kuleba said that the situation would be resolved through diplomatic channels. It was not until the autumn that F.-W. Steinmeier visited Ukraine after V. Zelenskyy invited him and Chancellor O. Scholz by phone in May.
Activities

In 2022, the political dialogue between Ukraine and Germany was exceptionally active, driven by high expectations and the need for German leadership to help Ukraine during the war.

High-level visits took place throughout the year. In May, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba met members of the German Government and the Bundestag. In June, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada R. Stefanchuk visited Germany, and in September, Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal paid a working visit. The Ukrainian-German High-Level Group on Economic Cooperation held its 12th meeting (24.10), and the 5th Ukrainian-German Economic Forum took place, which was the first such event during the eight months of the full-scale Russian aggression and had the highest representation in its history since 2015.

At the beginning of the year, German Foreign Minister A. Baerbock visited Ukraine twice. The German side also made a series of visits to Ukraine after the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion: President of the German Bundestag B. Bas visited Kyiv in May, Chancellor O. Scholz came to Ukraine in June, and Foreign Minister A. Baerbock visited Ukraine again in May and September.

There were also contacts with German representatives within the EU and G7. Presiding in the G7 in 2022, Germany supported the provision of assistance to Ukraine for as long as it was needed.

Ambassador A. Melnyk developed a traditionally active political communication, which sometimes faced criticism from German partners. After September 23, he was replaced by O. Makeiev, who continued the tradition of media presence.

Ukrainian MPs also made advocacy visits to promote support for Ukraine in Germany, particularly for establishing a special tribunal to investigate war crimes committed by Russia and for making it compensate for the damage its aggression caused to Ukraine. Charity concerts and exhibitions were also held throughout the year to draw attention to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Results

2022 was a very productive year for Ukrainian-German relations. Germany supported Ukraine’s aspirations to become an EU candidate by working with EU member states. Despite the industry's high dependence on Russian gas, the German government managed to organise alternative supplies of natural gas and took a leading role in promoting energy sanctions.

The Bundestag’s recognition of the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as a genocide of the Ukrainian people was one of Ukraine’s major victories in 2022, achieved through a long-term advocacy campaign.

As a result of unprecedented pressure mounted both by Ukraine and within the ruling coalition and Berlin’s international partners, Germany began supplying Ukraine with heavy weapons. By the end of the year, Ukraine received a large number of weapons, both from Bundeswehr warehouses and as military aid by way of supplies from (German) industry. According to the Federal Government and the Ukraine Support Tracker project, Germany financed more than EUR 2bn worth of weapons, becoming one of Ukraine's top three providers of military aid.

In 2022, German prosecutors took part in the investigation of war crimes in Ukraine and collected hundreds of pieces of evidence.

Germany also helped Ukraine to stabilise its energy infrastructure, which was damaged by Russian attacks. The German Federal Agency for Technical Assistance purchased about 480 power generators and delivered 196 of them to Ukraine by the end of 2022. In the autumn of 2022, the German Foreign Ministry established an Integrated Response Hub for assistance to Ukraine. Ukraine received a EUR 1bn grant from Germany to finance priority items of the Ukrainian budget, as well as loans from the German government’s KfW bank to modernise the energy system.

Trade between the two countries totalled USD 6.7bn in 2022 (USD 4.44bn in imports and USD 2.26bn in exports), compared to USD 9.1bn in 2021.
In 2022, relations with the United States became key to ensuring Ukraine’s defence capability and coordinating Western political, economic, and military support in the face of the full-scale Russian invasion. Throughout the year, Ukrainian governmental authorities were active in bilateral relations with the United States, but in most cases, this activity was related to Ukraine’s current needs for military, financial, and diplomatic support.
Political interest/engagement

Until February 24, Ukraine relied on the United States as a key player in the international arena that could prevent a potential full-scale Russian invasion through direct negotiations with Moscow, along with parallel strengthening of Ukraine's defence capabilities. It was then, against the backdrop of Russian troops amassing on the border, that the Ukrainian authorities first raised the issue of systematic arms supplies from the United States as a means of deterring potential aggression. Almost immediately after Russia's full-scale invasion, various actors engaged with the United States regarding three priorities: arms and training, macro-financial support, and political support for consolidating the pro-Ukrainian position of other partners, including strengthening the sanctions regime. To pursue these interests, the widest possible range of Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental institutions were involved in the US track of foreign policy throughout the year. In his speech at the Annual Ambassadorial meeting (23.12), President V. Zelenskyy referred to the US track as an example of the effective use of wartime diplomacy tools (e.g., the President and the First Lady's addresses to the US Congress and the state apparatus).

Relations with the United States and cooperation at the level of the strategic partnership were mentioned in the President's Annual Address to the VRU (28.12) and in the Analytical Report to it. The key narrative in both cases focused on highlighting the important role of the United States as a strategic partner of Ukraine in supporting the country's defence capabilities and economic stability and expressing gratitude for the political and sanctions stance against Russian aggression. Similar messages were also included in the President's speech to the leaders of the Group of Seven (12.12).

US issues were correspondingly present on the parliamentary agenda. In particular, during the year, the Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation put the issue of cooperation with the US on the agenda of its meetings 15 times. It concerned the visits of Ukrainian MPs to the United States to participate in negotiations and meetings of various levels and sectors.
Strategic communications

In the context of strategic communications with the United States, 2022 was an extremely productive year. President V. Zelenskyy addressed the US Congress several times. The key message of his first speech, broadcast online (16.03), was the immediate introduction of a no-fly zone over Ukraine and the transfer of combat aircraft. During his visit to the United States in December, the President of Ukraine addressed Congress again (21.12), noting the critical role of the US military and financial support for Ukraine and stressing the importance of maintaining the current level of bilateral cooperation.

In addition, First Lady O. Zelenska became the first spouse of a foreign leader to address the US Congress (20.07). She focused on human casualties, human rights, and the provision of weapons necessary for defence.

In the context of Russia's full-scale invasion, communications shifted to the tactical level of relations, addressing urgent tasks and dealing with existing crises without focusing too much on the strategic course of relations, including energy and economic issues covered in the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership, which was updated in 2021.

During the year, the President of Ukraine gave a number of important interviews to US media, thus contributing to an active pro-Ukrainian position among a larger audience. These included interviews with the Associated Press (29.03), on the 60 Minutes show (11.04), with NBC (29.06), an exclusive interview with Christiane Amanpour for CNN (10.11), and on My Next Guest with David Letterman (27.12). Foreign Minister D. Kuleba was also interviewed for The Late Show (22.09), which became a powerful information tool for Ukrainian diplomacy, although it was not a classic media interview format.

The Embassy of Ukraine in the United States was very active in the media, with Ambassador O. Markarova giving numerous interviews to Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC, and other news outlets.

Activities

In 2022, the most notable activities in the US-Ukraine relationship included President V. Zelenskyy’s visit to the USA (21.12), which reflected the high level of bilateral relations. First Lady O. Zelenska also visited the USA in July, where she met the US First Lady, Secretary of State A. Blinken, and USAID Administrator S. Power, addressed
Congress and attended public and charity events. US First Lady J. Biden visited Ukraine in May, where she met O. Zelenska in Uzhhorod.

Throughout the year, there was constant dialogue between the military and security services of both countries. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, V. Zaluzhnyi, had nearly weekly phone conversations with the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, M. Milley. The two countries’ defence ministers, O. Reznikov and L. J. Austin III, maintained regular communication, including meetings on the eve of Ramstein summits and other security conferences and international organisations’ meetings.

US Secretary of State A. Blinken and US Secretary of Defence L. J. Austin III visited Kyiv (24.04) and met President V. Zelenskyy. Ukraine's ministers of defence and foreign affairs also participated in the talks.

In addition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, D. Kuleba, visited the United States before the full-scale Russian invasion (22.02) and for the second time to participate in the general debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly (19–23.09). The year saw visits by Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal to discuss a wide range of economic support and cooperation issues (21–22.04) by a delegation from the Ministry of Health of Ukraine headed by Minister V. Lyashko and Deputy Minister — Chief State Sanitary Doctor of Ukraine I. Kuzin (15.12), a delegation from the National Bank of Ukraine (18.12), etc.

Throughout the year, the Embassy of Ukraine in Washington was highly active and productive, both in its direct diplomatic and consular work, as well as in its media presence and new initiatives (e.g., organising and supporting volunteer initiatives to help Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, working towards the provision of weapons to Ukraine by the United States, supporting the Ukrainian House, holding public social and cultural events, etc.).

Members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were actively involved in activities in the USA on an expanded range of issues. In particular, the following issues were covered: development of cooperation in law enforcement (MP S. Ionushas visited on 22.05–5.06); provision of medical assistance in the context of military conflict (MP A. Dubnov visited on 24.05); development of GR (MP A. Skorokhod visited on 9–19.06); handling of oil waste (MP O. Seminskyy visited on 6–14.08), etc. The agenda of interparliamentary cooperation at the level of contacts between the VRU and the Committees of the US House of Representatives and the US Senate included security and defence issues (e.g., the visit of
Ukrainian MPs to the USA on May 14–23 and on July 15–25), as well as sanctions pressure (e.g., the visit of the VRU delegation on 14–19.06).

During the year, representatives of the US Congress from both political parties visited Ukraine numerous times, and meetings were held at the military level.

Results

The key outcome of 2022 in the US track was the preservation and steady growth of US political, military, and financial support since the start of the full-scale invasion. Amid Ukraine's consistent demand for support, the United States continued to be a key partner that was skilled at rallying support from others and had a decisive voice in shaping all available multilateral assistance formats.

Furthermore, Ukraine has managed to preserve US interest in strategic narratives of cooperation and the development of a large number of non-security cooperation formats. Due to objective reasons of wartime conditions, trade and economic indicators of relations with the USA have significantly decreased compared to 2021. The total trade turnover between the two countries amounted to USD3 billion compared to USD 4.9 billion in 2021. According to the Customs Service of Ukraine, the main imports to Ukraine continued to include automotive products, electrical and telecommunications equipment, and coal. Ukraine's exports were mainly represented by agricultural products (mostly honey, sunflower oil, and fruit juices) and industrial products (mostly cast iron).

In total, in 2022, the United States allocated more than USD 30.4bn in security assistance to Ukraine, and this support was crucial to strengthening the defence and tactical capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The US also provided more than USD 13bn in macro-financial assistance to support the Ukrainian economy. An additional USD 1.9bn was provided in humanitarian aid, USD 220 million in support of media independence in wartime, and USD 340 million to help refugees within the framework of the Uniting for Ukraine programme.

The USA adopted over 2,000 sanctions and about 375 export control measures, including those targeting top officials and the largest international companies working with or in Russia. Additionally, the US Congress revoked normal trade relations with Russia, effectively denying Russia an adequate system of international trade.
In 2022, Ukrainian diplomacy managed to act flexibly and effectively in many promising areas of Ukrainian-French relations, resulting in the strengthening of France’s political position in support of Ukraine, the candidate status granted to Ukraine during the French presidency of the EU, the strengthening of cooperation in terms of weapons provision and significant commitments taken to ensure assistance in different areas.
Political interest/engagement

Political interest in cooperation with France during the war has always been high. First of all, for the President and his Office, but also other foreign policy actors, France remains one of the priority states, albeit difficult — cooperation with which is aimed to ensure the achievement of key foreign policy goals of Ukraine. In 2022, the importance of cooperation with France was emphasised in the following sectors: negotiations with the Russian Federation (especially during the first month after the invasion, given the direct contacts of President E. Macron with V. Putin); France as a key subject in the future system of security guarantees for Ukraine; Ukraine's status of a candidate for EU membership granted during the French EU presidency in the first half of 2022; provision of political and military support, in particular, heavy weapons; the imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation and Russia’s prosecution in international courts, including the documentation of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation within the territory of Ukraine and its recognition as a terrorist state, establishment of international compensation mechanism.

The focus of previous years on the expansion of economic cooperation and investment was also kept, but in current conditions, it has been modified as an encouragement for France to take an active part in Ukraine's post-war recovery projects and emergency aid provision (humanitarian aid, hosting refugees, supporting the energy sector in the winter period, demilitarisation of the occupied ZNPP). Strategically, the development of relations with France aims to change its traditional position regarding the priorities of European security system transformation and, accordingly, a high priority of political and economic relations with the Russian Federation.
Strategic communications

Similarly, to political interest, high priority was given to strategic communications with the political, expert community and French public. President Zelenskyy addressed both houses of the French Parliament (23.03) and had a conversation with French students and staff of universities (12.05) that was widely broadcast by the largest media.

In December, Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal addressed the French Parliament live during the Stability and Recovery Forum organised by President Macron. In February, the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a speech at an event attended by leading French analysts with several interviews with the French media. The First Lady and other officials also gave interviews to the French media.

In June, French President E. Macron visited Ukraine, including the war-affected areas (widely covered by the media).

Activities

In 2022, relations with France were actively developing, with priorities shifting during the year. In February-March, priority was given to guaranteeing French support and mediation regarding Ukraine’s position in negotiations, becoming one of the guarantors of Ukraine’s security. In April, assistance in investigating Russian war crimes committed in Ukraine became a priority. Ultimately, in the summer and autumn, humanitarian aid (“Vessel for Ukraine” campaign) and support for the energy sector after mass missile attacks (October-December) became relevant.

In the first half of 2022, French support for Ukraine in terms of obtaining the status of a candidate for EU membership became a general priority. The provision of weapons by France was initially semi-public, as the French side insisted, but eventually more and more disclosed, intensifying after a personal visit of President Macron to Kyiv and the affected districts of Kyiv region (16.06). Since the summer, another priority was added — de-blocking the Ukrainian ports for grain export, as well as the demilitarisation of the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP. At the end of November, in Paris, Ukrainian MPs were lobbying to establish a special international tribunal, but this process requires extra efforts.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, C. Colonna, visited Ukraine twice (May and September), as well as two parliamentary delegations — from the Senate led by
Chairman G. Larcher (10.07) and the National Assembly led by the Chairwoman Y. Braun-Pivet (26–29.09), and at the end of December — Minister of Defence S. Lecornu came to Ukraine. The President of Ukraine met with all mentioned French officials.

Dynamic telephone communication and coordination of both Presidents’ positions took place throughout the year. First Ladies also had meetings (during the UN GA in New York and the December visit to Paris).

Two large conferences held on December 13 (the international conference “Solidarity with the Ukrainian People” and the Forum on Economic Stability and Reconstruction of Ukraine) upon the initiative of President E. Macron may truly be named the culmination of efforts in the area of humanitarian aid and post-war recovery. Both events were attended by representatives of the government delegation with the participation of Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and First Lady O. Zelenska.

It is also worth noting the intensification of cultural diplomacy on the Ukrainian side: one track was led by First Lady O. Zelenska (introducing audio guides (Louvre museum), cooperation with libraries, assistance to Ukrainian cultural institutions, education of Ukrainian children), the other — by the representative of the Ukrainian Institute in France O. Sahaidak in cooperation with the Ukrainian Cultural Centre of the Embassy (“Ukrainian Spring” project).

Results

Based on the results of the year, France selected a more consistent position of supporting Ukraine in matters of restoring its independence and territorial integrity. Ukraine was granted the status of a candidate for EU membership under the French presidency in the EU and with its promotion. France also became an important, though not the leading, donor of military aid (Caesar self-propelled guns, Crotale air defence systems, radars, etc.), relatively small number of Ukrainian military personnel were trained in France during the year.

France hosted over 100,000 Ukrainian refugees and expressed its will to become a leader in terms of bilateral humanitarian aid provision (2,600 tons of humanitarian aid per year worth over EUR 276m, primarily for the recovery of destroyed infrastructure and urgent support for the energy sector), as well as coordination of international efforts for Ukraine’s recovery. Commitments taken at the international
conference “Solidarity with Ukraine” amounted to over EUR 1bn. The establishment of the Paris Civil Aid Coordination Mechanism based on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism was announced. France has also provided significant financial support (EUR 1.2bn in macro-financial assistance since February 2022). On November 28, the Agreement on providing Ukraine with a EUR 100m loan from the French Development Agency was signed (granted in December).

France undertook the commitments regarding the recovery of Chernihiv, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr regions. More than 700 French companies gathered and signed contracts (EUR 100m), in particular for the supply of rails, bridges, and seeds, a bilateral agreement on sustainable urban development for the purpose of recovery, technological and digital road map at the French-Ukrainian Sustainability and Recovery Conference (13.12), organised upon the request of the Ukrainian authorities,

Assistance in war crimes documentation included the transfer of mobile laboratories and the arrival of experts starting in April.

The activity of interparliamentary contacts was marked by the signing of the Memorandum on Parliamentary Cooperation between the National Assembly of the French Republic and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Commodity turnover between Ukraine and France in 2022 amounted to USD 1.8bn (compared to USD 2.66bn in 2021), with USD 1.2bn of imports.
While Japan’s place in the Ukrainian domestic political discourse remained vague, Ukraine managed to use the potential of bilateral relations with Tokyo and strengthen political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural cooperation. Thanks to frequent contacts between their top officials, the two countries shifted to a more realistic and to-the-point discussion of bilateral cooperation. Japan provided significant humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. At the same time, the outdated legal framework has to be revised as it stands in the way of closer investment and commercial ties.

### Japan

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2022
Political interest/engagement

In statements by Ukraine’s President and Prime Minister, Japan features as a friendly donor country and an important international partner for Kyiv in the struggle against Russian aggression and nuclear terrorism. Japan is mentioned as a G7 country and a potential reformer of international security institutions. In his addresses to the National Diet of Japan and leaders of G7 countries, President Zelenskyy marked Japan as a leader in Asia for supporting freedom and contributing to global security.

Noteworthy is Ukraine’s interest in the matter of the Northern Territories. The Verkhovna Rada, followed by the President, NSDC and Government, repeatedly highlighted Russia’s illegal occupation of the Northern Territories, drawing parallels between the occupation of the islands and the annexation of Crimea. This stance of Ukraine was set into legislation via the President’s Decree (7.10) and in the statement of the Ukrainian Parliament to the international community.

Strategic communications

2022 was revolutionary in terms of Ukraine’s presence in the media space of Japan. The address of President Zelenskyy (23.03) to the National Diet of Japan merits special attention as the first address of a foreign leader to the Japanese legislators. In his address, Ukraine’s President focused on the fight against Russia’s nuclear terrorism, the need to reform the UN and the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. Also, President Zelenskyy spoke to the Japanese students (4.07), calling on the youth to communicate the truth about Russia’s aggression, value peace and support Ukraine in informational and educational domains.

Communication was proactive through parliamentary channels. In particular, Ukrainian MPs spoke to the representatives of over 50 Japanese media outlets upon invitation of the Japan National Press Club during the visit of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to Japan in October. M. Chernotytskyi, Chair of the Board of the National Public Broadcasting of Ukraine, and S. Korsunsky, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Japan, spoke at the Japan National Press Club once (June) and thrice (February, April, and July), respectively. Ambassador Korsunsky exploited digital diplomacy tools proactively to reach a wide
audience on social media, gave countless interviews and comments to Japanese media, and regularly met with local politicians, entrepreneurs, and public figures.

The contacts of top Ukrainian officials with Japanese media were not limited by this. Throughout 2022, representatives of Ukrainian authorities, Armed Forces, businesses and civil society constantly appeared in Japan’s media, including its national broadcaster NHK and in a number of influential outlets, such as Sankei, Nikkei Asia, and Asahi. President Zelenskyy and First Lady Zelenska gave exclusive interviews to NHK in May and August, respectively.

Activities

Ukraine was very proactive in exploiting the potential of bilateral relations with Japan. In regular telephone conversations (15.02, 28.02, 4.03, 26.04, 30.09), President Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Kishida focused on strengthening the anti-war coalition and the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. The conversation between Prime Ministers Kishida and Shmyhal at the 77th session of the UN GA (22.09) echoed these themes. Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida met with Ukraine’s First Lady O. Zelenska. He did not manage to visit Kyiv, but he joined the Second Summit of the Crimea Platform via videoconference in August. In September, President Zelenskyy invited Japan’s Prime Minister to visit Ukraine in 2023 when Japan presides over G7.

The parliamentary dialogue intensified, too. In October, a group of the Verkhovna Rada MPs visited Japan to meet with the representatives of Japan’s National Diet, political parties, local authorities, businesses and media. In October, the National Diet Speaker Hiroyuki Hosoda participated in the First Parliamentary Summit of the Crimea Platform.

Worth mentioning are the regular contacts between the Office of the President of Ukraine and Japan on financial and humanitarian assistance, exchange of experience on rehabilitation of the military and possible engagement of Tokyo in international security guarantees for Ukraine. In addition, the top officials of both countries spoke repeatedly about strengthening sanctions against Russia and deepening cooperation in cybersecurity, energy, healthcare, and science and technology.

Kyiv insisted on trade liberalisation and wider engagement of Japanese investment in Ukraine’s agriculture and food industry, infrastructure projects, education and IT. To
develop commercial ties, the countries were considering the option of opening an office of the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) in Ukraine in October.

Contacts were ongoing at the level of local governments, NGOs, media and non-state institutions.

In the cultural domain, Japan joined two book projects, including the Ukrainian Bookshelf and Books Without Borders, to promote Ukrainian literature. Japanese audiences had a chance to get to know Ukrainian pop culture as Ukrainian celebrities offered charity shows. There were proactive efforts by the Ukrainian community and the Embassy of Ukraine in Japan.

**Results**

Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts helped receive unprecedented military, macro-financial and humanitarian assistance from Japan. In March and August, Japan's Ministry of Defence and Self-Defence Forces provided non-lethal gear, including bulletproof vests, helmets, chemical protective suits, communication devices, small reconnaissance UAVs, transportation vans and more to Ukraine. Since April, Tokyo has attended all Ukraine Defence Contact Group meetings, also known as the Ramstein group. Japan decided to help Ukraine demine its territory and launched anti-mine training for Ukraine’s Emergency Service personnel jointly with Cambodia. Japan allocated nearly USD 600m of macro-financial assistance to Ukraine. In addition to that, Tokyo provided significant urgent humanitarian aid.

Both countries cooperated efficiently in the agriculture, food and energy industries. Illustrative of this is the allocation of USD 14m to support the Grain from Ukraine humanitarian mission, USD 17m to help Ukraine purchase grain storage facilities, and nearly USD 2.57m to buy generators and solar-battery-powered lamps.

Despite the overall positive dynamics, Russia’s full-scale invasion prevented the development of Ukraine-Japan trade in 2022. Compared to 2021, Ukraine’s imports from Japan almost halved, and exports to Japan plummeted threefold in 2022. Their total trade amounted to USD 750.9m.
In February 2022, Ukraine had a unique political chance to approach EU membership. Membership application was submitted with a significant mobilisation of government, parliamentary, and expert capacity to prepare and carry out an advocacy campaign. The European Union’s recognition of Ukraine’s European perspective, as well as the candidate status granted in June, marked a historic moment for the state. However, despite significant intensification, by the end of 2022, Ukrainian authorities failed to fulfil all seven requests of the European Commission. Simultaneously, Ukraine is paving the way with gradual sectoral integration into the EU common market, eliminating obstacles to other “visa-free” initiatives in bilateral relations.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, after Ukraine had been granted the status of a candidate for EU membership by the European Council, the EU integration process was reformatted. During the first days of a full-scale invasion, different power branches expressed a consensual attitude towards the need to apply for membership. On February 28, the President signed the application in the presence of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, demonstrating a common political position.

Cooperation with the EU and European integration of Ukraine were mentioned in all major speeches of the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered to foreign audiences in 2022 with a focus on the inevitability of the European choice, reforms, and perspectives of accelerated accession procedure.

While advocating the decision to grant candidate status in the EU member states, the majority of high-ranking officials from the VRU, CMU, and OPU, as well as other relevant state executive bodies, were engaged in diplomatic and information campaigns. After receiving the status of a candidate, a Joint Statement on the Decision of the European Council to Grant Ukraine the Status of a Candidate for EU Membership (1.07) was signed in the Parliament hall during the plenary session by the President, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada and the Prime Minister of Ukraine. This document envisages the need to resume the dynamic integration process to become an EU member within the shortest term.

Gradual entering into the EU internal market and sectoral integration (energy, digital, customs, etc.) was another direction in EU integration solidification, exceptionally relevant at the government level.

Strategic communications

An awareness-raising campaign advocating the need to grant Ukraine the status of a candidate for membership among the EU members can be used as a model of active, targeted political and diplomatic communication with representatives of different power branches involved. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy, Chairman of the Verkhovna
Rada R. Stefanchuk, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal, Vice Prime Ministers Y. Svyrydenko and O. Stefanishyna, Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba were the most active as political communicators.

The President of Ukraine constantly stressed Ukraine’s readiness to transit to enlargement policy and acquire status in his online speeches to the national parliaments of the EU member states in April-June. Communication outlined the need to grant Ukraine the relevant status as soon as possible, thus enabling it to accelerate the process of acquiring membership and, respectively, reduce security risks and strengthen its unity with the democratic world.

In June, an informal “emissary” group was established for advocacy efforts within various target groups in the EU member states. This group included Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O. Stefanishyna, First Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova, Minister of Community and Territorial Development O. Chernyshov and Deputy Head of the OPU I. Zhovkva. The parliamentary track was represented by Chairman of the VRU R. Stefanchuk, First Deputy Chairman O. Kornienko and Deputy Chairwoman O. Kondratiuk with a group of MPs. Ukrainian NGOs and analytical centres also joined the communication process in the EU countries independently and in coordination with the authorities’ efforts.

The integration agenda was also implemented during the visits of the European institutions’ leaders to Ukraine: President of the European Council C. Michel (April, May), President of the European Commission U. von der Leyen (April, June), President of the European Parliament R. Metsola (April), the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security J. Borrell (April). Also, the issues of Ukraine’s candidate status and other sectoral integration formats (so-called “visa-free” initiatives) were raised by high-ranking officials of EU countries during their visits to Ukraine.

After Ukraine had acquired the candidate status, awareness-raising activities were performed in the context of further implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, as well as steps to implement the seven recommendations of the EC. A separate track was related to integration into the EU internal market and selected sectoral directions.
Activities

Ukraine's application for EU accession, signed by the President of Ukraine (28.02), was considered at the informal meeting of the EU leaders in Versailles (10–11.03). The European Council was not ready for a decision and offered the European Commission to introduce its opinion on the application, recognising Ukraine's aspirations and pro-European choice.

During her visit to Ukraine, the President of the EC U. von der Leyen (8.04) handed a questionnaire to evaluate Ukraine's readiness for the start of accession negotiations to the President of Ukraine, V. Zelenskyy. On April 18, the Ukrainian side had already processed and submitted the first block of questionnaire to the EU, on May 9—the second block. It should be noted that over 300 experts from various governmental institutions and NGOs participated in the Ukrainian report drafting. Based on the data presented by Ukraine, the European Commission published a statement on Ukraine's application for EU membership (17.06). Along with the recommendation to grant Ukraine a European perspective and candidate status, the EC introduced a set of requirements for Ukraine to fulfil in order to move towards the approximation.

At the Summit of the European Council (23.06), the EU members adopted the historic decision to grant Ukraine a candidate status with a formalised requirement to complete seven steps. Afterwards, the implementation activities started along with the intensified process of Association Agreement execution. A joint statement was signed by the leaders of state, government, and parliament, which postulated the need for rapid integration steps.

Further implementation progress was discussed during the visits of Ukrainian government officials to Brussels, as well as the visits made by the President of the EC U. von der Leyen and the Commissioner for the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations O. Varhelyi. The abovementioned requirements had also been discussed during the visits of Ministers of European Affairs, with ambassadors of EU member states and representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

At the same time, many efforts were taken to deepen sectoral integration at the governmental and parliamentary levels. In February, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Common Aviation Area Agreement between Ukraine, the EU and EU member states. Unfortunately, the full-scale aggression suspended this cooperation format.

In April, twenty-four EU mobile operators and three mobile operators from Ukraine signed a statement establishing accessible and free-of-charge roaming for international
calls between Ukraine and EU countries. The implementation of this agreement allowed Ukrainian operators to provide their clients with affordable roaming services in 25 EU Member States. In September, Ukraine’s incorporation into the free-roaming mechanism was discussed at the meeting held by Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and President of the EC U. von der Leyen.

On September 5, the European Union and Ukraine held the 8th meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council in Brussels, the first meeting with Ukraine in its updated status.

Results

The European Council’s decision to grant Ukraine a European perspective and the status of a candidate for EU membership has become a significant diplomatic achievement for Ukraine, shaping the dynamics and context of integration efforts for many years.

However, having acquired the status, Ukraine demonstrated an insufficient level of domestic engagement in terms of fulfilling the seven requirements of the European Commission. Also, as of the end of 2022, the EU-Ukraine Summit, an annual high-level bilateral event, did not take place, so Ukraine lost another opportunity to introduce its success, as well as to demand the partners to announce the following integration steps. Accordingly, the European Commission did not provide an assessment of the second questionnaire block, which refers to all aspects of legislative approximation, directing future negotiations on the EU membership.

In December, the VRU actively tried to change this situation and voted on a set of laws to implement EC recommendations right before the last European Council session in 2022.

At the same time, on a practical level, Ukraine achieved significant progress in the sectoral integration dimensions (communication with European institutions and EU members). In 2022, government communication resulted in energy, economic, transport and customs “visa-free” initiatives established by the EU. The parties signed agreements on Ukraine’s participation in the EU programs “Mytnytsia” (cooperation in the customs sector) and “Fiscalis” (cooperation in the taxation sector). Ukraine was also included in the program for digitalization and IT technology projects funding named “Digital Europe”, with a total budget of approximately EUR 7.5bn.
In mid-March, due to the coordinated work of Ukrainian diplomacy and energy sector representatives, Ukraine joined ENTSO-E a year ahead of schedule. In April, NEC “Ukrenergo” was granted observer status at ENTSO-E. This step made it possible to increase the export of Ukrainian electricity substantially. Despite optimistic plans to increase exports to the EU, these plans were postponed in October due to Russian attacks against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

Since June, the EU has lifted all trade restrictions for Ukrainian export (import duties, anti-dumping and protective measures) for one year. Also, in June, a one-year agreement was signed between the EU and Ukraine on freight road transportation, abolishing the mandatory licenses for Ukrainian drivers involved in bilateral and transit transportation via the EU territory. These measures greatly facilitated the trade and economic relations between Ukraine and the EU countries in the context of the catastrophic economic decline initiated by the full-scale war. On October 1, the provisions of the Common Transit Convention entered into force for Ukraine, enabling to transport goods globally with 35 other participating countries with one transit document, simplifying and accelerating customs clearance.

Exports to the EU countries increased insignificantly compared to 2021, reaching EUR 28bn with the EU, becoming the key trading partner of Ukraine.
Europe

Union

2022

| POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT | 5 |
| STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS | 5 |
| ACTIVITIES | 5 |
| RESULTS | 5 |

TOTAL SCORE: A

Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine stimulated the involvement of the European Union in support of Ukraine, as well as intensified political, economic, and energy pressure on Russia. The EU-provided assistance to Ukraine in all possible areas became critical since February 2022. In some cases, Brussels took urgent measures, responding to the essential needs of Ukrainians. Providing shelter to Ukrainians within the EU states, unprecedented volumes of humanitarian aid delivered via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, military aid via the European Peace Fund, macro-financial support for the budget, sanctions against Russia and other important dimensions of assistance present the EU as one of Ukraine’s strategic partners.
Political interest/engagement

Cooperation with the European Union was permanently present in statements made by high-ranking Ukrainian officials in 2022. The President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister, the Vice Prime Ministers, and the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada emphasised the need for comprehensive strengthening of EU sanctions against Russia, provision of financial, military, and humanitarian assistance to confront the aggressor, protection and support for Ukrainians, the establishment of recovery mechanism, etc. in their official communication with EU partners and in public speeches. Cooperation with the EU and individual member states and EU integration were defined as the core topics of the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada and other statements made by the state leaders domestically and abroad.

Strategic communications

Ukrainian side used a wide range of personal and online meetings and sessions of high-level international organisations in cooperation with representatives of European institutions, and leaders of the EU member states, thus prioritising the most problematic issues: political support for Ukraine, adoption of subsequent sanction packages against Russia, provision of macro-financial and military aid via the European Peace Fund mechanism, hosting and assisting Ukrainian citizens fleeing to the territory of EU member states, energy security, humanitarian aid via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, establishment of Ukraine Recovery Platform, holding Russia liable for war crimes and the crime of aggression.

The President of Ukraine delivered numerous online speeches at the sessions of the EU member states national parliaments, as well as during the summits of the European Council and international donor conferences with the participation of the EU leadership. Government officials have actively participated in special sessions of the Council of the EU, using the opportunity to inform the ministers of the member states on the current situation and needs of Ukraine.
Since April, the President of the European Council, C. Michel (April, May), the President of the European Commission, U. von der Leyen (April, June, September), the President of the European Parliament, R. Metsola (April), High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy J. Borrell (April) have been visiting Ukraine, including the de-occupied territories.

Activities

In addition to the working visits of the European leaders to Ukraine, the permanent sectoral dialogue was taking place at the level of the European Commission and the CMU, with business trips of government leaders and ministers to Brussels and corresponding trips made by EC commissioners and joint visits of the EU member states leaders to Ukraine. Issues related to Ukraine's support were also raised in institutionalised formats of dialogue — EU-Ukraine Association Council and the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee.

Ukrainian government officials were invited to participate in the European Civil Protection Forum, the EU Ambassadors’ Conference, informal meetings of the EU member state ministers, and sessions held by other European institutions.

Several large-scale international events were held to present the position of Ukraine in Switzerland, Germany, and France under the initiative of the President of the European Commission, U. von der Leyen, regarding the establishment of the Ukraine Recovery Platform. The Ukrainian delegation, led by the Prime Minister of Ukraine, participated in the International Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano (July), the International Expert Conference on the Recovery, Reconstruction, and Modernisation of Ukraine in Berlin (October), the Bilateral Conference for the Resilience and Reconstruction of Ukraine in Paris (December).

Results

Since Russia’s full-scale aggression, the EU has confirmed its status as Ukraine's strategic partner. The process was initiated on February 24 by the Declaration of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Policy and Security J. Borrell, with a set of
subsequent decisions presented at the EU summits and the EU Council meetings to confirm the unchanged position on condemnation of aggression and support for systemic assistance provision to Ukraine. Within a year, the European Parliament acted as one of the core political advocates for decisions in support of international resistance to aggression.

In March, the EU approved the Temporary Protection Directive granting the right to reside within the territory of EU member states along with access to essential services and assistance to Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war. In October, the EU extended the directive — currently, it covers the period until March 2024. As of the end of 2022, approximately 4 million people in need of temporary protection have been registered within the territory of EU countries.

As of December, the European Council, despite the destructive position of Hungary, managed to adopt nine sanction packages against the Russian Federation, including restrictive measures in the areas of financial services, the energy sector, innovative technologies and dual-purpose products, as well as freezing the assets owned by Russian oligarchs in the EU states, which produced the strongest impact.

It is worth mentioning the support for the Ukrainian economy and the budget sector in particular. During this year, EUR 11.6bn of assistance was provided or guaranteed by the EU (EUR 10.4bn for Ukraine — EUR 7.2bn of macro-financial assistance, EUR 1.8bn in the form of loans and EUR 1bn in the form of grants). In December, the European Council approved a substantial package — EUR 18bn — of aid to Ukraine in the format of soft loans for 2023.

With the help of the new extra-budgetary tool of the European Peace Fund, the EU leadership was able to finance the provision of military aid to Ukraine from the EU member states (EUR 3.1bn). In November, the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine was established — by December, over a thousand Ukrainian servicemen were being trained in the EU states.

