The year 2025 marked a radical turning point in U.S.-Hungarian relations. While the beginning of the year was characterized by the lingering pressure of the previous administration, by spring it had become clear that Budapest had once again become a point of interest for Washington and was nearly a key ally in Europe. The transformation occurred not only at the level of rhetoric but also in the fundamental approaches of the U.S. executive branch to issues of security, energy, and sanctions policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has effectively become the new U.S. administration’s primary ideological proxy partner within the European Union.

Authors

• Volodymyr Yaroshenko
• Oleksandr Kraiev
• Illia Yurchyna
• Yuliia Nevmerzhytska
  edited by Oleksandr Kraiev

The first weeks of 2025 seemed to mark the final chapter of the Biden administration’s “cold war.” On January 7, 2025, the U.S. Department of State and the Department of the Treasury announced the imposition of sanctions against Antal Rogan, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Hungary. The official justification cited “systemic corruption and the hijacking of state institutions.” However, this move was the democratic establishment’s last attempt to preserve the status quo. As early as April 15, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department made an unprecedented about-face, officially lifting the sanctions against Rogan. This decision marked a shift from a values-based policy to a policy of “transactional pragmatism.”

The White House: Orbán’s Great Opportunities

The key driver of change was the personal relationship between Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. Even before the official summits, Budapest began to play the role of an informal communicator. On February 21, 2025, the Prime Minister’s political director, Balázs Orbán, emphasized in an interview with CBS News that Hungary was ready to serve as a “diplomatic hub” for the implementation of American initiatives to end the war in Ukraine. Prior to his second presidential term, Donald Trump consulted with Viktor Orbán regarding the “resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war”, while simultaneously promising publicly to establish peace in Ukraine. At the same time, ahead of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, the Hungarian Prime Minister repeatedly expressed confidence that the American President would stop the armed conflict in Europe, asserting that “he has never initiated wars before”. This process culminated in November 2025. During an official reception in the Oval Office on November 7, Donald Trump not only called Orbán a “great leader” but also proclaimed the beginning of a “Golden Age” in relations between the two countries. This visit became a symbol of the legitimization of the “Hungarian way” at the highest level. Moreover, Trump moved to directly support his ally, stating on his Truth Social platform: “I am proud to support Viktor again in the election. He is making his country great.” We saw a revival of this narrative again in late March 2026 with new statements from President Trump about “the need for all Hungarian patriots to vote for Orbán.” 

The most contentious aspect of the interaction between the White House and the Hungarian government in 2025 was the issue of sanctions exemptions. The White House confirmed that it had granted Hungary a one-year exemption to import Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline. However, this move was not a unilateral concession. The State Department, led by Marco Rubio, and the U.S. Department of Energy simultaneously announced the signing of a Memorandum on Civil Nuclear Energy, which provides for the gradual replacement of Russian fuel with American fuel from Westinghouse. Thus, the administration converted its “friendship” with Orbán into concrete economic advantages for the American energy sector.

Congress and the remaining checks and balances of the system

While a spirit of “new pragmatism” prevailed in the executive branch, the U.S. Congress in 2025 became the scene of a deep ideological divide. The House of Representatives and the Senate demonstrated two radically different approaches to engaging with Viktor Orbán’s government, reflecting the broader domestic political crisis within the American establishment. 

Under the leadership of the Republican majority, the House of Representatives became Budapest’s primary lobbying platform in Washington. For the right wing of the Republican Party, Hungary has become not just an ally, but a model of a successful conservative counterrevolution. Jim Jordan, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, paid particular attention to this ideological affinity. On August 5, 2025, a report was released on the work of the delegation he led—it visited a number of European capitals to study “censorship” and the defense of free speech, where coordination with conservative governments (in particular Hungary) against the EU to protect “values” was discussed.

At the same time, the Democratic minority in the House attempted to resist this trend. On April 22, 2025, Gregory Meeks and a group of lawmakers from the Foreign Affairs Committee sent a formal inquiry to the State Department demanding an explanation for the “sudden change of course” regarding sanctions against Russia and its allies, including Hungary.

The Senate: Institutional Skepticism and Energy Security

Unlike the House, the U.S. Senate took a more reserved – and at times even hostile – stance. Even within the Republican Party, the “hawkish” wing remained suspicious of Hungary’s overly close ties with Russia.

