In March 2024, former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö was commissioned by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to prepare a report on the EU’s crisis preparedness. Speaking at a press conference to launch this initiative, the EC President noted that Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine has called into question the very notion of sustainable peace in Europe.

The report, due in autumn 2024, should offer a common vision of how to make Europe resilient to crises. The document is planned to focus on defence mechanisms, including conventional military defence, and responses to new threats in cyberspace and in the form of hybrid warfare. Particular attention will also be paid to building social resilience to crises.

The invitation of the Finnish politician to lead this process indicates that European institutions recognise the unique approach of Finland to developing a systemic approach to security at the national level, which can serve as an example for the future strategy of the European Union. The report itself should be instrumental for the new European Commission to formulate relevant policies during its next 5-year mandate.

At the same time, President Niinisto has repeatedly referred to the need to study the experience of Russia’s war against Ukraine, both the conventional dimension and the impact of the latest military capabilities, such as drones and cyber warfare.

The intention of this policy brief is to offer the European institutions and national governments of the EU member states some lessons on the resilience of the Ukrainian state and society, which proved to be the reason why Ukraine survived even when its larger Western partners did not believe in it in February 2022. It is also important to show not only the positive aspects, but also the areas where Ukraine was less prepared for the scale and direction of the challenges of hybrid and conventional aggression.

Based on the experience of the ongoing aggression against Ukraine, as well as Russia’s numerous attempts to strengthen its hybrid and information influence on the EU and NATO, the publication proposes certain steps that will contribute to building the EU’s readiness for Russia’s open conventional aggression, as well as to the formation of an effective deterrence and defence mechanism.

In terms of building a deterrence mechanism, the EU and NATO have already begun to form an appropriate architecture that could be effective in reducing the likelihood of an open conventional conflict with Russia and other potential adversaries. The only thing that currently stands in the way of updating the system is the lack of sufficient political will at the level of individual EU and NATO members.

Ukraine’s experience of confronting an aggressor with greater human and technical potential can become a truly transformative element for the EU’s defence doctrine, given the current nature of hostilities, the scale and consequences of negative transformations

 

Structure

1. 1. Lessons from Ukraine’s war against Russia
2. 1.1. The Ukrainian deterrence model
3. Combat-ready manpower
4. Lessons from mobilisation
5. Military training
6. Military and technical capabilities of Ukraine
7. 1.2. National resilience of Ukraine: planned and practical dimensions
8. Efficiency and functioning of the system of state bodies
9. Safety and protection of critical infrastructure facilities
10. Sustainable functioning of transport systems
11. Cybersecurity
12. Societal resilience to information influences
13. 1.3. Interaction with partners
14. 2. What lessons should the European Union take into account?
15. 2.1. Preparedness for a potential protracted armed conflict
16. 2.2. Deterrence by punishment
17. 2.3. Deterrence by denial
18. A strategy for balancing new and traditional weapons
19. Strengthening air and missile defence systems
20. Engineering and fortification readiness
21. Measures to protect critical infrastructure
22. Professional troops and mobilisation potential
23. 2.4. Resilience of the Union, Member States and societies
24. Resilience of governance and delivery of essential services to the population
25. Resilience of critical infrastructure
26. Management of migration movement
27. 2.5. Interaction
28. Collective defence
29. Coalitions as a model of adaptation
30. Sources

 

 

1. Lessons from Ukraine’s war against Russia

The decision to prepare a report on the EU’s preparedness to crises was made in March 2024, when Ukraine had been in a full-scale war against Russia for 2 years. The date is quite emblematic for drawing some lessons. On the one hand, we can talk about the European Commission’s willingness to form an information background for the work of the new composition of European institutions in the field of security and defence for the next 5 years, where there are opportunities to launch new tools and strengthen readiness for new challenges.

On the other hand, 2 years of full-scale confrontation between big nations have made it clear that such wars will be neither quick nor local. The time might come and military actions have a significant potential to spread the conflict to new territories.

Intelligence agencies of EU member states are already openly talking about the ongoing hybrid aggression against EU and NATO members, as well as the likelihood of an open conventional confrontation with Russia as early as the turn of 2030.

European institutions and governments of EU member states should, taking into account the experience gained by Ukraine, create preconditions for reducing the likelihood of an attack by strengthening the policy of deterrence and an independent military presence from the United States on the European continent.

At the same time, the EU members, together with NATO, should formulate a solid and predictable defence policy that can demonstrate adaptability to Russian offensive warfare.

A brief overview of how Ukraine has formulated a philosophy of preparedness for external military threats on the eve of a full-scale invasion should begin with the strategic documents adopted in 2021 and early 2022. It is worth noting here that at this point, from a domestic political point of view, President Zelenskyy, who at the beginning of his presidential term advocated the need for a quick resolution of the international conflict with Russia, has come to understand the impossibility of finding a fair and lasting solution in negotiations with Russia. Accordingly, the formation of new frameworks for Ukraine’s security and defence had to be based on the duration of the conflict, as well as the need to adequately prepare defence capabilities and the civilian sector’s readiness for further hybrid and conventional escalations in confrontation with the enemy.