In May, the EU, jointly with Ukraine and Moldova, introduced the so-called “Solidarity Lanes” to transport grain and other agricultural products from Ukraine, as well as to deliver essential items to Ukrainians. Thanks to this initiative, Ukrainian farmers shipped around 23 million tons of grain with EUR 20bn received as export earnings.

Within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, over 82,000 tons of humanitarian goods have been delivered to Ukraine from the EU countries and partners (EUR 527m).
EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

Despite the high political interest and intense activities, Ukraine failed to accomplish the expected result — a change of its status after applying for membership. In the first months of the Russian aggression, communication was ambiguous about possible quitting pursuing membership, which had a negative result. The security dialogue was stabilised and intensified in the summer, mostly focusing on ongoing assistance.
Political interest/engagement

Cooperation with NATO and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration was constantly on Ukraine’s political agenda in 2022. The President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, MPs and representatives of the President’s Office paid the most attention to Ukraine’s future NATO membership, military cooperation, training of the Ukrainian military in line with NATO standards, and NATO assistance due to the Russian aggression.

The President mentioned Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration at the annual Ambassadorial and spoke about the Ukrainian military accomplishing interoperability with NATO standards in his Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Already in the fall, President Zelenskyy noted clearly that Ukraine and NATO were “de facto allies. This has already been achieved. De facto, we have already completed our path to NATO. De facto, we have already proven interoperability with the Alliance’s standards” (30.09).

The theme of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration came up regularly in speeches and interviews by Foreign Minister Kuleba. Minister Kuleba spoke about the unwavering course towards NATO membership in his address to the annual Ambassadorial and noted that Ukraine could become a security donor for NATO. Foreign Minister Kuleba noted repeatedly in his interview with Ukrainian media (1.10) that “the future of the Euro-Atlantic space is decided in Ukraine. Euro-Atlantic security is impossible without Ukraine's victory.” Defence Minister Reznikov spoke about defence cooperation, military assistance, and training.

Head of the OPU, A. Yermak, accentuated cooperation with NATO and the importance of getting collective security guarantees that membership can provide in his speeches at international security conferences in various countries.

Strategic communications

In 2022, Ukraine’s strategic communications on NATO were ambiguous at times. From a clear position on NATO membership in early 2022 to the declaration of possible neutrality in exchange for the end of the war, from criticism of NATO for insufficient assistance to Ukraine that was not always objective to the return to clear communication on irreversibility or speeding up of the course towards NATO — all this led to confusion and a certain sense of undecidedness on the part of Ukraine.
Since summer, strategic communication has become clearer and more unequivocal, allowing Ukraine to improve dialogue with NATO. In June, President Zelenskyy spoke at the NATO Madrid Summit, focusing on the Russian aggression, future membership of Finland and Sweden, European security and military assistance — primarily air defence — for Ukraine, among other things.

President Zelenskyy had an online address to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly session in November. Among other things, he spoke about the support of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations by Ukrainians and the importance of Ukraine’s membership for European security. Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova attended the meeting of the Political Committee and spoke about the role of Ukraine on the frontline of the global fight for democracy as part of the spring session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Vilnius (28.05).

President Zelenskyy and representatives of his Office repeatedly spoke about security guarantees for Ukraine in interviews with international media and at international security conferences. However, they mostly focused on a “new European security system.” Only in the second half of the year they began to clarify that this includes Ukraine’s NATO membership. The theme of the future membership of Ukraine and assistance from NATO was often discussed with top officials from NATO member-states.

Ukrainian MPs, who are members of Ukraine’s Permanent Delegation to the NATO PA, proactively advocated Ukraine’s future membership in NATO.

NGOs and think tanks played an important role in promoting Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration both domestically and internationally. They held numerous rallies by the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, international discussions, and advocacy visits.

Activities

President Zelenskyy had several telephone conversations with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (19.01, 28.06, 2.08, 5.10). Among other things, they covered the fastest possible supply of non-lethal military assistance from NATO as part of the comprehensive package approved at the Madrid Summit, training for the Ukrainian military, the security situation in Ukraine and more, and coordination of further steps on the path of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
The level of Ukraine’s representation at NATO’s key Madrid Summit (29–30.06) was low. Deputy Head of the OPU I. Zhovkva was the only representative of Ukraine there, although President Zelenskyy addressed the summit attendees online. Apart from attending the summit, Zhovkva met with a number of NATO officials and the NATO PA President. Also, the President spoke at NATO PA in November.

Ukraine’s President, Verkhovna Rada Speaker and Prime Minister signed a joint appeal to approve the decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership as an integral element of ensuring security for Ukrainians and the citizens of the Euro-Atlantic space (30.09). This was a declaration of Ukraine’s application for membership, although this move is not legally mandatory, and 2005 is formally considered the year of Ukraine’s application. However, this served as a strong signal for Ukraine’s partners.

Foreign Minister Kuleba repeatedly met and spoke on the telephone with NATO Secretary General. In his meeting with Secretary General Stoltenberg in Brussels (22.09), Minister Kuleba presented the concept of the Kyiv Security Compact that should become a tool for ensuring Ukraine’s security until it joins NATO. Also, they met at NATO’s ministerial meeting in Bucharest (30.09), where they discussed the provision of the means of air defence and energy equipment to Ukraine. In the telephone conversations (1.10 and 10.10), they discussed the ongoing assistance of NATO to Ukraine and Ukraine’s future membership. Apart from that, Minister Kuleba attended NATO ministerial meetings in Brussels (April) and Bucharest (November), where security assistance for Ukraine was discussed.

Defence Minister Reznikov met with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg regularly, both individually and before the Ramstein group meetings (16.06 and 12.10), and attended the meetings of NATO defence ministers (16.03 and 12–13.10), where the parties spoke about the need for more weapons to fight Russia. Minister Reznikov visited NATO Headquarters as part of the Ukrainian delegation (12–13.10) to attend the sixth Ramstein group meeting, an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers, and had negotiations with Secretary General Stoltenberg, among others.

O. Stefanishyna, Ukraine’s Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, attended the Ukraine-NATO Commission meeting in Brussels focused on regional security (10.01) and met with a group of ambassadors who are permanent representatives of member-states to NATO on their visit to Ukraine (4.11).

Ukrainian MPs worked proactively as part of NATO PA and through bilateral meetings on Euro-Atlantic issues with representatives of parliaments of Estonia,
Hungary, the USA, Germany, France, Italy and Spain throughout 2022. The NATO-Ukraine Interparliamentary Council met in Brussels (24–25.01), focusing on the security situation and strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities. MPs from 14 NATO member-states came for the NATO-Ukraine-Interparliamentary Council meeting in Lviv (17.05). Among other things, they discussed Ukraine’s membership without MAP. A Ukrainian delegation attended NATO PA sessions in Vilnius and Madrid. VRU Vice Speaker Kondratiuk met with I. Fellin, NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security (10.12).

Head of the Presidential Office Yermak had a series of meetings with heads of missions of NATO member-states to the NATO Headquarters who visited Ukraine (3.11), they discussed the expectation of confirmation for NATO’s open-door policy in the context of Ukraine’s membership application and expansion of assistance for Ukraine to strengthen its air defence.

In November, a group of 25 cadets from nine Ukrainian military universities visited NATO Headquarters and SHAPE to learn about cooperation.

NATO was actively engaged in the work of the Ramstein group. The Secretary-General joined the Crimea Platform Summit (23.08) and repeatedly visited Ukrainian military training abroad.

**Results**

The results of Ukraine-NATO cooperation in 2022 did not meet expectations. Throughout 2022, NATO member-states made several statements, including the statement on the situation in and around Ukraine by defence ministers (16.02), on Russia’s attack against Ukraine by the North Atlantic Council (24.02); on condemnation of Russia’s attack on Ukraine and full solidarity with Ukraine by the leaders of NATO member-states (25.02); on the “referenda” by the North Atlantic Council (22.09); and on support for Ukraine in its fight against the Russian aggression by ministers of foreign affairs (30.11).

The signing of two joint Declarations on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration by Ukraine’s President with Czechia (31.10) and Montenegro (5.12) was a symbolic yet important result. These declarations were modelled after those in support of Ukraine’s EU integration that had been actively signed with partners in previous years. Presidents
of nine Central and Eastern European countries signed a joint declaration supporting Ukraine’s NATO membership (2.10).

A Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine was approved at the NATO Madrid Summit with initiatives on immediate, short-term non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine and the creation of a structure to strengthen NATO’s long-term support. Since March, NATO has been implementing support projects in various spheres as part of the CAP Ukraine Trust Fund. These include frontline food rations, fuel — including aviation fuel — army boots, medical supplies, military training, equipment for neutralising explosive devices and anti-drone equipment. At the same time, neither the Summit Declaration nor NATO’s New Strategic Concept strengthened the language on Ukraine’s future membership, nor did it point to the Enhanced Opportunity Partnership.

NATO PA approved two declarations. In May, it called on NATO member-state governments to take further steps to promote Ukraine on its path towards NATO membership and to intensify resistance to Russia. In November, it recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and called on the countries to establish a special international tribunal for punishment for the crimes of Russian aggression.

Ukraine became an associate member of NATO’s special technological Multilateral Interoperability Program. This allows Ukraine to implement NATO standards and join in developing new standards.

The Verkhovna Rada ratified the Memorandum on Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Communication and Information Agency on cooperation in consulting, management, communication, reconnaissance, and supervision in frames of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (16.11).

The Ukraine-NATO National Annual Program was not approved for 2022.

The NATO Representation to Ukraine did not return to Kyiv by the end of 2022, and NATO Secretary General did not visit Ukraine.
## BILATERAL RELATIONS

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In 2022 cooperation with Australia was defined as one of Ukraine’s most successful foreign policy tracks. Diplomats and high-ranking officials coordinated their activities and focused on enhancing bilateral relations, as well as promoting political, military, humanitarian, and financial support.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, political interest in Australia has definitely grown. The President noted assistance provided by this state in his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada and relevant Analytical Report. Minister of Defence O. Reznikov also made statements regarding Australian assistance. Both the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs regularly emphasised in their speeches the need to focus on diplomatic work among others in the Pacific region. Still, it was often specified as primarily the Global South, where Australia doesn’t belong despite its geographical location.

In December, the Parliamentary Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation Committee held a round table dedicated to Ukrainian-Australian cooperation, attended by the Ambassador of Ukraine to Australia, the Committee Chairman and the co-Chairman of the Ukraine-Australia Parliamentary Friendship Group, demonstrating the existing political interest in this area in the parliament.

Strategic communications

In 2022, Ukraine significantly intensified strategic communications in the abovementioned direction. V. Zelenskyy delivered his first speech to the Australian Parliament (31.03). The Sydney Morning Herald and the ABC channel interviewed the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In addition, D. Kuleba gave an online speech at the Pacific Islands Forum (8.07), the largest intergovernmental organisation in Oceania.

We should note the extraordinary activity of the Ambassador of Ukraine to Australia, paying immense attention to strategic communications, with numerous interviews for
Australian printed and online outlets, appearing on TV, and delivering speeches at round tables and forums. The use of Twitter as a strategic communication means — both by the Ambassador of Ukraine and the Minister of Foreign Affairs — has become an important feature of bilateral communication.

Another specific achievement of 2022 should be noted — the first visit of the Australian Prime Minister in the 30-year history of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Australia, followed by a joint press conference of V. Zelenskyy and A. Albanese.

**Activities**

In 2022, cooperation with Australia involved all key sectors: military, political, humanitarian, and economic.

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy delivered an online speech to Australian Parliament (31.03). The Prime Minister of Australia visited Ukraine (3.07).

Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba had bilateral meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia during the UN GA in New York (20.09), as well as with the Prime Minister of Australia at the ASEAN Summit (12.11), demonstrating a great example of how multilateral international events can be used to intensify bilateral meetings.

The appointment of a new ambassador has become an important step in Ukrainian-Australian relations (he has performed his duties since April 1, 2022).

Business contacts were actively established. For example, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Australia had a meeting with the head of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce to activate connections between Ukrainian and Australian businesses, as well as to enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and Australian chambers at national and regional levels (2.11). Also, the Ambassador of Ukraine keeps close ties with Australian MPs, in particular with the speaker of the House of Representatives (meeting held on 3.05), and with senators, in particular members of Ukraine-Australia Parliamentary Friendship Group; supports active cooperation with counterparts from other countries. Thus, the Ambassador took part in an informal meeting of ambassadors and deputy heads of missions in Australia (Nordic and Baltic states — Denmark, Finland, Estonia and Latvia) on November 14. Numerous activities and negotiations were carried out in 2022 to promote the provision of various weapons and humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
Results

As a result of active work in the context of bilateral relations, Australia has become the largest donor of military aid to Ukraine outside NATO. According to the Analytical Report to the President’s Address to the Verkhovna Rada, Australia imposed 1,166 sanction-related measures in total; 974 of these (over 83%) have been implemented since February 2022. In addition, Australia imposed financial sanctions on Russian oligarchs and politicians, banned the import of gold from Russia, and cancelled duties for exported Ukrainian goods. Australia also banned the export of bauxite to Russia, established the oil price cap and introduced 35% tariffs for Russian and Belarusian products.

Australia announced its intention to engage in the International Training Mission to deliver basic military training in the UK and deploy 70 military instructors in 2023. Over AUD 6 million of assistance was allocated to the Ukrainian border guard service to upgrade equipment, strengthen cyber security and enhance border control. Australia sent 60 Bushmaster armoured vehicles — according to statements of the Australian MFA and MoD, these performed brilliantly on the battlefield and contributed to the liberation of the Kharkiv region. Australia’s military assistance includes but is not limited to, six M777 lightweight towed howitzers, ammunition, and 28 M113 fully tracked armoured personnel carriers. As of October, the total amount of Australian aid to Ukraine reached AUD 655m, with over AUD 475m (equivalent to USD 330m) allocated specifically to the defence sector.

During his visit to Ukraine, Prime Minister A. Albanese announced Australia’s engagement in Ukraine’s lawsuit against Russia at the International Criminal Court.

Australia provides humanitarian visas to Ukrainian refugees in terms of humanitarian assistance.
Azerbaijan

2022

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TOTAL SCORE: C-

The full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated the limits of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Azerbaijan and the capacity of the Ukrainian government to produce a relevant impact concerning both a failure of Azerbaijan to impose anti-Russian sanctions and lack of full support for Ukraine within the framework of the UN GA. Meanwhile, mutual support of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity had become one of the key issues against the background of escalating tension in relations of both states with the Russian Federation and Armenia at a time when official statements regarding friendly relations between Ukraine and Azerbaijan were given.
Political interest/engagement

Direct dialogue between the Presidents of Ukraine and Azerbaijan (during the working visit of I. Aliyev to Kyiv (14.01) on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations establishment) stimulated positive dynamics of Ukraine's foreign policy towards Azerbaijan since the beginning of 2022. Based on the results of negotiations, President V. Zelenskyy emphasised that the visit of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan to Ukraine defined new quality of the strategic partnership between the two states in political, economic, and security sectors.

Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Azerbaijan A. Asadov (4.02) on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the diplomatic relations establishment, when the results of I. Aliyev's visit to Ukraine was highly praised, noting that the recent visit generated an additional impetus to strengthen the strategic partnership and activate cooperation between the two states. On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the diplomatic relations establishment between Azerbaijan and Ukraine, both Ministers of Foreign Affairs exchanged letters regarding the support of each other's territorial integrity (6.02).

The President of Ukraine welcomed the proposal made by Azerbaijan leaders to launch ceasefire negotiations with the Russian Federation together with Türkiye during a telephone conversation with President I. Aliyev (26.02).

In terms of strategic issues — non-provision of weapons to Ukraine in the context of war with the Russian Federation — President V. Zelenskyy clearly articulated Ukraine's position. In particular, the President of Ukraine expressed (23.04) his understanding of Azerbaijan's reluctance to support Ukraine in its fight against the Russian Federation at a level where Kyiv demands it from other states, justified by the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
While giving the speech at the 39th meeting of the GUAM Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs (21.09) as part of the UNGA 77th session (high-level week), Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba called on Azerbaijan to engage in the recovery of Ukrainian territories affected by Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The topic of “friendly relations” between the two states had been actively articulated throughout the year at individual and institutional levels. President V. Zelenskyy called his Azerbaijani colleague I. Aliyev a “good friend” (26.12); Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal emphasised that friendship, respect and mutual assistance between the two states remained unchanged in decades (4.02); the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada R. Stefanchuk stated that mutual support of each other’s territorial integrity proved the authenticity of true friendship (8.11).

The topic of mutual support for Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was a particular track of the Ukrainian officials’ foreign policy in 2022. During the escalation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh in September, the MFA of Ukraine (13.09) called on Armenia and Azerbaijan to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within their internationally recognised borders (according to the MFA spokesperson O. Nikolenko). Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba (30.09) appealed to the conflict parties to refrain from violence and expressed support towards the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within the internationally recognised borders.

During the visit of the Azerbaijani Parliament delegation to Kyiv (8.11), the MP from the “Servant of the People” party, Special Representative of President in the Constitutional Court F. Venislavskyi congratulated Azerbaijan on the return of its territory in Nagorno-Karabakh and noted the case of Azerbaijan as exemplary to numerous states whose territories were under occupation, demonstrating the ability to act effectively and make correct and timely decisions. At the same time, R. Stefanchuk offered to exchange opinions with Azerbaijan regarding Baku’s experience in settling territorial integrity issues (8.11).

However, Azerbaijan was not mentioned as a separate issue of Ukraine’s foreign policy either in the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada or in the relevant Analytical Report.
Strategic communications

After February 24, Ukrainian officials at the level of the Office of the President of Ukraine, CMU, and VRU focused on solving practical issues at the corresponding levels with the Azerbaijani counterparts, mostly as a result of direct agreements made by the presidents of both states. Strategic communications had been intensely concentrated at the level of the Embassy of Ukraine to Azerbaijan.

Activities

In 2022, meetings were held at a presidential level in the context of strengthening the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Azerbaijan. President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev visited Kyiv (14.01).

After a telephone conversation with I. Aliyev (26.02), V. Zelenskyy notified on the assistance Azerbaijan agreed to provide at Ukraine’s request (oil and petroleum products). During a telephone conversation with I. Aliyev (28.03) President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy informed his counterpart on the situation in Ukraine, expressed gratitude for the humanitarian aid provided to Ukraine, including medical supplies, and emphasised the importance of humanitarian corridors to be established.

Relevant ministries, led directly by the Prime Minister and MFA, were responsible for prompt coordination of political interaction in the format of systematic operational contacts between Ukrainian officials and Azerbaijani colleagues in the process of implementing intergovernmental agreements regarding the supply of humanitarian cargos from Azerbaijan to Ukraine (from medical supply to generators).

In the parliamentary dimension, Verkhovna Rada intensified its efforts to strengthen the party ties with colleagues from the Milli Majlis at the level of the two largest parliamentary parties: Ukrainian “Servant of the People” and Azerbaijani “Yeni Azerbaijan”. Verkhovna Rada held a meeting with the delegation of the Azerbaijani governing party (8.11), attended by the Speaker R. Stefanchuk, the First Deputy Speaker O. Kornienko, Chairwoman of the “Servant of the People” party, MP O. Shuliak, co-Chairman of Ukrainian-Azerbaijani Interparliamentary Group V. Koliukh, Deputy Co-Chairman L. Marchenko.
An online meeting led by the Ukrainian part of the Ukrainian-Azerbaijani Business Council was held in Kyiv (14.07) for the first time since the start of Russian aggression against Ukraine. This meeting demonstrated the exceptional readiness of Ukrainian business to implement mutually beneficial projects in Azerbaijan, even in the context of Russian aggression. The Embassy of Ukraine to Azerbaijan participated actively in the process of delivering humanitarian aid to Ukraine in 2022.

**Results**


According to the results of V. Zelenskyy’s telephone conversation with I. Aliyev (26.02), all SOCAR gas stations in Ukraine were tasked by the Azerbaijani representatives to provide free-of-charge fuel for ambulances and SES vehicles.

In 2022, Azerbaijan provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine (in particular, medicines, food, transformers and generators) equalling USD 17.6m and hosted 90 Ukrainian children in need of medical and psychological rehabilitation.

At the same time, Azerbaijan did not introduce or join any sanctions imposed on Russia. Azerbaijani delegation wasn’t present at all five UN GA meetings in 2022, where resolutions in support of Ukraine had been voted with no votes given.
Further steps planned to deepen the strategic partnership have been postponed. In particular, the agreement reached by V. Zelenskyy and I. Aliyev to hold meetings of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation and Council of Presidents of Ukraine and Azerbaijan within the first half of 2022 has been put on indefinite hold due to the full-scale war initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

During the visit of the “Yeni Azerbaijan” delegation to Kyiv (8.11), the Deputy Head of the party T. Budagov and the Head of “Servant of the People” party O. Shuliak signed a memorandum on cooperation.

In 2022, commodity turnover between Azerbaijan and Ukraine decreased by almost a third, amounting to USD 691.3m compared to USD 922.5m in 2021. Azerbaijan imported Ukrainian products equalling USD 191.3m, and Azerbaijani export to Ukraine amounted to USD 500m.
The strategic partnership between Ukraine and Georgia declared back in 2017, didn’t pass the test of the full-scale war initiated by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022. The existing traditional touchpoints for national interests — resistance to Russian aggression, de-occupation of territories and joint promotion of European and Euro-Atlantic integration priorities — turned out to be the separating lines and eventually transformed into factors of direct confrontation between Kyiv and Tbilisi. During this year, the political tension between the two states did not allow Ukraine to convince Georgian leadership of the need to support the fundamental principles of strategic partnership.
Political interest/engagement

After the start of Russia’s military invasion, the political leadership of Ukraine publicly accused Georgia of a hostile attitude towards Ukraine (1.03). President V. Zelenskyy told about the impediments introduced by the Georgian authorities for volunteers who wanted to support Ukraine and the destructive position to refuse to impose sanctions against the Russian Federation. Prime Minister of Ukraine D. Shmyhal called on his Georgian colleague I. Garibashvili to allow Georgian volunteers to fly to Ukraine.

The spokesman of the MFA of Ukraine, O. Nikolenko, announced the MFA’s position on the complete unacceptability of the intensification of Georgia’s trade relations with the Russian Federation (6.03) after the Russian Federation’s partial lifting of trade sanctions against Georgia in exchange for Georgia’s refusal to impose economic sanctions against Russia.

Another serious accusation of Georgia’s unfriendly attitude towards Kyiv was introduced in April by the Military Intelligence of Ukraine, stating that Russians were establishing smuggling channels to transport sanctioned goods via Georgian territory.

Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba assumed the possibility to hold Georgia liable for assisting the Russian Federation in sanctions bypassing and requested official evidence from the Georgian party to prove the opposite (5.04).

Several days before the start of the official visit of the Georgian parliamentary delegation led by the Speaker of the Parliament S. Papuashvili (16.04), the VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk managed to persuade his Georgian colleague to visit Bucha and Irpin (Kyiv region), liberated from Russian invaders (it had not been initially agreed by Georgian delegation). However, even at the parliamentary level, there was no chance to avoid scandalous tension in bilateral relations. In June, the Chairman of the “Servant of the People” faction in the VRU, D. Arakhamia, had to oppose accusations from the Prime Minister of Georgia, I. Garibashvili, of blocking the process of granting the EU candidate status to Georgia.

Just like in 2021, the “Saakashvili factor” provided extra tension in relations with Georgia throughout 2022, especially after February 12 when Ukraine officially recognised the former president of Georgia, Ukrainian citizen M. Saakashvili, as a victim in a case of improper treatment during his stay in the Georgian prison. Ombudsman D. Lubinet requested the Georgian authorities (15.02) to permit his visit of Ukrainian citizen
M. Saakashvili, whose health condition had deteriorated. President V. Zelenskyy called on Georgian authorities (20.12) to show mercy to M. Saakashvili and transfer him to a clinic in Ukraine, any European country or the USA.

At the same time, despite certain problems in bilateral relations, Ukraine continuously supported the spirit of a strategic partnership with regard to Georgian national interests in 2022. The MFA of Ukraine strongly condemned (11.04) the Russian actions on holding the so-called “presidential elections” in the occupied territory of the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in Georgia. Also, upon the occasion of the 14th anniversary of Russian armed aggression against Georgia, the MFA declared once again (7.08) its staunch support of Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity with the demand to de-occupy the seized territories.

Still, Georgia wasn’t mentioned as a separate issue of Ukraine’s foreign policy in the Annual Address to Verkhovna Rada or the relevant Analytical Report.

**Strategic communications**

The President of Ukraine was personally involved in strategic communication regarding Georgia. However, this communication usually separated Georgian society and the government. Thus, V. Zelenskyy expressed his sincere gratitude to Georgian citizens coming to Tbilisi streets on that day to support Ukraine and also to demand the resignation of the Prime Minister of Georgia, refusing to join the sanctions against the Russian Federation (25.02). Relations with Georgia were only worsening — V. Zelenskyy stated (23.04) that he considered Georgians as one of the closest nations but couldn’t understand the position of the state leaders, in particular, in the context of resisting the sanctions against the Russian Federation.

President Zelenskyy and the Chairman of the “Servant of the People” faction in the VRU, D. Arakhamia, addressed the participants of the anti-government march (24.06), organised in Tbilisi by Georgian opposition forces after the EU candidate status had not been granted to Georgia. The Ukrainian President stressed his faith in the European future of Georgia and promised that Ukraine would assist Georgians in that process. D. Arakhamia, claiming that both Ukrainians and Georgians always fought for their place in the European family, literally accused the Georgian leadership of stealing the chance to reunite with Europe.
At the same time, individual statements of Ukrainian politicians did not contribute to improving bilateral relations and governmental dialogue. For example, MP D. Arakhamiia announced (25.04) his plans to call on the EU and the US leaders to impose sanctions against the richest Georgian oligarch B. Ivanishvili, who, in his opinion, was closely tied to the Russian political elite, and that was a reason for the Georgian authorities to refuse from supporting Ukraine in the war against the Russian Federation. The statement of the Secretary of the NSDC of Ukraine, O. Danilov (26.03), also caused some turbulence — he called on Georgian leadership to help Ukraine in the fight against the Russian invaders and to open a “second front” against the Russian Federation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Statement of the Charge d’Affaires of Ukraine in Georgia A. Kasianov similarly resulted in complicating relations with Georgia — he stated (6.12) that Georgian authorities ignored the request to help Ukraine with the supply of generators in November-December.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba put high hope (5.04) on the appointment of I. Darchiashvili as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and potential positive impact on Georgian position towards countering Russian aggression. It’s worth mentioning that Ukraine prioritised systematic appeals to Georgian society as a strategic communication mechanism because citizens are much more prone to supporting Ukraine than state officials.

Activities

In 2022, the foreign policy activities in the problematic Georgian sector were aimed at solving practical issues, mostly with the efforts of the MFA. An accusation by the President of Ukraine regarding the unfriendly attitude of Georgia was reinforced by the summoning of the Ukrainian Ambassador to Georgia, I. Dolhov, to Kyiv for consultations (1.03). Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba had a conversation with his Georgian counterpart I. Darchiashvili (15.04) insisting on the unacceptability of any Russian sanctions bypassing with the help of Georgia, which was responded positively. D. Kuleba met with I. Darchiashvili during the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Prague (31.08) and discussed some bilateral issues, including the return of the Ambassador of Ukraine to Georgia and the future of the Eastern Partnership.
The efforts to stabilise relations at the parliamentary level resulted in certain relief, particularly on the day of the official visit made by the delegation of the Parliament of Georgia, headed by Speaker S. Papuashvili (16.04). R. Stefanchuk expressed gratitude to Georgians for supporting Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees and discussed the prospects of Georgia joining the global sanctions policy against the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian MP I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, backed by her colleagues from the Ukrainian-Georgian Parliamentary Group, met with Georgian Ambassador to Ukraine G. Zakarashvili (17.08). During the meeting, the Ukrainian party expressed gratitude to the Georgian people for supporting Ukrainians and discussed the possibility of intensifying support from the Georgian authorities. During her stay in Georgia, Ukrainian MP and co-Chair of Ukrainian-Georgian Interparliamentary Group L. Marchenko (14.08) took part in a working meeting with the staff of the Embassy of Ukraine to Georgia, visited the Ukrainian sectors in Tbilisi public schools and the volunteer centre supporting Ukrainian refugees in the Holy Trinity Cathedral.

Charge d’Affaires of Ukraine in Georgia A. Kasianov actively participated in public events, in particular international conferences, exchanging opinions on possible ways to strengthen the economic cooperation of the Black Sea states within the framework of joint projects and international formats of cooperation in the context of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and its blockage of the Black Sea.

**Results**

The significant deterioration of bilateral relations with Georgia in the context of the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine led to diplomatic ties loosening. The President dismissed I. Dolhov from the post of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Georgia (24.06) with no relevant appointments made in 2022.

Georgia has not introduced economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. At the same time, in 2022, Georgia voted “for” all five UN GA Resolutions in support of Ukraine.

The commodity turnover between Ukraine and Georgia in 2022 fell by 50% compared to 2021 and reached USD 353.2m. Ukraine exported 2.5 times more goods and services (USD 249m) than imported (USD 104m) from Georgia.
Local positive results include Georgia’s decision to send the necessary equipment to Ukraine at relevant request: Charge d’Affaires of Ukraine in Georgia A. Kasianov, together with Deputy Minister of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia R. Mikautadze, took part in the ceremony of loading 25 powerful (150–500 kW) generators, with a total cost over USD 530,000, purchased by the government of Georgia for further delivery to Ukraine (21.12). Georgian businesses provided significant humanitarian aid to Ukrainians residing in both countries, criticising their government for favouring the Russian Federation.

The CMU (9.02) approved the draft Protocol between the CMU and the Government of Georgia by a relevant decree regarding the amendments to the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Georgia on cooperation in the area of government communication (October 28, 1997).

Numerous appeals from the Ukrainian party, including the President’s requests, did not produce the desired result regarding Mikhail Saakashvili’s release from the Georgian prison or improving his conditions.
In 2022, Estonia became one of the countries that most actively assisted Ukraine in countering Russian aggression by providing defence, humanitarian, economic, and digital support to cope with war challenges. Additionally, Estonia advocated for Ukraine's membership of the EU and NATO, called for the prosecution of Russia, and joined the group investigating its crimes against Ukraine, which is expected to help the cause of Ukraine’s victory and reconstruction.

| POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT | 5 |
| STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS     | 5 |
| ACTIVITIES                   | 5 |
| RESULTS                      | 5 |
| **TOTAL SCORE:**             | **A** |

Estonia
Political interest/engagement

Estonia is regularly mentioned in Ukrainian political discourse as one of the country’s most active and reliable partners thanks to its significant contribution to strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities and support for its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Increasing sanctions pressure on Russia and holding it accountable has become a priority. Estonia is frequently mentioned by the Ukrainian President, Foreign Minister and others as a reliable and exemplary partner that provides military assistance.

MPs from various factions, including the “Servant of the People”, such as M. Mezentseva, O. Khomenko, V. Halaychuk, and P. Sushko, have advocated for Ukraine’s cooperation with Estonia. Priorities were given to cities and towns in the Kharkiv region, which they visited with the former Estonian Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, U. Reinsalu.

Strategic communications

Ukraine actively communicated with Estonia, expressing gratitude for the assistance provided and promoting sanctions and European integration policy. For example, in his address to the Riigikogu (13.04), President Zelenskyy thanked Estonia for being one of the first countries to provide defence assistance to Ukraine. He also thanked Estonia for supporting the discussion of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the corresponding sanctions policy in the EU and other international institutions.
V. Zelenskyy also thanked representatives of the parliaments of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia for signing a joint statement “On the urgent need to modernize Ukraine's air defense”. Additionally, he called on Estonian experts to join the work of the joint group investigating Russian war crimes in Ukraine.

In her address to the Estonian parliament, Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada O. Kondratiau thanked the Estonian parliament for recognising Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine as genocide.

Activities

The intensity of bilateral dialogue between the two countries was extremely high. Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs U. Reinsalu (2–4.08), Minister of Defence H. Pevkur and President A. Karis (21.02, 13.04) visited Kyiv, the latter coming to the capital before and after the full-scale invasion.

D. Kuleba and U. Reinsalu, the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Estonia, respectively, discussed steps towards creating a special tribunal to prosecute the crime of Russian aggression (12.11).

During a meeting in Kyiv, Ukrainian Minister of Defence O. Reznikov and his Estonian counterpart H. Pevkur arranged for the training of the Ukrainian military in certain specialities, including tactical medicine and evacuation specialists, and help with cyber troops for the Armed Forces of Ukraine (14.09). Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief V. Zaluzhnyi hosted a delegation of the Estonian Defence Forces led by Commander M. Herem that visited the sites of war crimes committed by Russian troops in Kyiv and Chernihiv regions.

Estonia is currently assisting the Ukrainian government with reconstructing the Zhytomyr region, which was the subject of two forums supported by the Estonian MFA. Strengthening economic cooperation between Ukraine and Estonia has become important in the fight against Russia. Ukraine’s Energy Minister H. Halushchenko met an Estonian delegation headed by Minister of Economic Affairs and Infrastructure R. Sikkut, who confirmed Estonia’s readiness to help Ukraine to restore the destroyed energy infrastructure.
The head of the Parliamentary Group on Interparliamentary Relations with the Republic of Estonia, MP A. Pushkarenko, met Riigikogu President J. Ratas to discuss the consequences of Russia’s destructive military aggression against Ukraine, while a Ukrainian delegation headed by First Deputy Speaker of the VRU O. Kornienko visited Estonia (15–17.12).

Thanks to the coordination of efforts, Estonia accepted temporarily displaced persons from Ukraine, and cultural cooperation between the two countries received a new impetus for development.

Results

The Estonian Riigikogu issued statements condemning Russia’s military aggression and expressing support for granting Ukraine the status of an EU candidate. The Riigikogu also recognised Russia as an aggressor state and its actions against Ukraine as genocide, refused to recognise the results of the referendums in the occupied territories of Ukraine that were rigged by Russia, and called for the prosecution of those responsible for international crimes committed by Russia.

Estonia strongly supported a unified position on granting Ukraine an EU candidate status and continues to advocate for Ukraine’s NATO membership. Additionally, Estonia froze tens of millions of euro worth of Russian assets in the country as part of the EU’s sanctions against Russia.

At the request of the MoD of Ukraine, Estonia has sent Kyiv military aid, including artillery, ammunition, personal protective equipment, and winter uniforms. Additionally, at the end of 2022, Estonia approved another military aid package aimed at helping the AFU with individual equipment such as body armour, ballistic protective plates for body armour, and uniforms. Estonia will also send generators, drones, weapon cleaning kits, and lung ventilators.

In support of Ukraine’s cybersecurity, Estonia has ensured the continuity of Ukrainian digital services in the cloud services from outside Ukraine. Furthermore, the Estonian government and local technology companies have provided material support to Ukraine, including donating equipment for monitoring and countering cyberattacks.
The Estonian MFA has allocated 50,000 euros to the Ukrainian humanitarian initiative Grain from Ukraine. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Estonia has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine worth more than EUR 20m, military aid worth more than EUR 255m, and raised EUR 17.8m in private donations. Estonia has provided defence assistance to Ukraine, amounting to approximately one-third of its defence budget. Additionally, it hosts over 48,000 Ukrainians, which is almost 3.7 per cent of Estonia's population.

Following talks between Ukrainian and Estonian officials, Estonia became one of the first countries to begin practical reconstruction of Ukraine, particularly in the Zhytomyr region. Estonia also launched projects to provide education for children and support for women and children affected by the war.