On April 18, 2025, Senators Jean Shaheen and Elizabeth Warren issued a joint statement in which they called the lifting of sanctions against Antal Rogan “an unlawful move that undermines the global fight against corruption.” A bipartisan resolution dated November 6, 2025, set an important precedent. Politicians with such differing views as Tom Tillis and Mitch McConnell joined Democrats in calling on Hungary to end its energy dependence on Russia. The senators demanded a single standard for all NATO members, emphasizing that “exceptions should not become the rule.”

The end of the year in the Senate was marked by an attempt to retrospectively analyze the shift in U.S. foreign policy. In December 2025, Senator Rubén Gallego initiated a discussion on how former critics of Orbán in the Senate (including then-Secretary of State Marco Rubio) had radically shifted their rhetoric in support of the “Hungarian model,” which, according to Gallego, sets a dangerous precedent for transatlantic unity.

Economics: Profit with a Hidden Cost 

For many years, Hungary’s trade relations with the United States have been characterized by a trade surplus in Hungary’s favor. Hungary’s traditional export categories remain pharmaceuticals and machinery, while those of the United States are technology and electronics. In 2025, Hungarian imports from the United States to Hungary increased by approximately $0.5 billion, reaching $3.3 billion. However, exports during the same period amounted to nearly $6.6 billion, maintaining a trade surplus of +100% in Hungary’s favor. Hungarian exports to the USA exceed imports in both absolute and relative terms. Accordingly, Budapest is likely to feel any unfavorable changes in this direction of trade more painfully than in the event of negative trends in supplies from American partners. However, it is worth noting that the US is not the largest destination in Hungary’s export statistics, given that Hungarian businesses are significantly more focused on the EU, particularly Germany, which is Hungary’s largest trading partner.

 

Growth was also seen in the area of investment projects. According to the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, a division of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in 2025, American investors signed projects with Hungary totaling 480 million euros. The agency called these figures record-breaking for the entire history of U.S.-Hungarian relations, and the U.S. ranked 4th in the annual ranking of the largest investors. By comparison, in 2024, Germany held the same position with a total of $377 million in new projects, while the United States was not included in the ranking at all.

 

However, China has maintained its absolute leadership in terms of the number and volume of investment projects since 2023. It is worth noting, however, that for two consecutive years, Chinese FDI has been declining by 2 billion euros annually. Thus, in 2023, the volume of new Chinese investments amounted to approximately €7 billion, in 2024 to €5 billion, and in 2025 to €3 billion. Although In absolute terms, 2025 was an all-time record year for the volume of Chinese imports to Hungary, reaching 11.53 billion EUR.

 

The question of economic and business cooperation between American businesspeople and Hungary remains open. Unlike the political dimension, ties in this area are weaker and are often driven by political rather than economic considerations. Major American multinational corporations, such as IBM, Microsoft, BlackRock, General Electric, and others, are present in Hungary; however, these companies do not actively participate in the Hungarian political sphere and do not engage in economic activity as actively as they do in other countries in the region. Instead, the ties between pro-Republican businesses and Hungary can be traced through sectors traditional for Republican Party sponsors—energy, defense, and private investment.

 

The energy sector is arguably the most active area of U.S.-Hungarian economic cooperation. Following Donald Trump’s election victory, contracts were signed between the U.S. and Hungary for the supply of liquefied natural gas from Chevron, the supply of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants from Westinghouse, and the purchase of small modular reactors from Holtec. However, the key factor in this cooperation remains the deep political motivation of both sides, as all new contracts were signed directly by the leaders of both countries—Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán—and against the backdrop of new sanctions being imposed on Russian energy giants. At the same time, a media campaign can be observed regarding the coverage of this event in the Hungarian media and by the Hungarian government. Thanks to the signing, the Orbán government can promote the narrative that it is capable of reaching agreements and maintains close ties with the United States.