In September 2020, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine was adopted, and in March 2021, the Military Security Strategy of Ukraine was adopted. It is the military strategy that demonstrates the vision that prevailed among the Ukrainian military and political leadership to ensure Ukraine’s comprehensive defence. According to the strategy, Ukraine’s comprehensive defence is based on preventive actions and resistance to the aggressor on land, at sea, in the air, in cyber and information space, using the full potential of the state and society, and employing all forms and methods of armed struggle against the aggressor, including asymmetric and other actions for the defence of Ukraine, in compliance with the principles and norms of international law. Such comprehensive defence should be based on three main components: deterrence, resilience and interaction.

Therefore, when looking for positive and negative lessons to learn, European partners should pay attention to how each of these elements was built.

1.1. The Ukrainian deterrence model

According to the military strategy, deterrence is based on the readiness of the security and defence sector, the national economy and the population of Ukraine to resist armed aggression. Deterrence also includes building up air defence capabilities and systematic establishment of territorial defence. It is also about preventive measures that the state can take, taking into account the ability to inflict unacceptable political, economic or military losses on the enemy, which should lead the enemy to stop aggressive actions or de-escalate.

Given that Ukraine has been in an international armed conflict with Russia since 2014, at the time of the full-scale aggression, it had significant defence sector resources that could have actually stopped the potential aggressor from escalating.

Combat-ready manpower

The main indicator that shapes the deterrence effect is the number of people with basic military training, combat experience, and active military service in the security and defence sector. Ukraine has been engaged in defensive hostilities against Russia’s aggressive actions since 2014. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, more than 500,000 ATO/JFO personnel and veterans were registered in Ukraine. It could indicate a significant percentage of the Ukrainian population with combat experience, weapons handling skills, and a high moral and psychological readiness to defend their country.

Such a large number of trained people should have been a deterrence factor for Russia, but Kremlin made its decision based on a completely different logic.

Officially, according to the law, before the full-scale invasion, 261,000 people, including about 10,000 civilians, were in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to the international Global Firepower ranking, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were ranked 22nd among the world’s strongest armies.

In 2022, the size of the overall security and defence sector tripled, reaching a total of about 1 million personnel, including intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Against the backdrop of the war, the Territorial Defence Forces developed rapidly. In January 2022, they were incorporated into the Armed Forces as a separate branch of the Armed Forces. In February, with the start of the invasion, more than 110,000 people enlisted in the territorial defence. As of 2023, the Territorial Defence Forces numbered more than 100,000 people.

Lessons from mobilisation

The lesson that Ukraine has learnt from being in a protracted war is to pay special attention to motivation, training, and appropriate technical equipment for infantry. Despite significant progress in increasing the technological sophistication of warfare, it is the infantry on the ground, the assault units, who hold the territory and recapture it from the invader.

In the third year of the war, Ukraine is beginning to experience a shortage of manpower. The absence of a legal framework for demobilisation leads to psychological fatigue among Ukrainian defenders, who have to stay on the front line almost continuously. In addition, the sanitary losses are gradually leading to the understaffing of a significant number of combat brigades.

On the one hand, the most motivated and trained citizens joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2022, so the level of Ukraine’s mobilisation potential began to be problematic in 2023. This forced the military and political leadership of Ukraine to improve the communication component, as well as strengthen social protection and management.

In May 2024, an updated law on mobilisation came into force, which introduced some novelties to the mobilisation process. All members of conscription age between 18 and 60 had to update their personal data. Almost 3.5 million Ukrainians received an electronic military registration document as an alternative to traditional paper documents through the Reserve+ mobile application.

One of the important lessons is also the awareness of the scale of Russia’s efforts to undermine the mobilisation situation. Certain excesses in the work of mobilisation authorities, which involved the use of coercive methods against individual citizens who resisted, were disseminated and replicated by Russian special services to instil fear among men of mobilisation age in Ukraine.

A rather wise decision was to introduce a recruitment system that was supposed to be an alternative to mobilisation by allowing men to choose their own military speciality and unit for service. Such centres provide confidential advice and do not issue the obligatory mobilisation notices. Starting from April 2024, such centres have been established in regional and district centres. Currently, there are more than 40 centres in Ukraine that have processed more than 22,000 applications as of mid-October, of which approximately 25% are already being considered as candidates for service.

In addition, in order to intensify mobilisation and reduce misunderstandings at the level of mobilisation centres, military units have been granted the right to directly recruit candidates for service who voluntarily wish to serve.

Another tool is the legislative regulation and social protection of contractual service by foreign citizens. An important law was recently adopted by the Ukrainian parliament, which opens up opportunities for foreign nationals willing to serve under contract as officers in the Armed Forces, the State Service of Ukraine for Transport and the National Guard.

In October 2024, when reporting publicly on his year in office, the Minister of Defence of Ukraine R. Umerov noted that the optimisation decisions made it possible to triple the mobilisation rate.

Military training

Russia’s full-scale aggression has forced a complete rewrite of the textbooks on training and use of the armed forces. The large-scale arrival on the battlefield of drones, robots, and artificial intelligence technologies is forcing changes in all aspects of offensive and defensive operations. In order to survive, it is necessary to adapt to the new requirements of internal positioning, approaches to camouflage of personnel and military equipment, rules of movement, and logistics. The rules of engagement vary from the classical canons, including the actions of the smallest units, to the size of brigades.