Ukraine and Estonia agreed to launch a pilot project to issue electronic consignment notes (e-CN) for road freight transporters to simplify transportation.

Trade between the two countries totalled USD 221m in 2022, with exports outweighing imports.
Two factors shaped Ukraine’s interest in Israel in 2022: the launch of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine and Israel’s ambiguous position, including its refusal to provide military support to Ukraine, suspension of visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens at the beginning of the war, etc. Healthcare and defence areas were key for a dialogue.
Political interest/engagement

Ukrainian politicians focused on getting Israel to support Ukraine in countering Russia. In particular, Verkhovna Rada’s Speaker, R. Stefanchuk, highlighted at the beginning of the war that “Ukraine needs support and supply of weapons, as well as help with the negotiations” (26.02). Ukraine expressed interest in receiving the Israeli air defence system and other defence technology. Representatives of Ukrainian authorities, including the Head of the OPU A. Yermak (20.02), spoke about this repeatedly. In his address to the Knesset, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy highlighted the efficiency of Israeli air defence and criticised Israel’s reluctance to provide it to Ukraine (20.03). At the same time, Israel was not mentioned in any foreign policy speech of the Ukrainian leadership.

Also, Ukraine was interested in having Israel join sanctions against Russia, as MP O. Vasylevska-Smahliuk pointed out during her visit to Israel (7.04).

Given Israel’s experience in physical and mental rehabilitation, healthcare was one of Ukraine’s areas of greatest interest. Ukraine’s Deputy Interior Minister said that “Ukraine critically needs the experience of Israeli colleagues as our people are undergoing the traumatic developments with which Israel has learned to deal professionally.” (11.08). Minister for Veterans Affairs Y. Laputina echoed this point (6.01).

The change of the Cabinet of Ministers in Israel in December differed its rhetoric as Ukraine expressed increasingly more hope that cooperation with Israel in the key areas of interest would progress. President Zelenskyy said, “We need Israel’s help and political leadership. And, as I have said, this has begun in recent days” (26.10).

Strategic communications

Strategic communication focused on informing Israel about developments in the context of Russia’s aggression and attracting its support. Contributing to a change in Israel’s ambiguous position on Russian aggression — including the suspension of visa-free travelling for Ukrainians — was one of the key tasks. However, no massive media campaigns were conducted. Representatives of Israel did not visit the de-occupied territory of Ukraine. Still, representatives of Ukrainian authorities made efforts to advocate the Ukrainian agenda — mostly via diplomatic channels.
Ukraine's President Zelenskyy spoke to different audiences with the following messages: drawing parallels between the experience of Ukraine and Israel in the fight for independence; calling for support for Ukraine's needs; condemning the government's ambiguous position on the conflict resolution, and gratitude to the people of Israel for its support. President Zelenskyy spoke to the Knesset (20.03), drawing parallels between Russia's war on Ukraine and the Holocaust and asking Israel not to be indifferent to what was happening in Ukraine, especially given the trauma of war experienced by both nations. This message was met with a mixed reaction in Israel.

In addition to that, President Zelenskyy met with representatives of Jewish communities (26.10), spoke to the participants of the Haaretz Democracy Conference (24.10), and did an online talk with the students and professors of Israel's top universities (23.06). Head of the OPU A. Yermak was active too, meeting with the representatives of the top Jewish organisations (20.10) and speaking to the Israeli media (24.03), focusing on the importance of providing weapons to Ukraine and Ukraine's desire to see Israel as one of its security guarantors.

Activities

Compared to 2021, there was a decline in activities on Israel's track. Contacts mostly took place in the context of discussing developments around Russian aggression. Ukraine's President and Foreign Minister were the most active in this. President Zelenskyy spoke to the Israeli Prime Minister on multiple occasions (3.03, 6.03, 8.03, 15.03, 5.05, 1.09, 7.11) and with its President once (24.11).

At the governmental level, Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke to the Prime Minister of Israel (21.10) and Foreign Minister (5.05). Ministers of Defence had a telephone conversation (20.04). Minister for Veterans Affairs Y. Laputina met with a delegation of experts from Israel to discuss bilateral cooperation in medical and psychological rehabilitation for the Ukrainian military and special programs (6.01). In this context, First Lady O. Zelenska spoke to the First Lady of Israel, seeking to get Israel engaged in Ukraine's national program for psychological support and thanked her for Israel's humanitarian assistance (17.05). Ukraine's Healthcare Minister, V. Liashko, discussed the options of investing in healthcare recovery with his Israeli peers (18.05).
Ukraine’s leadership focused its actions on attracting Israel’s military aid and overcoming some of the negative developments, such as the suspension of visa-free travelling for Ukrainians by Israel at the beginning of the war. Thanks to the actions of Ukraine’s Embassy to Israel that engaged lawyers, Ukraine managed to remove entry restrictions for Ukrainians through the court in July, after Israel imposed these restrictions at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Before the full-scale aggression, Ukraine and Israel managed to have political consultations between their MFA (13.02). They spoke about interaction in the framework of international organisations, the human rights situation on the occupied territory, and the accumulation of the Russian military along Ukraine’s borders.

Results

The war and a decline in interaction in the conventional areas of cooperation impacted the results of Ukraine’s work on the Israeli track. Ukraine failed to have Israel join sanctions against Russia and provide military assistance to Ukraine in 2022. However, Ukraine received humanitarian aid from Israel.

As a result of cooperation in healthcare, psychologists of the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior and Ukrainian mental health specialists received basic training in self-help and help for others in crisis situations at NATAL, the Israel centre of trauma and resilience. This was the product of an agreement between the First Ladies of the two countries. As part of the cooperation between the Ukrainian and Israeli Healthcare Ministries, Israeli clinics provide treatment to wounded Ukrainians and help treat Ukrainian cancer patients.

According to Ukraine’s customs service, the Ukraine-Israel trade was USD 627.7m, which was 34% below that of 2021. This included USD 328.7m worth of Ukraine’s exports and USD 299m of imports.
Ukrainian and Indian top officials communicated more often than in previous years. However, this was not enough to influence India’s stance on Russia’s war and reluctance to impose sanctions against Russia. This points to the need to intensify Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with India. The Ukrainian Embassy to India has been without Ambassador since July. India remains one of Ukraine’s biggest trade partners beyond the EU.
Political interest/engagement

Representatives of the Ukrainian government manifested their political interest in India in attempts to engage it in the coalition of the countries that oppose Russia’s aggression. In other contexts, they made statements where India was mostly mentioned as an important actor in the Global South.

In his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, President Zelenskyy specified that Ukraine could gain “new friends” and “new alliances”, including in the Global South, by sharing its positive experience in the digitalisation of public services. According to President Zelenskyy, this domain became a special priority. In his speech at the Ambassadorial, President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine should find “the format of its leadership in strategic processes in each of these regions [of the Global South],” mentioning India, among others.

In his interview for the Indian TV channel Republic World (7.04), President Zelenskyy said he would like to see India among the security guarantors for Ukraine.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba called on the Indian government in his interview with the Indian media to change its stance on the Russia-Ukraine war (New Delhi declares its stance neutral) and stop buying discounted Russian oil.

In his interview for RBC Ukraine (10.10), Chair of the VRU Foreign Policy Committee O. Merezhko described India’s stance as “not too hopeless” and something that can be worked with.

Strategic communications

Ukraine communicated inconsistently with the Indian media and society. In the first months of the war, Ukrainian MPs often spoke on Indian TV. After the interest in developments in Ukraine faded, representatives of different government sectors barely appeared on Indian TV. Representatives of Ukraine’s Embassy also commented a little while being in India.

In the first months of the full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy gave an interview for the Indian Republic World TV channel (7.04). Foreign Minister Kuleba gave an interview for two major Indian TV channels, India Today (27.04) and NDTV (6.12). In all interviews, the speakers said they hoped India would change its stance on the Russian invasion and cooperation with Russia.
Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s Ambassador to India, I. Polikha, gave an interview for the Indian WION channel (16.02). However, the interview was weak and controversial in terms of the signals to the Indian audience, including on the security of international students, as Indian students made up the biggest group of international students in Ukraine. Also, Ambassador Polikha spoke on other TV channels at the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

**Activities**

Ukraine and India had little cooperation in different areas in 2022. Telephone talks prevailed. Top officials of the two countries met twice in major summits. There was barely any cooperation at the level of ministries.

Since the launch of the full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy spoke repeatedly to India’s Prime Minister Modi on the telephone (26.02, 4.10, 26.12). They discussed important topics for both countries. In February, the conversation was about India’s political support for Ukraine at the UN and the evacuation of Indian students from Ukraine. In October, the conversation focused on the so-called “referenda” Russia staged in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine. In December, the two leaders spoke about India’s presidency at G20.

Foreign Minister Kuleba had a telephone conversation with India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar (8.08). Minister Kuleba thanked Minister Jaishankar for the humanitarian aid India provided to Ukraine, discussed ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation and focused on the security of Indian students. Apart from that, they met at the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia (12.11), where they discussed food security and Russia’s aggression.

Ukraine’s Prime Minister Shmyhal met with Foreign Minister Jaishankar at the UN GA (21.09), where he thanked him for humanitarian aid and shared President Zelenskyy’s proposal for India to become one of the security guarantors for Ukraine.

NSDC Secretary O. Danilov met with India’s Ambassador to Ukraine, Shri Harsh Kumar Jain (5.01 and 6.10). Ukraine’s Minister of Energy, H. Halushchenko, also met with India’s Ambassador to Ukraine (17.11) to discuss possible support for Ukraine in the energy sphere.

Head of President’s Office A. Yermak had a telephone conversation with A. Doval, National Security Advisor to India’s Prime Minister (8.11). They discussed the key aspects of Ukraine-India interaction, India’s presidency in G20, the Grain from Ukraine initiative, etc.
Ukraine did not have its Ambassador to India after July 2022. Ukraine's Embassy to India was engaged in organising cultural and awareness-raising events, including a photo exhibition about Russia's war on Ukraine. Also, Ukraine was represented at Grainmash Asia, an exhibition of agricultural machinery in Gandhinagar (15–17.09).

**Results**

India was one of Ukraine's biggest trade partners in 2022, with a total trade worth USD 2.58bn. Oil and fats are the key items Ukraine exports to India. At the same time, Ukraine's exports halved in 2022 compared to 2021, down to USD 772.2m.

India changed its stance in the UN vote for the resolution on the Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in 2022. It had voted against it in the past but abstained in 2022. Also, it abstained in the voting on other Ukraine-related resolutions, including resolutions on the Russian aggression, territorial integrity of Ukraine, and expulsion of Russia from the Human Rights Council in 2022 (dated 25.02, 2.03, 27.03, 14.11 and others).

Most Indian students who studied in Ukraine before Russia's full-scale invasion continue their studies in Ukraine. According to data from India's Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 15,783 Indian students continue their studies at Ukrainian universities. Out of these, 14,973 studied online.

India provides humanitarian aid to Ukraine. It mostly consists of medicines and medical equipment, including prostheses.
In 2022, the policy towards Iran was marked as short-sighted, with a negative impact on Ukraine’s strategic security. Any illusions the Ukrainian party had regarding the readiness of the Iranian regime for a constructive dialogue after the UIA PS752 passenger aircraft tragedy in January 2020 eventually vanished when Iranian drones were used to attack Ukraine along with other military aid supplied to the aggressor. The current context of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Iran can be characterised as tense.

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<td>Political Interest/Engagement</td>
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Political interest/engagement

The political interest of Ukrainian leadership towards Iran remained rather circumstantial by February. When the Iranian origin of attack drones, used by Russia to continue its terror in Ukraine, was established, Iran remained the focus of attention for all political, governmental, and security actors and experts.

IRI has been regularly mentioned in statements and messages given by the President of Ukraine, representatives of the OPU, the Secretary of the NSDC of Ukraine, the MFA of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Air Force, the Military Intelligence, the Prosecutor-General’s Office, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine etc. All branches of power, as well as the security and defence sector in particular, expressed a consolidated opinion on the unacceptability of providing support to occupying forces and the inevitability of prosecution for these actions.

In October, the MFA of Ukraine presented a statement claiming Iran to “refrain immediately from the supply of any weapons to Russia”, threatening with strict liability, “including international judicial proceedings regarding Russia’s crimes against Ukraine”. A similar statement was adopted by the Parliament of Ukraine (October). Occasionally the issue of imposing sanctions against Iran was raised.

The experts’ interest in this area had also been enhanced by the political processes inside Iran after mass protests in September, but this issue was left beyond the attention of leadership.

Strategic communications

Although strategic communication on Iranian issues targeted foreign audiences, it was not effective. The objective specificity of the IRI media landscape promoted the reporting on the war against Ukraine to be shaped by the significant impact of Russian narratives.

Some Ukrainian officials attempted to use the media holdings of Western partners, with English reports translated into Farsi, to convey the message of the neo-colonial essence of Russia’s war against Ukraine to the Iranian establishment and society impartially and objectively. For example, the head of the Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation, O. Merezhko, was present at BBC Persian. There
were individual cases of public communication at Iran International (a broadcasting company opposing the Iranian regime) with headquarters in the USA.

However, there wasn’t any systemic communication activity in this area (including the recall of the Ambassador of Ukraine to the IRI, S. Burdylyak, in the middle of the year, which also contributed to this result). Official communication channels were limited. In addition, considering the specificity of the Iranian media landscape, communication with Iranian media within the country has also been scarce.

Activities

Despite several attempts made at the beginning of 2022 to intensify the dialogue between Ukraine and Iran in an economic dimension (working meeting of Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce with the adviser of the IRI Embassy in Ukraine, 3.02), during the year, Ukrainian diplomacy mainly focused on Iranian-Russian dynamics and agreements concluded to expand cooperation in the area of defence industry cooperation.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba had six telephone conversations with the head of the Foreign Ministry of Iran, H. A. Abdullahian (17.02, 14.03, 13.04, 30.06, 15.07, 28.10), noting the unacceptability of any support to be provided to Russia in its war against Ukraine. No data is available regarding contacts at other levels. At the same time, in November, the Ukrainian side confirmed that an expert meeting with Iranian counterparts took place at the UN ground.

The level of coordination between Ukrainian government agencies in this matter may be described as satisfactory, considering the specificity of involving individual governmental agencies in the practical dimension of solving the problem with Iranian weapons supply to the aggressor.

Results

During the reporting year, the Iranian vector has shifted for Ukrainian diplomacy from a foreign policy dilemma to an actual threat to national security. 2022 was truly a disastrous year for Ukrainian-Iranian relations, staying on the verge of a complete rupture. Currently, any cooperation formats — e.g., the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-
Iranian Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation — prove to be completely meaningless.

Despite the public opinion in Iran expressing sympathy towards Ukraine, no official assistance, even humanitarian aid, had been provided. All previous achievements in the bilateral trade context (Ukraine had a positive balance in its favour) were completely nullified by the actions of the Iranian regime.

According to available data, the 2022 commodity turnover amounted to USD 267m (compared with 2021 — USD 723.7m), with export reaching around USD 208m and import — USD 59m, with a surplus in favour of Ukraine.
In 2022, Ukraine’s relations with China lost momentum. While the economic dimension used to provide some impetus to bilateral contacts, after February 24, China’s ambiguous neutrality, non-recognition of Russian aggression, and lack of support for Ukraine on international platforms led to an almost complete curtailment of contacts and cooperation.
Political interest/engagement

The political interest in relations with China regarding engaging Beijing as a mediator in the war with Russia or a security guarantor, which was noticeable at the beginning of the year, has gradually declined amid China’s demonstrated non-interference policy.

President V. Zelenskyy mentioned China in some of his speeches, particularly in an interview with The South China Morning Post (4.08), where he said that he would like to discuss China’s position on Russia’s invasion directly with Chinese President Xi Jinping. At the same time, the President said that he had always wanted “relations between Ukraine and China to strengthen and develop year by year”. The President also mentioned China at the Ambassadorial (December), specifically stressing that “growth and international stability in this century cannot be imagined without relations with Africa and other parts of the Global South: Latin America, India, other Asian countries, including China…” However, the President did not mention China in his Annual Address, and there is no mention of China in the Analytical Report to his Annual Address.

In an interview with the Chinese news agency Xinhua in April, Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba said that Ukraine had asked China for security guarantees in the wake of Russia’s full-scale aggression. D. Kuleba said that Ukraine’s relations with China lacked regular contact between the leaders (30.09).

The fact that a new Ukrainian ambassador to China has not been appointed since February 2021 may also indicate a low level of interest.

Strategic communications

Strategic communications were limited to occasional interviews of President V. Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba with Chinese media, such as the President’s interview with The South China Morning Post (4.08). Ukraine’s presence in the Chinese information space was limited due to state control over traditional and social media in China.
Activities

Bilateral activities during the year did not meet the expectations for China’s possible role in stopping Russian aggression, particularly because of its status as a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum. The low political dialogue observed in previous years declined even further. Economic cooperation, which had previously been prevalent, was limited due to Russian aggression and, in particular, due to the blockade of Ukrainian ports.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba had a telephone conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (1.03). The head of the Ukrainian diplomacy informed his Chinese counterpart in detail about the developments of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, the shelling of civilian infrastructure and the killing of civilians, and asked Wang Yi to use relations between Beijing and Moscow to force Russia to stop the hostilities. The Chinese minister reaffirmed China’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and noted the strategic nature of bilateral relations.

The two ministers met again in New York on the side-lines of the UN GA (23.09) to discuss bilateral relations. During the meeting, Wang Yi reaffirmed China’s respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and said that force should not be a means of resolving disputes.

Results

Nearly the only notable outcome of the bilateral relations was Beijing’s declaration of cooperation with other countries in “playing a constructive role in de-escalation efforts” while avoiding direct support for Russia. China consistently emphasised its support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and called for the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons, but did not support sanctions, continued active economic contacts with Russia, and abstained from voting on the most important Ukrainian resolutions in the UN General Assembly.

It is worth mentioning that the Chinese Red Cross Society provided humanitarian aid, including food, medicine, sleeping bags, and baby food, but not on a significant scale.

Trade between the two countries amounted to USD 11.1bn, compared to USD 15bn in 2021. Meanwhile, exports of Ukrainian goods totalled USD 2.47bn, while imports amounted to USD 8.67bn.
Response to Russia’s full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine has proven Latvia to be Kyiv’s steadfast and loyal partner. Latvia has made cooperation with Ukraine one of the top three priorities of its foreign policy. Through political, economic, financial, social, defence, and humanitarian cooperation, Ukraine has received full support and strengthened its leverage in the EU, especially on the eve of obtaining an EU candidate status. Latvia is also ready to assist Ukraine in its Euro-Atlantic integration. Additionally, Ukraine can count on Latvia as a reliable coalition partner in bringing Russia to justice for its genocide and aggression against Ukraine.
Political interest/engagement

Russia’s full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine and, as a result, common security threats to Ukraine and Latvia have prompted intensified cooperation between the two countries. Given Latvia’s consistent and pragmatic position, the country is regularly mentioned in Ukrainian political discourse as one of Ukraine’s most active and reliable partners. In particular, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba noted in his speech that Latvia was the first country to recognise Russia as a “state sponsor of terrorism”.

Although Latvia was not singled out in major foreign policy speeches, it was frequently mentioned in interviews and discussions as a prime example of a comprehensive and reliable partner, particularly within the context of the EU and NATO.

Strategic communications

An important political event was the President of Ukraine’s address to the Saeima (26.05), in which V. Zelenskyy expressed gratitude to Latvia for sending Stingers and other weapons on February 23, which helped Ukraine in the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

During her visit to Latvia, the Vice Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, O. Kondratiuk, noted that Latvia’s total economic, military, humanitarian, and financial support for Ukraine amounted to 1% of its GDP. Additionally, Latvia has shown leadership in bringing Russian war criminals to international criminal responsibility. Latvia was one of the first countries to join Ukraine’s case against Russia in the International Court of Justice under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

President of Latvia E. Levits visited Kyiv twice: in April, becoming one of the first foreign leaders to come to Ukraine after the start of Russia’s full-scale aggression, and in September, the first foreign leader to pay a two-day visit.

Activities

The two countries engaged in intensive dialogue during the year. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy received President of Latvia E. Levits (13.04 and 9.09) and the Speaker of the Latvian Parliament I. Mūrniece (25.03). V. Zelenskyy and Prime Minister
of Latvia K. Karinš discussed Ukraine’s grain exports and support for its EU membership candidate status over the phone (22.06).

The ministers of justice of Ukraine and Latvia, D. Maliuska and J. Bordāns, stated (14.07) that joint work on an agreement on the confiscation of Russian state property abroad had begun and that during the investigation prosecutors from Latvia had visited Ukraine several times to verify and confirm war crimes committed by Russia.

Deputy Defence Minister of Ukraine H. Maliar met a Latvian delegation led by the Parliamentary Secretary of the MoD of the Republic of Latvia, B. Bjodniece, before the outbreak of war (25–27.01) to discuss logistical and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, the development of further bilateral cooperation, and strategic communications in the defence sector.

Ukrainian MPs continued to communicate with their Latvian counterparts within the Crimea Platform Support Group framework, which was established in the Latvian parliament.

The First Lady of Latvia visited Kyiv Region (23.07) at the invitation of O. Zelenska.

The cultural dimension of cooperation between Ukraine and Latvia has strengthened. Ukrainian Parliament Vice Speaker O. Kondratiuk opened at the Saeima an exhibition by photojournalist Max Levin, who was killed by Russian forces in March 2022. The Kyiv gallery Galerie Les Noms organised the “Ukrainian Seasons of Contemporary Art” exhibition at the European Union House in the Latvian capital. One of the leading Latvian theatres, Jaunais Rigas Teatris, held the premiere of the play “Bad Roads” by N. Vorozhbyt (10–12.06). The Academic Library in Riga, with the support of the University of Latvia and the Embassy of Ukraine, hosted a screening of the Ukrainian documentary film “MYTH” about Ukrainian hero V. Slipak, as well as an Open Workshop project on the creation of mosaic replicas paraphrasing the works of artist Maria Prymachenko.

Results

As a sign of solidarity, high-ranking Latvian officials, including the President, the Speaker of the Saeima, ministers, and MPs, visited Ukraine. The Speaker of the Saeima and his Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts were the first high-ranking foreign official to visit Kyiv after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Latvian Saeima issued statements condemning Russia’s military aggression, expressing support for granting Ukraine the status of an EU candidate, calling for a no-fly zone over Ukraine, and recognising Russia as an aggressor state. Latvia did not recognize the results of the referendums in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which were rigged by Russia, and called for prosecuting those responsible for the international crimes committed by Russia. Latvia provided military support to Ukraine, amounting to one per cent of its GDP (EUR 310m).

Latvia joined Lithuania and Estonia in signing a joint statement titled “On the Urgent Need to Modernize Ukraine’s Air Defence”. Thanks to successful negotiations between the Ministries of Justice of both countries, Latvia has developed a law on the alienation of Russian and Belarusian real estate.

In the defence sector, even before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Latvia provided military support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which proved important in repelling the first major wave of the Russian assault. Subsequent assistance included weapons, personal equipment, field rations, ammunition, anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, fuel, vehicles, and other equipment worth over EUR 310m.

Latvia has allocated EUR 9.3m for macro-financial support, humanitarian aid, and cooperation with Ukraine. Of this amount, EUR 5m was provided as a grant through the World Bank Group, EUR 0.6m to the UN agencies and the International Red Cross, and EUR 1.66m in support of the healthcare sector of Ukraine (ambulances, medicines, and medical equipment). It also contributed EUR 152,000 to the EU Aviation Safety Agency’s solidarity fund to support Ukraine and Moldova. The Public TV and Radio Broadcasting Company of Ukraine received EUR 0.56m, and EUR 50,000 was allocated to the Grain from Ukraine initiative. Furthermore, Latvia provided EUR 10m in guarantees to secure World Bank loans to ensure the smooth operation of the Ukrainian government.

Latvia allocated assistance to meet Ukraine’s urgent need for reconstruction, support for Ukrainian media, health and psychological rehabilitation programmes, good governance, business, and education support. Latvia became the first country to resist Russian disinformation by revoking the license of the Dozhd TV channel.

Trade between the two countries totalled USD 533.8m in 2022, compared to USD 499.13m in 2021.
Russia’s full-scale invasion and the ongoing war have shaped the main areas of work in bilateral relations between Ukraine and Lithuania. Lithuania has become one of Ukraine’s most proactive allies and advocates on international platforms, a stance that Ukrainian political actors have unanimously appreciated. During the year, the issues of providing Western weapons, rolling out sanctions and holding Russia accountable, ensuring post-war reconstruction of Ukraine, and providing humanitarian and financial assistance dominated the bilateral relations.
Political interest/engagement

During the year, Ukraine stepped up its foreign policy efforts with regard to Lithuania, as evidenced by regular involvement in bilateral relations and the existing consensus among Ukrainian political actors on this issue.

The President regularly expressed his gratitude to the government and people of Lithuania in his speeches and video addresses. The Analytical Report to the President's Annual Address acknowledged Lithuania as one of Ukraine's most active advocates, as reflected by its support for Ukraine's prospects on the path to full EU membership, Lithuania's recognition of Russia's actions as genocide, and Russia as a terrorist state. In addition, Lithuania is regarded as one of the countries participating in the international training mission for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which has been running in the UK since June. It is also noted that Lithuania consistently provided financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine throughout the year.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba repeatedly mentioned Lithuania's unwavering political, economic, military, and humanitarian support, noting the country's efforts to lobby for Ukraine's interests in the bilateral format, within the EU and NATO, as well as its proactive position in holding Russia accountable for its crimes. Defence Minister O. Reznikov emphasised even greater rapprochement between the two countries and coordination of efforts in defence and security, the results of which often preceded decisions on international platforms, such as during the allies' Ramstein meetings.

In addition to the “finance — weapons — sanctions against Russia” track, which is present in most statements on Lithuania by Ukrainian officials, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal highlighted the importance of bilateral trade, particularly in the context of expanding Ukraine's export opportunities.

At the inter-parliamentary level, Lithuania was a constant topic on the VRU Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation agenda.
Strategic communications

Ukraine demonstrated considerable involvement in effectively communicating the goals and results of bilateral work, emphasising, in particular, the two countries’ common interests, expressing gratitude to the Lithuanian people, and addressing the audience directly with an awareness of the national context. President V. Zelenskyy’s video speech to the Seimas of Lithuania (April) was a notable example.

The Embassy of Ukraine in Lithuania was active, initiating or joining numerous events, social projects for IDPs, and humanitarian and cultural missions.

Lithuanian Prime Minister I. Šimonytė was the first foreign leader to visit the liberated Kyiv region (April). The issue of rebuilding Ukraine, including using frozen Russian assets, became one of the main narratives of bilateral relations during President Zelenskyy’s meeting with Seimas Speaker V. Čmilytė-Nielsen and the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation (November). The meeting was preceded by the Lithuanian delegation’s visit to Bucha, Irpin, and Borodyanka. A. Anušauskas was the first foreign defence minister to visit Kyiv after the outbreak of the full-scale war (March). Another strategically important event was President Nausėda’s speech to the Verkhovna Rada (July), in which he noted that Lithuania would continue to make every effort to ensure that the world did not forget about the ongoing war.

Activities

President Nausėda paid an official visit to Kyiv for the meeting of the Lublin Triangle presidents the day before the full-scale invasion (February) and said that “Ukraine will not be left alone amid Russian aggression”. After the full-scale war erupted, he paid two visits to Ukraine (April and July). Prime Minister I. Šimonyte made several visits to Ukraine both on the eve of the full-scale invasion and during the first months of the war (February, April, November). Foreign Minister G. Landsbergis also visited Kyiv several times during the year (May, November).

VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk and his First Deputy O. Kornienko met a delegation of the Lithuanian Seimas led by Speaker V. Čmilyte-Nielsen (November). The key event was a visit by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to Vilnius, during which VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk addressed the Lithuanian Seimas (December).
The mentioned meetings and visits focused on the following key issues: Lithuania’s military, political, financial, and humanitarian assistance; sanctions against Russia and Lithuania’s advocacy of Ukraine’s interests on international platforms; bringing Russia to justice and establishing legal mechanisms for this; economic cooperation; and post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

**Results**

The countries reached a number of agreements, including the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between the VRU Apparatus and the Office of the Lithuanian Seimas (December) and an Agreement on cooperation in the protection of children affected by war (April).

As one of Ukraine’s most active allies in the war against Russia, Lithuania adopted several important resolutions supporting Ukraine, such as recognising Russia as a terrorist state and Russia’s actions as genocide against the Ukrainian people (May). Additionally, there were legislative initiatives to confiscate Russian assets and to promote the creation of a Special Tribunal to bring Russia’s top leadership to justice. Lithuania continues to play a significant role in Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, and in 2022, it was busy preparing for the 2023 NATO Summit to be held in Vilnius.

According to Defence Minister A. Anušauskas, Lithuania’s military support to Ukraine amounted to about EUR 283m, including air defence systems, light infantry weapons, anti-tank weapons, mortars, machine guns, ammunition, armoured vehicles and howitzers, as well as large amounts of Soviet-type weapons. About 400 Ukrainian soldiers have been trained at Lithuanian training centres. The total amount of assistance provided by Lithuania is between EUR 600m and 700m. The country has accepted about 70,000 Ukrainian refugees, which is more than 2% of the Lithuanian population. The joint initiative of the first ladies of the two countries and the efforts of the Ukrainian Embassy in the Republic of Lithuania resulted in the opening in Vilnius of the EU’s first centre for Ukrainian refugees (June).

According to the State Customs Service, in 2022, imports of goods from Lithuania amounted to USD 1.3bn, while exports reached USD 663.9m. Total trade with Lithuania amounted to USD 1.9bn.
At the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, there was some uncertainty in bilateral relations, but this gave way to deepening relations later in the year. This was partly triggered by granting the EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. High-level contacts between Ukraine and Moldova showed active dynamics throughout the year, but the existing formats of cooperation lacked content, and the activities of the bilateral presidential commission remained in their inception phase.
Political interest/engagement

Despite some uncertainty in relations at the beginning of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the situation improved later in the year, and political interest in cooperation increased. Despite not mentioning Moldova in his key speeches (during the meeting with ambassadors or in his Annual Address), in the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU V. Zelenskyy referred to the Republic of Moldova in the context of so-called “small alliances” that would benefit Ukraine in protecting its national interests. There is a separate mention of Moldova’s progress in recognising Ukraine’s electronic documents, etc.

In May, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, D. Shmyhal, announced a planned update of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Moldova.

At a briefing in early May, Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba said that Ukraine would continue to cooperate with the Republic of Moldova and support its territorial integrity amid the escalation with the unrecognised Transnistrian region. In June, the Minister also expressed support for Moldova’s government and its people, as well as for its intention to impose sanctions against Russia.

Strategic communications

Ukraine’s strategic communications with Moldova were limited to invitations issued to high-ranking officials to visit Ukraine. For example, during her visit to Ukraine in June, Moldovan President M. Sandu visited Borodyanka, Bucha, and Irpin. During her visit to Ukraine in December, Moldovan Prime Minister N. Gavrilita visited Bucha and Irpin. During the visit, she made a statement “condemning the actions of the Russian military and expressed support for the continuation of the investigation into Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine”.

Activities

Top Moldovan officials paid several visits to Ukraine during the year. In late June, the President of the Republic of Moldova, M. Sandu, visited Ukraine. The two leaders discussed, among other things, Moldova's transit potential for Ukrainian exports, energy cooperation, regional security in the context of the Transnistrian settlement, and the facilitation of border and customs cooperation.

During her working visit to Kyiv in December, the Moldovan Prime Minister, N. Gavrilita, discussed a wide range of issues with her Ukrainian counterpart, D. Shmyhal. In particular, they agreed to improve border control, strengthen Moldova's air defence system, and cooperate in the energy, trade, economic, and logistics sectors. The bilateral meeting also touched upon the settlement of the Transnistrian problem.

In early May, the Ukrainian Parliament Speaker, R. Stefanchuk, met his Moldovan counterpart I. Grosu in Kyiv to discuss security issues. In addition, the two speakers met in a multilateral format during the First Parliamentary Summit of the Crimea Platform in Zagreb in October.

An active dialogue was constantly maintained at the level of the heads of the diplomatic missions of Ukraine and Moldova. In particular, D. Kuleba and N. Popescu discussed Ukraine's assistance to Moldova in a bilateral format on the side-lines of an informal meeting of EU defence and foreign ministers (the Gymnich meeting in August). In particular, they discussed strengthening Moldova's energy security.

The countries' foreign ministries, with the participation of relevant ministries, including the energy ones, launched a new format of cooperation in the respective sectors. In early September, Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania agreed to noted develop energy projects and focus on the energy security of the three countries. It should be added that in addition to relevant ministries, national regulators, and leading energy companies of the countries also participated in the meeting. Thus, multilevel cooperation is underway at the level of the executive power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Energy) and business representatives.
Results

The governments of Ukraine and Moldova stated that they have agreed to continue their efforts to eliminate administrative and procedural barriers to the freer movement of people and goods between the countries, as well as to cooperate on air defence, improve border control, and support cooperation and dialogue on peace and security in the Transnistrian region of Moldova.

At high-level meetings, it was decided to establish a bilateral working group to coordinate Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration into the EU, to hold a trilateral meeting of the prime ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania in 2023, and to build a bridge across the Dniester River in the shared border section, connecting the Ukrainian highway T-02–02 Mohyliv-Podilskyy — Yampil — Bershad — Uman and Moldova’s M2.

According to the UN, 674,057 Ukrainian refugees have fled to Moldova since February 24, 2022, of whom 102,283 remain there to date. Moldova has supported all Ukrainian resolutions in the UN GA and statements in other international organisations but has not imposed separate sanctions against Russia. However, it does implement EU sanctions.

Trade between the two countries increased in 2022 to USD 1.07bn (from USD 976.59m in 2021), of which Ukrainian exports accounted for USD 923.3m.
In 2022, relations between Ukraine and Poland were built around responding to critical situations caused by the Russian invasion. However, the activities of Ukrainian actors and bilateral contacts in this context were based on the formats of interaction created in previous years and the established communication between the two countries’ leaderships. At the most important moment, both countries fully utilised the potential for cooperation.
Political interest/engagement

Kyiv has shown a steady political interest in developing partnerships with Poland in strategic areas: bilateral and multilateral security cooperation (such as in establishing joint ventures in the defence industry or building international alliances), advocating Ukraine’s movement towards the EU and NATO, supporting the imposed and new sanctions against Russia, participation of Poland and Polish businesses in rebuilding Ukrainian infrastructure, joint logistics and energy projects, and social issues. Based on the statements analysed, it can be concluded that Ukraine has begun to form a vision of relations with Poland in the new environment, using the potential of previous cooperation.

In his speech to the Verkhovna Rada in May, President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy said that the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion had confirmed the strategic nature of the partnership between Kyiv and Warsaw, which should be further strengthened. During his visit to Poland in May, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal stressed that Kyiv and Warsaw are allies, with their actions reflecting this status, especially in mutual defence capacity building.

Strategic communications

Throughout 2022, the Ukrainian government’s strategic communications targeted the Polish audience. In March, the Polish Sejm became one of the first parliaments in the world to be addressed by V. Zelenskyy online. In the summer, V. Zelenskyy awarded the cities of Rzeszów and Przemysł with the title of Saviour City.

In May, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, D. Shmyhal, paid an official visit to Poland and spoke to several local media outlets. Ukrainian experts and officials regularly provided comments to the Polish media.