 

Despite providing substantial funding to the Republican Party, U.S. defense companies do not have a significant presence in Hungary. The military equipment in service with the Hungarian Armed Forces is predominantly of European or Turkish manufacture, and occasionally of Soviet origin. The most expensive weapons—namely, aircraft, tanks, and armored personnel carriers—are overwhelmingly of either Swedish or German manufacture. Given this, the U.S. defense industry focuses more attention on Poland, which has traditionally been the largest buyer of American military equipment in the region. Poland also hosts facilities and factories of American defense giants such as Lockheed Martin. Hungary’s other neighbors—the Czech Republic and Slovakia—are also engaging in more active cooperation with the American defense industry. Unlike Hungary, the Czech Republic has purchased 24 American F-35 fighter jets to replace the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen, which are also in service with Hungary, while Slovakia has acquired 12 UH-60 multi-purpose helicopters.

 

American private equity firms are virtually absent from the Hungarian market. Unlike in Poland or the Czech Republic, major players in the U.S. market, such as Blackstone and The Carlyle Group, are not actively operating in Hungary.

To summarize the overall situation regarding American business in Hungary, it can be said that economic cooperation between Hungary and the United States tends to be ad hoc due to regular government intervention in the economy and the existence of a small circle of companies and businesspeople closely tied to the government and the prime minister personally. Another factor is the extensive presence of Chinese business in Hungary, which has been the largest investor in the Hungarian economy for several years in a row.

 

Next, we should consider the possibility of financial support from the United States. Following a visit to Washington in November 2025, the former Hungarian prime minister stated that the United States would provide financial assistance to Hungary in the event of external attacks on the national currency, which generated significant attention in the media and among investors. However, shortly thereafter, in an interview with Politico, Donald Trump directly denied this claim, though he confirmed that Orbán had approached him personally with such a request. It is worth noting that the U.S. employed a similar strategy with Argentina when, ahead of parliamentary elections, Washington provided Buenos Aires with a $20 billion currency swap, after which the party of incumbent President Javier Milei won the election.

 

Speaking of opportunities, there is sufficient—though not extensive—room for cooperation in the energy sector, given the presence of Chinese projects in solar energy and Russian projects in nuclear and oil and gas. Nevertheless, the Orbán government has the opportunity to use new contracts with the United States to improve its domestic image.

‘The Golden Age of Hedging’: Does Hungary still have cards to play?

The government of Hungary has let the state fall into a unique situation: both the U.S. and Russia were interested in the positive outcomes of the elections for the same political power, which is the Fidesz party. To achieve this unprecedented and simultaneous high level of personal relations with both Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán has been gradually conducting the hedging policy for the last 16 years.

 

In this paper, the term ‘hedging’ is used in terms pointed out by J.D. Ciorciari & Jurgen Haacke, which is ‘a national security or alignment strategy, undertaken by one state toward another, featuring a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements’. As Goh rightfully points out, the states that use the hedging strategy ‘cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another’. The hedging strategy was instrumentalised by the Fidesz government in order to deepen the process of autocratization of Hungary (coined by Anghel and Jones), which has been observed over the last 16 years. In Hungary, most of the benefits of the hedging course of action are used to extend the gaps between the national elites and population in social, political and economic aspects.

 

In fact, the Hungarian hedging method has allowed the contemporary national elites to open opportunities for involving finance flows or other means of economic support from several concurrent powers in the world (Washington, Moscow, Beijing and Brussels) simultaneously. The roles of Hungarian discourse and relations with the U.S. are therefore crucial, as the U.S. remains one of the largest partners of Hungary.

‘The Golden Age’: Not all that glitters is gold

During Orban times, the Hungarian political discourse was filled with the narratives that promote close cooperation with Washington DC. One of the most common narratives, related to the recent political convergence of Hungary and the U.S., is the ‘Golden Era (Golden Age)’ narrative.

 

In April 2025, after the meeting with the U.S. Secretary of the State Marco Rubio, Hungarian Minister Szijjártó tweeted: ‘There is no doubt that Hungarian–American relations have entered a new chapter, marked by mutual respect, shared priorities and close cooperation’. Indeed, the Orbán Government appeared to have been anticipating the Trump Administration to come to office, as opposed to the Joseph Biden administration, which was characterised by Szijjártó as the one that ‘treated Hungary as an enemy’.