Providing high-quality training increases the chances of a soldier’s survival and effective performance of assigned tasks. Over the past 2.5 years, Ukraine has gained a lot of experience, which it is now trying to implement by extending the duration of training (pilot programmes lasting 1.5 months instead of the standard 30 days) and in-depth training of instructors.

Ukraine has a system of training centres that provide basic general military training and receives training support from partners. Despite the increase in military training of Ukrainian recruits at training bases in the EU and NATO countries, Ukraine still needs to scale up its training infrastructure to meet the quantitative needs of the Ukrainian army.

Ukraine is trying to take an innovative approach to training. For example, one of the new elements of communication with foreign partners on whose territory Ukrainian troops train is the proposal to create separate brigades trained and armed by that partner. Such an initiative has been launched in France and Germany, and consultations are underway to extend it to the Nordic countries.

A separate innovation is the certification of private specialised training centres to train specialists for the defence sector.

In general, as of October, the Ministry of Defence reported that the number of training facilities available for training Ukrainian troops had increased by 5 times.

Military and technical capabilities of Ukraine

Ukraine depends on its partners for military support, which accounts for a significant percentage of the weapons and ammunition on the battlefield. However, official Kyiv fully understands that the burden will increasingly fall on the shoulders of Ukraine’s own defence industry.

Ukraine’s defence capabilities are gaining ground after the almost complete destruction of the main facilities of Ukraine’s military-industrial base in 2022. In 2023, military production doubled, and in 2024, production volumes tripled. The Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has financed defence production totalling over USD 4 billion this year. Particular attention is paid to the supply of ammunition to the army: in 2023, the Ukrainian share of ammunition was 18%, and in 2024 it was 41%. At the same time, Ukraine is trying to scale up the production of ammunition of Western systems, especially 155 mm artillery shells, together with foreign partners.

Active cooperation between the government team and manufacturers has yielded a positive result in launching mass production of Ukrainian strike UAVs, which have a range of about 1,000 km and have already proven effective in destroying or disabling air defence systems, military airfields, equipment and ammunition storage sites. Optimistic are the statements of the Ukrainian authorities in 2024 about the successful testing of a Ukrainian ballistic missile, which, if scaled up, could become a significant deterrent against further escalation.

It is clear that the use of long-range missiles alone will certainly not bring Ukraine victory. To put this in perspective, the Russian aggressor has fired about 9,600 missiles and 14,000 long-range Shahed drones at Ukraine since 24 February 2022. Despite such an incredible number of attacks on Ukrainian soil, the enemy has not managed to break the spirit of Ukrainians and force them to surrender. Therefore, Ukrainians should probably not expect that with fewer weapons, Ukraine will be able to force Russia to stop its aggression. However, the availability of Ukraine’s own missile development and scaling up, along with the permission of partners to use their long-range weapons, can significantly reduce Russia’s offensive potential and cause significant losses for the defence industry.

Technology and innovation

Maintaining leadership in the use of unmanned systems is a vital priority for Ukraine. So much so that Ukraine was the first to introduce the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The formula for success lies in open competition and expertise with unmanned platforms, as well as government procurement and scaling up production. Ukraine is a pioneer in the introduction of drone swarm technology, which is also currently demonstrating impressive results on the battlefield and is becoming an effective deterrent. Naval drones have become an effective guarantee for expelling the remnants of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from military bases in Crimea. In 2024 alone, Ukraine destroyed 10 warships and one submarine without its own full-fledged fleet.

The effectiveness of Ukrainian robotic systems on the battlefield, including ground-based kamikaze drones, demining, evacuation and logistics vehicles, has also been proven.

The key to Ukraine’s success is to abandon the old, long-running bureaucratic procedures, sometimes Soviet-style, that slow down the process of approval for use in the defence and security sector. This has yielded results: as of September 2024, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine has codified and approved more than 900 samples of weapons and military equipment (in 2023, only 405 samples were approved). At the same time, national manufacturers accounted for two-thirds of the total. Most of the new models are vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, ammunition, electronic warfare systems, communications, engineering equipment, and ground robotic platforms.

Ukrainian developers are also particularly proud of the DELTA combat system of situationa awareness, which has enabled the armed forces to destroy approximately $15 billion worth of Russian equipment. This technology also successfully proved itself during NATO’s anti-drone exercises in September 2024.

In general, it should be noted that surveys of Ukrainian military personnel show a high degree of digitalisation. For example, according to a survey in the Army+ app, every second serviceman uses combat IT systems on a daily basis, mainly to obtain information about the enemy.

 

1.2. National resilience of Ukraine: planned and practical dimensions

In September 2021, the Concept for the Implementation of the National Resilience System of Ukraine was put into effect, which was to be a continuation of a number of strategic documents approved this year. The document defines national resilience as ‘the ability of the state and society to effectively counter threats of any origin and nature, adapt to changes in the security environment, maintain sustainable functioning, and quickly recover to the desired equilibrium after a crisis’.

