The military-political relations between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation have undergone a gradual yet systemic evolution, resulting in the creation of a deep and multifaceted model of military cooperation. While formally declaring equality and mutual benefit, this model in practice reflects the asymmetric nature of the relationship, in which key defense decisions are increasingly made under the influence of Russian strategic interests.

Military cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation is a key element of their multi-level integration. Over the course of three decades, this cooperation has undergone significant transformations, culminating in the formation of joint military structures, the conduct of regular exercises, and the gradual loss of part of Belarus’s military sovereignty. The process of rapprochement became particularly intense after 2020, when the domestic political crisis in Belarus and the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Federation led to further convergence between Minsk and Moscow.

The military integration of the two countries is carried out through a series of institutional and legal mechanisms. At the same time, the preservation of part of Belarus’s sovereignty allows Minsk to position itself as an independent actor in international relations, while Moscow views the so-called “Union State” with Belarus as an important tool for advancing its geopolitical ambitions in the region.

This study aims to systematize the main elements of military cooperation between Belarus and Russia, outline its contractual and legal framework, analyze key formats of integration, and assess the strategic consequences of this process—both for the domestic political situation within Belarus and for regional security as a whole.

The study also seeks to draw the attention of the broader expert community and political actors in order to dispel misleading illusions about the true extent of cooperation between the Russian Federation and Belarus, and to promote the development of a comprehensive set of measures to prevent further integration of these two countries.

 

Authors:

• Anton Oksentiuk, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Pavlo Rad, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Mykhailo Sinauk,  Intern of the  “Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director of the “Russian and Belarusian  Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Reviewer:

• Agiya Zagrebelska, Advocacy, Partnerships & Communications Director, Economic Security Council of Ukraine.

 

Art and Technical Editor:

• Anatolii Chernysh, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER 1. THE TREATY FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN BELARUS AND RUSSIA

 

The historical trajectory of military cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation mirrors the broader evolution of their bilateral political relationship. In the 1990s, military cooperation was relatively limited and primarily driven by necessity, stemming from the transitional nature of post-Soviet political relations. Domestic political factors significantly influenced the development of military cooperation, notably the necessity to establish a foundational framework for future integration, which also served as leverage in domestic political strategies. For instance, in the late 1990s, the Belarusian leadership used military cooperation with Moscow as a tool to secure its own preferences and, at times, even to exert potential influence on Russian domestic politics under the Lukashenko regime.

 

From Russia’s perspective, military cooperation during this period reassured its political elites of the Kremlin’s ongoing influence over its neighboring states, a critical factor amidst the political instability marking Boris Yeltsin’s final years in office. This dynamic continued into subsequent decades: in the 2000s, the treaty framework saw little expansion, whereas from 2020 onward, it underwent a notable intensification—driven both by the internal political crisis in Belarus and the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which triggered the deepest regional security destabilization since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

 

To systematically address this topic, it is necessary to examine the treaty base that regulates military cooperation between Russia and Belarus. Although both countries have signed a large number of bilateral agreements, memoranda, and programs over the past decades, several key documents stand out not only in terms of their scope but also due to their significant impact on the current and future development of this military partnership. These critical treaties are outlined below:

 

“Agreement on Coordination of Actions in the Military Sphere,” July 20, 1992

 

This was the first formal agreement between Russia and Belarus following the collapse of the USSR. Its stated purpose was to coordinate the establishment of national armed forces in both countries, while also codifying a narrative that would become a recurring theme: a commitment to prevent “the use of territory by third countries against the partner state.”

 

“Treaty on Military Cooperation” / “Agreement on Joint Ensuring Regional Security in the Military Sphere,” December 19, 1997

 

These two documents should be considered among the most important in the further military cooperation between Russia and Belarus. They established a legal framework for integration, notably introducing the concept of the “Regional Group of Forces” (RGF) – a formation that remained theoretical for decades but began materializing with the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war. These documents provided the legal basis for the operations of this joint military formation, which functions under de facto unified command.

 

At the same time, the Treaty on Military Cooperation itself initiated the process of harmonizing the military doctrines and legislation of the Russian Federation and Belarus, unifying the command and control system, joint production of weapons, and the creation of a single state defense order.