 

The visits of the U.S. government officials to Hungary play another pivotal role in the promotion of the hedging strategy of Budapest. Namely, the visit of the U.S. Secretary of the State, Marco Rubio in February 2026, as well as the heavily expected visit of the Vice President of the U.S., JD Vance, in early April 2026 were set to underscore the importance of the ‘Golden Age’ narrative once again. Marco Rubio pointed out that ‘President Trump is deeply committed to your [Viktor Orbán’s] success’, framing the ‘positive results’ of Hungarian elections as the matter of the U.S. national interest. The reaction of the Fidesz government was apparent, as Viktor Orbán once again emphasized on the ‘friendship and mutual trust’ between the U.S. and Hungary (namely, between the Trump Administration and Orbán’s government).

 

Back in November 2025, the Hungarian Prime Minister posted a tweet that around 1400 American companies work in Hungary, stating that ‘if there has ever been a golden age in Hungarian–American relations, it is now’. The accent here is pinned to the fact that Hungary, supposedly, appears a good deal to invest money in. According to Magyar Nezmet (the Hungarian state-owned media), in November 2025, the U.S. company ‘Procter and Gamble’ sent another tranche to Hungary, estimated at HUF 72 billion (EUR 187 million) to build two plants in Gyöngyös and Csömör. Prime Minister Orbán once again called it ‘Golden Age’, continuing promoting the good image of the U.S. in Hungary as a part of Hungary’s hedging framework. Furthermore, Péter Szijjártó highlighted that total U.S. investments in Hungary reached around HUF 190 billion by the end of 2025.

 

However, the contemporary state of the Hungarian economy, based on the S&P rate ‘BBB-’, which tends to be lowered even more after the Hungarian elections in April 2026, dramatically undermines this emphasis. Thus, the ‘Golden Age’ narrative appears less as an objective reflection of economic conditions and more as a political instrument. It serves to construct a positive image of the Fidesz government as capable of attracting foreign capital from diverse partners. Labelling the new American investments as the “New Era” in economic relations between the two countries currently seems more like wishful thinking and the implementation of a political media campaign. Relative indicators show that the USA is far from the status of even one of Hungary’s main foreign economic partners.

 

In the meantime, the questions about the U.S. investments in Hungary were asked by the TISZA party leader, Petér Magyar, as well. ‘Viktor Orbán must explain why he went to Washington to ask President @realDonaldTrump [Donald Trump] for a giga-loan! Why did he request a bailout package from the United States similar to Ferenc Gyurcsány’s IMF loan? … Is there a near-state bankruptcy situation?’ The fact that the TISZA leader raised this issue as crucial in the Hungarian discourse is apparent, given his reminiscence of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s IMF loan which led Hungary right into the huge financial crisis.

 

Although such statements are considered as pre-election propaganda tools exploited by Magyar, it does not alter the fact that the controversies, which emerge as a result of Hungary’s hedging, exacerbate the public discourse tension around such heavily securitised topics, as the economy of the state. 

EU-U.S-Hungary track: Hungarian two-chair diplomacy

Viktor Orbán actively used his close relations with the Trump Administration to hedge on some of the EU prohibitions and internal policies. Nevertheless, in case the interest of the White House does not intersect with the interest of the Fidesz government in Hungary, Budapest may hesitate to support Washington DC. In some cases, the ‘friends’ in the U.S. may even become subject to critics.

 

The use of close relations to hedge on the EU commitments can be exemplified with the issue, related to the dependency of Hungary on the Russian energy sources. Besides, the ‘Golden Age’ narrative here was again used by Petér Szijjártó. The meetings with two American ministers, Chris Wright and Doug Burgum, Szijjártó described as the beginning of a new ‘Golden Age’. Furthermore, this Szijjártó’s tweet is also a pure example of the Hungarian hedging: ‘The US also plays a role in Hungary’s gas supply. Our American partners understand that energy security is a matter of geography. Energy must come from several sources and routes. Unlike Brussels, they approach this practically, not ideologically.’ In this regard, the compliments to the White House were presented by the Fidesz government to praise Washington for the allowance to hedge on the EU energy policies by remaining heavily dependent on Russian crude oil and gas in particular. 

 

Moreover, the ‘Golden Age’ narrative can also be opposed to the ‘Brussels Elite’ one, which suggests that the EU policies aimed at the support of Ukraine and banning Russia dry out the Hungarian money. The support of the U.S. is framed as the ‘financial shield against Brussels’ by Viktor Orbán, while the Hungarian hedging strategy can be revealed on this occasion as well. 