The concept was developed in line with NATO’s approach to resilience building at the time, and the Vice Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine was responsible for its development.

To the seven NATO’s baseline requirements (continuity of government services; resilient energy supplies, food and water resources; ability to deal with mass casualties and uncontrolled movement of people; resilient civil communications and civil transport systems) identified by the Allies at the NATO Summit in Wales, Ukraine added two more elements to its national resilience: social resilience to information influences, and financial and economic resilience, in particular, the continuity of key business processes. Ukraine has been actively engaged in cooperation with NATO to strengthen resilience.

However, due to the timing of the decision, as well as a number of internal obstacles to the implementation of the concept, the national resilience system could not be fully launched at all levels, from national to local. However, it can be pointed out that the Ukrainian government and population have been able to demonstrate impressive examples of resilience in most of the areas identified in the Concept. The lessons of ensuring the stability and continuity of the government team and the provision of basic services to the population of Ukraine were included in the Alliance’s resilience goals adopted at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023.

The second attempt was made in November 2023, when the government approved the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Concept of the National Resilience System by 2025. This plan was developed on the basis of an assessment of the national resilience system at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and taking into account the identified cross-sectoral vulnerabilities, implemented by US experts.

The plan’s feature is the introduction of a comprehensive system for identifying, prioritising, preventing and effectively responding to threats and risks of any nature. It also introduces monitoring and analysis of the effectiveness of the national resilience system.

An important role in this plan is also assigned to work with Ukrainian society, training in skills and algorithms of behaviour in crisis situations, and ways for civilians to support the Ukrainian military.

Efficiency and functioning of the system of state bodies

The resilience and adaptability of Ukraine’s governance system may indeed be an experience that will be valuable for European partners in building their resilience and preparedness algorithms. Ukraine is a unique space where governance models, including those adopted in the EU, can be tested for resilience.

In 2022, the public manifesto of the country’s top leadership in the first hours of the full-scale invasion was important from a psychological point of view, as it declared their continued stay in Kyiv and the preservation of the vertical of power.

However, against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s use of all means of aggression, including attempts to destroy or interfere with telecommunications systems, two important reforms that allowed for the continuity of governance were digitalisation and decentralisation.

‘The state in a smartphone’ became a familiar slogan for Ukrainians even before the full-scale invasion began. The government team committed itself to transferring as many public services as possible to the electronic format. The Diia app became a user-friendly application that made it easier to get information from government databases and to do business.

Russia’s full-scale invasion has changed the government’s focus to create services for war-affected citizens in need of assistance. In particular, through Diia, it is possible to restore lost documents, receive grants to support veterans and their families, businesses affected by the war, help internally displaced persons, and receive compensation for damaged or destroyed property. As of October 2024, the app was used by more than 21 million people, both in Ukraine and abroad. More than 130 electronic services were available.

The war has also become a catalyst for innovation in the civil service, which has begun to make greater use of the government’s electronic human resources management system (HRMIS). However, the war has revealed urgent problems related to the balance of digitalisation and the human factor in service delivery. Thus, the security factor has forced government officials to bring back some tools previously absorbed by digitalisation, such as backup paper records and postal service.

In 2024, according to the E-Government Development Index, Ukraine ranks 5th in terms of digital public services and 1st in terms of E-Participation, the willingness of citizens to engage in government processes through online platforms.

The decentralisation reform launched by the government in 2014 has given the local level more powers and financial resources to pursue the interests of communities independently. It is through the leadership and high legitimacy of the elected posts of mayors, village and settlement heads that border communities were able to organise, on the one hand, a proper resistance to the enemy, and, on the other hand, to provide the necessary services to citizens in the context of hostilities. In addition, financially capable local governments allocated UAH 37.7 billion for security and defence in 2022-2023.

A separate negative aspect, which in some cases occurred at the regional or municipal levels in the border regions of Ukraine, was and still is the lack of coordination between local governments and military administrations established pursuant to the Law on Martial Law.

Safety and protection of critical infrastructure facilities

Before the full-scale war, Ukraine’s energy system was largely dependent on fossil and nuclear fuels. In 2021, electricity production in Ukraine was 156.6 TWh. Nuclear power plants (NPPs) accounted for 55.1% of the total generation, thermal power plants (TPPs) and combined heat and power plants (CHPs) for 29.3%, and hydroelectric power plants (HPPs) and pumped storage plants (PSHPPs) for 6.7%. Ukraine’s energy sector remains the second highest priority target for the enemy to destroy. Ukraine’s power system continues to recover from nine massive Russian attacks, with a power shortage and emergency and scheduled repairs at power facilities. Thus, as of the end of 2023, Ukraine’s integrated power system lost 44% of nuclear generation, 78% of TPPs (including occupied plants), 66% of block CHPs, 12% of HPPs and 32% of PSPs. 45% of distribution capacities were damaged. The occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP accounts for 10.7% of Ukraine’s total generating capacity and 44.3% of the total capacity of nuclear power plants. According to the latest estimates, Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has suffered losses of USD 56 billion due to Russian aggression.