 

“Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State of Russia and Belarus,” December 8, 1999

 

This document is one of the key agreements that primarily defines political and economic cooperation between Russia and Belarus. At the time of its signing, both sides genuinely intended to use it as a tool for the further formation of a joint state. However, within a few years, the “Union State” had effectively become a source of irritation for both countries. Despite the broad nature of the agreement, which did not provide for mandatory elements of military integration, it laid the groundwork for a potential threat to Belarus’ sovereignty and, consequently, to regional stability.

 

This is due to deep differences in the views of the two countries’ leadership on the future of this structure. For Russia, the Union State is seen only as a stage of deeper integration, the end result of which is likely to be some form of accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Russian Federation. At the same time, Minsk is publicly demonstrating that it is not currently considering the option of losing the remnants of its sovereignty. This discrepancy also determines the different approaches to military cooperation: for Russia, the Belarusian army is not a separate entity, so the absence of a formalized process of military integration within the Union State is quite natural.

 

“Agreement on Joint Protection of the External Border of the Union State in Airspace” (Unified Air Defense System), February 3, 2009

 

This agreement was the first significant and practical step towards the integration of the armed forces of Belarus and Russia. The agreement also provided legal grounds for transferring operational control of the Belarusian air defense system to Russia “during periods of threat” – a provision that effectively grants Moscow direct control. It is important to note that the signing of this agreement coincided with the beginning of Russia’s foreign policy confrontation with Western countries, as well as the start of decades of aggressive actions and rhetoric towards its neighbors. This confrontational policy only deepened in the future and was increasingly reflected in subsequent bilateral agreements with Belarus, which began to gradually transform into a de facto proxy force for Moscow.

 

“Strategic Partnership Program between the Ministries of Defense of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus for 2021–2025,” March 2, 2021

 

This program openly demonstrated for the first time Moscow’s desire to formalize the integration processes between the two states in the long term, especially in the military-technical sphere. Although in practice it is not publicly known how deep this integration goes (since a significant part of the statements are propaganda), this document should be seen as an important tool for the Russian Federation to put pressure on Belarus. It provides the Kremlin with additional arguments for promoting a number of integration initiatives in the military sphere, such as joint training, exercises, exchange of experience, as well as coordination of mobilization resources and military registration.

 

It is important to note that prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Belarusian-Russian military cooperation, though present, was largely symbolic and aimed at creating political pressure on Poland and Lithuania. However, with the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the situation changed dramatically. Since 2022, there has been a steady increase in the direct military presence of the Russian Federation on Belarusian territory. This is reflected, in particular, in the growing number of bilateral agreements that lay the groundwork for a permanent threat to both Ukraine’s northern border and NATO’s eastern flank.

 

“Protocol on Amendments to the 1997 Agreement on Regional Security,” December 3, 2022

 

This protocol laid the groundwork for the permanent stationing of Russian troops in Belarus. It legally formalized the presence of Russian forces and infrastructure within the Regional Group of Forces on Belarusian territory, shifting the emphasis from joint exercises to permanent deployment of Russian Armed Forces.

 

“Agreement on the Establishment and Operation of Joint Combat Training Centers,” March 28, 2023

 

This agreement marked a further step toward operationalizing the Regional Group of Forces. Rather than merely symbolic measures, it represents tangible integration. The training centers are designed to ensure a continuous Russian military presence on Belarusian soil.

 

“Package of documents on the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus,” May 25, 2023

 

Today, this agreement is one of two that pose the most serious threat to regional security from Belarus. It regulates the storage, control, and potential use of Russian tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus, effectively transforming the country into a forward base for Russia’s nuclear capability.

 

“Resolution on the Modernization and Development of the Union State’s Railway Infrastructure,” January 4, 2024

 

This initiative aims to upgrade critical rail lines connecting Russia’s Northwestern transport hub with Belarus. It strengthens the interdependence of both countries’ transportation systems for military purposes, enabling rapid deployment of troops and equipment. Considering that Russia is simultaneously enhancing its rail and military infrastructure near the Baltic states, this resolution should not be dismissed as mere rhetoric but seen as a key element in the development and sustained operation of the Regional Group of Forces.

 

“Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the Union State,” December 6, 2024

 

This treaty is the second most significant instrument of military interaction between Russia and Belarus. It marks the transformation of the Union State from a primarily political-economic project into a tool of regional security coercion. Legally, the agreement allows Russia to unilaterally deploy military assets in Belarus if a “threat to sovereignty” arises—a term left deliberately vague and subject to broad Russian interpretation. This includes not only troop deployments but also the construction of new military infrastructure beyond what already exists.