 

Nonetheless, as was underlined before, the warm relations between Trump and Orbán do not guarantee the lack of negativity toward the Washington DC deriving from Budapest. Although the U.S. private investment proposal was warmly greeted in Budapest, it did not prevent Viktor Orbán from criticising the EU and U.S. leaders by stating that ‘Europeans and Americans are ready to ‘pay for this [Russian-Ukrainian war] in Ukrainian blood’. Hence, despite ‘Golden Ages’ and ‘financial shields’ that exist in the U.S.-related discourse in Hungary, the contemporary Hungarian government does not hesitate to hedge, given its need to unblock EU funding, and particularly, its desire to halt  the financial and military support of Ukraine. In this regard, even the Washington partners may become targets of criticism.

Russia-U.S.-Hungary track: Securitization above everything

Hungary is seen as a state, which position, often aligned either with the U.S. or with Russia, can fragment the EU as a political actor from within. As a favor in return, the Hungarian hedging blueprint allowed the Fidesz government to receive economic (from Russia) and political (from the U.S.) preferences against certain policies of the EU, including the energy policy, to further autocratise the state.

 

The position of the U.S. on the EU use of the Russian energy sources remains heavily dependent on the results of its military operations in the Strait of Hormuz. On the basis of these events, the Fidesz government praised the Trump’s Administration decision to partially halt the sanctions on Russian oil shipments. Accordingly, Minister Szijjártó urged the EU to follow the example of the U.S. by letting the Russian oil enter the global markets by sea. 

 

The rapid rise of the fuel prices has become a cold shower for the whole world, including the EU, after the ‘Epic Fury’ operation was announced. For Hungary, the U.S. military activity in the Middle East has created a room for the advocacy of the national elites’ interest, which revolves around the need to remain dependent on the Russian energy sources, despite formally being a part of the REPowerEU Initiative. 

 

The hedging policy of the Orbán government can also be exemplified with the ambiguity of the ‘no war’ narrative, highlighted by Petér Magyar. ‘Would @PM_ViktorOrbán [Viktor Orbán] take Hungary to war if Donald Trump asked? … if the U.S. president asks, they would consider helping the United States in a war against Iran. In plain terms, this means that Orbán would send Hungarian soldiers to war if @realDonaldTrump [Donald Trump] requested it.’ The discrepancy highlighted by Magyar is related to the fact that the Fidesz propaganda often portrays the support of Ukraine and its EU accession as a future risk for the Hungarian soldiers to be sent to warzone in Ukraine; regardless, more obvious risks, such as the possible deployment of the Hungarian troops in Iran does not seem to be a huge issue for Viktor Orbán.

 

Indeed, whereas the Fidesz propaganda often portrays the EU as heavily influenced by the President of Ukraine, in the U.S.-related discourse, Viktor Orbán also framed the EU restrictions on Russian energy resources as the threat to the Hungarian people deriving directly from Brussels and making Hungarians ‘suffer’: ‘Hungary is landlocked. As President @realDonaldTrump [Donald Trump] rightly pointed out: we cannot be blamed for lacking seaports or alternative pipelines, and we appreciate his recognition of this reality. Cut us off from Russian oil and gas, and our economy would tumble 4%, families would suffer, and energy bills would skyrocket. We will not bow to Brussels’ demands – our energy security and our families must come first!’. 

 

Here, the Hungarian hedging position allows for the continuation of the purchase and use of the Russian energy resources, the maintenance of friendly relations with the U.S., and securitizing its oil and gas dependence on Russia before the EU. 

The fate of the ‘Golden Era’: Will hedging remain after April 12?

The contemporary Hungarian government has completely instrumentalised the fear before Russian-Ukrainian war as a purely pre-election agenda tool. The U.S.-Iran potential military track appears to be acceptable for Fidesz, which poses a significant, yet rhetorical question on whether the position of Budapest is consistent and not influenced by the need to conduct hedging policy. The need to further conduct hedging is also justified by the dependence on Russian energy resources, which are subject to be banned in the EU within the next 2 years. Still, the TISZA party program is less optimistic about such a rapid shift from Russian oil and gas, as the Russian energy resource ban is planned for 2035.