After November 2022, Ukraine has a number of mechanisms to balance the system to prevent blackouts. There may be temporary blackouts following missile attacks, but uncontrolled blackouts are unlikely. The government team is currently working on 3 levels of passive protection for critical infrastructure. The first level involves protection with gabions and sand, and the second level involves the construction of reinforced concrete bulkheads that can withstand direct hits from Russian drones. According to the government team, 22 of Ukrenergo’s energy facilities have installed the experimental third level of protection, but only 1-2 facilities are scheduled to pilot it. In general, most of Ukrenergo’s first-phase energy infrastructure facilities are already 85% protected.

An important element of resilience is providing backup power supply to educational and healthcare facilities. As of September 2024, 80% of schools and 100% of hospitals are equipped with generators. A total of 16,000 high-capacity industrial generators have been connected, but there is an urgent need for another 1,800 powerful generators.

Sustainable functioning of transport systems

Transport infrastructure also suffered from the first hours of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The first attempts to calculate the damage at the beginning of 2023 showed that the total loss of infrastructure in Ukraine was more than USD 35 billion, of which USD 26.6 billion was direct destruction of roads, and another USD 4.4 billion was the loss of Ukrzaliznytsia railway company from the war. State transport companies have noted a significant amount of infrastructure damage. Ukrzaliznytsia reported damage to 12,000 railway facilities, of which about 5,000 have been repaired. The Ukravtodor company counted 25,000 km of roads and 315 bridges damaged.

Despite this, Ukraine was able to ensure the controlled evacuation of Ukrainian citizens within the country and to the borders with Western partners. In 2022, Ukrzaliznytsia evacuated more than 4 million people from the frontline territories by train and transported 314,000 tonnes of humanitarian aid.

By blocking Ukrainian ports, Russia has inflicted a powerful blow to Ukraine’s economy. Prior to the full-scale invasion, a significant portion of imports and about 70% of exports were carried by sea, including 90% of agricultural products. With the loss of access to sea and air transport, road and rail transport have taken over the bulk of passenger and freight traffic.

Coordinated actions with EU partners helped to ensure the so-called ‘transport visa-free regime’, when transport permits were cancelled for Ukrainian carriers. The Government also worked with partners to develop military mobility routes for the delivery of military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine.

Through the joint efforts of the government team, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Armed Forces, in August 2023, after Russia withdrew from the grain deal, Ukraine managed to unblock the operation of Ukrainian ports despite the persistence of security risks. And in 2024, Ukraine shipped 66 million tonnes of cargo through the sea corridor from the ports of Odesa and the Danube, which is the same as in 2021.

Cybersecurity

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine had significant support from the US and EU in building institutional capacity in the field of cybersecurity. In 2021, Ukraine’s Cybersecurity Strategy until 2025 was adopted.

Russia’s aggression in cyberspace is an additional tool to the conventional means of warfare against Ukraine. The government’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) points out that since the beginning of full-scale aggression, Russia has significantly increased its attempts to destabilise the functioning of state institutions in cyberspace. The number of attacks is growing every year. Ministries, government agencies, and critical infrastructure, including the energy sector, IT companies, and telecommunications providers, are most often targeted by cyberattacks.

Overall, in 2023, the number of cyberattacks in Ukraine increased by 15.9% compared to 2022. In the first half of 2024, the number of Russian hacker attacks on Ukrainian facilities increased by 19% compared to the second half of 2023. Despite an 85% decrease in critical and high-risk incidents, the number of malware attacks increased by 40%.

Major attacks included the cyberattack on the mobile operator Kyivstar in December 2023, which left 24.4 million subscribers of the largest operator without communication for several days, and the January 2024 attack on the Parkovy data centre, whose clients include dozens of state-owned companies.

In the first half of 2024, Russian hackers shifted their cyberattacks to everything directly related to the theatre of operations and attacks on service providers.

The institutional cybersecurity infrastructure in Ukraine currently has significant potential to counteract the intentions of interference by Russia’s special services and other international criminal groups.

Societal resilience to information influences

Prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukraine remained a testing ground for Russia’s hybrid and information operations. Ukraine gradually built up its resilience and resistance.

This included bans and sanctions against a number of Russian TV channels, print media, and social media. However, Russian agents continued to operate on the territory of Ukraine in the form of parliamentary political parties, religious and civil society organisations, which were used by the Kremlin for subversive activities.

At the same time, the main institutional infrastructure for countering Russian propaganda and disinformation was created in 2021. At the same time, the Ukrainian civil society sector has gained considerable experience in developing initiatives to identify and counter Russian narratives.

The full-scale invasion significantly intensified the work of Ukrainian governmental and non-governmental institutions to identify and neutralise the pro-Russian ‘fifth column’, whose activities began to pose a deadly threat to Ukrainian society.

Ukraine has banned the activities of political parties whose links with Russia have been officially proven.

In 2022, as part of the implementation of the European Commission’s recommendations for obtaining EU membership, Ukraine adopted the Law on Media, which created additional frameworks to combat manipulation and disinformation produced by the Russian aggressor.

Other initiatives were also adopted at the parliamentary level, such as the resolution ‘On the use of the ideology of racism by the political regime of the Russian Federation, condemnation of the principles and practices of racism as totalitarian and hateful’.