Vladimir Putin (left) and Alexander Lukashenko (right) during the signing ceremony of the “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the Union State,” at the meeting of the “Supreme State Council of the Union State”. December 6, 2024, Minsk, Belarus. “President of the Republic of Belarus”.

 

The treaties outlined above already present a direct military threat to Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members in the short term. Even if the war in Ukraine were to end, the current trajectory of Russian military infrastructure development in Belarus is unlikely to be reversed. This creates an urgent need for affected countries to enhance their defensive posture. As of now, neither Ukraine nor NATO’s eastern members, particularly Poland and Lithuania, appear adequately prepared, legally or politically, to respond swiftly in the event of a sudden political transition in Belarus.

 

Particular attention must be paid to the nuclear issue. Until 2021, the Belarusian Constitution enshrined the country’s neutral and non-nuclear status (Article 18), effectively prohibiting the presence of foreign nuclear weapons. However, late 2021 amendments abolished these provisions. The legitimacy of these changes is questionable, as they were adopted amid political crisis and without broad public debate. This means that in the long term, Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania have a real opportunity to raise this issue during negotiations with a potential new government that may replace Lukashenko’s regime. It is necessary to emphasize the lack of democratic process at the time of the decision to renounce neutrality and non-nuclear status, which creates legal space for international review of these changes in the future.

 

CHAPTER 2. COOPERATION BETWEEN BELARUS AND RUSSIA IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR

Military cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus has become a systemic factor in supporting the aggression against Ukraine. Despite international sanctions, the existing partnership format has demonstrated an ability to adapt and circumvent restrictions.

Long before 2022, there was an extensive network of military agreements and joint military structures between the two countries. One of the key structures is the joint Regional Group of Forces, as well as the integrated air defense system. Russia also maintained a significant military presence on Belarusian territory, particularly through agreements for the lease of military facilities. This historically established military cooperation provided a solid foundation for its intensification between 2022 and 2025.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the beginning of a qualitatively new phase of military collaboration between the Russian Federation and Belarus. Belarus provided its territory as a staging ground for the invasion, including for launching missiles at Ukrainian cities. In addition, the Belarusian military-industrial complex began actively serving the needs of the Russian army, and the official Minsk government transferred military equipment to Russia in several stages.

Thus, Belarus transferred at least 111 T-72 tanks, 40 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and Ural military trucks from storage depots. It is known that the Republic of Belarus exported over 130,000 tons of various types of ammunition to Russia between January 2022 and February 2023. Additionally, under the guise of modernization, an undisclosed number of Akatsiya self-propelled artillery systems were transferred.

Moreover, Belarusian arms manufacturers provided assistance in repairing and upgrading Russian military equipment, while Belarusian railway workers have been — and continue to be — a critical component in supporting Russia’s logistical capabilities.

2.1. Strengthening of Logistical Capabilities

With the start of the full-scale invasion, Belarus played a significant role in the logistical support of Russian military operations in Ukraine. Its territory was used for troop transit, equipment transfer, and as a base for certain air operations. Belarus’s geographical location provided Russia with a convenient staging ground for offensives into Ukraine’s northern regions, significantly reducing the time and distance needed for troop and equipment deployment.

The most important railway routes used for troop movement included Orsha (Belarus) – Bryansk (Russia), Kalinkovichi (Belarus) – Bryansk (Russia), and Minsk (Belarus) – Smolensk (Russia). It is highly likely that these routes are still used to transport defense-related components, now under the guise of civilian cargo. Railway hubs in Zhlobin and Orsha are used for reloading and transit of goods, as is the Minsk-2 airport, which is also integrated into the logistical chains.

Regarding road transportation, the most important routes are Minsk–Bryansk and Gomel–Novoazovsk, which facilitate the transport of essential equipment not only to Russian territory but also to the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories.

Based on this, the main logistical hubs in Belarus are Orsha, Kalinkovichi, and Baranovichi. Key facilities include the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant (ARP), storage depots in Gomel, and the “Bereza” training ground, which is frequently used for weapons testing.

Given the near-complete withdrawal of the Russian contingent from Belarusian territory, the two sides are now primarily focused on cooperation in the defense-industrial sector. Thus, the most common scheme of logistical interaction between Moscow and Minsk in the military sphere includes the following components:

• Stage 1: Transportation of weapons/components from Russia to Belarus (by rail or road transport).
• Stage 2: Belarusian factories (such as MZKT and the 558th Aircraft Repair Plant) modernize or repair the equipment.
• Stage 3: The completed systems are sent back to Russia or directly to the combat zone.