Polish Prime Minister M. Morawiecki was on the first international delegation to visit Kyiv, which was still besieged by Russian troops (March). He visited Ukraine four times in total in 2022. Polish President A. Duda was one of the first two foreign heads of state to visit the Ukrainian capital since the start of the full-scale invasion (April). He visited Ukraine three times in 2022 and announced the start of an advocacy tour in support of granting Ukraine the status of an EU candidate during his speech to the VRU
in May. Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence M. Blaszczak and Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. Rau also visited Ukraine in 2022. All these officials visited the deoccupied towns of the Kyiv region.

Activities

In terms of intensity and content, Ukrainian actors were highly active in relations with Poland in 2022. Active contacts took place both before and after the outbreak of full-scale aggression. In particular, the President of Ukraine, V. Zelenskyy, visited Poland in January. During the President A. Duda’s visit to Kyiv in May, the two leaders agreed to develop a bilateral agreement on simplified border crossing and a new treaty of good neighbourhoodship.

At a meeting in Warsaw in January, the Ukrainian and Polish Ministers of Infrastructure agreed to mutually resolve the problem of transport permits and improve transit conditions. In February, the two heads of government met to discuss political, defence, and economic cooperation. The same month, V. Zelenskyy and D. Kuleba received Polish Foreign Minister Z. Rau in Kyiv to discuss the ways of making the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine more effective and cooperation along the London-Warsaw-Kyiv axis.

After the start of the full-scale invasion, Poland was one of the first countries to be visited by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence.

In the autumn, the President and Prime Minister of Ukraine offered Poland 100 tonnes of coal and electricity from the Khmelnytsky NPP, given the prospect of a crisis in the electricity market.

In November, V. Zelenskyy said that Poland was ready to join the Grain from Ukraine initiative to support the transport of Ukrainian exports. Later, during a visit to Warsaw, D. Shmyhal and M. Morawiecki discussed Poland’s involvement in confiscating Russian assets.

Results

Poland remained Ukraine’s main strategic partner throughout the year, providing significant humanitarian, diplomatic and military assistance. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, as of early January 2023, Poland
was the third country in the world in terms of the share of its GDP allocated or earmarked for assistance to Ukraine as part of bilateral cooperation and at the EU level, and the fifth in terms of absolute amounts (having provided or promised support worth almost EUR 3.6bn).

Polish partners were among the first to provide the Ukrainian military with heavy armoured vehicles. Poland has now transferred almost its entire arsenal of Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine. At the end of 2022, Warsaw was one of the biggest promoters of providing Ukraine with Western-style tanks and Patriot air defence systems.

Warsaw was actively involved in developing and advocating EU sanctions packages against Russia. Poland has accepted more than 1.5 million refugees from Ukraine.

In June, the Ukrainian and Polish Prime Ministers signed a joint statement in which they stressed the need to strengthen cooperation in the defence industry, military-technical, economic and energy sectors, reaffirmed their commitment to the April 23 Memorandum of Understanding on enhancing railway cooperation, agreed to improve border infrastructure and to hold a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation and the Intergovernmental Coordination Council on Interregional Cooperation in the near future.

In October, the volume of grain transported from Ukraine through Poland reached over 450,000 tonnes per month, although the average summer monthly figure was just over 220,000 tonnes. In September, the Ministries of Agrarian Policy and Infrastructure of both countries signed a memorandum on the construction of a pipeline to transport oil from Ukraine to the Polish port of Gdansk. In November, the Verkhovna Rada supported an increase in 2022 state budget expenditures for the programme “Development of Border Road Infrastructure on the Ukrainian-Polish Border” by providing a loan from Poland. In addition, the reconstruction of two tracks in the Lviv region that connect the Khyriv station with the Polish railway is worth mentioning. In this context, it is worth noting that Ukraine was granted the status of a partner in the Three Seas Initiative in June, which should facilitate the development of joint infrastructure projects, including with Poland.

In addition, Polish suppliers accounted for more than half of all petrol and diesel imports to the Ukrainian market in January-November, according to Eurostat.

Trade turnover between the two countries increased to USD 12.2bn in the year under review, up from USD 10.2bn in 2021, making Poland one of Ukraine’s top trading partners.
The Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, significantly accelerated Ukrainian-Romanian contacts. The level of political interest increased, and bilateral cooperation intensified in many areas. The President of Romania paid a visit to Ukraine, which had been postponed since 2017. All of this suggests prospects for further deepening bilateral cooperation and partnership.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, Ukraine’s interest in Romania increased significantly, though it was not always publicly declared at the highest level. In particular, it was not mentioned in the President’s speeches. The Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the VRU contains several references to Romania. It is especially stated that cooperation in various formats (Bucharest Nine, the Three Seas, Ukraine-Poland-Romania, Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova triangles) would contribute to more effectively protecting national interests. It was also noted that a logistics hub in Romania had been established to collect and deliver humanitarian aid. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy expressed his gratitude to Romania and President K. Iohannis on social media for their significant contribution to Ukraine’s defence capability and support for Ukraine’s EU membership.

In September, the foreign ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, along with their energy ministers, launched a new trilateral format of cooperation. Ukraine’s Defence Minister O. Reznikov mentioned Romania in the context of common threats in the Black Sea region and Romania’s assistance to Ukraine. Politicians most often mentioned Romania when discussing the prospects for shipping Ukrainian exports through Romanian ports.

Strategic communications

In his address to the Romanian parliament (4.04), Ukrainian President V. Zelenskyy spoke about civilian killings in Bucha and listed evidence that could be used for a future tribunal on Russian war crimes. The President also thanked Romania for hosting Ukrainian refugees.

Romanian Prime Minister N. Ciucă and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of the Romanian Parliament, M. Ciolacu, visited Irpin (27.04). Following the visit, the Prime Minister expressed Romania’s support for an international investigation to bring those responsible for international crimes to justice, including through the Romanian government’s recent voluntary financial contribution to the International Criminal Court Trust Fund. Romanian President K. Iohannis visited Irpin (16.06) and called for the prosecution of Russian criminals.
Activities

Effective political and economic dialogue with Romanian partners continued in 2022. Several meetings and high-level visits took place on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Presidents V. Zelenskyy and K. Iohannis finally met in mid-June when the Romanian leader visited Kyiv. This visit had been planned since 2017 but had been constantly postponed.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba paid a working visit to Romania (22.04). The main purpose of the visit was to discuss the assistance Romania could provide to Ukraine. D. Kuleba was received by Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucă, with whom he discussed the diversification of Ukrainian export routes. D. Kuleba also held talks with Romanian Defence Minister V. Dîncu and Foreign Minister B. Aurescu, with whom he discussed the security situation amid the war. In addition, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister attended the Bucharest NATO meeting in November, where he met his Romanian counterpart B. Aurescu. The two discussed further support for Ukraine and the importance of improving communication between Ukraine and Romania to facilitate the movement of people and goods.

Romanian Prime Minister N. Ciucă paid two visits to Ukraine. During the first working visit (26.04), the Speaker of the Romanian Parliament’s Chamber of Deputies, M. Ciolacu, and Foreign Minister B. Aurescu came to Kyiv together with the Romanian Prime Minister. The high-level delegation held a series of meetings with President V. Zelenskyy, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and Speaker of the VRU R. Stefanchuk. The Romanian delegation expressed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal suggested that Romanian Prime Minister N. Ciucă consider the possibility of opening the Dyakivtsi-Rakovets border crossing point as soon as possible.

On 10 November, the Prime Minister of Romania paid another visit to Ukraine and met the head of the Ukrainian Government, D. Shmyhal. The prime ministers discussed the creation of a bilateral working group on the development of transport infrastructure along the shared border. According to D. Shmyhal, the EU Advisory Mission to Ukraine will join the work. The energy sector was also on the agenda. The parties discussed power equipment supply and the intensification of work in this area jointly with the European Commission.
Contacts between the countries also continued at the parliamentary level. The First Deputy Speaker of the VRU, O. Kornienko, visited Romania in June. Taking part in the first parliamentary summit of the Crimea Platform (24–25.10) in Croatia, Romanian Senate President A. Gorghiu said that her country would help Ukraine with post-war reconstruction. She also called on other European representatives to bring Ukraine closer to the EU.

Results

Romania has been actively involved in helping Ukraine since the first days of Russia’s aggression. In particular, a logistics hub was established in Romania to coordinate humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Romania has also become a key corridor for the export of Ukrainian agricultural products. While the exports of these products to Romania were only valued at USD 1.8m in 2021, they saw a steep rise up to USD 1.24bn in 2022. Romania also became Ukraine’s main fuel supplier in 2022, with fuel imports growing 30 times up and reaching 1m tonnes, with another 250,000 tonnes transported in transit through Romania. OMV Petrom and Rompetrol cover about 40% of Ukraine’s fuel needs. The total trade turnover between the two countries amounted to USD 5.37bn.

Romania has consistently advocated for the EU to offer a European perspective to Ukraine and supported relevant proposals of the European Commission.

The foreign ministers of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, together with their energy colleagues, launched a new trilateral format of cooperation (15.09), which will be based on the interaction of the foreign ministries and involve other relevant ministries according to their priorities.

A joint meeting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of the Romanian Parliament (24.11) adopted a political declaration recognising the Holodomor (the deliberate artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932–1933) as a crime against the Ukrainian people and humanity.

On international platforms, Romanian partners demonstrated consistent and unwavering support for Ukraine. At the 29th OSCE Ministerial Council meeting (1.12), Romanian Foreign Minister B. Aurescu called for an immediate end to Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine and the withdrawal of its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.

The Krasnoyilsk — Vicovu de Sus border crossing point on the Ukrainian-Romanian border was opened in November. According to the head of the Ukrainian Government, D. Shmyhal, this was the first border crossing built from scratch since 1998.

During a visit to Romania (21.11), Ukraine’s Minister of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, R. Strilets and Romania’s Minister of Environment, Water and Forests, B. Tánczos, signed an Agreement on the Implementation of the Espoo Convention. This is the first stage of implementation of the roadmap developed for Ukraine by the Convention Implementation Committee.

According to the State Customs Service, trade between the two countries in 2022 totalled USD 5.35bn, compared to USD 2.3bn in 2021, partly due to the transit of Ukrainian goods through Romania after the closure of Black Sea ports.
Slovakia

The Slovak Republic is one of Ukraine’s key partners in Europe, providing humanitarian, political, and military assistance in the face of full-scale Russian aggression. Compared to previous years, when Ukraine-Slovakia relations did not enjoy a significant political or public interest in Ukraine and mostly came to the forefront during bilateral visits, there is now higher political and media interest in bilateral relations.
Political interest/engagement

Given Slovakia’s significant contribution to strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities, supporting its European integration aspirations, and providing shelter to Ukrainian refugees, Slovakia regularly appears in Ukrainian political discourse as one of the country’s most active and reliable partners. Ukrainian officials, including the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, mentioned Slovakia in several public speeches, both at home and abroad, in the context of military assistance and cooperation in the Ramstein format, participation in assistance projects to supply energy equipment and demining of liberated territories, potential participation in Ukraine’s reconstruction, etc.

The President of Ukraine’s Analytical Report to the Annual Address to the VRU names Slovakia as one of the countries that “made the greatest contribution to maintaining Ukraine’s stability in the military, economic, energy, and other sectors”. Ukrainian officials frequently highlight that Slovakia was among the first countries to offer defence assistance to Ukraine.

While seeking support for Ukraine’s EU membership application, particular emphasis was placed on Slovakia as one of several EU member states that signed a bilateral declaration acknowledging Ukraine’s European prospect in late 2021.

Strategic communications

The Ukrainian leadership’s strategic communication, both directly with the Slovak audience and in general on cooperation with this country, can be deemed appropriate and fitting for Slovakia’s status as a key partner of Ukraine. Significant political events included speeches by both presidents to the parliaments: President Z. Čaputová’s speech to the Verkhovna Rada (31.05) and President V. Zelenskyy’s speech to the National Council of the Slovak Republic (10.05). In his address, the President called on the Slovak people to continue to be the voice of Ukraine in Europe and praised Slovakia’s military assistance to Ukraine and manifestations of solidarity, including the visit by the Prime Minister and Slovak MPs to Bucha.
In June, the President also delivered a speech at the GLOBSEC International Security Forum in Bratislava. An important message is consistent gratitude to the Slovak people for providing shelter to over 100,000 Ukrainian refugees.

**Activities**

The intensity of bilateral dialogue in 2022 was high. The President of Ukraine had phone conversations with the President and Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, while the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs visited Kyiv in February, the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine visited Bratislava in June, the Ministers of Foreign and European Affairs, the Minister of Defence, and the Minister of Economy visited Ukraine in December. Slovak Prime Minister E. Heger's visit to Ukraine (8.04) was symbolic as he was among the first foreign leaders to come after the start of Russia's full-scale aggression. In June, Slovak President Z. Čaputová visited Ukraine.

Ukrainian initiatives in the context of cooperation with Eastern European countries are noteworthy. The Presidential Office introduced the Kyiv Initiative, a new format involving foreign policy advisers to the heads of state and government of Eastern European countries, including Slovakia, aimed at strengthening coordination in regional security issues. The President also initiated Ukraine's accession to the Three Seas format, of which Slovakia is a member.

**Results**

Slovakia has made a significant contribution to strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities. It is the fifth largest donor of military assistance to Ukraine by the percentage of GDP. The Slovak Republic has provided S-300 air defence systems, M-17 helicopters, ammunition for Grad multiple rocket launchers, Zuzana 2 howitzers, Bozena demining systems, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, ammunition, fuel, etc. Slovakia has provided over EUR 4m in humanitarian aid to Ukraine and established a logistics hub for EU aid in Košice.
Slovak government officials actively advocated the status of an EU candidate for Ukraine.

After a break, in December, the Joint Commission on Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation met for the first time since 2013. The protocol signed following the meeting set out key agreements on further bilateral cooperation, including trade and investment, energy, transport, electronic communications, science and innovation, etc.

Despite the war, bilateral trade in 2022 increased by more than 30% (USD 2.67bn). Given Russia's blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, cooperation with Slovakia in arranging so-called “solidarity corridors” for the export of agricultural products and other critical goods from Ukraine was important.
Türkiye played an important role in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2022, including containing Russia’s aggression. Ukraine managed to get Ankara’s political and diplomatic support in protecting its territorial integrity, implementing a number of military-technical projects, accomplishing an agreement on closing the Straits for Russian military vessels, and signing a free trade agreement and the Grain Deal. At the same time, Ukraine failed to persuade Turkish partners to join sanctions against the Russian Federation and take a tougher stance in condemning Russia’s aggression because of Türkiye’s interest in developing economic and energy cooperation with Russia.
Political interest/engagement

From the first days of Russia’s full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye’s military-technical, political, diplomatic, and humanitarian support became especially important. Ukraine’s President; ministers of foreign affairs, defence and infrastructure, as well as representatives of the President’s Office and some MPs mentioned this repeatedly in their statements. Cooperation with Türkiye was mentioned most frequently in official statements in the context of the delivery of Bayraktar TB2 UCAVs and plans to build a factory to produce them in Ukraine; the decision to close straits for the Russian navy; and mediation initiatives by the Turkish President, meetings of Russian and Ukrainian delegations at Turkish negotiation platforms; Ankara’s support in POW exchange and partial resumption of agricultural exports from Ukraine under the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

At the same time, as other international partners increased their support for Ukraine and Türkiye sought to stick to a nominally neutral position in the public domain, Ukraine’s President, in his address to the Verkhovna Rada, ministers and diplomats barely mentioned Türkiye’s military assistance. Instead, the key highlights were humanitarian initiatives and cooperation in the fight against the global food crisis caused by Russian aggression.

Strategic communications

The communication of Ukraine’s President with the Turkish audience was limited to one interview for the Turkish TV channel HaberTürk in April and his address at the forum of TRT World, Türkiye’s public broadcaster, in December, where President Erdogan spoke too. President Zelenskyy did not have his trademark addresses to parliament, the public, or meetings with students in Türkiye. Ukraine was mostly present in Turkish media through interviews with representatives of the MFA and Ukraine’s Embassy in Türkiye.
In April, Türkiye’s Presidential Spokesperson İ. Kalın visited Kyiv, where he spoke to President Zelenskyy and the Head of the OPU, A. Yermak. However, neither President Erdogan nor top-level delegations from Türkiye visited de-occupied territories or came to Kyiv or frontline regions for working visits since the war began.

Activities

While some formats of bilateral interaction were suspended after the Russian aggression began, an intense political dialogue marked 2022. In 2022, the President of Türkiye visited Ukraine twice: for the 10th meeting of the High-Level Strategic Council (3.02) in Kyiv and the trilateral meeting with the UN Secretary-General and the Ukrainian President on the prospect of the grain corridors (18.08) in Lviv. Apart from that, President Zelenskyy had 16 telephone conversations with President Erdogan. Diplomatic efforts focused mainly on initiating and keeping humanitarian corridors operational to export agricultural products from Ukraine and on POW exchange.

In January, Ukrainian MPs from the parliamentary group of friendship visited Türkiye, had a meeting with the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, the Chair and MPs of the Turkish group of friendship and the Chair of the Turkish Delegation to PACE.

In February, the key ministers responsible for priority areas of cooperation – foreign affairs, interior, economy, energy, infrastructure and others — attended the meeting of the High-Level Strategic Council chaired by the two presidents in Kyiv.

In March, a Ukrainian delegation led by MFA D. Kuleba participated in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, which the Turkish side proposed as a platform for talks on the termination of fighting in Ukraine with the Russian MFA. As a continuation of this track, the Ukrainian and Russian delegations talked in Istanbul in late March. President Erdogan officially opened the talks.

Ukraine’s Infrastructure Minister O. Kubrakov visited Türkiye several times in 2022 as part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In October, First Lady O. Zelenska and
Head of the OPU A. Yermak went on a working visit to Türkiye to meet the defenders of Azovstal released from Russian captivity due to the mediation of President Erdogan. During that visit, First Lady Zelenska and Ukrainian Navy Commander O. Neyizhpapa attended the ceremony of launching the Ada-class corvette built for the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Türkiye.

Results

Ankara consistently sticks to non-recognition of the attempted illegal annexation of Crimea and other regions of Ukraine by Russia, speaks in defence of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the 1991 borders and provides political and diplomatic support to Kyiv both bilaterally — supporting the Ukrainian peace formula, and multilaterally — joining in the Crimean Platform, voting for Ukrainian resolutions at the UN GA, etc.

Relations are developing proactively in the military technology and defence industry. In February, the two countries signed the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of High Technology, Aviation and Space Industries, and Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada ratified it in December. This agreement seeks to improve the investment climate for Turkish companies in these fields. Among other things, this agreement creates the legal framework for constructing a factory to produce and maintain Turkish Bayraktar UACVs in Ukraine. After Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Bayraktar TB2 UACVs were sold and donated to Ukraine, and the new Akıncı and Kızılelma models received Ukrainian-made engines. Given the special status of relations with the Russian Federation, Türkiye avoids making official statements about transferring military aid to Ukraine. But open sources provide information about a transfer of 200 BMC Kirpi protected vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, and other types of armaments to Ukraine. According to Türkiye’s Ambassador to Ukraine, nearly 30 defence projects were at different stages of implementation.

The Ukraine-Türkiye Free Trade Agreement was signed (3.02) after almost ten years of negotiations — it is yet to be ratified. It opens new opportunities in the economy and trade. According to Ukraine’s State Customs Service, Ukraine-Türkiye trade reached USD 6.3bn in 2022, including USD 3.36 in imports and USD 2.94bn in exports. This makes Türkiye the biggest market for Ukrainian goods beyond the EU. Grain and agricultural
products were an important element of Ukraine's exports. According to the UN Joint Coordination Centre, Türkiye is among the three top destination countries for the Black Sea Grain Initiative ships.

Humanitarian cooperation brought important accomplishments, too. Ankara's mediation in POW exchange, talks about setting up a safe zone around Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the transfer of nearly a thousand orphaned children to Türkiye from Southern Ukraine, and declaration of intent to accept injured Ukrainian Army servicemen for treatment are some of these important accomplishments.

At the same time, Ukraine did not manage to persuade their Turkish partners to introduce sanctions against Russia, close borders for Russian businesses and tourists, close its airspace for Russian airplanes and its ports for Russian cargo ships carrying the grain stolen from Ukraine, which Russia took out of the occupied territory, including ports in the occupied Crimea. Another problematic issue which Ukrainian diplomats did not manage to solve was the refusal of Turkish authorities to inspect Russian trade ships used by the aggressor state to ship weapons through the Bosporus in violation of the Montreux Convention. Ukraine's presence in Turkish media remains insufficient as anti-Western/pro-Russian narratives dominate both conventional and social media in Türkiye.
Hungary

2022

POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT  2
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS  2
ACTIVITIES  2
RESULTS  3

TOTAL SCORE:  D+

Despite condemning Russia’s aggression and supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, representatives of the Hungarian government have repeatedly called for lifting restrictions on Russia, an immediate ceasefire and peace talks, maintained contacts with Kremlin officials and accused the West of prolonging the war. Budapest’s position has resulted in a lower political interest from Ukraine. However, sectoral cooperation, including the export of some agricultural products from Ukraine, fuel imports, participation in the reconstruction of Ukrainian regions, as well as humanitarian aid from the Hungarian government and society, have been important to Ukraine during the war and was in the focus of Ukrainian relevant agencies.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, representatives of Ukraine repeatedly drew attention to the state of relations between official Kyiv and Budapest and expressed interest in establishing a dialogue between the two capitals to change the position of the Hungarian authorities in the context of Russian aggression. However, the interest shown in this area of foreign policy was reactive and not driven by systematic or strategic planning. The main reason for this was that, unlike all its EU counterparts, Hungary’s leadership had been loyal to the Kremlin since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and did not consider its actions a threat to its own country.

President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy did not mention Hungary in his Annual Address to the VRU or his speech at the Ambassadorial Meeting. However, during a telephone conversation with Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orban in June, V. Zelenskyy invited him to visit Kyiv. Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba most frequently commented on the prospects of relations with Budapest during the year but mostly did this in interviews with Ukrainian media. For example, in August, he said that “as long as Hungary’s statements do not match its decisions on Ukraine, we can live and work”. In December, he stated that bilateral relations are unlikely to change until the government in Hungary changes.

Strategic communications

In 2022, the Ukrainian authorities’ systemic strategic communications did not target either the Hungarian audience in general or the country’s elites. The primary reasons for this included the negative inertia in relations between the two countries, which emerged in previous years and was exacerbated by the start of the full-scale invasion, and the blocking by actors in Hungary.

V. Zelenskyy reached out to V. Orban at least twice via public platforms — in a speech to the European Council and a video message on the President’s social media pages — to secure support for sanctions against the Kremlin and the transit of weapons to Ukraine.
through the territory of Hungary. However, the Ukrainian leader never spoke to the National Assembly since Hungary was one of the three EU countries that did not allow him to address their parliaments.

From the first days of the full-scale invasion until her recall from office in July, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Hungary, L. Nepop, regularly organised rallies in support of Ukraine and gave interviews and comments published by Hungarian opposition outlets but not pro-government Hungarian media.

**Activities**

No high-ranking Ukrainian officials, including the President, Prime Minister, or minister, were invited to visit Hungary, nor did they initiate such a trip. Throughout the year, no meetings of any bilateral intergovernmental commissions took place, and no ministers met. Amid Budapest’s allegations that the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Ukraine are being infringed and its blocking of meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Ukrainian government did not continue dialogue with its Hungarian partners on these issues in 2022, addressing them instead as part of relations with the EU (The adoption of a law on national minorities is one of the European Commission’s requirements for Kyiv.). The President of Ukraine has not appointed a new ambassador to Hungary since L. Nepop finished her work there.

However, since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Transport have been negotiating with Hungarian partners to facilitate Ukrainian carriers’ access to Hungary’s logistics infrastructure for transporting humanitarian aid and agricultural exports from Ukraine.

Additionally, throughout the year, the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy held talks with its Hungarian counterpart on fuel supplies to Ukraine and the export of Ukrainian electricity to the EU market. During one of the visits to Ukraine, State Secretary of the Hungarian MFA L. Magyar and the Deputy Ministers of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine discussed the need to intensify the work of the Ukrainian-Hungarian Intergovernmental Mixed Commission on Cross-Border and Border Cooperation and Budapest’s participation in the reconstruction of Ukraine.

In November, President of Hungary K. Novák was one of the last European leaders to visit Kyiv, where she condemned Russian aggression.
Results

Despite the Hungarian leadership’s loyalty to the Kremlin and ambiguous statements about how to stop the war, in 2022, Hungary supported all EU sanctions packages against Russia (having secured certain exemptions). Hungary has also been active in providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s State Secretary L. Magyar has visited Ukraine at least four times to deliver such aid. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy monitoring, Hungary ranked seventh in the world in terms of the share of GDP allocated or designated as humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

Hungary has cancelled permits for Ukrainian carriers using its transport infrastructure. In November, the Deputy Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary signed an agreement to expand bilateral cross-border cooperation (primarily aimed at building border transport infrastructure) and announced the opening of a new border crossing point.

In addition, Hungary joined Kyiv’s Grain from Ukraine initiative. Also, in October, a terminal was opened in the Hungarian village of Fényeslitke, near the border with Ukraine, to reload containers of Ukrainian grain for further transport to Adriatic ports. Eventually, the Hungarian government declared its readiness to contribute to Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction, and the Hungarian Ecumenical Service signed a memorandum of partnership with the Borodyanka and Bucha communities, which provided for the reconstruction of destroyed educational establishments.

Still, in 2022, Hungary refused to provide weapons to Ukraine and did not join the EU mission to train the Ukrainian military. Additionally, the Hungarian electricity grid operator delayed the process of allowing Ukrainian electricity suppliers to enter the European market.

The total trade turnover between the two countries in 2022 was USD 3.55bn, with Ukraine accounting for a significant surplus.
In 2022, the Czech Republic was the focus of Ukraine’s diplomacy in the context of its European integration and counteraction to Russian aggression. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Czech Republic has provided Ukraine with weapons, offered humanitarian and financial support, and expressed its readiness to contribute to the country’s post-war reconstruction. Additionally, during its presidency of the EU Council, the Czech government facilitated several sanctions packages and advocated for the establishment of a special tribunal for Russian war criminals. In the future, the two countries’ high-level political understanding should be utilised to build a strategic partnership and implement joint projects.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, Ukrainian representatives showed interest in cooperating with the Czech Republic and commented on statements made by Czech political actors. However, this interest did not prioritize Prague over other European capitals. Rather, it was driven by the Czech government’s stance on the Russian invasion and its presidency in the Council of the EU.

President V. Zelenskyy did not mention the Czech Republic specifically in his Annual Address to the VRU. However, the Analytical Report by the National Institute for Strategic Studies cited Czech partners several times in the context of military, economic, energy, and humanitarian assistance.

In May, the Deputy Head of the OPU, I. Zhovkva, referred to the Czech Republic as “one of Ukraine’s key European partners” during a meeting with Czech Prime Minister P. Fiala in Prague. In the summer, Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration O. Stefanishyna and the Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU, I. Klympush-Tsintsadze, emphasised the importance of maintaining close contacts with the Czech side to further Ukraine’s European integration aspirations, particularly in the context of the Czech presidency in the Council of the EU.

During working briefings in November, both Prime Minister D. Shmyhal and Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba emphasised the need to deepen intergovernmental cooperation with the Czech Republic to implement joint projects, especially in the military and technical sectors.
Strategic communications

The Ukrainian government regularly communicated with the Czech audience through strategic outreach efforts in 2022. In June, President V. Zelenskyy spoke online to members of the Czech parliament. In October, he awarded Prague the Saviour City award for hosting Ukrainian refugees, while First Lady O. Zelenska addressed thousands at a rally in the Czech capital.

Ukrainian Ambassador to Prague Y. Perebyinis provided comments and interviews to Czech media outlets on events in Ukraine until his resignation in July. The Ukrainian diplomatic mission also organised public events in support of Ukraine in various Czech cities throughout the year.

In July, Czech Foreign Minister J. Lipavský visited liberated towns in the Kyiv region.

Activities

Cooperation between Ukrainian and Czech actors in 2022 was systematic and regular. Moreover, the two governments' contacts had already intensified before Russia's full-scale invasion. In January, Foreign Ministers D. Kuleba and J. Lipavský agreed to coordinate actions to deter Kremlin aggression, discussed priorities for the upcoming Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU, and explored ways to strengthen relations between Central European countries. Throughout the year, D. Kuleba maintained regular contact with J. Lipavský regarding Czech military and political support, Prague's advocacy for new sanctions against Russia, and investigations of Russian war crimes at the EU level.

In February, Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief V. Zaluzhnyi and Czech Deputy Minister of Defence D. Blazkovec discussed deepening Ukrainian-Czech security cooperation.

A delegation of Ukrainian MPs visited Prague in April, and a team from the Presidential Office, led by I. Zhovkva, came to the Czech capital in May. On both occasions, Ukrainian representatives discussed Czech military, political, economic, and humanitarian support, post-war reconstruction, and Ukraine's accession to the EU with leaders and representatives of the Czech executive and legislative branches. In July, Vice
Prime Minister O. Stefanishyna met Czech Minister for European Affairs M. Bek to discuss the priorities of cooperation between Kyiv and Prague in the coming months in the context of the Czech presidency of the EU Council.

Finally, the Czech Prime Minister, P. Fiala, visited Kyiv twice during the year. He was with the first foreign delegation to visit the Ukrainian capital, still besieged by Russian troops, in March. He also led a group of Czech officials who came to Ukraine in October. While the first visit was primarily a show of political support for Ukraine from Prague, the second one indicated the beginning of closer cooperation between the cabinets of the two states. During his October visit, P. Fiala met President V. Zelenskyy and Prime Minister D. Shmyhal while a number of Ukrainian ministers discussed bilateral cooperation in the military, economic, industrial, cultural, educational, and humanitarian sectors with their Czech counterparts. This demonstrates Kyiv’s intention to build strategic relations with its Czech partners.

However, since the end of Y. Perebyinis’s tenure as Ukraine’s ambassador to Prague in July, Ukraine’s interests in the Czech Republic have been represented by a chargé d’affaires rather than an ambassador.

Results

Throughout the year, especially during its presidency of the Council of the EU, the Czech government consistently advocated in the EU for sanctions against Russia and its individual citizens and defended the idea of establishing a special tribunal to investigate and condemn Russian war crimes. In addition, the Czech government has repeatedly confirmed its readiness to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and has already financed the restoration of bridges in the Kyiv region.

An important point in the development of bilateral relations was a meeting of the government delegations of Ukraine and the Czech Republic in October. The prime ministers of both countries agreed to intensify the work of intergovernmental commissions in all areas (by signing a joint statement) and signed a Memorandum of Cooperation in Standardisation, Metrology, and Conformity Assessment and a Memorandum of Understanding between the MFA of Ukraine and the Czech Republic. The two officials also agreed to establish joint production of weapons, primarily artillery
ammunition and certain types of armoured vehicles. Also, during his October visit to Kyiv, P. Fiala and V. Zelenskyy signed a Joint Declaration on Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic perspective.

Since the beginning of the year, the Czech authorities have provided Ukraine with the maximum possible support in all areas in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion. At the end of January, the Czech Republic became the third country in the world whose government decided to provide lethal weapons in the form of artillery shells to Ukraine due to the growing threat from the east. Since April, Prague has handed several batches of Soviet-type tanks and armoured personnel carriers over to Ukraine and has also arranged for the repair of Ukrainian armoured vehicles at its facilities. In addition, the Czech Republic has systematically provided financial (both bilateral and within the EU), energy, and humanitarian support to its Ukrainian partners. In total, from the beginning of the full-scale invasion to the end of 2022, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the Czech Republic provided or intended to provide Ukraine with EUR 625m worth of aid, or about 0.15% of the country’s GDP (13th and 17th in the world by these indicators).

In 2022, trade between the two countries amounted to USD 2.79bn, compared to USD 2.89bn in 2021.
### Belligerent Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>n/d</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
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Ukraine–Russia relations hit rock bottom in 2022 as the two countries are at war. Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with Russia and became the core of the coalition of democratic countries countering Russia’s aggression. Ukraine’s efforts focused on countering Russia’s aggression and influence in the world.

Russia

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2022</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL INTEREST/ENGAGEMENT</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTIVITIES</td>
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<td>RESULTS</td>
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<td>TOTAL SCORE:</td>
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Ukraine–Russia relations hit rock bottom in 2022 as the two countries are at war. Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with Russia and became the core of the coalition of democratic countries countering Russia’s aggression. Ukraine’s efforts focused on countering Russia’s aggression and influence in the world.
Political interest/engagement

Political interest by Ukraine's leadership in the Russian Federation remained high in 2022. This was exclusively because of the definition of Russia as an aggressor and reshaping Ukraine to counter the armed attack and to shape international support for Ukraine in the war launched by Russia. While there were some statements on possible negotiations and compromise with Russia in February and March, Ukraine's stance became unequivocal since April: victory in the war and holding Russia accountable for the crimes it committed.

President Zelenskyy stated in his Annual Address to the VRU that Ukraine united the EU in the face of the Russian threat. His entire speech focused on various aspects of countering the Kremlin's expansionist plans.

Throughout 2022, Ukraine's leadership highlighted the struggle of the Ukrainian people against the Russian aggressors and the expectation of international humanitarian and military assistance. Generally, Russia's growing military aggression throughout 2022 served as the consolidating factor for the pro-government and opposition parties in parliament around the security agenda. The openly pro-Russian politicians claimed there would be no war at the beginning of 2022. When the war covered a large territory of Ukraine, they mostly left Ukraine, and some were arrested by the Security Services of Ukraine.

Strategic communications

Efforts to counter Russia are reflected in Ukraine's strategic documents. Apart from that, they are the cornerstone of all public statements of Ukraine's leadership, both in Ukraine and abroad. Russia remains defined as the key long-term threat to Ukraine, and its violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity as the key external challenge to national security.
Throughout 2022, President Zelenskyy appealed to the Russians several times, calling on them to lay down arms and fight for their freedom. Defence Minister Reznikov and Foreign Minister Kuleba made similar statements. Attempts to communicate Ukraine’s stance to the Russians included President Zelenskyy’s interviews for Meduza, Dozhd and Commersant (27.03). Also, President Zelenskyy spoke proactively on international platforms and gave interviews for international media. Most of these interviews focused on various aspects of the Russian aggression and its consequences.

Activities

Direct political contacts between the governments of Ukraine and Russia were at the minimum level in 2022 and essentially stopped after Russia's full-scale invasion.

Ukraine’s activity on Russia before the full-scale invasion was focused on preventing further escalation. Among other things, Ukraine’s communication with the Western allies intensified further amid the build-up of Russian troops along Ukraine’s borders and aggravating situation around the so-called “Donetsk People's Republic” and “Luhansk People's Republic.” Illustrative of this was President Zelenskyy’s speech at the Munich Security Conference (19.02), where he pointed to the obvious nature of Moscow's aggressive plans and proposed to call a summit of the Budapest Memorandum signatories.

Ukraine’s activity on Russia was focused exclusively on countering the aggression, receiving military and political assistance from the allies and creating an anti-Russian international coalition. At the same time, Ukraine made efforts to have peace talks to stabilize the situation — particularly to prevent the humanitarian crisis in late February and March, albeit to no avail. There were attempts to hold ceasefire talks in February-March in Belarus and a trilateral meeting of Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba, Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov and Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu in Türkiye (10.03). The last Ukraine-Russia meeting took place in Istanbul (29–30.03). It focused on security guarantees for Ukraine and the further evolution of war. No talks took place after that because the parties had incompatible positions. Further efforts of Ukraine’s government focused on international isolation of Russia, holding it accountable for war crimes and consolidation of allies.
Ukraine interacted proactively with its partners within the framework of international courts on Russia’s crimes. The Ukraine-Russia diplomatic confrontation intensified, and Ukraine made efforts to weaken Russia’s influence in international organisations, including the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and others. Illustrative of this is the advocacy of the idea of expelling Russia from the UN and Security Council particularly, including because of the illegitimacy of its inclusion in these bodies.