Another landmark was the adoption by the Ukrainian parliament in 2024 of the Law ‘On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Religious Organisations’, which outlawed the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.

In September 2024, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy was renamed the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications, which should also symbolise efforts to strengthen the promotion of Ukrainian narratives.

 

1.3. Interaction with partners

The third element of comprehensive defence is interaction , which is the coordination of internal Ukrainian plans with measures taken to support Ukraine by the EU and NATO institutions, their members, as well as other states and international organisations.

Since 2014, Ukraine has clearly defined its foreign policy course towards EU and NATO membership and the implementation of the Association Agreement. In 2019, the course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration was enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine. In cooperation with partners from both organisations, as well as individual members, Ukraine has tried to pragmatically defend the interests of restoring its territorial integrity and sovereignty. This laid the groundwork for the development of wartime diplomacy’s systemic goals with the onset of full-scale aggression.

The elements of this crisis communication with partners are: the introduction of sanctions against Russia, financial and military assistance to Ukraine, European and Euro-Atlantic integration, prosecution for the crime of aggression, war crimes, transfer of Russia’s sovereign assets frozen in partner countries to Ukraine’s needs, and rebuilding the state after the war.

Given that Ukraine is dependent on political, diplomatic, economic, military and humanitarian support from the G7 partners, the European Union and NATO, official Kyiv is systematically fostering relations with its partners. Already in the first days of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine applied for EU membership as a form of long-term support and preservation of its democratic identity. As early as June 2022, Ukraine was granted the status of an EU candidate.

A similar algorithm has been tested for NATO membership, but given the lack of consensus and fears of escalation on the part of some allies, this initiative has not been developed significantly. Ukraine’s gradual path towards NATO membership received some progress at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, where the allies indicated that Ukraine would be in NATO, but without a clear timeframe for the invitation.

Among the many international initiatives initiated by Ukraine together with its partners, it is worth noting the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein Group) and the mechanisms for implementing the Peace Formula.

These initiatives truly demonstrate Ukraine’s resilience, the search for extraordinary solutions, and the appeal to international law. At the same time, these two initiatives are mutually beneficial. Implementation of the Peace Formula will create a broad legal framework for countering potential aggressors, not just Russia. At the same time, military cooperation within the framework of the Ramstein Group can already help the EU and its individual members build their defence capabilities and strengthen deterrence tools against a potential aggressor. It is worth mentioning here the establishment of 8 capability coalitions within the framework of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. These coalitions include 34 member states out of more than 50 Ramstein participants. The coalitions are formed around specific military capabilities that Ukraine needs to help develop. The topics are very urgent: demining, drones, IT, maritime capabilities, artillery, air defence, etc.

Some coalitions have already signed Memoranda of Understanding that allow for coordinated funding and procurement. This approach allows countries to pool their resources to jointly support Ukraine’s defence capabilities. The so-called ‘Danish format’ of investment, which involves the purchase of equipment from Ukrainian manufacturers in accordance with the needs of the Armed Forces, is worth mentioning. In this way, Denmark financed the production of the Ukrainian “Bohdana” self-propelled artillery system, and Lithuania intends to invest in the production of the “Palianytsia” long-range drone-missile. Overall, the investment potential of the Ukrainian defence industry is estimated at $20 billion by 2025.

 

2. What lessons should the European Union take into account?

 

2.1. Preparedness for a potential protracted armed conflict

Currently, Ukraine is acting as a kind of outpost of the EU and NATO on its Eastern borders, destroying Russia’s technical and human capabilities on its territory in a war of attrition. Officially estimated total combat losses of the enemy from 2022 to end of October are as follows: personnel about 695,000, tanks – 9137, troop-carrying AFVs – about 18500, artillery systems – 20,000 MLRS – 1240, anti-aircraft systems – about 1000, aircraft – 369, ships/boats – 28. This is an invaluable contribution to reducing the military potential of Russian aggression for years, but unfortunately Russia is already building up its capabilities to restore and modernise its defence.

If Russia is practically determined to open a front with an EU and NATO member on its Eastern flank, it may indicate that events would unfold in a negative scenario for Ukraine in 2025-2030. Thus, another Russian aggression in 2030 could mean a strategic defeat for Ukraine and its partners on the territory of Ukraine, and an inability to stop the Russian army’s invasion by joint efforts. This also means that in this scenario, Russia would legitimise its territorial seizures and create a strategic pause to reorient its military machine to new targets.

At the same time, it would mean that all potential instruments of non-military and conventional deterrence of Russia by the European Union have failed. Russia has the financial resources to continue its military offensive by reorienting its energy trade and by circumventing sanctions, and the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of generating significant amounts of modernised military equipment and ammunition in sufficient quantities to support a ground offensive.

Russia’s mobilisation resources would still be sufficient to repeat the tactics of fighting on the frontline with Ukraine, where daily losses of Russian troops could reach four figures.

However, an even more threatening element is that in such favourable conditions, military cooperation between Russia, Iran and North Korea would significantly increase the offensive potential of all three authoritarian regimes. These members of the coalition of aggression can strengthen each other’s military and technical capabilities, complementing the gaps in the military capabilities of the target country. Russia can rely on the capabilities of military-technical cooperation with Iran and the DPRK to build up strategic stockpiles of ammunition, ballistic missiles, and kamikaze drones needed for massive attacks.