 

Hungarian hedging becomes even more visible when it comes to the definition of the actors that ʼinterfere’ the Hungarian elections. As opposed to the EU and Ukraine, demonization of which became the main pre-election tool of the Fidesz government, the U.S. clear allegiance to one of the two main political powers does not seem to be framed as any sort of ‘interference’. At the same time, the TISZA party uses the very same hedging approach to put blame on the policy of the Fidesz government, in particular, on the Fidesz close affiliation to the White House, yet the Trump Administration remains unblamed. 

 

One of the main emphasises used by TISZA is the ‘dishonest Viktor Orbán’ narrative: ‘Trump became president as a billionaire. Orbán became a billionaire from being prime minister.’, – Petér Magyar stressed in November 2025. This attitude hints that despite visible and clear close Orbán-Trump ties, Petér Magyar hedges on these relations, exclusively framing Viktor Orbán as the political adversary. Consequently, the TISZA party uses very similar hedging approaches in the domestic discourse, avoiding direct confrontation rhetoric with the U.S. government and primarily focusing on the Fidesz side of the Trump-Orbán ‘friendship’. 

 

When the new Hungarian government becomes TISZA-led, no substantial changes to the Hungarian hedging strategy toward the U.S., used by the Fidesz government, may be expected as well. The approaches and discursive rhetoric may differ, however, the need to hedge on certain decisions to protect the national interest of Hungary, discussed in this work, as well as to maintain the balance between the U.S., EU and Russia will remain crucial for the new Hungarian government. At this rate, it appears that TISZA will most likely continue conducting the hedging policy, though the political motivations and tone will certainly differ.

 

Overall, the hedging strategy has become a vital tool for the contemporary Hungarian government, which seems to seek the most profitable way to conduct domestic policy based on the foreign investments. While the actions of the Fidesz government remain highly questionable, it is no doubt that regardless of the outcomes of the Hungarian elections, hedging will remain one of the primary courses of action for the new Hungarian government, especially towards the U.S. 

Recommendations

 

For Kyiv:

• Avoid boosting but keep countering media campaigns launched by Fidesz and its proxies to prevent disinformation spread and anti-Ukrainian attitudes  from Orban and his government.
• Raise the political cost of lifting the US sanctions on Russia in exchange for Russia signing contracts with American companies. Keep advocating this point by strengthening bilateral contacts with American members of Congress and think tanks.
• Consider the narratives constructed by the following politicians: President Donald J. Trump, the Secretary of the StateMarco Rubio, representative Jim Jordan (R – Ohio), representative Scott Fitzgerald (R – Wisconsin), representative Kevin Kiley (independent – California) since they may indicate the current state of affairs between Trump’s and Orban’s teams.
• Promote and advocate the assessments of the following politicians who proved to be more realistic in the case of Hungary: senator Elizabeth Warren (D – Massachusetts), senator Jeanne Shaheen (D – New Hampshire), senator Thom Tillis (R – North Carolina), senator Mitch McConnell (R – Kentucky), senator Ruben Gallego (D – Arizona), representative Gregory W. Meeks (D – New York), Steny Hoyer (D – Maryland).
• Establish long-term cooperation with American energy and defence companies to contain the Hungarian lobby in Washington. The need to rebuild and renovate the Ukrainian energy sector and the Ukrainian experience in the drone war can be the main drivers in achieving this goal.

For Brussels:

• Consider stepping aside from the consensus voting procedure in order to prevent a veto from Orban’s government on important problems in case of the Fidesz win.
• Counter Russian and American disinformation campaigns aimed to destabilize institutional resilience and the elections across the EU by leveraging such mechanisms as the Digital Services Act (2022), the Code of Practice on Disinformation (2022), the European Democracy Action Plan (2022), the European Media Freedom Act (2024) and other related instruments. 
• Establish a full ban on Russian energy supplies and diversify energy products import in compliance with REPowerEU provisions.
• Offer the EU institutional resources and “good offices” as a platform to ease tension between Ukraine and the new Hungarian government.
• Deepen the accountability of the European Commission’s Annual Report on Ukraine’s EU accession, based on the progress related to the national minorities issues. Set the specific framework and expectations on this matter, mutually agreed with Ukraine and Hungary.