The Ukrainian, Turkish, and Russian military delegations met in Istanbul with the mediation of the UN (13.07) to talk about the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports from the Black Sea ports amid the deteriorating global food crisis. The parties agreed to have another meeting of the Ukrainian and Russian delegations where the agreement on exports of Ukrainian grain was signed (22.07).

President Zelenskyy spoke at the UN Security Council meeting, calling on member-states to influence Russia. Also, he spoke at the general debate of the 77th UN General Assembly proposing the points of his peace formula. He presented proposals to end the war at the G20 summit.

**Results**

Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with Russia at the beginning of its full-scale invasion (24.02).

The Ukrainian government passed six packages of sanctions against Russia and its individual citizens and companies. Overall, the sanctions apply to 3,258 individuals and 1,603 companies from Russia or linked to Russia, according to the National Agency for Preventing Corruption (NAZK). Among others, 35 Russian government members, 606 State Duma and Federation Council representatives, local deputies, 261 individuals engaged in education and academia, 119 public figures and representatives of big businesses, and 75 artists and media representatives are on the sanction lists. Ukraine’s other initiatives included the creation of the grain corridor to unblock the shipments of Ukrainian agricultural produce and prevent a food crisis provoked by Russia’s aggression. Ukraine’s Infrastructure Minister O. Kubrakov, Türkiye’s Defence Minister H. Akar and UN Secretary-General A. Guterres signed the document. Defence Minister S. Shoigu signed it on behalf of Russia (22.07).
Ukraine terminated two agreements on geodesy, cartography and aerospace data exchange and five agreements on bilateral cooperation with Russia in various spheres, including tax, competition development, exploitation and protection of natural water resources, spacecraft and space, and energy.

2022 was the year of concentrating efforts to counter Russia's aggression and building the anti-Putin coalition. Progress in this area includes the proactive imposition of economic and political sanctions against Russia by Ukraine's partners; advocacy of security guarantees for Ukraine — including by creating the U-24 association of countries; and bringing military assistance to an industrial scale bilaterally and through the meetings of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. As a result, many countries united around assistance for Ukraine, and this assistance became systemic. Ukraine's proactive efforts internationally gave a serious boost to the consolidation of the international community in countering Russia.
Belarus

In 2022, political and economic relations between Ukraine and Belarus deteriorated, reaching an all-time low. Despite promises that Ukraine was not in danger from Belarus, Minsk acted as a co-aggressor in the Russian military invasion, dramatically changing the nature of bilateral relations. Although diplomatic relations have not been completely severed, there have hardly been any contacts between the two countries.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, the Ukrainian leadership's political interest in Belarus was limited to perceiving it as a co-aggressor, expecting its direct entry into the war, and looking for an alternative economic partner. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian politicians left the topic of Belarus out of their speeches to the general public. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the VRU only mentions the need to replace goods from Belarus with goods from other countries. The Head of the Presidential Office, A. Yermak, said that it was strategically important that Belarus was not actively involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine.


Strategic communications

The main communication concerning Belarus was aimed at its population rather than leadership. In 2022, Ukraine paid special attention to preventing the reopening of the front in the north. President of Ukraine V. Zelenskyy and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine appealed to Belarusian citizens and the military to prevent drawing the country into Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian embassy in Minsk cut its staff but did not cease operations and was used by the Ukrainian authorities as a communication channel with both Lukashenka’s regime and Russia. At the same time, some Ukrainian political actors highlighted the role of Belarusian volunteers fighting in the AFU and spoke cautiously about Belarusian opposition leader S. Tsikhanouskaya, demanding she takes an unambiguous position at the beginning of the war.
Activities

Ukraine's activities in relation to Belarus underwent significant changes during the year due to its complicity in Russia's aggression against Ukraine. In 2022, Ukraine responded to unfriendly steps and threats from Belarus, using both diplomatic and military means. Thus, in March, the MFA of Ukraine sent an official note to the MFA of Belarus, saying that the Belarusian Embassy in Ukraine must be reduced to five staff members to reciprocate Minsk's earlier decision. The first meetings to negotiate a truce took place in Belarus in February.

The Ukrainian government terminated some agreements with the Republic of Belarus.

The Ukrainian Defence Forces reinforced the border with Belarus, anticipating a possible offensive from the north. Regular activities included mine laying in dangerous border areas, installation of barriers and tracking systems, construction of a wall and fortifications, as well as military training near the border.

As for the Ukrainian embassy in Belarus, the Ambassador's main task was to protect Ukrainian citizens who found themselves in trouble before or after the start of the full-scale invasion.

The creation of Belarusian volunteer units within the AFU demonstrates the interest of the Ukrainian leadership in supporting the Belarusian democratic opposition. At the same time, there were no official contacts with the official political opposition led by S. Tsikhanouskaya during the year.
Results

In 2022, there was a significant decline in bilateral cooperation, especially in trade volumes, which fell notably after the Russian invasion. In February, the total trade turnover between the two countries was USD 534.2m, but in August, it dropped to around USD 7m. The total turnover for the year was USD 1.6bn, compared to USD 6.3bn in 2021. Imports amounted to USD 1.42bn, while exports were only USD 186m. Regular seizures of Belarusian corporate property also indicate the curtailment of economic cooperation between the two countries. However, Ukraine was occasionally accused of certain unofficial attempts to avoid applying European sanctions against Belarus.

Although Belarusian actions in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war fall under the definition of an “act of aggression” under Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kyiv has not broken off diplomatic relations with Minsk, seeing this as one of the tools to prevent Belarus's direct participation in the war against Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba said on the matter that he considered it necessary to break off diplomatic relations with Belarus if its army entered the territory of Ukraine.

The CMU denounced three international treaties on education and science in April, an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of tax evasion with respect to income and property taxes in November, and agreements between the governments of Ukraine and Belarus on air services, mutual supplies of arms, military equipment, other material resources and services for defence and security needs, additional confidence and security measures, joint research and development in the field of armaments and military technology, and mutual protection of intellectual products created and provided in the course of bilateral military-technical cooperation in December.
# REGIONAL COOPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>MIDDLE EAST</td>
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<tr>
<td>WESTERN BALKANS</td>
<td>C+</td>
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<tr>
<td>INDO-PACIFIC REGION</td>
<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>LATIN AMERICA</td>
<td>C+</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHERN EUROPE</td>
<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA</td>
<td>B+</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRAL ASIA</td>
<td>E+</td>
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Russia’s full-scale aggression impacted Ukraine’s foreign policy in the Middle East in 2022. Ukraine’s leadership made efforts to inform Middle East countries about the war and to engage them in supporting Ukraine. However, Ukraine conducted no wide-scale media campaigns, and Ukrainian embassies were not sufficiently active. There were fewer intergovernmental and interparliamentary activities in the context of key spheres of interest. Gulf countries remain the priority for cooperation.
Political interest/engagement

The level of interest in the Middle East, in general, and its individual countries, in particular, declined somewhat in 2022 compared to 2021. The Middle East was mentioned in the context of expanding the geography of Ukrainian diplomacy alongside other regions of interest as having “enormous untapped potential to strengthen Ukraine’s position globally” (briefing by MFA D. Kuleba on 18.10). Economic interest in the Middle East as a market for Ukrainian exports and a source of investment was notable. Among others, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister spoke about this in the talks with a UAE delegation in Dubai (5.12). At the same time, the Middle East was not mentioned in the President's Annual Address to the VRU or the Analytical Report to the Address, or the public part of the annual Ambassadorial in December.

Gulf countries remain in Ukraine’s focus. Ukraine’s interest in the subregion is manifested in the aspiration to develop investment cooperation, as mentioned by the Head of the President’s Office, A. Yermak, in his address to foreign ministers of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (2.06). Also, he expressed Ukraine’s interest in cooperating in the media domain, including in countering Russian propaganda. Ukraine’s foreign minister said that developing cooperation with the Gulf countries is one of the President’s priorities (2.06). Ukraine is interested in interacting with individual countries of the subregion. Verkhovna Rada’s First Deputy Speaker, O. Kornienko, highlighted Oman and Bahrain (11.10), while Foreign Minister D. Kuleba mentioned the UAE as one of the most promising trade partners for Ukraine in the Middle East (5.12).

The war affected Ukraine’s manifestation of interest in the Middle East in the context of consolidating the global community to counter Russia’s aggression. Head of the OPU A. Yermak called on the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf countries to “play an active role in resolving the current global food and energy crisis.” The Middle
East was mentioned in the context of energy and food security and security of the region in general. According to President Zelenskyy, “the sooner peace is achieved on our land thanks to the Ukrainian victory, the less evil Russia will bring to other regions, including the Middle East, in its cooperation with Iran” (25.10).

**Strategic communications**

Ukraine’s presence in the media space of the Middle East countries did not become systemic. Representatives of the Middle East countries did not visit the de-occupied territory. No massive media campaigns oriented at the Middle East countries were conducted. However, top Ukrainian officials reached out to audiences in some countries or regional organisations. This communication focused on informing audiences about the Russian aggression, threats for the region emanating from the Russian aggression — including food security — and engaging Middle East countries in supporting Ukraine.

In his address at Qatar’s Doha Forum via videoconference (26.03), Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy highlighted the importance of Ukraine as a guarantor of food security and Russia’s actions that undermine it. In addition, he called on the Middle East countries to help overcome energy dependence on Russia and to impose sanctions.

In his interview for Al Jazeera (13.03), Verkhovna Rada Speaker R. Stefanchuk drew parallels between the Russian aggression in Ukraine and its consequences in Syria and Libya and called on parliaments of Africa and Middle East countries to stand in solidarity with Ukraine in his address to them (31.03). O. Merezhko, Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Interparliamentary Cooperation, did an interview with the Arab UAE-based news channel Asharq (29.03) focusing on the brutal nature of actions and threats emanating from Russia. M. Subkh, Special Representative of Ukraine for the Middle East and Africa echoed these messages in his address to the extraordinary session of the League of Arab States (11.08).

Ukraine’s Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Algeria were the only ones who proactively gave interviews to local media and kept audiences updated about developments in Ukraine. Top TV channels, such as Al Jazeera, Al Ghad, Al Qahera, Sky News Arabia and others, featured Ukrainian experts as speakers frequently.
Activities

2022 added a new dimension to Ukraine’s work regarding the Middle East. In addition to the traditional activities in economic and industrial domains that remained the key dimensions of work, Ukraine was informing the Middle East countries about Russia’s aggression and made efforts to engage their support. For this purpose, Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy held a number of telephone conversations with the leaders of Middle East countries, including Saudi Arabia (05.03, 23.09, 14.10), the UAE (19.01, 05.03, 30.03, 18.05, 17.10), Egypt (30.03), and Qatar (03.03, 10.10). Foreign Minister D. Kuleba met with foreign ministers of the UAE (22.09), Bahrain (21.09), and Saudi Arabia (25.05) and had telephone conversations with foreign ministers of Oman (12.11), Egypt (19.05), Libya (09.05), and the UAE (11.08).

Agriculture, energy security and investment remained the key spheres of cooperation Ukraine was interested in. In economic cooperation, Gulf states remain the priority. In the meeting of the Head of OPU, A. Yermak and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba with the foreign ministers of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (5.12), A. Yermak proposed to establish a special Consultation Council for closer and more efficient cooperation with the countries of this subregion. The launch of talks to sign a comprehensive economic partnership agreement with the UAE (5.12) was the highlight of development. R. Umerov, Head of Ukraine’s State Property Fund, met with the Executive Director and CEO of the UAE sovereign wealth fund to discuss areas of cooperation in establishing a sovereign wealth fund for Ukraine (27.09). He met with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (22.09).

As part of the Grain Deal, Ukraine continued to send grain to several countries in the region. Part of it was sent under the Grain from Ukraine initiative. Ukrainian grain reached Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman.

Despite the war, Ukraine managed to participate in a range of exhibitions, including Arab Health at Expo 2020 Dubai (25.01) and Agro UA: smart decisions at Expo 2020 Dubai (12–16.02). However, the regular meetings of government commissions and rounds of political consultations with the region’s countries did not occur in 2022.

Ukraine appointed a Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa.
Results

Fewer visits, meetings, and consultations between representatives of Ukraine and countries of the region and a shift of Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities in the context of the full-scale aggression had a negative impact on its performance on the Middle East. In the context of the war, following efficient interaction between Ukraine and the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and their willingness to do mediation, Ukraine managed to return ten foreigners who fought for Ukraine from Russian captivity (engagement of Saudi Arabia) and unblock the export of agricultural produce from Ukraine (engagement of the UAE). Apart from that, the agreement on humanitarian support for Ukraine with the UAE resulted in 1,200 generators donated to Ukraine.

The launch of the work on the agreement on comprehensive economic partnership with the UAE resulted from the agreement reached by Ukraine's President during his visit to the UAE in February 2021. Ukraine’s First Vice Prime Minister and Economy Minister, Y. Svyrydenko, and UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Trade, Dr Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, signed a Joint Statement on the launch of this work.

Cultural cooperation delivered some results. Ukrainian-language publications and books about Ukraine in Arabic were handed over to the National Library of Jordan (10.09). A Ukrainian-language guide was launched at the National Museum of Qatar as part of the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Embassy of Ukraine to Qatar and Qatar Museums (7.12).

The Middle East countries mostly voted in favour of UN GA resolutions that were key for Ukraine, including on aggression against Ukraine (2.03); and on Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations (12.10). The exception was the UN GA resolution to suspend the rights of membership in the Human Rights Council of the Russian Federation (7.04) — most countries of the region abstained in that vote. Syria was the only country in the region that voted against all key resolutions. Given its support of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and support for the occupation of some of Ukraine’s territory, among other things, Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with Syria.

According to Ukraine's Customs Service, Ukraine's total trade with the Middle East countries (except for Türkiye, Israel, and Iran) totalled USD 3.9bn in 2022, which was USD 4bn down from 2021. Exports amounted to USD 3bn or 6.9 per cent of Ukraine's total exports. Egypt and Saudi Arabia remain Ukraine’s main trade partners.
Ukraine’s foreign policy activity regarding Western Balkans intensified in 2022, focusing on seeking support in countering Russia’s aggression and Ukraine’s EU and NATO integration. More interparliamentary contacts and meetings among top officials helped expand the political dialogue. There was a serious boost in political, humanitarian and military cooperation with Slovenia, Albania, North Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro.

**Western Balkans**

2022

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Political interest/engagement

Russia’s war against Ukraine pushed Ukraine to seek new partners. It looked more proactively in the Balkan region. Western Balkan countries featured in addresses to Ukrainians by President Zelenskyy (8.05; 15.06) and speeches and articles by MFA Kuleba (e.g., Minister Kuleba contrasted Serbia against other countries of the region in his article How Ukraine Will Win in Foreign Affairs on 17.06, writing that Putin “could even trigger a new war in the Western Balkans”). Within the region, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, and North Macedonia could be the priorities for Ukraine as they have expressed support and helped Ukraine counter Russia’s aggression. Ukraine did not get Serbia to join the sanctions against Russia or impose its own restrictions.

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy addressed two parliaments of Balkan countries in the online format: The Parliament of Albania (3.05) and the Parliament of Slovenia (8.07). Verkhovna Rada’s Deputy Speaker O. Kondratiuk and Speaker R. Stefanchuk addressed the Croatian Sabor (26.05 and 26.10), respectively.

Ukraine’s Ambassador to North Macedonia, L. Dir, joined the opening of the exhibition commemorating the 1932–1933 Holodomor titled Ukraine Remembers! The World Acknowledges! held in Skopje (24.11). Ukraine’s Ambassador to Slovenia, A. Taran, participated in opening the Art Defence exhibition in Ljubljana (28.11).

The visits of top officials to the de-occupied territories of Ukraine caught the spotlight of international media: Albania PM Rama and Montenegro PM Abazović visited Irpin and Borodianka in March, Croatia PM Plenković visited Bucha and Irpin in March, and Slovenia’s MoD Šarec visited Irpin in November. They expressed readiness to contribute to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine by providing equipment and funding.
Activities

All of the Ukrainian public bodies were engaged in developing relations with the Western Balkan countries throughout 2022, and they became more proactive during the year. At the same time, meetings often took place online. Ukraine's foreign policy regarding Western Balkans included top-level meetings, interparliamentary contacts, and online consultations.

Ukraine's President met with Slovenia PM Janša in March; Albania PM Rama, Montenegro PM Abazović, and North Macedonia PM Kovačevski in June; and Croatia PM Plenković in October. They discussed military, security and humanitarian cooperation.

The parliamentary track was developing proactively during the year. O. Merezhko, Head of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation Committee had a video conference with the leaders of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Serbian National Assembly in June. VRU Deputy Speaker O. Kondratiuk met with Croatia's Health Minister Beroš in October.

Ukrainian Minister of Defence O. Reznikov met with the delegation from Slovenia led by its minister Šarec in November. They discussed the reinforcement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with bilateral defence projects.

MFA-level meetings took place both bilaterally and at international events. Ukraine's Minister D. Kuleba met with Albania’s Minister Osmani at the Munich Security Conference in February and as part of the OSCE Troika visit to the Poland-Ukraine border in April, and Montenegro’s Minister Krivokapić at the informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in May.

Ukraine’s Ambassador to Croatia, V. Kyrylych, met with Croatia PM Plenković in March to talk about support for Ukraine in its resistance to Russian aggression, joining the EU and support for Ukrainians who have fled to Croatia as a result of the Russian invasion.

Reinvigoration of the dialogue with Serbia is noteworthy. Among other things, Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, E. Dzhaparova, met with Serbia’s Foreign Minister Selaković at the 132nd Committee of Ministers of the CoE in Turin in May. Ukraine’s Ambassador Tolkach met with Serbia’s Minister of Culture and Information, Gojković, in July, Minister of Mining and Energy Djedović, in December and others.
Albania, North Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Montenegro participated in the plenary session of the 1st Parliamentary Summit of the international Crimea Platform organised by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Sabor in Zagreb (25.10) and in the meetings of the Ramstein contact group on defence of Ukraine. The wives of all Western Balkan countries attended the Kyiv Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen (23.07).

With the support of the Ukrainian Embassy in Zagreb, Ukrainian corporation Biosfera launched Support Ukrainians (10.05), an international export campaign to support Ukrainian producers and donated money to UNICEF to help those affected in Ukraine. Dobro Dobrim DoDo, a humanitarian organisation, launched the campaign Country without mines: Let’s save lives in Ukraine (24.08) in Croatia, and the Ukrainian House was opened there that day.

Cultural and public diplomacy was developing. First Lady O. Zelenska initiated the project Ukrainian Book Shelf in Tirana (Albania), Split and Zagreb (Croatia). Ukraine's Embassy in Skopje supported the First Balkan Meeting of Ukrainians Abroad titled the Role of the Ukrainian community during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (19.11). The Ukrainian Alley was opened in Skopje (12.09).

All these developments, as well as demonstrations of support for Ukraine in rallies with thousands of people in most Western Balkan countries, were covered extensively in the Balkan media.

**Results**

All Western Balkan countries, including Serbia, expressed support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine and voted to exclude Russia from the UN HRC. They provide humanitarian, financial, technical, and demining aid to Ukraine, and most of these countries provide military support as well. Croatian experts consult Ukraine's Department of War Crime Investigation at the General Prosecutor’s Office and help through mobile trial groups. Ukraine has agreements on the rehabilitation of its military personnel with these countries.

Western Balkan countries created favourable conditions for refugees from Ukraine, including up to one year of authorisation-free residence (Albania); free housing (Montenegro); access to education, social and healthcare services for women and children, retreats for the children of Ukraine’s defenders (Croatia).
The Verkhovna Rada’s apparatus and Expert Service of the Croatian Sabor signed a Cooperation Memorandum to improve parliaments’ efficiency, including harmonising Ukraine’s legislation with the EU’s acquis and strengthening institutional dialogue to accomplish mutual interests.

Ukraine’s Ambassador A. Taran signed a donation agreement between the MFA of Slovenia and the Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Slovenia to obtain a fully equipped C-class EMS vehicle in November.

Bucha and Kavadarci (North Macedonia) became sister cities (20.10. Kavadarci already allocated 600,000 denars of assistance to Ukraine.

According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, mutual trade of goods between Ukraine and Western Balkan countries was as follows: USD 302.5m with Serbia, including USD 134.9m in exports and USD 167.6m in imports; USD 301.8m with Slovenia, including USD 58.9m in exports and USD 242.8m in imports; USD 141m with Croatia, including USD 73.2m in exports and USD 67.8m in imports. These are followed by North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Economically, agriculture was dominant. The war and COVID-19 affected tourism and energy.
In 2022, Ukraine significantly strengthened its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. Joining the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was one of the biggest accomplishments. A Ukrainian delegation participated proactively in the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly for the first time ever, and the President of Indonesia visited Ukraine for the first time ever. Japan and Australia are the most proactive partners of Ukraine in the Indo-Pacific. Ukraine’s relations with Singapore, South Korea, New Zealand, and Cambodia developed well in 2022. Relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan required more attention.
Political interest/engagement

Throughout 2022, Ukraine’s President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Verkhovna Rada’s leadership took proactive efforts to maintain political dialogue with the Indo-Pacific countries. The President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Verkhovna Rada MPs spoke repeatedly about the importance of strengthening cooperation. President Zelenskyy said in his address to the Ambassadorial in December that “global growth and international stability” are unthinkable without relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In his daily address (23.12), he also mentioned that Ukraine was preparing to intensify its diplomacy in those regions.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister consistently speaks of strengthening relations with ASEAN countries. He mentioned this at the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh (10–12.12).

Representatives of the Verkhovna Rada declared identical positions, including when they visited countries of the region to attend the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) in Cambodia (21–23.11) and South Korea (24–26.11). The VRU Foreign Affairs Committee mentioned the region in its agenda (12.07) in the context of a working trip of MPs to Japan.

At the same time, most statements referred to Asia generally without specifying priority countries or areas.

Strategic communications

President Zelenskyy communicated proactively both with the government and non-government sectors through major events in the region. Among others, he spoke to the National Diet of Japan (23.03) and the National Assembly of South Korea (11.04). Apart from that, he was invited to speak to the security experts and politicians from the Indo-Pacific countries attending the national security forum Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (11.06), Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore (17.11), and the meeting of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (27.05). Apart from that, President Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Shmyhal addressed the Asian Leadership Conference in South Korea (13.07).
Since Indonesia presided over G20 in 2022, Ukraine’s attention was especially focused on the group. President Zelenskyy spoke online at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia (15.11), and Foreign Minister Kuleba spoke to the ministerial summit of G20 in Bali (8.07) in a video address.

Ukraine’s Ambassador to Indonesia, V. Hamian, Ambassador to Australia, V. Myroshnychenko, Ambassador to Singapore, K. Zelenko, and Ambassador to Japan, S. Korsunsky, communicated actively with the local media.

A parliamentary delegation from South Korea (5.06), Indonesia President J. Widodo (29.06), and Australia Prime Minister A. Albanese (3.07) visited the de-occupied parts of the Kyiv region.

**Activities**

Despite the war, cooperation with ASEAN countries evolved both bilaterally and multilaterally in various spheres. Contacts with Australia (see Australia section), Cambodia, South Korea, Japan (see Japan section), Indonesia, and Singapore were the most active.

The visit of Ukraine’s Foreign Minister D. Kuleba to the ASEAN summit (9–11.11) was important for establishing bilateral cooperation. This was the first time Ukraine attended this summit. Foreign Minister Kuleba met there with Singapore’s Foreign Minister Balakrishnan (they met earlier at the UN GA on 21.09); second Foreign Minister of Brunei Yusof; Foreign Minister of Thailand Pramudwinai; Cambodia Prime Minister Hun Sen and Foreign Minister Sokhonn; Vietnam Foreign Minister Bùi Thanh Sơn; and Australia Prime Minister A. Albanese. Before his visit, Minister Kuleba had a telephone conversation with ASEAN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi (25.10). Minister Kuleba’s meetings with PM Sen and Minister Sokhonn at the ASEAN summit included conversations about training for Ukrainian sappers by Cambodia and Japan.

At the ministerial level, Minister Kuleba spoke to South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong (15.04). Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister D. Senik visited the Republic of the Philippines (9.06), meeting with the Secretary of the Department of Information and Telecommunication Technology, Ivan Uy. Also, he met with the Philippines Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr.
A VRU delegation attended the AIPA for the first time (21–23.11). Ukraine received the status of the Observer for AIPA in 2021. Representatives of the VRU met with MPs from Indonesia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Brunei, and AIPA Secretary General at the Assembly.

In October, a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation met with a delegation from Cambodia at the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly. VRU Deputy Speaker O. Kondratiuk met with MPs from Singapore, Australia, and Indonesia at the G20 Parliamentary Speakers’ Summit in Indonesia (5–7.10).

In June, a parliamentary delegation of South Korea visited Ukraine, including the de-occupied parts of the Kyiv region. In November, a VRU delegation went on a working visit to South Korea, where they met with the Korea-Ukraine friendship group of the National Assembly. The visit aimed to deepen parliamentary cooperation. The head of the delegation, VRU First Deputy Speaker O. Kornienko, had a working visit with Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Lee Won-jae, focusing on the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure. O. Kornienko met with the National Assembly Deputy Speaker Chung Wootaik.

The first online meeting between the VRU group for parliamentary ties with Thailand and the group of friendship with Ukraine of the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Thailand was on 25.08. They discussed the development and intensification of bilateral parliamentary cooperation.

Ukraine intensified relations with Singapore. Among other things, Deputy Foreign Minister D. Senik met with Singapore’s Foreign Minister Balakrishnan (10.06). V. Zhora, Deputy Head of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, spoke at the 7th Singapore International Cyber Week (19.10). Ukraine’s Ambassador to Singapore, K. Zelenko, met with Singapore’s Healthcare Minister Ong Ye Kung (26.08). She spoke about the challenges the Ukrainian healthcare system faced due to Russia’s aggression.

Dialogue has intensified at various levels with New Zealand. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba spoke on the telephone with New Zealand Foreign Minister N. Mahuta (16.02). They spoke about measures to contain Russia. After Russia’s full-scale invasion, New Zealand joined the sanctions against Russia. In May, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister, D. Senik, met with New Zealand’s Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, R. Taylor. They exchanged opinions about the prospects of bilateral cooperation.
The fourth meeting of the Governmental Ukrainian-Indonesian Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation that took place online (26.07) was the first event of this level since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The parties discussed the current situation in both countries at the plenary session. They focused a lot on Ukraine’s moves to support food security worldwide. Bilateral political dialogue is active, too. Among other things, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba had two telephone conversations with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister R. Marsudi (17.02 and 26.04). She visited Kyiv in June and met with Minister Kuleba.

While Ukraine has no ambassador in Malaysia, the Embassy of Ukraine there participates proactively in various events to spread information about the situation in Ukraine and to establish contacts. Representatives of the Ukrainian Embassy in Thailand had a meeting at the General Prosecutor’s Office of Thailand (6.07), Geoinformatics and Space Technology Development Agency (11.01), and the Royal Thai Police (4.01).

On February 10, before the full-scale war, Ukraine’s Minister for Strategic Industries, P. Riabikin, met with Pakistani Ambassador N. Khokhar. The organisation of the Joint Governmental Ukrainian-Pakistani Commission for Economic Development was one of the key themes. Minister Riabikin leads the Ukrainian section of this effort.

Ukraine’s embassies to Thailand (also covers Laos), India (also covers Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives), and Malaysia (also covers the Philippines and Timor-Leste) remain without ambassadors.

Results

New Zealand, Australia, and Japan provided financial, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine in 2022. These countries joined sanctions against Russia. Singapore and South Korea imposed their sanctions on Russia. Pakistan and Thailand provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

During his visit to Cambodia (10.11), Ukraine’s Foreign Minister D. Kuleba signed the Instrument to join the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, one of
Ukraine’s major accomplishments in strengthening cooperation with the countries in the region.

Cambodia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Vietnam, Laos, Timor-Leste, and Sri Lanka abstained from voting on UN GA resolutions that were important for Ukraine in 2022. Thailand and Bhutan abstained from voting for some resolutions, such as the Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine (14.11). Other countries of the region voted for Ukrainian resolutions. North Korea is the only country that votes against them. Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam were the only countries in the region that abstained in the vote on the UN GA resolution on Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine (24.03).

Ukraine severed diplomatic relations with North Korea for its military cooperation with Russia (14.07).

Regarding economic cooperation, the respective authorities of Ukraine and Singapore authorised the health certificate for animal feeds. An international veterinarian certificate was issued to Ukrainian exporters of table eggs to Pakistan. Australia abolished import duties for Ukrainian food products for a year and donated 70 thousand tons of coal. Japan and South Korea joined the US to produce small modular reactors (SMRs). A protocol decision was signed as a result of the 4th meeting of the Governmental Ukrainian-Indonesian Commission for Economic and Technical Cooperation.

Ukraine’s exports to the Indo-Pacific countries halved on average in 2022 compared to 2021, down to USD 18.7m to Australia; USD 96.7m to Bangladesh; USD 102.6m to Vietnam; USD 4.5m to New Zealand; and USD 106m to Japan. Exports to South Korea declined the least at 21%, down to USD 237.2m; 4.9% to Malaysia, reaching USD 126m; and grew 33% to Singapore, up to USD 28.8m. The greatest decline of Ukraine’s exports was to Indonesia at 88%, down to just USD 98.4m; 80% to Cambodia, down to USD 0.5m; 81% to Pakistan, down to USD 126m; 84% to Thailand, down to USD 35m; 93% to the Philippines, down to USD 8.7m, and 90% to Sri Lanka, down to USD 3.4m. As a result, South Korea, Malaysia, and Pakistan were Ukraine’s top trade partners in the Indo-Pacific. The top items imported by the countries in the region included cereals, oils and fats, ore, slag and ash.
Latin American foreign policy track was not considered a priority at the beginning of the year. During the year, Ukraine made significant progress in countries with a high level of cooperation with North American and European partners, which means they have a high degree of support for Ukraine in countering Russian aggression. However, Ukraine’s attempts to gain broad support among South American power elites on its own have so far had limited effect. Despite the continuing reluctance to directly join anti-Russian sanctions or provide military assistance to Ukraine, almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries (LAC) have expressed their support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and condemned Russian aggression.
**Political interest/engagement**

At the beginning of 2022, the Latin American region was not considered an important area of Ukraine's foreign policy. Interest in the region was mainly driven by economic factors, such as expanding Ukrainian export opportunities and opening new markets.

However, since the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression, the MFA and the country's leadership have emphasised the need to expand international support for Ukraine, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, to counter the invasion. By the end of the year, public statements by government officials showed a tendency towards introducing the concept of the Global South into circulation. However, this did not add to the understanding of specific objectives and priorities in the region. In particular, during the Annual Address to the VRU in December, the President noted that the development of relations with African countries “and other countries of the Global South” was now a special priority. In his speech at the Annual Ambassadorial in December, the President specified the parts of the Global South, without which “it is impossible to imagine global growth and international stability in this century”, namely “Latin America, India, other Asian countries, including China and Southeast Asia, the entire region of the Indian and Pacific Islands”.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba discussed Ukraine's interests “from Latin America to Oceania” at the Ambassadors’ Meeting in December. He emphasised that “diplomacy in these regions will not be secondary” and Ukraine will build it “as part of the West”, guided by the indivisibility of its interests in the world. In public statements, the importance of the LAC countries was highlighted in the context of the need for international support within the framework of the Crimea Platform.

Evidence of political interest in the region is reflected in the steps taken to staff Ukraine's diplomatic missions in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

The importance of assistance to Ukraine from the LAC countries was also emphasised in the context of nuclear safety. Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada R. Stefanchuk called on partners in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay, to “take Ukraine’s nuclear facilities under their protection” (20.03) following the seizure of the Zaporizhzhia NPP by Russian troops. He
expressed hope that these countries would join sanctions against the aggressor. During his telephone conversation with the President of the Senate of Mexico, S. Creel (October), he indicated that Ukraine considered Mexico one of its key partners in Latin America.

Despite increased interest in cooperation within the framework of interparliamentary friendship groups on the part of Latin American partners (visits to Ukraine by Mexican and Chilean parliamentarians in July and May, respectively), the VRU’s Committee on Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation has generally shown little interest in the LAC countries.

**Strategic communications**

Public speeches by representatives of Ukrainian authorities to foreign audiences and publications in regional media have been important. The President addressed a meeting of the Organisation of American States online (6.10), calling on its members to support Ukraine and thanking them for revoking Russia’s observer status in the organisation.

In August, the President gave an online speech to Chilean students, which was broadcast by Chilean and some Latin American media. In his address, the President stressed the importance of LAC countries joining anti-Russian sanctions and spreading truthful information about Russian aggression. He also spoke about the prospect of rebuilding Ukraine and invited the region’s countries to join.

The visit by Guatemalan President A. Giammattei to Ukraine (July) was widely covered by Guatemalan and regional media.

Unfortunately, the President’s request to the regional organisation Mercosur to address the high assembly with a speech was rejected without explanation.

Following a telephone conversation with Brazilian President J. Bolsonaro (July), the President of Ukraine gave his first interview to a Latin American media outlet, the Brazilian TV channel Globo, and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba gave an interview to the Argentine news website Infobae. Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova also gave an interview with a Mexican publication. In addition, some of D. Kuleba’s speeches were disseminated in the region via Spanish media, Spanish-language versions of leading world media, and Spanish translations of interviews given by the minister to domestic media. The special platform — war.ukraine.ua — launched by the MFA of Ukraine has had a Spanish-language version since mid-summer.
The heads of diplomatic missions have traditionally been the main “mouthpieces” of Ukraine in LAC, making numerous appearances in regional media (Mexican, Guatemalan, Chilean, Peruvian, Brazilian), and the head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Mexico held a press conference on Russian aggression against Ukraine (24.02). Also, former Ukrainian ambassadors to LAC (R. Spirin and R. Tronenko) commented on the war in Ukraine for the Latin American audience.

**Activities**

2022 was supposed to be the year of celebrating the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s diplomatic relations with many countries in the LAC region. In particular, by February 24, celebrations were held to mark the establishment of relations with Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the MFA has made efforts to find real political allies in the LAC region to counter the aggression. It was important that Ambassador O. Dramaretska addressed the Mexican Congress with a speech in the very first days of the war (March).

In June, President V. Zelenskyy had a telephone conversation with the President of Ecuador (G. Lasso), followed by conversations with the Presidents of Argentina (A. Fernandez), Chile (G. Boric) and Paraguay (M. Abdo Benitez) in July, during which he thanked them for their support for Ukraine, humanitarian aid, and condemnation of Russian aggression, and discussed the possibility of engaging Chilean specialists in demining Ukrainian territories. Later, the President of Ukraine had telephone conversations with the Presidents J. Bolsonaro of Brazil and L. Lacalle Pou of Uruguay.

In late December, a Ukrainian delegation led by First Deputy Prime Minister — Minister of Economy Y. Svyrydenko met newly-elected Brazilian President L. da Silva to present President Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula.