The EU possesses potential tools that could be part of an effective deterrence infrastructure. Updating the majority of these instruments is connected with the search for ways to internationally coerce Russia to stop its aggression and restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The institutional and procedural formalisation of these steps could be a good warning signal to other authoritarian states with aggressive intentions towards the EU. After the elections, the new European institutions have the opportunity to strengthen the political framework for the formation of a system that would discourage potential enemies from aggression through non-military means. Unlike Ukraine, the European Union has the basis for a serious system of deterrence by punishment.

 

2.2. Deterrence by punishment

Strengthening the EU sanctions mechanism. It should be noted that since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2014, the sanctions regime has evolved significantly towards the introduction of severe restrictions on individuals and legal entities in Russia, Belarus, Iran, and other countries involved in the unleashing of aggression against Ukraine. However, the weak mechanism of monitoring and enforcement of sanctions by third countries leads to rapid adaptation of Russia and its allies to circumvent the sanctions regime.

For example, recent studies by Ukrainian experts of the debris of North Korean missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine in September 2024 indicate the presence of microelectronics elements from the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. At the end of 2023, Ukraine also handed over to its foreign partners a report on the parts made by European manufacturers in Iranian Shahed-136/131 drones, which are used almost daily by the Russians to target the Ukrainian population.

A separate area of focus here should be the preemptive search for legal entities registered in the EU by former immigrants from Russia or the CIS region who have permits or licences to export dual-use goods to ‘risk zone’ countries and then re-export these items to Russia.

Introduce mechanisms to compensate for the damage at the cost of the aggressor. If there is political will, the mechanism of transferring Russia’s sovereign assets to compensate for the damage caused by the aggression against Ukraine could be actualised. The EU has taken the first steps in this direction, but they are not sufficient in terms of demonstrating its determination to confront the perpetrator of international law. Currently, the use of windfall profits from the Russian assets to cover assistance to Ukraine, both military and financial, should be the first political step towards using the aggressor’s sovereign assets for the benefit of the victim.

Bringing to criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and developing appropriate mechanisms in accordance with international law. Leaders of authoritarian regimes tend to believe that the bloody international armed conflicts they unleash will not bring them before an international tribunal.

However, it is worth noting here that the decision taken by the International Criminal Court in March 2023 to issue arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Presidential Ombudswoman for Children’s Affairs Maria Lvova-Belova has had a significant impact on the Russian leadership. The warrant against the Russian president is the first ever issued against the leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council, whom the ICC suspects of war crimes in the form of illegal deportations and transfers of people, including children, from the occupied territory of Ukraine since at least 24 February 2022. Therefore, active work on the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression should also send a clear signal to V. Putin and his accomplices.

 

2.3. Deterrence by denial

A strategy for balancing new and traditional weapons

Two and a half years of experience in the war against Russia show that despite the innovative and technological solutions that come to the battlefield, traditional approaches to providing fire power in offensive and defensive operations play an equally important role. The same relates to military hardware. Therefore, when engaged in a war of attrition, it is important to have firepower parity between barrel and multiple rocket artillery. As part of the defence capability support programmes developed by the EU and NATO, EU member states should determine how many artillery pieces and what systems they should have at their disposal. A White Paper to be prepared by the new Commissioner for Defence and Space should provide answers on the EU’s own capabilities to balance the latest technological weapons with traditional means of countering the enemy.

Strengthening air and missile defence systems

Air and missile defence systems are an effective means of deterrence.

Despite the fact that NATO’s European allies have modern air and missile defence capabilities, Russia’s tactics of massive and combined use of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as long-range drones, indicate the need to build up a multi-level air defence system and create a significant stockpile of air defence ammunition.

Here, the advice may be to stop the embarrassing practice of ignoring the entry of Russian attack UAVs or cruise missiles into the airspace of NATO members. NATO air defence systems must demonstrate their ability to protect the security of their citizens.

The next step could be an extended deterrence model, with NATO’s Eastern flank countries taking over the protection of Ukraine’s Western regions. At the moment, it is hard to imagine how shooting down missiles over Ukrainian territory could be an escalation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, as some allies have pointed out. It is worth recalling that Ukraine’s request for air defence systems capable of defending against ballistic missile threats is urgent and directly aligned with the goals of resilience and civilian protection.

Engineering and fortification readiness

The Ukrainian experience should also make it clear that NATO’s new regional defence plans for the Eastern direction should use all available means to prevent Russia from temporarily occupying the territory. The example of Bucha and other occupied territories of Ukraine shows the inhuman treatment of civilians by Russian troops during the occupation. Torture, rape, looting, and murder are common practices for the Russian military. Therefore, proper engineering and fortification of the border with Russia (and Belarus) should be the first element of deterrence. Russian approaches to building offensive operations are also looking for weaknesses in the construction of Ukrainian defence. At present, Ukraine, in the absence of air superiority, has not yet found a response to the use of guided aerial bombs by Russian forces, which have a known destructive power. Due to the massive use of UAVs, Ukrainian defenders are forced to abandon their positions in order to save the lives of personnel. Therefore, the level of protection of engineered structures must be commensurate with the level of destructive power to save the lives of armed forces personnel.