Given the regular deployment of logistical capacities and the transfer of weapons and troops—particularly within the framework of military exercises—the Russian Federation has developed a well-practiced and coordinated mechanism for the rapid movement of forces and assets into Belarusian territory. Additionally, both sides conduct regular exercises specifically focused on the relocation of military echelons as part of combat readiness checks, thereby achieving greater optimization of logistics processes.

This experience is extremely important for armies that heavily rely on rail transport, and in the context of escalating security tensions in the region, it could be used to conduct new military operations—both against Ukraine and against NATO member states.

2.2. Coordination of the Military-Industrial Complex

Even though Belarus is not directly involved in hostilities, it serves as an industrial base for the Russian Federation. Russian and Belarusian military industries are interdependent and well-integrated. According to the State Committee for Military Industry of the Republic of Belarus, 99 Belarusian enterprises supply 1,880 types of components and weapons elements for 255 enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.

Furthermore, since 2020,  the importance of the Russian market for the Belarusian defense industry has been growing. Thus, in 2019 the share of the Russian market was 26% (compared to 2015, the numbers were reduced by half which was possible due to the diversification of partnerships), but after the suppression of the protests and a significant weakening of Belarus’s sovereignty, the situation has changed. Therefore, in 2022, the share of the Russian market in Belarusian exports reached 60%

As in the Soviet times, the Belarusian military-industrial complex predominantly specializes in the manufacturing of heavy off-road military trucks; repair and modernization of vehicles and aircrafts; production of optical devices, sighting complexes, fire control systems, radio-electronic equipment, and software complexes.

 

Although Belarus is capable of producing a wide range of light armored vehicles, such as the BRDM “Kaiman” armored scout car or “Defender” MRAP, these have not been spotted in the Russian Army. The same goes with some modernized pieces of Soviet-era weaponry, such as MLRS “Uragan-M” or BM-21B “BelGrad” that could have been pretty useful in the conditions of a conflict of such scale and intensity. Consequently, Minsk acts not as a direct supplier, but rather as a subcontractor with its share of specialization and responsibility.

Belarusian armored vehicle “Volat V1” (MZKT 490100). Illustrative photo. BelTechExport.  

 

Thus, mobile launchers of Russian ground-based missile complexes “Topol-M” and “Yars” are placed on the wheeled chassis produced by the “MZKT”. On the chassis of the Belarusian manufacturer are also placed combat assets of the operational-tactical missile complex “Iskander”, multiple rocket launcher “Uragan-1M”, self-propelled launchers and mobile radar systems of the air-defense missile complex S-400 Triumf, etc. Belarusian defense industry enterprises also manufacture parts and components for Russian multiple launch rocket systems. For example, it is known that OJSC “Volatavto” produces components for the BM-21 “Grad” MLRS.

 

The 558 Aircraft Repair Plant repairs and modernizes Russian aircrafts, such as Su-25, Su-27, Su-30, and MiG-29, as well as Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters. Belarusian specialists of the “Monitor Service” plant are involved in the repair of “Tunguska”, “Tor”, and “Kvadrat” air defense systems at the request of Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Damaged Russian vehicles are also periodically repaired by Belarusian mechanics whether at Belarusian enterprises or at Russian ones, where specialists from Belarus are sent.

 

However, these are high-tech military products that are of the biggest importance for the Russian Federation – primarily optical and optical-electronic sighting systems. JSC “Peleng” manufactures multi-channel gunner’s sight “Sosna-U” that is used in T-72B3 main battle tanks, gunner’s sight with thermal channel “Essa” that is installed on T-90 tanks, as well as gunner’s sight “Plisa” installed on T-80U tank and its modifications. In addition, “Peleng” provides the Russian military with multi-channel gunner’s sight “Vesna-K” and “Sozh-TM” for BMP-3 fighting vehicles. JSC “Ekran produces on-board equipment for MiG-29, Su-27, Su-30, and Su-33 fighting jets, while JSC “Integral” is one of the main Belarusian manufacturers of microchips for a wide range of missiles, including strategic ones.