During the year, the political dialogue between Ukraine and Guatemala intensified. In early February, Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba had a telephone conversation with his Guatemalan counterpart M. A. Bucaro Flores. In August, Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova held an online meeting with M. A. Bucaro Flores and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Immigration of Belize. The intensive political dialogue with Guatemala continued with another virtual meeting between E. Dzhaparova and her Guatemalan counterpart R. Palma Urzúa (November).
In May, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Mexico, O. Dramaretska, presented her credentials to the Presidents of Costa Rica and Guatemala, R. A. Chaves Robles and A. Giammattei, respectively. During her visits, she met the foreign ministers of both countries, spoke to members of the Guatemalan Congress, and gave a series of interviews to major TV channels. In August, she visited Costa Rica again, delivered a message to the President and met the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Foreign Trade. In July, representatives of the Ukrainian MFA’s Department of American Affairs met a delegation of the Chamber of Deputies of the Mexican Congress, who were on a working visit to Ukraine.

In August, Ukrainian Foreign Minister D. Kuleba had telephone conversations with his counterparts from Guyana and Suriname, H. Todd and A. Ramdin, respectively. D. Kuleba met the foreign ministers of Panama, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Belize on the sidelines of the UN GA. In August, Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine E. Dzhaparova held a series of telephone conversations, particularly with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship of Argentina, P. A. Tettamanti, and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Paraguay, I. R. Silvero Silvagni.

In May, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba met his Peruvian counterpart, C. R. Landa Arroyo, in Davos to discuss global food security and bilateral trade and economic contacts. During a telephone conversation in August, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister informed him about the unblocking of Ukrainian ports and the resumption of exports. Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova met members of the National Congress of the Republic of Chile (May).

During the year, the heads of Ukraine’s foreign diplomatic missions in the LAC region held several meetings with representatives of the defence ministries and general staffs (Chile, Peru, Argentina) to discuss the intensification of bilateral military-technical cooperation.

While organising and holding exhibitions and commemorative events, such as commemorating the fallen heroes of the Heavenly Hundred, victims of the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people, and the Holodomor of 1932–1933, or organising pro-Ukrainian events in the LAC region, Ukraine’s foreign diplomatic missions in the region relied on the collective support of the embassies of some European states, such as Poland, the United Kingdom, France, as well as Latin American states like Guatemala and Chile, the United States, and the EU Delegation to the region. The Ukrainian community in these countries was also actively involved.
Ukrainian-Mexican relations noticeably livened up in parliamentary diplomacy. In May, a video conference was held with the participation of the Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Relations, O. Merezhko, and the Head of the Mexican Senate Foreign Relations Committee, G. Vasconcelos, during which they agreed to establish a constructive dialogue between the two countries' legislatures. In July, a delegation of Mexican parliamentarians visited the VRU. Ukrainian MPs paid a return visit to Mexico in September. During a virtual meeting VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk and the President of the Mexican Congress, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies S. Creel Miranda, discussed the possibility for the President of Ukraine to address the Mexican Parliament directly. The Head of the VRU's Foreign Affairs Committee also held a video conference with his Guatemalan counterpart M. E. Conde Orellana (June).

The track towards intensifying interparliamentary cooperation between Ukraine and Chile in 2022, launched last year, has deepened. Thus, in May, the Head of the Parliamentary Committee, O. Merezhko, met the President and members of the Republican Party of the Republic of Chile who visited Ukraine. During the year, the head of Ukraine’s diplomatic mission in Chile had a number of meetings with local legislators.

In November, the Ambassador of Ukraine to Spain, S. Pohoreltsev, met a delegation of the Colombian Liberal Party and lawmakers from both houses of Congress who took part in the XXVI Congress of the Socialist International (Madrid, Spain). The meeting discussed the establishment of a friendship group with Ukraine in the Colombian Congress. Also, in November, the head of Ukraine’s diplomatic mission in Peru met local lawmakers and the head of the Liberal Party of Colombia. In July, the Peruvian party APRA expressed its support for the Ukrainian people in a special statement.

Ukrainian MP H. Mykhayliuk and this year’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate, O. Matviychuk, participated in the 12th Consultative Assembly of Parliamentarians on the International Criminal Court and the Rule of Law (CAP-ICC), which took place in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in November. During the visit, H. Mykhayliuk also held meetings with members of the National Congress and the municipal government of Buenos Aires, while O. Matviychuk spoke at the Argentine Catholic University.

Throughout the year, Ukrainian diplomats (including the heads of the Ukrainian embassies in Mexico and Argentina) and government officials (Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko and Ukrainian lawmakers) discussed potential infrastructure projects aimed at rebuilding Ukraine with regional government and business elites.
The Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, M. Solskyi, initiated the creation of the Council of Grain Producers and Exporters, which will further discuss the format of joint activities between Ukraine, the USA, Canada, Australia, and Brazil to form a common position on the export of oilseeds and grains, and share experiences. In July, he discussed this topic with the head of the Brazilian Embassy in Ukraine, who pledged his country’s support for Ukraine’s proposal.

A number of meetings on bilateral trade, business organisation, and opening of new markets were held by the heads of Ukraine’s diplomatic missions in LAC (in particular, the heads of the embassies in Argentina, Peru, and Chile) and the embassies of Brazil and Cuba in Ukraine.

In April, Ukraine was represented at the International Air and Space Fair (FIDAE), one of the most important exhibitions in the Latin American and Caribbean region, where the capabilities of the State Space Agency of Ukraine were presented, and several meetings were held with key partners, the Chilean civil aviation authorities, and the Chilean Space Association. In May, the Ukrainian stand was presented at the 46th International Book Fair in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and a cultural event, “Day of Ukraine”, was held as part of the fair. In November, the Head of the Embassy of Ukraine in Cuba took part in the XXXVIII International Fair FIHAV 2022 (Havana, Cuba).

Ukraine’s First Lady was an honoured guest at the Forum of First Ladies and Spouses of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (November), which she addressed online.

As part of cultural cooperation, a memorial in honour of Ukraine was unveiled in Jalisco in August as a sign of solidarity. Ukrainian artists toured Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, and athletes participated in international competitions in Peru and Brazil. Ukrainian films were screened in Argentina and Peru. In November, Buenos Aires (Argentina) hosted a photo exhibition of six Ukrainian and Latin American photojournalists. Also, in November, the City Council of Belo Horizonte (Brazil) presented an Honorary Award to the Head of the Ukrainian Embassy in Brazil in solidarity with the Ukrainian people. As a sign of support for Ukraine, architectural structures and landmark locations were illuminated throughout the year in different countries of the LAC region. The Ukrainian Cultural Society PROSVITA in Argentina sent an appeal to President Fernandez to recognise the Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people.

Ukraine’s ambassadors to Argentina and Peru were appointed in December and to Cuba in May. However, the heads of two diplomatic missions — in Brazil and Chile — have not been appointed.
Results

The first visible results of Ukraine’s intensified diplomatic efforts in the LAC region became evident in the late spring and summer of 2022. For some time, Latin American colleagues took a “wait-and-see” attitude, mostly confining themselves to voting in support of the Ukrainian resolution in the UN GA. Only a few foreign ministries issued statements supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity at once.

In July, the President of Guatemala, A. Giammattei, visited Ukraine. In April, the Government of Guatemala appealed to the Organisation of American States (OAS) to suspend Russia’s observer status in it, and in October, it initiated the adoption of a second resolution within the OAS condemning Russian aggression. During the meeting of the presidents, it was announced that Guatemala was ready to join the initiative to create a special tribunal for Russia “over the crime of aggression against the people of Ukraine”.

Guatemala and Suriname took part in the Second Summit of the Crimea Platform (held online in August), while Costa Rica and Guyana participated in the First Parliamentary Summit of the Crimea Platform in Zagreb (Croatia, October). At the initiative of the Chilean delegation and a group of parliamentarians representing LAC countries, the Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a resolution in support of Ukraine (October). Political parties of the LAC countries, full members of the Socialist International, issued a joint declaration condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine, human rights violations in the temporarily occupied territories, and the bombing of critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine by Russian troops. Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru condemned the illegal referendums in the regions of Ukraine occupied by Russian troops. The Organisation of American States adopted two declarations in February and October condemning Russia’s aggression and crimes against civilians and calling for the immediate withdrawal of its troops from Ukraine. The October OAS resolution “Continued Support for an End to Russian Aggression in Ukraine” was supported by 22 LAC countries, while 11 countries, including Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil, did not sign.

The Government of Ukraine approved a draft agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala on the mutual abolition of visa requirements (July).

Following the President of Guatemala, A. Giammattei’s visit to Ukraine, a friendship group of five MPs was established in the VRU (August).
As part of humanitarian aid, the Mexican Government sent over 1.6 tonnes of seeds to farmers in the Odesa region. Chile allocated an additional USD 150,000 to the UN Refugee Agency, and Caritas Chile donated EUR 84,000 to Caritas Ukraine. Citizens of Peru collected a shipment of household essentials. One of the leading Paraguayan rice producers, together with the Slavic Baptist Association of Paraguay, delivered 22 tonnes of rice to Ukraine as humanitarian aid (March). Argentina sent 11 humanitarian shipments between March and November 2022. Charity events in support of Ukraine were held in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.

In September, the Chamber of Deputies of the Mexican Parliament signed a twinning agreement between the city of Irpin and the municipality of Tlajomulco, Jalisco (Mexico). The agreement provides for the Mexican side’s assistance in rebuilding and normalising life in the city.

The Government of Guatemala sent humanitarian teams to Ukraine to rescue and assist in de-mining and debris removal.

The MFA arranged preferential participation for Ukrainian exporters in exhibitions in 18 countries, including Chile.

The full-scale Russian invasion has had a negative impact on Ukraine’s trade with the LAC region. According to the State Customs Service of Ukraine, Ukrainian exports fell by 85%, and imports fell by 33.5%. The rate of decline is particularly significant in the markets of Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (which were down 10.7 and 5.6 times, respectively), as well as in Colombia, the Dominican Republic (which were down 8.5 and 5.5 times, respectively) and Guatemala (which was down 225 times). Before the visit of the President of Guatemala to Ukraine, it was noted that the country was 80% dependent on the export of Ukrainian grain crops.
In 2022, the Nordic countries repeatedly condemned Russia's war against Ukraine, provided Ukraine with comprehensive support, were open to communication with the Ukrainian authorities, and showed interest in the developments caused by the full-scale aggression. Ukraine has intensified its contacts with Norway and Sweden, particularly due to the latter’s preparation for its presidency of the Council of the EU in 2023.

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Political interest/engagement

Northern Europe received little attention at the level of official statements or interviews with Ukrainian officials during the year. The countries of the region were often mentioned in the context of specific assistance packages or bilateral meetings, the EU and NATO. Functional interaction with these countries has increased significantly.

In his Annual Address to the VRU, V. Zelenskyy mentioned only Norway in the context of the humanitarian grain initiative. The obvious reason is both the increased focus on other regions and the existing channels of communication with Scandinavian countries, which provide strong support and financial assistance to Ukraine within the established mechanisms of cooperation and newly added formats (in particular, assistance in regional programmes for the reconstruction of Ukraine). At the same time, the Scandinavian countries were repeatedly mentioned along with other countries that support Ukraine and put pressure on the aggressor state.

Strategic communications

Top-level communications between Ukraine and the Nordic countries intensified significantly in 2022. On several occasions, the President of Ukraine addressed the national parliaments of the Scandinavian countries online and the people of these countries on large screens.

Norway drew parallels between the speeches of two foreign leaders who delivered speeches in the Storting (Norwegian parliament) — W. Churchill and V. Zelenskyy. In his online address (30.03), the latter called for providing Ukraine with weapons, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia, withdrawing Norwegian businesses from there, freeing Europe from Russian energy resources, and rebuilding Ukraine.

V. Zelenskyy spoke online to the Swedish parliament (24.03), highlighting the need to restore Ukraine and put pressure on Russia.

In a speech to the Eduskunta, the Finnish parliament (8.04), the President of Ukraine drew parallels between Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Stalin’s attack on Finland, thanked for defence assistance and called for increased sanctions pressure on Russia.

President V. Zelenskyy addressed the Danish Parliament (29.03), calling the country to join post-war reconstruction efforts. In his address to the Danish people broadcast on the
squares of Copenhagen and Aarhus on the anniversary of Denmark’s liberation from the Nazis (4.05), the President thanked the Danes for their support for Ukraine and called for greater efforts to stop the war.

Danish officials’ visits and speeches to Ukraine also attracted media attention. For example, Prime Minister of Denmark M. Frederiksen delivered an online speech to the Verkhovna Rada (21.06), drawing parallels between the war against Nazism and the war against Russia, emphasising Denmark’s support for Ukraine, and expressing readiness to put pressure on Russia.

Representatives of Denmark and Norway received Ukraine’s state awards: The President of Ukraine presented the Order of Merit, 1st class, to Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Kofod and Minister of Defence M. Bødskov, the Order of Princess Olga, 3rd class, to Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Huitfeldt, and the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise, 2nd class, to the President of Norwegian Storting, M. Gharahkhani.

Activities

The Nordic countries’ interest in Ukraine and their support in countering Russian aggression were reflected in their leaders’ and senior officials’ visits to Ukraine. Prime Minister of Denmark M. Frederiksen visited Ukraine in April, Prime Minister of Finland S. Marin in May, Prime Minister of Sweden M. Andersson and Prime Minister of Norway J. G. Støre in July.

There were active contacts on cooperation between the ministries of defence about military and security support. Danish Minister of Defence J. Kofod visited Ukraine in May. The foreign ministers of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, along with the foreign ministers of four other countries, visited Kyiv in late November. All countries were active in the Ramstein format. In May, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, A. Huitfeldt and the President of the Norwegian Storting, M. Gharahkhani, visited Kyiv. Among other things, M. Gharahkhani discussed strengthening security support for Ukraine with the President of Ukraine and held talks with the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister D. Kuleba visited Sweden (29.08) to consolidate international support for Ukraine and increase sanctions pressure on Russia. During the visit, he met Prime Minister M. Andersson, Foreign Minister A. Linde, the leadership of the Swedish Parliament, etc.
Even before the outbreak of the full-scale war, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba visited Denmark (27.01), where he had an audience with Queen Margrethe II of Denmark and met Foreign Minister J. Kofod to discuss security assistance to Ukraine and economic stability.

The Conference for Northern European Defence Allies of Ukraine, initiated by the UK and Denmark, took place in Copenhagen (11.08). Unlike the Ramstein format, its goal was to develop plans for long-term military and security support for Ukraine.

Scandinavian countries also back international initiatives in support of Ukraine and condemn Russia’s actions. For example, the President of Finland, S. Niinistö, spoke at the international inaugural Grain from Ukraine summit (26.11).

Mykolayiv city and Mykolayiv region officials O. Senkevych and V. Kim met Danish Minister for Development F. M. Mortensen (20.08) to discuss future cooperation in rebuilding Mykolayiv and the region after extensive damage caused by the Russian army.

**Results**

After the outbreak of a full-scale war, the Nordic countries proved to be reliable partners of Ukraine in providing military and humanitarian assistance, hosting Ukrainian refugees, maintaining pressure on Russia, and participating in programmes to rebuild Ukraine. The Scandinavian countries responded to current problems and provided sectoral assistance (support for energy infrastructure and mitigation of shelling damage to other civilian infrastructure) and joined programmes to create mechanisms for Ukraine’s post-victory recovery. Finland has provided more than EUR 190 million in military assistance, including artillery, ammunition, and other items. Finnish instructors are involved in training the Ukrainian military.

In June, Sweden announced an additional defence aid package for Ukraine in the amount of SEK 500 million (about USD 50 million) and an additional humanitarian aid package of the same amount. The total amount of Swedish assistance to Ukraine since February 2022, excluding the latest package at the end of 2022, has exceeded EUR 900 million, including over EUR 570 million in military support.

By the end of 2022, Denmark had provided EUR 565 million in military aid and EUR 192 million in civilian assistance to Ukraine.

In addition to its massive military and humanitarian aid, Norway, a non-EU member, has joined the sanctions against Russia.
The Scandinavian countries support Ukraine in the international arena, joining various initiatives to help it fight against Russia and restore the already liberated territories. For example, Denmark is a co-sponsor of the UN GA resolution “Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (12.10), as well as the UN GA resolution “Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine” (14.11), which creates a mechanism for compensating Ukraine for the losses caused by the war unleashed by Russia. As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Norway also joined the promotion of the Ukrainian agenda in 2022.

A new Copenhagen Format was launched (11.08) as a conference of Ukraine’s allies, involving more than 20 countries, to develop solutions to strengthen assistance to Ukraine.

Initiatives to rebuild individual regions are also worthy of attention, as specific projects targeting particular infrastructure facilities seem especially attractive to Northern European countries. For example, Denmark has taken over the reconstruction of the Mykolayiv region, as Danish Prime Minister M. Frederiksen (22.04) announced during her visit to Ukraine. The Mykolayiv Recovery Office was launched (7.09). The first step was the creation of a roadmap and its approval by Danish representatives. Mykolayiv and Denmark signed a memorandum of cooperation (19.08) to avoid corruption risks. Humanitarian and financial assistance was provided to the affected region to address the consequences of Russian shelling.

Representatives of the Nordic countries have been vocal in condemning Russia’s war against Ukraine, using harshly critical rhetoric. On the eve of Russia’s full-scale military invasion, Denmark condemned Russia’s preparation of the casus belli, namely the recognition of the so-called “DPR” and “LPR” on 22 February 2022, as did other Nordic countries.

In 2022, Ukraine’s trade with Denmark totalled USD 471 million, Sweden — USD 593.1 million, Norway — USD 305.3 million, Finland — USD 301.2 million, and Iceland — USD 80.7 million. After significant growth in the previous year, Ukraine’s trade with all countries in the region fell by almost 30% in 2022.
Ukraine took its Africa policy to the next level in 2022. It intensified relations with African countries, and the engagement of Ukraine’s leadership and MFA was unprecedented. Work on strategic communication improved significantly, too. Ukraine took a number of important steps to establish proper representation of its interests in Africa. At the same time, the absence of long-standing work in Africa prevented Ukraine from accomplishing sustainable results.
Political interest/engagement

Ukraine’s President V. Zelenskyy demonstrated a strong interest in intensifying Ukraine’s foreign policy in Africa. In his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, he focused on Africa specifically in the context of finding new friends, alliances, and political and economic opportunities for Ukraine. The address highlights the development of cooperation with the countries of Africa and the Global South. It noted that this vector became a special priority. President Zelenskyy highlighted that Ukraine should become and was already becoming a leader of global efforts for food security in this context. He noted that the Ukrainian agricultural sector was helping guarantee food and social security in the countries of Africa.

The Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the VRU focused specifically on the African vector as part of the effort to draw the attention of countries around the world to the problem of Russian aggression at international fora. It noted that Ukraine’s President addressed the countries of the African Union for the first time in Ukrainian history.

President Zelenskyy strongly focused on Africa in his address to the annual Ambassadorial (23.12). He said that Ukraine was reloading its relations with dozens of African countries, and ten countries had already been chosen as locations for Ukraine’s new embassies in Africa. He mentioned that the concept of a Ukraine-Africa trade house was designed and declared the goal of accomplishing the representation of Ukraine in 30 countries of Africa.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba showed strong interest in developing relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. This was manifested in his numerous interviews and statements throughout 2022. Minister Kuleba put a special accent on Africa in his address to the annual Ambassadorial. He said that Africa is waiting for Ukraine to return, and finding common points of contact, common interests, and common benefits is the only thing Ukraine and African countries need in this context.

Unfortunately, Ukrainian MPs had little interest in Africa.
Strategic communications

Ukraine took its strategic communication in Africa to an unprecedented level in 2022. It held a media campaign to assert Ukraine's interests and counter hostile Russian propaganda. In particular, Ukraine's President addressed the meeting of the African Union Assembly Bureau (20.06) and the XVIII Summit of the International Organisation of the Francophonie (20.11) for the first time ever. Also, Ukraine's President had a range of online meetings with journalists from Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Ghana.

During his Africa tour (1–10.10), Foreign Minister D. Kuleba had three briefings for mass media with journalists from Kenya, South Africa, Senegal, Tanzania, Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. Special Representative of Ukraine for the Middle East and Africa spoke at the meeting of the League of Arab States (LAS), an organisation of ten African countries (11.08), for the first time.

Ukraine's Ambassador to South Africa, L. Abravitova, ensured proactive and consistent communication with the media and media presence for Ukraine. Ambassador to Kenya A. Pravednyk, Ambassador to Senegal Y. Pyvovarov, and Chargé d'Affaires in Nigeria B. Soltys worked proactively with the media as well.

Activities

Ukraine developed extremely proactive work in Africa throughout 2022. MFA of Ukraine approved the Strategy for Developing Ukraine's Relations with the States of Africa (14.01). The Strategy was never disclosed for public access. In July, M. Subkh was appointed Special Representative of Ukraine for the Middle East and Africa by a President's decree.

Bilateral contacts with countries of the region were very intense. Ukraine's President had 18 conversations with African countries throughout 2022. Nine were the first such conversations in the history of bilateral relations. These included conversations with the leaders of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, DRC, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, and Botswana.

For the first time, Ukraine's Minister of Foreign Affairs had a tour of African countries (1–10.10), having official visits to Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Kenya. Ukraine's Special Representative for the Middle East and Africa, M. Subkh, took over the series of
visits interrupted due to Russia’s missile attacks against Ukraine. He visited Ethiopia, Mozambique, Botswana, South Africa, and Nigeria. Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs had 35 conversations and meetings with representatives of African countries since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale aggression.

Food security was one of the key issues after the beginning of the full-fledged Russian aggression. As part of the effort to fight hunger in Ethiopia and Somalia, Ukraine’s President signed a decree (21.09) to allocate 50 thousand tons of humanitarian assistance — 25 thousand tons for each country. In addition, the Ukrainian President presented Grain from Ukraine, a program to supply food from Ukraine to the countries of Africa with donor funding, at the World Food Summit. Respectively, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution (24.11) to provide 125 thousand metric tons of wheat and maize to Sudan, Kenya, and Nigeria in humanitarian aid.

Ukraine took steps to strengthen parliamentary cooperation. A delegation led by the Verkhovna Rada First Deputy Speaker O. Kornienko took part in the 145th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Kigali, Rwanda (11–16.10). They met with parliamentary delegations from five countries in Africa. O. Kornienko visited Mozambique (14–15.10), where he met with the Speaker of the Mozambique Assembly of the Republic.

U. Embaló, Guinea-Bissau President and current Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) visited Ukraine (26.10). This was the first visit of a leader of a Sub-Saharan African country to Ukraine since 2004.

Overall, Ukrainian diplomacy was the most proactive in its history in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022, accomplishing an unprecedented intensity of bilateral contacts. Still, Ukraine has not had an ambassador in Ethiopia since 2009.

Results

2022 saw positive dynamics in relations with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa at the level of political dialogue and international cooperation. However, the absence of long-standing consistent work stands in the way of accomplishing serious results quickly in this domain. The steps taken in 2022 are important and necessary. But they are mostly oriented on compensating for the lack of these steps to secure Ukraine’s interests in the region in the past years.
The fact that no African country voted against the Territorial integrity of Ukraine: defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations resolution (12.10) for the first time can qualify as an accomplishment. Also, for the first time since the beginning of Russia’s aggression in 2014, Ukraine managed to get the support of Angola, Morocco, and Guinea-Bissau in the voting at the UN. Ukraine enjoyed the support of some other countries of the region in the vote on the UN GA resolution on the Russian aggression (2.03), including votes in favour from Benin, Botswana, Gabon, Djibouti, DRC, Zambia, Cabo Verde, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Chad. Support in the vote for the UN GA resolution to expel Russia from the UN HR Council was significantly lower. Out of all African countries, just the DRC, the Comoro Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mauritius, Malawi, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Chad voted in favour of the resolution.

Ukraine managed to get some positive signals in the context of expanding opportunities for supplies of Soviet-type armaments from some African countries.

Ukraine managed to engage top African attendees and speakers at the Crimea Platform Summit. Niger and Liberia joined the Joint Statement of the 2022 Summit, while Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire participated in the Crimea Platform (23.08).

Ukraine’s trade with Sub-Saharan Africa dropped due to war-triggered logistical problems. Ukraine’s exports to the region plummeted especially low. Total trade with the Sub-Saharan African countries was USD 819m in 2022. Out of this, the export of goods was USD 537m, and imports amounted to USD 281m. Respectively, Ukraine’s surplus in trade with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa was USD 255m. Trade with the region accounted for 0.79% of Ukraine’s total trade.

The net weight of Sub-Saharan African countries in Ukraine’s total exports of 2022 was 1.2 per cent. This is half of the 2.7 per cent in 2021. The net weight of Sub-Saharan African countries in Ukraine’s total imports is 0.74%. The biggest importers of Ukrainian produce in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2022 included Sudan (USD 60m), Ethiopia (USD 54m), Ghana (USD 41m), Cameroon (USD 38m), Djibouti (USD 33m), Senegal (USD 29m), Nigeria (USD 28m), Somalia (USD 27m), Kenya (USD 27m), and South Africa (USD 22m). As before, the key items of Ukraine’s exports to Sub-Saharan Africa included wheat, sunflower oil, flat-rolled carbon steel, hot-rolled steel rods and bars, and semi-finished carbon steel products.
In 2022, Ukraine’s foreign policy in Central Asia was very limited. Given the serious dependence of CA countries on Russia, and their membership in a number of Russia-led military, political, and economic organisations, Ukraine did not receive any political, military, diplomatic, economic or significant humanitarian support from them. The political dialogue was taking place exclusively as part of the everyday work of embassies. Economic projects were frozen, and Ukraine had little information presence in CA media.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, Ukraine had a very limited political interest in Central Asian countries. Given the economic focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy in the region and the traditionally heavy political, economic, and military dependence of CA countries on Russia, the military action of 2022 did not offer any opening for developing Ukraine’s relations with CA.

Ukraine’s President mentioned Asia in the context of Ukraine’s importance in ensuring food security in his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada and Analytical Report to it. However, he did not refer to CA specifically.

In his address to the annual Ambassadorial in December, Ukraine’s President spoke about plans to focus more on the “regions and continents where our interests are so far represented less than we need for the benefit of Ukraine and our protection from Russia’s aggression.” President Zelenskyy mentioned Asian countries in this context but only specified China and Southeast Asia. In this context, Ukraine’s MFA D. Kuleba noted that Ukraine would be developing mutually beneficial and deep relations with various regions of the world, including Asian countries.

Similarly, President Zelenskyy spoke about preparations for modernising the diplomatic service, intensifying Ukraine’s diplomacy, and strengthening Ukraine’s position in a number of regions, mentioning Asia among others, given the region’s “significant economic potential” and “the need to change positions in voting in the UN” in his video address (23.12). He did not mention any specific CA country or name the CA region.

Strategic communications

Despite more attention from the Ukrainian leadership to Asian countries in general, the CA region was not their focus in 2022. Illustrating this, Ukraine’s President did not appear in events in CA countries by contrast to his activity in the countries of East and Southeast Asia.

An online interview with Ukraine’s MFA D. Kuleba in September for the media of CA countries was virtually the only event for the CA platform. In that interview, Minister Kuleba described developments in Ukraine, expressed readiness to develop economic cooperation with CA countries, and outlined the threat from Russia to the statehood of CA countries.

Ukrainian ambassadors did one or two interviews throughout 2022 in their respective countries.
Activities

There were no official contacts with CA countries at the level of country leaders or ministers. Dialogue was maintained through Ukraine’s missions abroad to keep up existing interaction and solve issues to resume economic cooperation with Ukraine, support cultural and historical memory events, etc.

Top-level communication was fragmented, only in the format of telephone talks and only with the leader of Kazakhstan. In their telephone conversation (2.03), the presidents of Ukraine and Kazakhstan discussed the “complicated security situation in the region” and agreed to cooperate on humanitarian issues. Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy congratulated Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev on his victory in the early election (22.11), expressed interest in further developing Ukraine-Kazakhstan relations and thanked President Tokayev for humanitarian aid.

In 2022, Ukraine did not have some ambassadors in the region, including Tajikistan (from October 2021 to June 2022) and Kazakhstan (from October 2022 to present).

Results

All countries of CA demonstrate a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war. At the same time, in June, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev said that Kazakhstan did not recognize the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. Ukraine interpreted this as a diplomatic victory illustrated in the telephone conversation between presidents Zelenskyy and Tokayev by expressing gratitude and readiness to develop “specific projects of cooperation in economy, energy, and digitalisation”. Uzbekistan’s MFA Kamilov made a similar statement of non-recognition of the “republics.”

Generally, CA countries declare that they will not violate the sanctions imposed on Russia and call on their citizens to avoid participating in the war against Ukraine, stressing criminal liability for it. CA countries — primarily NGOs and businesses — sent humanitarian help to Ukraine. The installation of invincibility yurts in Kyiv, Bucha, and Kharkiv by Kazakh businessmen and representatives of the diaspora in Ukraine got the most visibility in the media space. While this was a private initiative and the Embassy of Kazakhstan was not involved, according to Kazakhstan’s MFA Spokesperson Smadiarov,
the installation of the yurts triggered a negative reaction from Russia. It said that this was damaging to the Russia-Kazakhstan strategic partnership.

CA countries continue to vote unfavourably for Ukraine on its resolutions at the UN. Russia’s full-scale war and war crimes have not changed their position compared to earlier years. They keep abstaining (not voting) or voting against Ukraine’s resolutions at the UN. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan abstained, and Turkmenistan did not vote on the Aggression against Ukraine resolution (2.03). In the vote on the Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine resolution (24.03), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan abstained, and Turkmenistan did not vote. In the vote on the Suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council (7.04), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan voted against it, and Turkmenistan did not vote. In the vote on the Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine resolution (15.11), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan abstained, while Turkmenistan did not vote. Kazakhstan voted against the Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol resolution (16.12), while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan abstained, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not vote.

Astana’s demand to dismiss Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan P. Vrublevsky, following his comment on some aspects of the Ukraine-Russia war in August, was illustrative: he said that Ukraine was “trying to kill as many Russians as possible: the more of them are killed now, the fewer will have to be killed by the next generations of Ukrainians. Astana expressed its protest and requested Ukraine to change its ambassador. Ambassador Vrublevsky left Kazakhstan in October without any explanation of the reasons.

While declaring the intent to stick to the sanctions, CA countries are actively used by Russia to bypass the sanctions. This is done as follows: Russian businesses relocate to CA countries; establish new logistics and production chains, create shell companies to import the equipment covered by the sanctions, and re-export deficit goods and equipment to Russia via parallel import schemes; military equipment produced by CA countries is possibly provided to Russia (examples include Tynys enterprise of National Company Kazakhstan Engineering or Dastan, a Kyrgyz company); and Kazakh ship Zhibek Zholy was involved in transporting stolen Ukrainian grain.
Notably, all CA countries were absent from the Second Summit of the Crimea Platform, while the efforts of Ukrainian embassies to block Russian TV channels in CA countries did not succeed. Russian media continue to dominate the media space of CA countries, while Ukraine has not managed to expand its information presence there. Apart from that, the Ukrainian side had difficulties communicating with the local authorities. Among other things, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, V. Zhovtenko, noted that “relations are moderate” while not being able to get a meeting, e.g. with the Ministry of Emergencies of Kyrgyzstan.

Some efforts were made to improve the legal framework for international deliveries (Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan remained Ukraine’s key trade partner in the region. However, trade declined with all eight countries of the region, except for Turkmenistan. Total trade in goods was USD 805.9m with Kazakhstan (down from USD 1.29bn in 2021); USD 348.6m with Uzbekistan (down from USD 703m in 2021); USD 214.1m with Turkmenistan (up from USD 144m in 2021); USD 39.3m with Kyrgyzstan (down from USD 54.7m in 2021); and USD 12.1m (down from USD 22m in 2021) with Tajikistan.
## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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United Nations

2022

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TOTAL SCORE:  A

Ukraine used all the UN tools for political and humanitarian response to Russia’s full-scale aggression in 2022. Ukraine managed to garner unprecedented support for important resolutions at the UN GA, get Russia suspended from the Human Rights Council, and keep the impact of war on the agenda of the UN SC constantly, as well as use other UN platforms. This boosted interest in cooperation with the UN and using its mechanisms.
Political interest/engagement

In contrast to previous years, political interest in the role of the UN and Ukraine’s policy in this area intensified in the crisis of 2022. This interest was not limited to the MFA or current work of ministries in the respective frameworks. The President and Minister of Foreign Affairs focused on the UN’s role as a mediator and guarantor of international security, its importance in the investigation of war crimes, establishment of a Tribunal, condemnation of the aggressor, suspension of Russia from the UN Security Council and other ways to limit Russia’s influence. This was mentioned in many addresses and interviews throughout 2022.

The President focused especially on the UN and initiatives within its framework in his speech at the Ambassadorial in December. He said that “historically significant results have been achieved in our cooperation with the UN and at the UN site” (23.12). The Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the VRU strongly focuses on the UN, including General Assembly resolutions, struggles at the UN SC, etc.

Strategic communications

Ukraine intensified diplomatic, media, and social media channels to promote its agenda for the UN in 2022. International media provided extensive coverage of the President’s online addresses to the UN Security Council (5.04, 28.06, 24.08, 27.09, 24.11). Apart from that, President Zelenskyy spoke at other events that could put specific consequences of the war in the spotlight — such as the Global Food Security Summit that took place in the UN GA (21.09) and spoke to the attendees of the 27th UN Climate Change Conference in Sharm El Sheikh (8.11).

Ukrainian representatives repeatedly spoke about the preparation of a summit for peace in 2022 that could take place on the UN platform, thus highlighting its role as a respected neutral mediator.
Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the UN, S. Kyslytsia, frequently spoke in the media, and his Twitter account was one of the most active accounts of Ukrainian diplomats, getting thousands of likes and regularly becoming an instrument of trolling against the Russian delegation. Non-verbal communication, such as reading the UN Charter at the UN SC meeting or using theatre binoculars to see the results of the UN GA vote, achieved the goal of catching the media’s attention and triggering a wide-scale debate.

The MFA and NGOs launched Twitter storms repeatedly to promote the idea of suspending Russia from the UN SC and Human Rights Council, condemn the Kremlin’s actions in the run-up to important voting, etc.

**Activities**

In addition to the traditional address at the opening of the UN GA (21.09), where President Zelenskyy proposed five principles of the Peace Formula, he spoke on numerous occasions at the UN SC throughout 2022, including on war crimes in Bucha (5.04), after the shelling of Kremenchuk (28.06), on Ukraine’s independence and respect for the UN Charter (24.08), the illegal nature of referenda in the occupied territories (27.09), and the need to condemn “any forms of energy terrorism” and adopt a resolution on this (24.11).

Apart from that, President Zelenskyy had telephone conversations with UN Secretary-General Guterres, including on the evacuation of Azovstal defenders (4.05) and escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict (28.09).

First Lady O. Zelenska and Prime Minister D. Shmyhal met with UN SG Guterres in New York (21.09), where they thanked him for his support and help for the people of Ukraine. The presidents of Ukraine and Türkiye, and the UN Secretary-General had a trilateral meeting in Lviv for the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a bilateral meeting of Ukraine’s President and the UN Secretary-General (18.08).

The Ukrainian delegation was lobbying for Ukraine’s interests during the September UN GA session, including mobilising the coalition to protect the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In addition to the MFA, the delegation included Prosecutor General A. Kostin, head of the VRU Foreign Policy and Interparliamentary Cooperation Committee O. Merezhko, and Head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People R. Chubarov.
Foreign Minister Kuleba joined the UN SC meeting on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine (22.09), where he focused on Russian war crimes in Ukraine and accountability for them.

First Lady Zelenska attended the HeForShe global summit and Women in Conflicts forum at the 77th session of the UN GA in September. She spoke about Ukrainian women in wartime.

Head of the OPU A. Yermak met with the General Secretary of the UN Conference on Trade and Development during her visit to Kyiv (17.08) to discuss the international food crisis and other challenges for the Ukrainian economy. Deputy Head of the OPU I. Zhovkva met with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (7.07).