Measures to protect critical infrastructure

Secondly, Ukrainian military experts have already shown that Russia’s long-range missile capabilities are being significantly modernised to improve their accuracy and resistance to electronic warfare, which requires physical protection of command and control facilities and critical infrastructure. New facilities should already be planned to be built to meet increased security requirements.

Particular attention should be paid to protecting nuclear energy facilities on the territory of countries on NATO’s eastern flank from damage or capture. Currently, there are nuclear power plants on the eastern border in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Finland. Poland intends to build nuclear power generation facilities. During the full-scale invasion, two Ukrainian NPPs were subjected to territorial attacks, and Zaporizhzhia NPP, the largest in Europe, is still under the control of the Russian occupiers.

Professional troops and mobilisation potential

If in 2022 Russia has not been deterred by the presence of about half a million Ukrainian citizens with combat experience since 2014 at the time of its invasion of Ukraine, it can be predicted that the numbers of most EU armies on the Eastern flank and the lack of combat experience will not be a serious deterrent for the Russian army. Therefore, at present, it is advisable to invite Ukrainian specialists with combat experience to train both contract soldiers and reservists in partner countries. Technological advances on the battlefield require changes to combat on a periodic basis, so the adaptation of training programmes should also be swift.

Particular attention should also be paid to modelling the preservation of mobilisation potential in the event of a protracted war, which may also pose a challenge to the authorities of the defending country. The models that Ukraine is currently adapting can serve as an example for some EU members, where the military doctrine provides for reliance on mobilisation resources to eventually replace professional troops.

 

2.4. Resilience of the Union, Member States and societies

Resilience of governance and delivery of essential services to the population

A national resilience framework based on NATO guidelines should also be based on clear measurement indicators that allow for tracking the level of threats and responses. Approaches to threat identification should also be unified at the EU level.

A separate area of resilience of crisis management elements is the digitalisation of a number of administrative, educational and advisory services. This reduces the need for geographical attachment and the need for physical contact with the relevant institutions.

It is worth noting that the regions of Ukraine played an instrumental role in repelling Russian aggression in 2022, where the leadership of local authorities was crucial. Given the different approaches to the administrative-territorial structure of EU member states, it is advisable to hold regional meetings of neighbouring states to share experiences and plan joint civilian information campaigns among their populations.

Resilience of critical infrastructure

The duration of the Russian-Ukrainian war should also encourage European partners to take into account the need for uninterrupted provision of vital services to their populations when developing their own resilience strategies. These include healthcare, education, and other essential services for citizens. Such facilities should be equipped with shelters that can accommodate the appropriate number of employees or clients, as well as adequate backup power sources.

Management of migration movement

The issue of internally displaced persons who may move from EU border countries should also be based on scenarios of varying intensity. According to the UN, in the two years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, more than 14 million Ukrainians have been forced to leave their homes, both internally displaced and those who have fled the country.

 

2.5. Interaction

Collective defence

The most obvious lesson from the Russian-Ukrainian war that the European Union should take into account is the urgent need to ensure that the armed conflict is ended before the enemy feels the potential to expand it to other countries, both EU and NATO members and partner countries, such as Moldova.

Ukraine’s experience should also demonstrate that even a relatively large army and a significant amount of defence capabilities will not ensure peace if the country acts alone, without partners and allies. Collective defence is the only possible way to gain peace in the vicinity of an authoritarian and militaristic regime.

Ongoing dialogue between the EU, NATO and Ukraine can greatly enhance the synergy of experience, resources and tools that will make the preparedness system more adaptive to threats, regardless of their scale or intensity. This is especially true when it comes to the experience of confronting an autocratic aggressive state that perceives democratic governance systems as a threat.

Coalitions as a model of adaptation

Capability coalitions are a mini-model for developing the necessary new defence technologies or equipment that are currently in demand on the battlefield. The creation of joint investment projects in MilTech, including those involving Ukrainian production, can be an important element in shaping future collective defence needs. Working with such coalitions should also be reflected in future EU programmes to support the defence capabilities of EU members.

 

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This publication was produced within the project “Supporting the activities of the Ukrainian National Platform of the EaP CSF in 2024” implemented by the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting.

Background information

The Ukrainian National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (UNP)  is a network of more than 150 non-governmental organizations in Ukraine that advocates Ukrainian interests within the framework of the Eastern Partnership. The platform is part of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF).

The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) is a unique multi-layered regional civil society platform aimed at promoting European integration, facilitating reforms and democratic transformations in the six Eastern Partnership countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Serving as the civil society and people-to-people dimension of the Eastern Partnership, the EaP CSF strives to strengthen civil society in the region and boost pluralism in public discourse and policy-making by promoting participatory democracy and fundamental freedoms. The EaP CSF is a non-partisan bona fide non-governmental organisation”.

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The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum Ukrainian National Platform

eap-csf.org.ua

unp.eap@gmail.com   

www.facebook.com/unp.eap.csf

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