Ukraine’s partners, which are members of the UN Security Council, consistently kept Ukrainian issues on the agenda and repeatedly called special sessions where the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, invited Ukrainian experts and human rights defenders had an opportunity to speak. Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the UN, S. Kyslytsia, had an opportunity to speak on the threats to international peace and security section of the agenda regularly at the UN SC (31.01, 11.04, 19.04, 5.05, 12.05, 6.06, 21.06, 6.09, 8.09, 16.11, 6.12).

Overall, Ukraine’s Representation to the UN in New York was working proactively in all areas despite not being fully staffed. Among other things, it addressed the first unofficial meeting for the intergovernmental talks on the reformatting of the UN SC (10.02); the UN SC meeting on women and children in Russia’s war against Ukraine (11.04); the open debate of the UN SC on food security (19.05); UN GA meeting on Agriculture development, food security and nutrition (23.05); UN SC open debate on the protection of the civilian population (25.05) and stronger responsibility for the violation of international law (3.06); UN SC open debate on the Women, peace and security section of the agenda (15.06); the 8th Biannual Meeting of States of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (27.06); UN SC open debate on children and armed conflict (19.07), and UN SC open debate New Orientation for Reformed Multilateralism (14.12).

On its part, Ukraine’s Permanent Representation to the UN in Geneva covered human rights, arms controls, environmental security, migration and more. Among other things, representatives of Ukraine spoke at the intersessional meeting of member-states of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (22.06); a meeting on cybersecurity of the Disarmament Conference (16.08); the official consultation meeting of member-states to
the Biological Weapons Convention (5.09); interactive dialog with the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous People (28.09); general debate of the 73rd session of the Executive Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (12.10); the 13th Dialog with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (13.12) and more.

The Interactive Dialog on the situation in Ukraine met in Geneva.

First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Dzhaparova spoke at the 21st session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous People in New York (25.04). Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Tochytskyi spoke at the event on nuclear security and safety in Ukraine (2.08); Government Commissioner on Gender Policy K. Levchenko spoke at the UN Women Executive Council meeting (21.06); SSU Deputy Head spoke at the UN Global Congress on Victims of Terrorism (8.09), and Deputy Minister of Economy O. Hryban spoke at the Assembly of member-states of the World Intellectual Property Organisation in Geneva (21.07).

Ukraine, Estonia, Costa Rica, Latvia, Liechtenstein, and Lithuania hosted a top-level joint event during the International Law Week at the UN GA. The theme of the event was Law Not War: A Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression (25.10). A virtual event took place at the 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva and focused on the discussion of ways to hold Russia accountable for crimes against Ukraine and its people (27.09).

Representatives of Ukrainian NGOs and MPs visited UN Headquarters repeatedly throughout 2022 to promote Ukraine's agenda and position on dealing with the consequences of the Russian aggression and holding Russia accountable.

A lot of work was done within the UN to lay the foundation for ensuring accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. This includes the establishment of an international Tribunal and investigations by the International Criminal Court. In addition, Ukraine filed a lawsuit against Russia to the International Court of Justice (27.02), demanding an emergency hearing and the court verdict forcing Russia to stop its illegal attack on Ukraine.

UN Secretary-General A. Guterres visited Kyiv twice. He came in April to visit the de-occupied territory in the Kyiv region and meet with Ukraine's President and returned together with Türkiye's President in July to work on the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Representatives of the UN's thematic institutions visited Ukraine, too.
Results

Ukraine’s biggest accomplishment in 2022 was voting for the UN General Assembly resolutions that gained an unprecedented number of votes — twice as many in support and four times fewer against — compared to what Ukrainian resolutions gained in previous years. The November 14 resolution on the compensation mechanism to pay for the damage the Russian armed aggression caused in Ukraine got the fewest votes in support at 94 and 14 votes against.

An unprecedented 141 countries voted in favour of and just five against the first UN GA resolution after the beginning of the full-scale aggression on Aggression against Ukraine (2.03). One hundred forty countries voted in favour of the second resolution, Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine, and five voted against it (24.03). The third major resolution on the Territorial integrity of Ukraine that condemned the illegal referenda garnered 143 votes in support (12.10). Eighty-two countries voted for the traditional annual resolution on human rights in Crimea (12.12), up from 65 in 2021.

Ukraine managed to get Russia suspended from the Human Rights Council. Ninety-three countries voted in favour of that, 25 voted against it, and 58 abstained (7.04).

In response to Ukraine’s lawsuit against the Russian Federation, the ICJ obliged Russia (16.03) to stop its invasion of Ukraine immediately. Ukraine submitted a Memorandum to the ICJ (1.07) in the case on the Genocide Convention against the Russian Federation, demanding recognition of responsibility and full reimbursement of the losses it caused by Russia. Over 40 countries supported Ukraine in this case and joined the lawsuit.

Upon the initiative of Ukraine and with the support of its partners, a decision was approved (20.12) to freeze the funding of the Moscow-based Meteorological Synthesising Centre-East as the 2023 budget was approved for the implementation of the Action Plan of the UN Economic Commission for Europe’s Action Plan on long-range transboundary air pollution.

The UN International Independent Investigation Commission presented an oral report on investigating developments in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Sumy oblasts under the Russian occupation in February-March 2022 at the 51st session of the UN Human Rights Council. It confirmed that the Russian Federation committed war crimes.
The 14th conference of parties to the Convention on Wetlands approved the Response to the environmental emergency in Ukraine relating to the damage of its wetlands of international importance (Ramsar sites) stemming from the Russian Federation’s aggression resolution initiated by Ukraine and 35 co-author states (12.11).

The UN mediated signing of the Grain Deal to export Ukrainian grain via maritime routes in July. It was further extended in November.

Various UN institutions dealt with the consequences of the Russian aggression and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine throughout 2022. These included the International Organisation for Migration, High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNICEF, UNESCO, UN Women, WHO and others. The UCHA-run humanitarian funds allocated USD 252m for life-saving operations in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale Russian aggression, including USD 192m through the Ukrainian Humanitarian Fund (UHF) and USD 60m through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). A plan to restore ruined schools by September 1 was drafted in cooperation with UNICEF.
Ukraine’s cooperation with the OSCE is characterised by a certain loss of interest in terms of its operations since it de facto stopped functioning as the key mediator between Ukraine and the Russian Federation with the start of a full-scale Russian invasion. The activity and effectiveness of interaction with the OSCE are in decline due to the inability of the organisation to limit the involvement of the Russian Federation in the meetings, thus enabling Russian representatives to block certain activities and impede the work of Ukrainian diplomats.
Political interest/engagement

Political interest in cooperation with the OSCE is mostly based on the organisation’s effectiveness in countering Russian aggression. Statements and addresses from the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence to exclude the Russian Federation from the OSCE were introduced in spring and repeated at the end of the year with very insignificant impact, though.

The President did not mention the OSCE in his Annual Address to VRU, although there was a call to reform international organisations, which failed to fulfil their tasks in his speech. On March 31, Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba made a statement regarding Russia’s blockage of the OSCE SMM mandate and outlined that Ukraine retained its interest in the mission functioning and that the SMM suspension would not assist Russia in avoiding its liability for war crimes.

The official Ukrainian delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly also focused on criticising the organisation for its passive and inert approach. In general, Ukraine’s interest in the OSCE has decreased significantly due to the change in the nature of the international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and minimised capacity and, presumably, the desire of the OSCE to impact its course, blockage of further OSCE SMM functioning.

Strategic communications

In November, President V. Zelenskyy addressed the OSCE PA requesting to exclude the Russian Federation, thus promoting the Ukrainian agenda of advocating the termination of Russia’s membership in international organisations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence expressed a similar opinion. The Minister of Defence also told Wall Street Journal that international organisations, particularly the OSCE, demonstrated its ineffectiveness, being unable to prevent armed conflicts and thus failing to achieve one of its key goals.
Despite the address of President V. Zelenskyy to the OSCE PA, strategic communication with the OSCE had not been active enough and had not retained the interaction with the OSCE in the focus of attention. Ukraine’s advocacy potential to promote any changes in the OSCE’s position on Russia’s membership was not used to the full extent — as in the case of advocacy for the provision of weapons or Russia’s exclusion from the UN. This may indicate other priorities set by Ukrainian diplomacy and the OSCE to be considered a relatively “futile” context.

Activities

Ukraine’s cooperation with the OSCE was definitely affected by the veto of the Russian Federation, which resulted in the termination of the OSCE SMM functions in March and the closure of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator office in Ukraine in July.

In August, the President of Ukraine met with the then OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Z. Rau, in Kyiv, but this visit was focused more on bilateral relations with Poland instead of cooperation with the OSCE. OSCE Secretary General H. Schmidt also visited Kyiv — during her meeting with V. Zelenskyy, the latter asked for the OSCE assistance in the process of liberating the Ukrainian captives who were members of the OSCE SMM team.

Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba addressed the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference (29.06), stressing the need to suspend Russia’s mandate. In December, D. Kuleba took part in the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Lodz (Poland), where a Russian representative had been absent — for the first time, as noted by the Minister. D. Kuleba, who called again for the exclusion of Russia from the OSCE, for the organisation to support the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, for supporting the Peace Formula proposed by Ukraine, and for the recognition of the Holodomor as genocide of Ukrainians.

In November, the Ukrainian delegation announced their boycott of the OSCE PA session due to the absence of the organisation’s opinion regarding the termination of the Russian delegation membership.
Results

The OSCE leadership made statements to support Ukraine, although no specific actions called for by the Ukrainian side had been taken. There was an important signal — a boycott of the meeting of the OSCE PA Standing Committee by the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation that was upheld by representatives of Estonia and Lithuania, but it is necessary to take further steps to extend this support within the OSCE PA.

Another positive result was achieved — over 34 states took part in the additional event of the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting dedicated to the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Still, this meeting cannot be defined as productive as, despite the absence of Russian representatives, the ministers of foreign affairs from various states could not even settle the joint resolution issue.

Termination of the OSCE SMM activities along with the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine were the negative outcome of 2022. At the same time, a significant achievement was introduced — the launch of a new support program for Ukraine, established due to updated financial and legal mechanisms of the OSCE, thus making it possible to avoid Russia’s veto. Around 25 projects are expected to be rolled out during the program implementation period. The OSCE also continues providing support to Ukraine, mostly in the format of recommendations, raising public awareness of risks, conducting training and assisting in the development of policy and regulatory framework to respond to key challenges.
In 2022, Ukraine experienced increased political interest and sought cooperation within the Council of Europe. Cooperation was primarily focused on supporting Ukraine and countering Russia, which has waged a full-scale war against Ukraine. Established priorities were maintained, including support for the implementation of reforms, strengthening the rule of law, democratic institutions, human rights, local democracy, etc. Ukraine and the CoE demonstrated mutual interest in dialogue and close cooperation. In 2022, Ukraine’s relations with the CoE saw increased political support within the Committee of Ministers, the PACE, the ECHR, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, and the Venice Commission.

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<td><strong>TOTAL SCORE:</strong></td>
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Political interest/engagement

In 2022, Ukraine’s political interest in cooperation with the Council of Europe remained consistently high but was concentrated mainly at the level of MPs. This is due, on the one hand, to Kyiv’s interest in attracting more international support in countering Russia as a military aggressor and, on the other hand, to the Council of Europe’s willingness to provide such support. The high level of mutual interest resulted in a series of statements, visits, decisions, and support for a number of Ukrainian initiatives within the CoE.

Diplomats, parliamentarians, and government officials were actively promoting this interest. In particular, it is worth noting the VRU’s Address to the UN, the CoE, the EU, OSCE, the International Committee of the Red Cross, parliaments, and governments of foreign countries on the violation of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation and de facto occupying authorities under its control in relation to prisoners of war who defended Ukraine (30.08). Ukraine thus outlined its position on how it would like to see this institution’s position on Russian aggression.

Special attention was paid to the Council of Europe in the Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the VRU. It noted that the CoE became the first international organisation to strip Russia of its membership because of its aggression against Ukraine.

Ukrainian MPs in the PACE paid much attention to the existing mechanisms of the CoE to help Ukraine and lobbied for Ukraine’s position among other PACE members.

Strategic communications

Throughout the year, Ukraine consistently communicated and highlighted cooperation with the Council of Europe at various levels as a foreign policy priority. The President of Ukraine addressed the plenary meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe during the autumn session (13.10), where he presented Ukraine’s position on peace negotiations and readiness to implement elements of a peaceful settlement with the participation of European partners.

First Lady O. Zelenska paid a symbolic but significant visit to Strasbourg to meet the leadership of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe (14.09).
Activities

In 2022, practical steps were taken to promote Ukraine’s interests in cooperation with the CoE. For example, several visits and meetings were held at the ministerial and deputy ministerial levels. These included a meeting between Deputy Minister of Youth and Sports for European Integration A. Chesnokov and the Head of the Council of Europe’s Sport Division, S. Kwasny (12.05), the visit of the First Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, O. Kornienko, to France for meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE and a meeting with the Secretary General of the CoE, M. Pejčinović-Burić (7.11).

An important aspect of these meetings is that they significantly expanded the practical and technical components of the relationship between the Council of Europe and Ukraine. Notably, they addressed issues of law enforcement and judiciary reform, as discussed at the meeting between Minister of Justice D. Malyuska and the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights D. Mijatović during her visit to Ukraine (10.05). There were also discussions on the consolidation of the results of decentralisation reform, which was discussed at the meeting between the Minister of Communities and Territories Development, O. Chernyshev, and the President of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (3.06), and a working meeting between the Deputy Minister of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine, N. Kozlovska, and representatives of the CoE Development Bank (26.08).

The Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to the PACE also played an active role. The delegation focused on holding Russia accountable for war crimes and genocide in Ukraine, as well as strengthening the Assembly’s anti-Russian stance and increasing the international isolation of the Russian Federation. As a result, several important decisions were passed, including the expulsion of the Russian Federation from the PACE (15.03), the launch of the process of establishing a hybrid tribunal against Russia (28.04), and the recognition of the Russian regime as a terrorist one (13.10). The delegation also worked on including Ukrainian amendments in various reports and resolutions on human rights, climate, etc.

Another important aspect was Ukraine’s accession to the Council of Europe Development Bank. On March 13, the Cabinet of Ministers established an interagency working group, and additional negotiations were held at the level of Deputy Minister of Finance O. Zykova (29.09) and Minister of Community and Territories Development O. Chernyshev with the Governor of the Council of Europe Development Bank, C. Monticelli, on Ukraine’s accession (5.10).
Results

In 2022, Ukraine maintained steadfast support for its resolutions at the CoE and significantly influenced the agenda within its institutions. The parties reached a mutual understanding regarding Russia and developed a common approach to the “Russian case”. In addition, the CoE became a platform where Ukraine successfully highlighted its successes in reforms, contacted European partners to support these processes and developed new joint projects.

An important step was the green light for Ukraine to join the Council of Europe Development Bank, which could become an additional tool for Ukraine’s economic and social recovery in the future.

The year’s results also included the consistent position of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in condemning Russian aggression, Russian occupiers’ crimes in Ukraine, and the activities of the Putin regime. In addition, a series of pro-Ukrainian resolutions was adopted thanks to the active work of the Ukrainian delegation. In particular, attention should be drawn to the decision to expel the Russian Federation from the PACE (15.03) and the decision to recognise the Russian political regime as a terrorist one (13.10). The issue of legal responsibility also remained an important topic. Hence, the PACE unanimously adopted a resolution on the political start of the process of establishing a special tribunal for Russia on the Ukrainian initiative (28.04).

Moreover, at the end of April, the PACE elected Ukrainian international lawyer M. Gnatovskyy a European Court of Human Rights judge on behalf of Ukraine (26.04).
Building an International Coalition for the Recovery of Ukraine

2022 was a year of unprecedented challenges for Ukraine. Beyond the needs of the defence sphere and macro-financial aid, Ukraine has already been working on the Post-war Recovery Plan. This means that Ukraine is already proactively working on building an international coalition. Ukrainian diplomats managed to achieve clear assurances that the reconstruction of Ukraine would be supported, and the targeted reconstruction initiatives have been launched. At the same time, a full-fledged mechanism of coordination for the complex recovery was being discussed.
Political interest/engagement

It is not an overstatement to say that all key foreign policy actors of Ukraine are working on establishing an international coalition on Ukraine's recovery. The President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Vice Prime Minister-Minister of Economy, and other members of the Government raise this issue consistently.

Importantly, Ukrainian diplomats are also engaged in strengthening the international coalition, as highlighted by President V. Zelenskyy and Foreign Minister D. Kuleba in their addresses to Ukrainian diplomats at the Ambassadorial in December. Establishing an international coalition is seen both from the perspective of the future post-war recovery and as an advocacy for military, humanitarian, financial, and technical aid for Ukraine. However, recovery needs are obviously a priority for all key actors in Ukraine's foreign policy.

The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine plays a limited role in the processes linked to establishing the international coalition. This role can be strengthened. Some MPs, including VRU Speaker R. Stefanchuk, participate in international events focused on building the coalition and comment on its relevance. However, parliamentary diplomacy can be engaged far more to consolidate support for the recovery of Ukraine.

Strategic communications

Ukraine used all opportunities in strategic communications to mobilise international support for recovery needs in 2022. The President of Ukraine appealed to the international community repeatedly, using the platforms of major recovery conferences in Switzerland, Germany, and France in order to highlight the need to provide post-war recovery support to Ukraine. Prime Minister D. Shmyhal represented Ukraine at these events in person. The points on the need for financial aid featured in the President’s address to the UN Security Council, even if they did not focus on recovery specifically. The President spoke about recovery needs at the Second Ministerial Roundtable Discussion for Support to Ukraine led by the Ukrainian Government, the World Bank Group, and the IMF, highlighting the immediate reconstruction needs.

Other important manifestations are the addresses of EU and member-state leaders to the Verkhovna Rada. European Commission President U. von der Leyen and Poland's
President A. Duda were among the leaders who expressed willingness to join Ukraine's post-war recovery effort in their addresses to Ukraine's Parliament. At the same time, corruption risks in Ukraine's recovery are often mentioned in international media and the statements of some politicians. This means that communication should be more proactive and efficient in this domain.

Post-war recovery was mentioned most often in statements by Ukraine’s Prime Minister Shmyhal, Vice PM for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Stefanishyna, then Minister of Community and Territory Development Chernyshov and Infrastructure Minister Kubrakov. At the same time, top Ukrainian officials can be more proactive in communicating the post-war recovery with international media. O. Chernyshov gave an interview on recovery needs to EURONEWS. But recovery rarely features as a central theme of such interviews.

**Activities**

The key events in the effort to establish a Ukraine recovery international coalition were the three major conferences in Lugano (July), Berlin (October), and Paris (December). The Lugano conference engaged representatives of over 40 countries and 16 international organisations. The Ukrainian Government voiced the first assessments of recovery needs at USD 750bn. However, there were no specific proposals from international partners. Still, the conference showed that Ukraine has the full support of its allies, and the realisation is growing that the recovery should begin now.

The Berlin conference was a significant step forward compared to the one in Lugano. This is where the attendees discussed the establishment of a Ukraine Recovery Platform for the first time after the European Commission proposed the idea back in May. The Paris Conference gathered over 45 countries, 20 international organisations and over 700 companies. Importantly, all three conferences engaged various stakeholders, from representatives of parliaments and governments to civil society and business. This points to a consensus between Ukrainian society and its allies about the approach to recovery and the transparency and inclusivity of the consultations about it.

Establishing the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from War is an important initiative. It was tasked with designing a Recovery Plan. The National Council, too, was built on the principles of inclusivity and transparency, even if its work led to
partially successful deliverables. One clear benefit was the engagement of businesses, civil society, and representatives of international development partners in consultations, which made its work more trustworthy for international partners. At the same time, it had a number of weaknesses, such as the lack of consistency, having too many participants, low political accountability for deliverables, and more. Still, the work of the National Council was extremely important for building the international recovery coalition as it demonstrated how serious Ukraine's intentions were and its ability to plan short-, mid- and long-term.

**Results**

International partners readily covered a great share of Ukraine's needs at the initial stage of recovery. For example, Ukraine managed to draw nearly EUR 1bn following the recovery conference in Paris. President Zelenskyy said that the initial-stage recovery needs would take nearly EUR 17bn. As a result, the European Commission announced in December the allocation of EUR 18bn for Ukraine in 2023. While not declaring that this money must be spent on recovery needs specifically, this amount will cover them to some extent.

In another accomplishment of Ukraine's diplomacy, the European Commission designed a mechanism for coordinating the post-war recovery that had already passed the first stage of public debate at the recovery conference in Germany. Individual EU member-states are taking charge of rebuilding the ruined regions of Ukraine. In one example, Latvia took charge of the Chernihiv region.
The sanctions policy by the US, EU, and other allies of Ukraine became at the forefront of the West’s support for Ukraine after the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. A wide range of individual and sectoral sanctions was imposed on the Russian Federation and Belarus, and a range of foreign companies voluntarily left the markets of aggressor states. Ukraine conducted a proactive policy of pushing sanction lists, imposing maximum sanctions and monitoring sanction violations or bypassing.
Political interest/engagement

Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s President repeatedly called on Ukraine’s allies to impose preventive sanctions on Russia. After the full-scale invasion, increasing the pressure of sanctions against the aggressor became a mandatory element of the foreign policy agenda of the Ukrainian government. The President of Ukraine, Head of the OPU, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs are the key advocates of the sanctions policy.

The President of Ukraine consistently raises the issue of strengthening the sanctions pressure in his visits abroad or communication with top foreign officials. In his meeting with the President of Lithuania, President Zelenskyy highlighted the need for tougher sanctions against Russia. He expressed a desire for sanctions to be approved faster and for the gaps that allow bypassing to be closed.

In May, the President of Ukraine addressed G7 leaders, highlighting the need to strengthen sanctions against Russia, including implementing the recommendations designed by the Yermak-McFaul group that cover the ban of export-import transactions with the Russian Federation, wide visa restrictions against Russian citizens, an oil embargo and more. President Zelenskyy addressed G7 leaders in December again, mentioning sanctions against Russia.

In his address to the Ambassadorial in December, Ukraine’s President focused on the importance of keeping sanctions in place and strengthening them. The Head of the OPU was actively engaged in the sanctions policy, explaining and coordinating it.

Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the MFA generally focused on expanding the sanctions pressure on Russia, too. For example, Minister Kuleba urged EU member-states to pass the toughest possible sanctions against Russia after Russia’s President announced the launch of military mobilisation. Also, expanding sanctions against Russia and Belarus is something Ukrainian MPs focus on in their work with MPs from other countries.

In parallel, the discussion of the sanctions track is taking place at the level of Ukraine’s Prime Minister. For example, Prime Minister D. Shmyhal had a meeting with the Executive Vice President of the European Commission on developing mechanisms to confiscate frozen Russian assets.
Strategic communications

Shortly after February 24, Ukraine’s President, MFA, and representatives of the President’s Office launched proactive communication with Ukraine’s partners on increasing sanctions, among other things. President Zelenskyy mentioned or commented on sanctions policy-related issues in over 260 statements and addresses. By contrast, the issue of sanctions came up 50 times in the President’s official statements and addresses published on his official websites and accounts in 2021. Most of the President’s statements and speeches in 2022 were on foreign policy and addressed to Ukraine’s international partners by contrast to 2021, when most of his announcements related to sanctions were about decisions of Ukraine’s NSDC. At the top-level meetings, the President of Ukraine covered sanctions generally, just sometimes focusing on detailed proposals on sanction prohibitions and restrictions.

The Head of the OPU had a sanctions bulletin on his Telegram account, providing updates on decisions on sanctions against Russia by Ukraine’s partners.

The proposals and roadmaps elaborated by the Yermak-McFaul group served as strategic guidance on the sanctions track. The group has elaborated ten recommendation documents that were shared with the EU, US, and other partners. In 2022, Ukraine launched a range of advocacy campaigns focused on getting sanctions imposed on specific individuals or industries in Russia. For example, the Yermak-McFaul group advocated the idea of labelling Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism. The US has so far refused to include Russia on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. By contrast, the European Parliament supported a resolution to recognise Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism in November.

Ukrainian leadership consistently raised the issue of sanctions in meetings with other countries’ officials. The most important tracks in strategic communications include the President’s addresses to G7 leaders, US Congress and personal meeting with the US President at the White House; online addresses to the European Council; personal communication with the President of the European Commission; and addresses to parliaments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Italy, France, etc.
Activities

Ukraine continues to approximate its foreign policy course with Brussels by joining the EU’s sanctions. So far, this is a political approximation through Ukraine’s unilateral declaration of support for the EU’s sanctions.

The head of the OPU supervised the sanctions policy. The Kyiv Initiative format was launched in August with foreign policy advisors to the leaders of governments of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary. Increasing sanctions against Russia was among the central issues of the meeting. The Ukrainian Head of OPU briefed Ukraine’s MPs on the coordination of the sanctions track in the parliamentary dimension and outlined the priorities for Ukraine.

Established in April, the Yermak-McFaul group has been working on recommendations to strengthen the pressure of sanctions. A working group was established to look for Russian assets abroad. The EU and US have special representatives in charge of the work on sanctions against Russia.

Ukraine changed its Special Representative for Sanctions at the MFA. O. Vasylenko replaced O. Makeiev after his two years in that role.

The foreign policy dimension of the sanctions policy can be traced in various expert and government tracks. In their meetings with foreign partners, the Head of the OPU and the Foreign Minister raised the issue of strengthening sanctions against Russia. In the June meeting with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the Head of the OPU proposed the attending countries join international sanctions against Russia. The presentation of the Yermak-McFaul group’s action plan on sanctions against Russia was another joint event. Ukraine pushed targeted solutions for improving the sanctions mechanism. The topics discussed included putting Russia on the FATF black-list, closing maritime communication with Russia, organising a coordination mechanism to exchange information about sanction bypassing, and removing any taboos on new sanctions.

Ukraine has an Interagency Working Group on the state sanctions policy led by Y. Svyrydenko, the First Vice Prime Minister — Minister of Economy. The National Corruption Prevention Agency launched the War and Sanctions portal that lists sanctioned individuals and companies and the speed of passing sanctions against the individuals responsible for the aggressive war against Ukraine.

Advocating the idea of using frozen Russian assets as compensation to Ukraine is an important aspect of Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda. Ukraine’s President is calling on
European and US leaders to find a legal solution to cover the reparations of war-caused losses to Ukraine. The proposal of a full embargo for Russian fuels was a partly effective aspect of Ukraine's advocacy, resulting in a price cap for Russian oil.

Representatives of Ukraine are invited to the EU working meetings where the next sanction packages are discussed. However, Ukraine's attendance of these meetings is limited to voicing expectations or proposals. After Ukraine's representatives speak, the talks on the next package of sanctions take place in a closed format with EU member-states and the European Commission.

Results

When the full-scale invasion began, the EU member-states, the US, UK, Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Taiwan, and Switzerland, imposed sanctions against Russia and partially against Belarus. A triad of assistance to Ukraine emerged consisting of three components: arms, sanctions, and financial support. Sanction programs against Russia can be described as wartime sanctions. These are the biggest sanctions ever imposed beyond the UN framework.

Until February 24, 2022, two main sanction programs were in place. One prohibited any economic activity on the territory of Crimea. The other was linked to actions that undermined the security and sovereignty of Ukraine. However, the list of individual sanctions was not impressive. After the February 24, 2022, full-scale invasion, the EU and US revised their approach to sanctions profoundly. Sanctions against Russia and Belarus now prohibit and restrict investment, exports and imports of dual-use items, supply of technology for oil and energy industries, supply of technology for the aviation industry, SWIFT transactions, withdrawal of assets, broadcasting of Russian media and more. Throughout 2022, the EU passed nine packages of sanctions. The most complex sanction solutions covered the ban on the purchase of Russian gas and the restriction of petroleum product prices which G7 and EU countries joined.

By imposing this scale of sanctions, Western partners de facto declared an economic blockade against Russia and Belarus. Even though over 2,000 individuals and 500 companies are already under the EU's individual sanctions, the Ukrainian government believes this is insufficient since far more are involved in the launch of the war of aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine imposed sanctions against over 3,300 individuals
and 1,550 legal entities involved in the activities aimed against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Ukraine launched an international initiative to impose sanctions against Russian propagandists and warmongers. Ukrainian sanctions cover most Russian actors of culture who support the war. Besides Ukraine, Canada imposed the most sanctions against Russian propagandists and opinion leaders.

At the same time, some countries stated expressly that they would not impose sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. For example, official representatives of Serbia, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Türkiye, India, and China made such declarations.

The level and scale of sanctions against aggressor states can qualify as Ukraine’s accomplishment in foreign policy. The blocking of Russian assets abroad caught the Russian leadership by surprise, so the EU and US have the financial assets under their control that can be used to put pressure on Moscow or to pay reparations to Ukraine.
Due to the outbreak of full-scale Russian aggression in February, representatives from all branches of the government and civil society were engaged in military diplomacy throughout the year. The main focus of negotiations between the President, other senior officials, and Ukraine’s partners was on the supply of weapons and non-lethal assistance to Ukraine, which also became the central theme of all public statements. The most significant results include the creation of the Ramstein consultative format involving 54 countries and the provision of lethal weapons by over 30 nations.
### Political interest/engagement

Throughout the year, representatives from all branches of the government and relevant central executive agencies were highly interested and involved in military diplomacy due to the need to repel full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine. In January and February, high-ranking officials emphasised the need to provide Ukraine with weapons as a possible deterrent to Russian aggression, but starting in March, the rhetoric changed to highlight the need to preserve Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity and repel aggression. Although the vast majority of statements were related to the domestic agenda, the importance of international partnerships, bilateral security assistance, and the need for NATO membership were consistently accentuated throughout the year.

Likewise, security guarantees for Ukraine, including military protection and support, received considerable attention in statements and interviews by the President, the heads of the Presidential Office and the MFA, among others.

During the Annual Ambassadorial, the President prioritised defence and security assistance to Ukraine, as well as NATO membership, among the main tasks for embassies in 2023. The President mentioned cooperation with NATO and the Alliance’s standards in his Annual Address to the VRU. The issue of NATO also featured prominently in Foreign Minister D. Kuleba’s speech at the Ambassadorial in December. In particular, the Minister pointed out that Ukraine is becoming the strongest military power on NATO’s eastern flank, fundamentally changing the military balance in the region and acting as a security donor for NATO.

The Ramstein Group format can be considered an important element of military diplomacy and has gained respective political weight. It is mentioned in the Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address. The ministers of foreign affairs and defence, MPs, and others regularly addressed this topic too.

Defence Minister O. Reznikov emphasised military-technical and security cooperation with NATO partners, Black Sea security issues, cooperation in arms acquisition or joint production, and the Ramstein format in his numerous interviews and comments.
Strategic communications

Throughout the year, President V. Zelenskyy spoke about the need to provide Ukraine with a variety of weapons to protect its population, critical infrastructure, liberate the occupied territories, etc., in every speech he gave to foreign parliaments, major conferences, and international organisations. For example, at a video conference of the Group of Seven leaders (11.10), V. Zelenskyy stressed the need to step up joint efforts to create an air shield for Ukraine. The President also spoke at the NATO Summit in Madrid in June.

In numerous interviews with foreign media, the President, the Minister of Defence, and the Head of the OPU focused on the need to provide Ukraine with weapons and security assistance, Ukraine’s role in protecting European security, the development of the Armed Forces, and the “testing” of foreign-made weapons on the territory of Ukraine.

The MoD launched several interesting and effective communication campaigns on social media, including Twitter, aimed at foreign audiences, such as calling for the supply of air defence systems or expressing gratitude for the weapons provided. Volunteer initiatives were also actively involved in creating various social media campaigns, especially in the spring.

Activities

The main activities throughout the year were focused on consolidating partner countries’ military and political support for Ukraine, enhancing the operational capabilities of the AFU through training, information exchange, provision of weapons, and increasing interoperability with NATO allies. The President, MFA, MoD, and MPs were involved in lobbying and seeking weapons and military assistance, discussing the provision of weapons at every meeting with foreign partners.

The most active dialogue and cooperation were with the USA, the UK, the Baltic states, NATO, and the EU (see the relevant sections). Additionally, Ukrainian representatives have intensified security dialogue with non-NATO countries, such as
Japan, Australia, Sweden, and Moldova. Before the war broke out, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic states had begun to provide Ukraine with weapons and had clearly identified the threat from Russia. The most significant discussions, active lobbying, and advocacy were focused on obtaining air defence systems, tanks, and long-range missiles.

The Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, General V. Zaluzhnyi, had nearly weekly telephone conversations with the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General M. Milley. The ministers of defence of Ukraine and the United States also had regular telephone conversations and meetings.

During the year, seven meetings of the Ukraine Defence Consultative Group were held in the Ramstein format, three of which were held online (22.04, 23.05, 15.06, 20.07, 08.09, 12.10, 16.11). Representatives from 40 countries attended the first meeting. By the end of the year, the number of participants grew to 54. Not only EU and NATO members joined, but also Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Ecuador, Georgia, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Moldova, New Zealand, South Korea, Tunisia, and Qatar. The ministers of defence of Ukraine and the US chaired each meeting.

A conference of Ukraine’s allies was held in Copenhagen (11.08), attended by 26 countries, to develop solutions to strengthen assistance to Ukraine. The main difference from the Ramstein format was the focus on long-term projects. The meeting resulted in the announcement of more than EUR 1.5bn in funding, equipment, and training to strengthen Ukraine’s military capabilities, including the supply of available weapons, missiles, and ammunition, increased production of weapons for Ukraine, training of Ukrainian soldiers, and mine clearance.

At the beginning of the year, due to armed aggression, Ukraine withdrew its entire peacekeeping contingent from the UN missions.

Ukrainian troops were trained in the US, Germany, the UK, Spain, Poland, and other countries. A total of 26 countries provided training for the Ukrainian military as of the end of the year.

On 30 September, Ukraine applied for NATO membership under the fast-track procedure.
Results

Throughout the year, the Council of the European Union adopted assistance measures under the European Peace Facility (EPF) to support the capacity and resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (28.02, 23.03, 13.04, 23.05, 21.07 and 17.10). In addition, the Council of the EU launched the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), which aims to strengthen the military capabilities of the AFU (17.10). At the Madrid Summit, NATO leaders agreed on an enhanced assistance package for Ukraine (see the relevant section).

The newly created Ramstein format (April) brought together more than 50 countries — not only NATO members but also Asian, African, and Middle East states. Ukraine received both lethal and non-lethal military assistance from its partners.

Since the beginning of the Russian aggression, the US has provided Ukraine with more than USD 20bn worth of weapons. The USA has become the largest security donor to Ukraine. US President J. Biden signed the Ukraine Democracy Defence Lend-Lease Act (9.05). The UK has provided GBP 2.3bn in aid, becoming the second largest security donor, and launched a mission to train Ukrainian military personnel on its territory.

The countries that provided Ukraine with the most lethal and non-lethal military assistance in 2022 were the US, the UK, Japan, Germany, Poland, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Australia, Estonia, Norway, Lithuania, and Finland.
Economic diplomacy is among the highest priorities in Ukraine’s foreign relations system. Strategic communication covers the areas of international financial support and economic recovery, sanctions pressure, freezing of the Russian Federation assets, promotion of investment involvement and revitalisation of export, primarily food products. It became possible to avoid a disaster in terms of international trade — export of goods amounted to USD 44.17bn (64.9% compared to 2021), import — USD 59.51bn (81.7% compared to 2021). Neighbouring EU countries — Poland and Romania — became the key trade partners.
Political interest/engagement

Economic diplomacy is among the highest priorities in the system of Ukraine’s foreign relations, along with international military support. During this year, key political actors demonstrated an understanding of the importance of highlighting the economic dimension of foreign policy, ensuring macroeconomic support and intensifying the sanctions pressure. The President consistently mentioned the economic goals as a priority for the Ukrainian diplomatic missions’ activities, together with the promotion of Ukrainian business. It is outlined in the President’s Annual Address that Ukraine’s post-war recovery shall be truly the largest economic project in modern Europe.

VRU used the parliamentary democracy tools to ensure economic support from international partners.

The task of protecting national economic interests abroad is coordinated by a special representative on economic diplomacy and the relevant department at the MFA. Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba paid immense attention to economic diplomacy while delivering his speech at the annual Ambassadorial (December). Among the key principles, he singled out, in particular, new economic opportunities presented by Ukraine, assistance to Ukrainian exporters in the process of entering global markets, and economic recovery of the state, giving an example of Ukraine’s responsibility in the context of the Grain from Ukraine initiative.

The mission to promote Ukraine’s investment image in the international arena, raise awareness of investment opportunities, consult on domestic business procedures, facilitate investors’ communication with the authorities, and provide assistance to solve systemic problems is performed by UkraineInvest.
Strategic communications

Economic diplomacy has taken an important niche in the respective strategic documents of Ukraine: The National Security Strategy, the Economic Security Strategy, the Foreign Policy Strategy, and the National Economic Strategy. Support for the Ukrainian economy during the war and its recovery has definitely become the backbone of Ukrainian diplomacy. In particular, the priority of companies which operated or entered Ukraine during the war is emphasised. The leading foreign economic areas are promoting export growth, attracting foreign investments, loans, participation in international economic organisations, and free trade agreements.

Strategic communication has been significantly intensified in the foreign economic sector. The main tasks were defined as follows: changing the status of resource mere supplier in global food policy and shaping the political and economic added value of Ukraine’s powerful agricultural export. Recognition of Ukraine as a guarantor of global food security was also backed by certain ideological components — in a broader context, it relates to the state’s transformation into an aid donor, namely via establishing the Ukrainian International Aid Agency in future. The Grain from Ukraine proved to be a successful initiative with a relevant strong emphasis put by the President in his speeches to an international audience.

During meetings with leaders of the EU institutions, numerous “visa-free” issues were introduced constantly by the Prime Minister (energy, transport, economics, customs, digital sectors). The African tour of the Minister of Foreign Affairs marked the rise of political and economic interest in African countries, with specific announcements made regarding the restart of relations and strengthening of ties in the following year.

In 2022, economic diplomacy gained a human-centred dimension, reflected in the continuous expression of gratitude to the countries hosting Ukrainian citizens who fled to search for refuge and in the declared intentions of the need to retain them as members of Ukrainian society. The return of Ukrainians from abroad is closely related to security guarantees and economic growth, recovery and further integration with the EU.
Activities

Ukrainian export strengthening and support remained among the priorities of Ukrainian diplomacy. NAZOVNI platform is fully operational with a task to assist in entering foreign markets, and the establishment of the Ukrainian Exporters Academy is planned (within the platform framework). The unified Diia.Business information portal offers a set of supporting tools for both beginners in the export sector and ones actively engaged in this activity — from foreign market analytics, educational events and consulting, and foreign partner search tools to state and donors’ grants.

The recovery of Ukraine has been set as a new direction in the economic diplomacy area. The first significant event organised to activate this process was the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano (4–5.07). The next conference was held in Berlin (25.10). On December 13, at the International conference “Standing with the Ukrainian People”, which took place in Paris, an announcement was made that almost EUR 1bn of assistance should be allocated to support the energy and infrastructure sectors.

Active work aimed at introducing five “visa-free” initiatives was carried out with European partners. The European Commission and EU member states bordering Ukraine launched the “Solidarity Lines” initiative between Ukraine and the EU — corridors for Ukrainian export and import. Among other activities, we should note the 8th meeting of the EU-Ukraine Association Council (5.09) — significant economic results were achieved within the framework of bilateral cooperation.

Many meetings at the highest level with representatives of various states had a strong economic component. The promotion of Ukrainian interests on the African continent should be outlined separately. The tour of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (October) gave exceptional results: meetings of representatives of Ukrainian and local business actors, discussions related to practical cooperation (agriculture and agro-industry, heavy industry, digital and information technologies, pharmaceutical industry); signing memoranda of understanding between the Council of Exporters and Investors at the MFA and business associations and chambers of commerce from African countries; ten states were selected to open new embassies of Ukraine within its territory; presenting the concept of “Ukraine — Africa” Trade House with affiliates opened in the capitals of the most promising countries.
Results

Ensuring sustainable sanctions pressure (including the seizure of Russian foreign assets) and provision of financial support to the Ukrainian economy should definitely be added to the list of economic diplomacy achievements in 2022. More than 6,000 sanctions have been imposed globally, new packages of restrictions are being drafted, over 200 reputable international companies withdrew from the Russian market, and up to USD 500bn of assets were frozen.

After February 24, over USD 28bn flowed into the budget of Ukraine from international partners, with the biggest contributions from the USA, the EU, Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom. For 2023 the EU is ready to allocate EUR 18bn and the USA — USD 45bn.

Despite the war and related destruction, it became possible to avoid a catastrophe in foreign trade — export of goods amounted to USD 44.17bn (64.9 % compared to 2021), import — USD 59.51bn (81.7 % compared to 2021). Due to objective reasons neighbouring EU countries — Poland and Romania — became the leaders, with almost 24 % of Ukrainian export delivered to them, but most of it is transited due to the closure of Ukrainian ports. In export structure, ferrous metals were replaced by crops — the share of agricultural and food products in total export share increased from almost 36 % in 2021 to 46 % in 2022, the share of metallurgic products decreased from 24 % to 16 %, and heavy industry percentage remained almost the same.

The Grain Initiative has been a significant support to Ukrainian producers. Thanks to the unblocking of Ukrainian Black Sea ports, the export of agricultural products was simplified — since August 1, 14.3m tons of Ukrainian food products have been exported to Asia, Europe, and Africa. Ukraine also launched and initiated Grain from Ukraine program — under this initiative, 60 ships with Ukrainian grain are planned to deliver it to the poorest countries in Africa.

De facto integration into the EU is already taking place, backed by the introduction of energy, transport, economic, customs and digital “visa-free” initiatives.
Energy Diplomacy

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Energy diplomacy of Ukraine has never been so crucial for the state’s survival as in 2022 and, at the same time, so poorly backed by a domestic regulatory framework. Still, highly ambitious goals were set at the highest political level — its achievement shall define the long-term trend of domestic energy sector development and pave the way to a common European energy space.
Political interest/engagement

Full-scale Russian aggression has abruptly intensified Ukrainian authorities’ attention to energy diplomacy. The test run of the United Energy System of Ukraine in autonomous mode, launched a few hours before the invasion with an expected duration of several days, turned into one of the most important battles of this war — all political contacts, from the President of Ukraine to the Minister of Energy and the transmission system operator “Ukrenergo”, had been involved in accelerating the synchronisation procedure (with ENTSO-E).

The large-scale destructions of energy infrastructure shifted the focus of energy diplomacy — from discussions of decarbonisation prospects within the framework of the European integration course to searching for mechanisms to meet the basic needs in electricity, oil products, natural gas, and heat supply. The President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister, government officials and MPs focused their maximum efforts on assistance obtaining from the EU, the Energy Community and individual partner states, including electrical equipment and machinery, kits to repair and recover the networks and gas pipelines, deployment of local generation sources, etc. In order to overcome the shortage of oil products, both political and diplomatic connections were leveraged, as well as state efforts to unblock overland transborder traffic and free market prices to create incentives for private suppliers.

The prioritisation of Ukraine’s shift towards low-carbon energy and full integration into the European market was announced at the level of the President, the head of government, with the aim to generate significant capacity to generate and export clean energy to the EU countries in the future.

Strategic communications

Negative consequences of large-scale hostilities, particularly targeted missile and UAV attacks against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, have become one of the key narratives in foreign policy addresses of high-ranking officials presented at all levels to the international community.
The President of Ukraine cited examples of negative Russian attacks' impact on energy infrastructure in multiple statements made for parliaments of foreign countries, during the negotiations with states' leaders, emphasising the serious risks for the civilian population. The key details of these statements were also mentioned in speeches and at meetings of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Energy and other top-ranking officials with their foreign counterparts.

Numerous parliamentary delegations, businesses, and NGOs representatives also advocated the needs of the Ukrainian energy industry. Ukrainian speakers conveyed a consolidated message on the importance of supporting Ukraine to the democratic world and the urgency of rejecting Russian energy resources in the format of individual meetings, online consultations and public events.

**Activities**

Ukraine’s energy diplomacy was backed by the joint efforts of state power branches and civic society, with efforts focused on assistance obtained to retain the functionality of the domestic energy industry, ensuring timely repair and replacement of damaged equipment, strengthening the critical infrastructure security by means of air defence and international cooperation for the import of energy resources and sanctions pressure against exported Russian energy resources.

Based on the materials of relevant government institutions, the President of Ukraine mentioned the domestic energy industry needs and the strategic goals for its development in his speeches and statements at working meetings (online and during visits of foreign leaders). The Prime Minister of Ukraine and the Minister of Energy elaborately articulated these messages to their foreign colleagues via professional contacts, as well as involving numerous delegations and active communication channels, in particular the Energy Community Secretariat, often in close cooperation with representatives of the non-governmental sector to convey this information to their colleagues in European and US think tanks.

Ukrainian MPs had special tours around the EU states and the USA with the aim of informing local legislators of the current situation and urgent needs and explaining the importance of supporting the functionality of the energy sector.
Results

Technical synchronisation of the unified energy system of Ukraine with ENTSO-E (16.03), followed by the launch of commercial export and import operations, has become one of the first results at the pinnacle of Russian atrocities.

Several international conferences and charity events were held where high-ranking Ukrainian officials introduced the future vision for the Ukrainian energy sector to foreign politicians, government officials and businesses. In particular, the “Ukraine Recovery Plan: Energy” was presented in Lugano with the establishment of the Ukraine Energy Support Fund (6.04), coordinated by the Energy Community.

In July, Ukraine became an Association country in the International Energy Agency, taking an important step towards full membership.

The large-scale war and multiple war crimes pushed Ukraine’s European and US partners to introduce substantial sanctions packages against the Russian energy sector. Thus, the EU was gradually shifting from decisions to reject Russian coal, oil and petroleum products to reducing natural gas import via diversification of supply and consumption decrease. Still, Russian gas has been widely used as a geopolitical weapon, including the unilateral reduction or blockage of supply in violation of existing contracts, as well as undermining gas transportation infrastructure in the Baltic Sea to stimulate gas shortage in Europe and push political and security trade-offs.
Russia’s full-scale aggression boosted Ukraine’s public diplomacy that accumulated resources and was extremely proactive in 2022, despite wartime. It focused on strengthening support for Ukraine in the world in 2022 through massive communication outside of Ukraine about Russian crimes, on the one hand, and the resilience of Ukrainians, on the other hand; countering (pro)Russian narratives and colonial paradigms of understanding Ukraine, and further promotion of Ukraine in the world.
Political interest/engagement

Political interest in public diplomacy remained high throughout 2022. While top officials often did not refer to public diplomacy directly, its key objectives and goals were often featured in their statements and addresses. For example, the President’s appeal in his Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to “make sure that when the world sees the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag of ours, they will know that it is about freedom and about people who have a strong home” essentially refers to public diplomacy. In his speech at the Ambassadorial, President V. Zelenskyy highlighted the importance of quality communication with the world and the promotion of Ukraine, including through “the organisation of visits of those who can actually become and are newsmakers in the country of your stay.” Also, President Zelenskyy highlighted the important role of culture, science, and sports in wartime and the need to strengthen the potential of Ukrainian culture in communication with the world for the sake of support for Ukraine. According to President Zelenskyy, culture often does the most — along with diplomacy and journalism — “to make the world understand our struggle and help us” (March 9 address).

Like never before, the Analytical Report to the President’s Annual Address to the VRU focuses on specific success stories of Ukraine’s cultural diplomacy in 2022. It highlights the need to inform the global community about Russia’s crimes and to engage the global community in protecting and preserving Ukraine’s national cultural values.

Foreign Minister D. Kuleba, First Deputy Foreign Minister E. Dzhaparova and First Lady O. Zelenska demonstrated consistently high interest in public diplomacy.

Head of the OPU A. Yermak mentioned the brand of Ukraine. One occasion where he mentioned it was the meeting with representatives of creative industries.

Strategic communications

Advanced communication was part of Ukraine’s public diplomacy in 2022. The nature of this communication illustrated its level. It included numerous interviews of President Zelenskyy, ministers and ambassadors for the top international media (see respective sections); addresses to students in the top universities; speeches at cultural events, including festivals, exhibitions, conference openings, and more. Twitter was used actively.
A lot of Ukrainian researchers and experts provided many comments for the media, explaining the reasons and nature of the Russian aggression; debunking stereotypes about Ukrainian history, culture and identity; and informing about the need to leave the colonial perspective in the context of understanding Ukraine that Russia had been imposing for years.

The Ukrainian Institute, Ukraine's diplomatic missions abroad, and individual cultural initiatives invested a lot of effort into urging foreign partners to stop their cultural and academic cooperation with Russia and reject the “culture beyond politics” paradigm in the context of war. For example, three days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian Institute sent this appeal to over 300 foreign cultural and academic institutions (27.02). Also, this campaign insisted that inviting representatives of Ukraine and Russia to attend events together is unacceptable. In an important development, the data-driven reasoning against the “culture beyond politics” paradigm was often based on the research of Russia's cultural diplomacy initiated by the Ukrainian Institute.

Activities

Despite all the wartime challenges, public diplomacy was highly proactive and engaged many actors in Ukraine and abroad in 2022. A vast number of projects, art initiatives, and civic events took place throughout 2022 to promote Ukraine in the world, communicate about Russia's crimes and get international support in Ukraine’s fight against the aggressor. Launched by the Ukrainian MFA, the #StandWithUkraine hashtag became one of the most trending hashtags. Created right after the start of the full-scale invasion, the https://war.ukraine.ua/ portal operates in eight languages and has a reach of over 900 million users. The “Ukraine.ua” Instagram account is one of the top official accounts for states.

The team of the Ukrainian Institute implemented 120 projects covering 22 countries throughout 2022. The initiatives implemented by the Ukrainian Institute — some of them jointly with foreign partners — included the UK/Ukraine Season of Culture; Printemps Ukrainien (Ukrainian Spring) in France; a Ukrainian pavilion at the 59th La Biennale di Venezia; Postcards from Ukraine, a project that demonstrated Ukraine’s centuries-old cultural legacy destroyed by Russia; a digital campaign to introduce audiences to
Ukraine's multiculturalism and more. The annual International Cultural Diplomacy Forum was held in Brussels in 2022. A representative of the Ukrainian Institute in France was appointed. The Ukrainian Institute was preparing to open its office in Germany. It continued its empirical research that serves as the basis for further project planning. Among other things, it researched Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar studies in the world.

Initiated by First Lady Zelenska jointly with the MFA, Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and the Ukrainian Book Institute, the Ukrainian Bookshelf was launched in 27 countries. Its objective is to promote Ukrainian literature in Ukrainian and other languages in libraries across the world. Ukrainian-language audio guides were introduced in the additional world's top museums. The project now covers 54 museums in 35 countries. The second Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen was broadcasted in over 20 countries.

Ukraine's embassies and diplomatic missions abroad were highly proactive. They also informed audiences abroad about Russian crimes and Ukrainian resilience in countering the aggressor. Ukrainian artists worked on promoting Ukraine in the world. Examples include concerts by the Ukrainian Freedom Orchestra, Kyiv Symphony Orchestra, Kalush Orchestra, and others; events with Ukrainian writers focused on Ukraine at the Frankfurt Book Fair, Im Focus: Ukraine writers' tours in Germany organised by Meridian Czernowitz, etc.; exhibitions by Ukrainian artists, such as The Captured House modern art show, and others. Notes from Ukraine, a historical concert for the centennial of the Ukrainian Republican Koshuts Capella concert in the US, was sold out in New York's Carnegie Hall.

Representatives of think tanks went on advocacy trips to countries of strategic interest for Ukraine's foreign policy. Ukrainians abroad held frequent civic rallies, exhibitions, art events, and charity nights. These included both the Ukrainians who have lived abroad for many years and have established institutional associations and those who left Ukraine in 2022 temporarily, fleeing the war. Influencers and bloggers joined information campaigns.
Results

Ukraine made it to the top 20 influential countries in the world, ranking 19 out of 121 in 2022, according to the Global Soft Power Index 2023. The rating showed a serious increase in Ukraine’s recognisability. Unfortunately, there was no significant change in the reputation ranking.

The Ukrainian borshch was listed as UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage that requires protection. Two Ukrainian projects were awarded the European Heritage Award / Europa Nostra Awards. Ukraine won Eurovision. Created in 2020, the “Ukraine: History, Culture and Identities” course became available on Coursera.

Interest is growing in Ukrainian studies abroad, although it is still often accompanied by the Russian narratives promoted and generously funded by Russia for years abroad. However, there is some progress in this area. For example, some museums changed their descriptions of some paintings in 2022, shifting the accent from the Russian to the Ukrainian component. These include the Metropolitan Museum of Art and London’s National Gallery.

A lot of foreign institutions offered support to Ukrainian artists, musicians, publishers, academics and others throughout 2022, initiating targeted programs or offering preferential treatment to Ukrainians in existing programs. Creatives Unite, an EU project that emerged as a coordination centre during the COVID-19 pandemic, changed its vector towards supporting Ukrainian initiatives. EUNIC, the EU network of national cultural institutions, welcomed the Ukrainian Institute as an Associate Member.

Restrictions for travelling abroad for men eligible for military service was a serious challenge in research and academic diplomacy. Many events planned with foreign partners in Ukraine were cancelled due to Russia’s military aggression or switched to the online format.
Political interest in the non-proliferation issue increased amidst nuclear rhetoric and nuclear security threats accompanying Russia’s invasion. Despite the war, Ukraine reaffirmed its unwavering compliance with its international commitments. A political consensus exists on Ukraine’s foreign policy in non-proliferation, but accomplishments are limited in this domain.
Political interest/engagement

Political interest in non-proliferation and nuclear energy forcibly became one of the key interests due to open and covert nuclear threats and the occupation of nuclear objects linked to the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The position of Ukrainian governmental agencies and institutions was coordinated and reflected a correct assessment of the situation. There was a shared understanding that such actions aimed to intimidate the state and society to accomplish concessions and to influence Ukraine’s partners to prevent or undermine support for Ukraine.

At the same time, Ukraine built its foreign policy on the presumption that a nuclear strike against Ukraine would have a commensurate response; Russia has to be held accountable for violating international norms — including the charters of the UN and IAEA — up to stripping Russia of the right to own nuclear weapons; Russia has to leave the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and solidarity on sanctions around the nuclear sphere will play the key role. However, the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not mention non-proliferation in their key foreign policy speeches, including the address to the Ambassadorial and the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada, and the Analytical Report to the Address.

Strategic communications

Overall, Ukraine had a good communication strategy: top Ukrainian officials spoke at all available platforms that had anything to do with non-proliferation. The political elite responded quickly to information triggers, which helped Ukraine strengthen its image as a responsible actor and contributed to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. For example, Ukraine invited IAEA to inspect in response to Russia’s statements alleging Ukraine of developing a dirty bomb in November. The inspection did not find any evidence of undeclared nuclear activities or material.
Still, some tensions emerged in the period researched in this report. President Zelenskyy initiated (19.02) the final fourth attempt at consultations under the Budapest Memorandum due to systemic failure to fulfil security assurances. He warned that all package decisions of 1994 would be questioned in case of failure. Russia used this point as part of its propaganda, portraying this as Ukraine’s aspiration to return to the status of a nuclear state.

Communication was difficult with the IAEA because of general criticism from Ukraine, including criticism of bias, as Russians accounted for 25% of its leadership. However, Ukraine’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, S. Kyslytsia, highlighted at the meeting of the UN SC (September) that Ukraine appreciated the courage and professionalism of experts at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, and the situation stabilised by the end of 2022.

The narrative of the negative consequences of inactivity in response to the violation of security guarantees was raised at the NPT Review Conference (1–26.08). Ukrainian statements focused on expanding Russia’s nuclear potential counter to the NPT. Ukraine avoided criticising its nuclear power allies. But its strongest point was that the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons prevented the timely provision of arms to Ukraine. The strongest was the statement at the third committee of the Conference on the peaceful use of nuclear power, calling on the international community to adopt a legally binding document to prohibit attacks against nuclear objects.

In its strategic communications, Ukraine draws parallels between the presence of the Russian Federation at the UN SC as a permanent member — and abusing its veto power there — and its nuclear threats. Ukraine repeatedly raised the issue of stripping Russia of the right to own nuclear weapons and its rights and privileges at the IAEA for Russia’s systemic violation of charters. Unfortunately, not all speeches outlined clearly what Ukraine proposed. Appeals to exclude Russia from the IAEA can be counterproductive: given its share in the global nuclear industry, this may lead to the breakup of the organisation and the emergence of alternative bilateral control tools that existed before the IAEA.
Activities

In 2022, Ukraine’s activity in the non-proliferation domain focused on exploiting international platforms to counter Russia’s aggression. Also, Ukraine once again reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the obligations it had undertaken on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and condemned the actions of the countries that raise concern, including North Korea and Iran. Special attention was paid to the universalisation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), resolution 1540 and talks on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Ukraine’s stance on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons remained mostly unchanged after the first meeting of members in 2022 because of the political environment. At the NPT Review Conference in August, Ukraine emphasised the need for negative security guarantees for the countries that do not own nuclear weapons but was not sufficiently proactive in creating a comprehensive document on guarantees. Ukrainian top officials met repeatedly with IAEA Director General Grossi, who made unprecedented four official visits to Ukraine (March, April, August, and October).

In September, Ukraine’s Government proposed the NSDC to impose sanctions on nuclear energy against over 700 individuals and legal entities linked to Rosatom as recommended by the Interagency Working Group. Head of the OPU A. Yermak said (26.12) that the sanctions group was working on getting international sanctions imposed.

The National Strategy to Prevent the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Exploitation by Non-State Actors was drafted. It covers the key elements of the UN SC resolution 1540 (2004) and aims to coordinate national institutions.

Results

The international community expresses significant support to Ukraine regarding non-proliferation issues and stresses that Ukraine has been exploiting its nuclear stations safely and reliably for decades, complying with all internationally recognised principles and raising no concerns about proliferation. The August NPT Review Conference final report included many points addressing the current situation from pro-Ukrainian
perspectives. Russia blocked it eventually. As part of the Review Conference, a strong statement was presented on behalf of 55 countries and the EU that called for the IAEA mission to be allowed to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

The IAEA General Conference, where delegations of all member-states take part, was a disappointment and a defeat for Ukraine. The only thing Ukraine managed to have included in the nuclear safety and security resolution was a general phrase about “the importance of nuclear safety and security ... in all circumstances.” The resolution on nuclear guarantees was the only one urging member-states to “refrain from attacks or threats of attacks on nuclear facilities.” In contrast to the practice of 1985 and 1990, no individual resolution was adopted.

IAEA’s response to physical violence against personnel at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the kidnapping of its leadership and the creation of a pseudo company Zaporozhskaya AES by Rosatom was underwhelming. On the other hand, Ukraine managed to appeal to Russia to withdraw its troops and other personnel from the Zaporizhzhia NPP included in the resolution by the IAEA’s Board of Governors (17.11). Unfortunately, a nuclear safety and security protection zone was not introduced around the power plant. Improvements include the establishment of permanent IAEA missions at all Ukrainian nuclear power plants and the resolution by the European Parliament urging the respective players to expand sanctions against Russia to the nuclear power industry.

Ukraine was working to make its nuclear industrial complex less dependent on Russia. In June, Westinghouse and Ukraine’s Energoatom signed expanded agreements to supply all nuclear fuel for Ukraine and increase the number of AP1000 reactors from five to nine to be built at the Khmelnytsky NPP. In early 2022, Energoatom and Rolls-Royce agreed to cooperate on building small modular reactors (SMR) in Ukraine. Apart from that, Ukraine will join the US, Japan, and South Korea in the public-private R&D consortium for SMRs.
Due to Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, millions of Ukrainians, mostly women and children, have found themselves abroad and have become forced refugees. Ukraine has established close cooperation with Ukrainian communities in partner countries and relevant local authorities through its diplomatic missions. Ukrainian diaspora organisations have joined in helping both refugees and the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, Ukraine receives more from Ukrainians abroad than it gives. Still, the Ukrainian government’s communication and outreach efforts to support Ukrainian refugees and diaspora organisations significantly improved in 2022.
Political interest/engagement

In 2022, political interest in the issues of Ukrainians abroad remained high. Throughout the year, the state leadership expressed hope that Ukrainians abroad would help refugees, facilitate humanitarian aid and support in repelling Russian aggression. It also expressed hope for the return of Ukrainians to their homeland.

The position of the Ukrainian authorities on protecting the rights of Ukrainians in the world is also important. In his speech at the Ambassadorial (23.12), President V. Zelenskyy stressed that all the rights and legitimate interests of Ukrainians (Ukrainian identity, cultural, educational, information and social needs) in the host countries were met. At the same conference, Foreign Minister D. Kuleba emphasised the indivisibility of the community and that the new policy towards Ukrainians in the world to be launched by the state.

The President’s Annual Address to the VRU (28.12) also stressed that “millions of our people who have become displaced and have found shelter abroad should not become refugees”. The President thanked all countries for helping Ukrainians abroad but noted that “we must make sure they remain part of Ukrainian society”.

Throughout the year, Ukraine’s leadership expressed gratitude to its partner countries for supporting and protecting Ukrainians who became forced refugees because of the war.

Strategic communications

The issue of Ukrainians abroad is addressed in official strategic documents aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the return and reintegration of Ukrainian migrants into Ukrainian society. However, due to the hostilities, standard communication mechanisms were not effective. The Public Diplomacy Strategy of the MFA of Ukraine for 2021–2025 remains a valid document but currently appears to be more declarative than effective.
The information and communication efforts have improved significantly: the information provided to Ukrainians abroad is now consistent, with narratives and public events aimed at maximising support for Ukraine in the war and countering Kremlin influence in most countries with a significant Ukrainian population. The MFA and embassies in the respective countries regularly address social and legal issues faced by Ukrainians abroad and try to conduct various activities to support them.

Activities

The MFA and foreign diplomatic missions primarily manage cooperation with the Ukrainian diaspora. The Ukrainian Institute is responsible for implementing projects aimed at establishing international cultural and educational ties. The Ukrainian government maintains connections with Ukrainians abroad primarily through the Ukrainian World Congress. For instance, Ambassador O. Markarova met the UWC leadership at the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States (11.05). The UWC President held meetings with high-ranking Ukrainian officials (03.06), including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Veterans Affairs, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Prosecutor-General. In addition, the head of the OPU, A. Yermak, held a video conference with representatives of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (28.09). Minister of Foreign Affairs D. Kuleba and Deputy Minister of Defence H. Maliar met the UWC leadership towards the end of the year (13.12).

In Moldova, the Centre for Assistance to Refugees from Ukraine hosted a parliamentary friendship group from the VRU to discuss the living conditions of forced migrants from Ukraine, humanitarian aid, and the transfer to EU countries (06.05). The Minister of Education and Science participated in a meeting on the education of Ukrainian students abroad (29.08). The meeting involved representatives of Lviv Polytechnic National University and the Lviv Regional Military Administration and discussed creating appropriate conditions for secondary school education for Ukrainians living abroad.
Foreign diplomatic missions’ involvement in cooperating with Ukrainians abroad is worth noting. The embassies regularly participate in protests and cultural events organised by the Ukrainian community in many countries, create additional technical capacities for consular services for Ukrainian citizens, and negotiate the expansion of the rights and social guarantees for Ukrainian migrants in respective countries, among other things.

In 2022, the National Commission on Ukrainians Abroad meetings were chaired by Deputy Foreign Minister Y. Perebyinis (03.08, 15.12). It discussed granting the status of a foreign Ukrainian to foreigners from several countries, as well as amending the Law of Ukraine “On Ukrainians Abroad”.

Results

Despite numerous challenges posed by large-scale hostilities, there were no significant changes in relations with the diaspora in 2022 compared to the previous year. Ukrainian government agencies and officials regularly communicated with diaspora representatives on cooperation, collecting aid for the Ukrainian army, and drawing attention to the problems of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Ukrainians abroad initiated, organised, and participated in events to draw attention to Ukraine in the light of Russian aggression, raised funds to help refugees and the Armed Forces and delivered humanitarian aid. Ukrainian communities in Poland, Lithuania, the United States, Canada, Germany, the UK, Romania, Sweden, Australia, Spain, the Czech Republic, and many other countries around the world were active. However, in many cases, the community took the initiative, not the Ukrainian state.

The Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine and the UWC signed a Cooperation Plan (03.06). The Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the MFA of Ukraine issued a joint order “On Approval of the Procedure for Interagency Cooperation on the Issuance of Documents on Basic Secondary Education and Complete Secondary Education under Martial Law in Ukraine to Students Abroad” (09.06). The International Institute of Education, Culture and Diaspora Relations of Lviv Polytechnic National University presented an app to help Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic and organised projects aimed at promoting the Ukrainian language among Ukrainians abroad.
The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine supported the launch of a pilot project to issue a passport of a citizen of Ukraine and a passport of a citizen of Ukraine for foreign travel to citizens who found themselves abroad (10.06). The Law of Ukraine “On the Foundations of State Policy in the Field of Strengthening Ukrainian National and Civil Identity” was adopted (13.12), which introduces the legal term “Ukrainian national identity”, including into the Law of Ukraine “On Ukrainians Abroad” (2012).

The National Commission for Ukrainians Abroad has granted the status of a Ukrainian abroad to several dozen people. However, the small number of people who have been granted this status indicates that there are no significant advantages to obtain this status for diaspora members.
TEN PRINCIPLES OF WAR-TIME DIPLOMACY IN 2023
1. Cohesion between international statements and domestic reform, especially in the format of Ukraine’s EU and NATO integration. A focus on advocating specific steps Ukraine has taken on the way to membership rather than the political responsibility of these organisations.

2. A shift to an individual (tailor-made) approach and consideration of the partners’ pragmatic interests in strategic communications; a search for reasoning for why partners should benefit from supporting Ukraine in the future.

3. Intensified dialogue with big businesses and transnational corporations that can become drivers of Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction and lobbyists for pro-Ukrainian policies in their countries.

4. Ukraine’s leadership in international organisations goes beyond the issues directly linked to the consequences of Russia’s aggression. This wider range includes issues where Ukraine has gained significant expertise through the war or that have gained new relevance, such as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the safety of critical infrastructure, protection from sexual violence during war, the rights of children in conflicts, punishment for war crimes, etc.

5. Return to the practice of personal visits of Ukraine’s leadership, Minister of foreign affairs and MPs to the countries that call for special attention.
Considering electoral timeframe in strategic partners in 2023 in preparation of important decisions or advocacy of serious decisions for Ukraine.

Engaging partner countries in building relations with the third countries and regions where Ukraine has no proper history of active relations or sufficient diplomatic representation.

Combining the political leadership of Ukraine and partner countries in advocacy and deepening certain aspects of wartime diplomacy that require wide international approval.

Strengthening Ukraine’s diplomatic missions abroad: find solutions to the staff shortage, stop delays in appointing ambassadors, and fasten the missions announced in 2022.

A synergy of public authorities, expert community, and civil society to promote Ukraine’s agenda and defend its national interests. Creating the environment for proper advocacy, including finding a solution to allow experts to go abroad for important international events.
### Table of the 2022 Scores for the Foreign Policy of Ukraine

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**TOTAL SCORE**

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<td>European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity</td>
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<td>Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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<td>National Security and Defence Council</td>
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<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>the Ukrainian World Congress</td>
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<td>Weapons of mass destruction</td>
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<td>Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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</table>
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Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is a network-based nongovernmental analytical centre, the goal of which is to participate in providing democratic ground for the developing and implementation of foreign and security policies by government authorities of Ukraine, implementation of international and nationwide projects and programs, directed at improvement of foreign policy analysis and expertise, enhancement of expert community participation in a decision-making process in the spheres of foreign policy, international relations, public diplomacy.

The activities of the “Ukrainian Prism” are:

- provision of sustainable collaboration between the expert community and the bodies of the executive and legislative power of Ukraine, which are involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine;

- research on foreign policy, diplomatic service, international relations and security, development and publication of respective recommendations;

- assistance to the state authorities of Ukraine in spreading reliable information about Ukraine abroad and creation of public diplomacy channels.

- facilitating improvement of legislation, which regulates foreign and security policy of Ukraine, the basics of diplomatic service and public diplomacy.

- informational, organisational and consulting support of public authorities, civil society organisations, educational establishments and other subjects of foreign policy and security issues.

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is officially registered as a nongovernmental organisation in 2015, while analytical work and research have been carried out within the network of foreign policy experts “Ukrainian Prism” since 2012.

At present, the organisation united more than 15 experts in the sphere of foreign policy, international relations, and international security, as well as associated experts from different analytical and academic institutions in Ukraine and abroad.
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is the oldest political foundation of Germany, which has had a rich social-democratic tradition since the day of its foundation in 1925. The foundation was started as a political will of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany, whose name the Foundation bears.

The key activity of our political Foundation is the implementation of basic ideals and values of social democracy: freedom, justice, and solidarity. The Foundation operates in close connection with social democrats and organisations of independent trade unions. As a non-profit, the Foundation organises its activity on the principles of independence and self-governance.

The Foundation fosters the development of:

- free society, which is based on the principles of solidarity and gives all its citizens the opportunity to participate in the political, economic, social and cultural life, regardless of their background, gender or religious beliefs;
- active and strong democracy, sustainable economic growth and decent job opportunities for all citizens;
- welfare state with developed education and health system, which at the same time strives at overcoming poverty and provides shelter against endeavours and hardships that citizens have to face during lifetime;
- a state that holds responsibility for peace and social progress in Europe and the whole world.

The Foundation supports and enhances the ideals of social democracy, in particular by means of:

- political awareness-building with the aim of strengthening civil society. Political awareness-building programs of the Foundation in Germany are focused on motivating citizens, developing their independence, informing and teaching them best practices of active participation in political life, activities of trade unions and civil society. We promote citizens’ participation in discussions on social issues and in decision-making processes;
• political consultations. The foundation holds strategic research on main issues of economic, social and educational policies, as well as on the ways of further development of democracy. Due to engagement of academic circles and active politicians, the Foundation creates conditions for a broad discussion on the issues of building a fair and sustainable economic and social pattern in certain countries, Europe and the whole world;

• international collaboration. Due to international offices of the Foundation, which carry out their activities in more than 100 countries of the world, the Foundation supports the policy of peaceful collaboration and human rights protection, promotes creation and reinforcement of democratic, social and constitutional bodies. The Foundation is in favour of independent trade unions and strong civil society. Within the framework of European integration process the Foundation actively promotes socially-oriented, democratic and competitive Europe;

• support for talented youth by providing scholarships, in particular to students and post-graduates from underprivileged families or migrants;

• preservation of collective social democratic memory. Archives and libraries of the Foundation, as well as works on contemporary history allow to preserve the roots of social democracy and trade unions, at the same time, they are information sources for conducting social-political and historical research.

At present, there are head-offices of the Foundation in Bonn and Berlin. Besides, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Foundation has six educational centres as well as 12 county and regional offices. Apart from that, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation possesses its own library in Bonn, which comprises 650,000 volumes. “The Archives of Social Democracy” of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn includes the biggest collection of materials from the history of the European labour movement.