 

Moreover, due to the lack of a unified sanctions policy toward Russia and Belarus, defense enterprises of the Republic of Belarus are able to obtain Western-made equipment and components through imports facilitated by intermediary companies connected to Alexander Lukashenko. In particular, this enables the import of microchips and electronics of European and American origin, which are used in aircraft such as the Su-34 and Su-30SM, as well as in Russian missiles like the R-37, Kh-59M2A, S-300, Kh-101, “Iskander”, and “Kalibr”.

 

The beginning of Russia’s large-scale invasion naturally increased the volume of orders for the military-industrial complex of Belarus. Consequently, some defense enterprises in Belarus work in three shifts. For example, JSC “Peleng” was actively recruiting employees, and it received a large order for the production of “Sosna-U” gunner’s sight, almost all of which were transferred to Russia. A significant increase in defense orders and vacancies was spotted at other enterprises, including plants of “BelOMO Holding”, JSC “MZKT”, 558 Aircraft Repair Plant, and “Orsha Aircraft Repair Plant”. So it is not surprising that the State Military-Industrial Committee of Belarus reported a record volume of military production in 2024. This trend is also confirmed by the financial performance of some Belarusian defense companies. For example, one of the largest Belarusian defense enterprises, “Integral,” had delivered over six million microchips to Russia by mid-2024, worth $130 million, and the company’s profit for 2023 increased more than 40-fold compared to 2021.

 

Moreover, military-industrial cooperation between Belarus and Russia will continue. According to the program of military-technical cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation until 2025, a number of activities are planned. These include joint R&D on new and modernization of existing models of weaponry and military equipment, launching of joint production of final samples of weapons, military equipment, and their components, as well as the implementation of measures of the common policy in the field of rate setting, standardization, and cataloging of military products. Since the current document expires this year, the parties are already developing a corresponding program for the period up to 2030. It can be expected that it will be finalized by the end of the current year, and its content will not differ significantly.

 

It appears that the Belarusian defense industry will also be ramping up the production of ammunition and drones. In particular, there are plans to manufacture 300,000 rocket projectiles and 450,000 artillery shells per year. Belarusian arms manufacturers are also placing special emphasis on drone production. One of the enterprises within the Amkodor holding — “SVT Plant” — is gradually developing drone manufacturing, with the most promising models by Belarusian standards being the “Svisloch SVT” and “Chekan.” However, given the rather mediocre quality of Belarusian drones, a more realistic scenario would be to shift production to Russian manufacturing facilities. This is especially likely since the Russian side has already publicly announced such plans.

 

Thus, the current formula of defense cooperation between Minsk and Moscow indicates a low likelihood of direct involvement of the Belarusian army in the war at this time. Belarus is important not as a combat force, but as a quiet rear base where military equipment and components can be manufactured without the risk of strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This situation also allows Minsk to be used for more flexible purposes, such as conducting information and psychological operations.

 

2.3. Conducting Joint Information and Psychological Operations

In addition to serving as a logistical and material base for Moscow, Belarus has also become an active participant in Russia’s psychological and information operations. For example, the leak of Pentagon documents revealed that in the first half of 2023, Russia attempted to create the impression—particularly within Ukrainian intelligence—of a possible second offensive from Belarusian territory. These actions, combined with mobilization drills and periodic declarations about preparing for war, are aimed at maintaining constant pressure on Ukrainian society and its military-political leadership.

Similar tactics have been observed in the context of Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine and attempts to regain control over lost territories in the Kursk region. In this regard, Belarus conducted military exercises and accused Ukraine of sending saboteurs across the border and violating Belarusian airspace—further contributing to the broader psychological warfare strategy coordinated with Russia.

In June 2024, this pressure compelled Lukashenko to publicly announce the deployment of additional troops to the border with Ukraine—allegedly in response to maneuvers by the Ukrainian army. Simultaneously with creating artificial tension along the Ukrainian border, the Lukashenko regime sought to expand its room for geopolitical maneuvering, notably through joint military exercises with China and the release of political prisoners.

These actions may not have gone unnoticed: Russia repeatedly launched Shahed 136/131 kamikaze drones and cruise missiles at Ukraine through Belarusian airspace. Concerned that the situation could spiral out of control, Lukashenko ordered the withdrawal of troops from the Ukrainian border on July 13, in an apparent attempt to avoid a potential military response from Kyiv.

However, on August 10—nearly a month after the de-escalation—Lukashenko ordered a renewed deployment of one-third of the Belarusian army to the Ukrainian border, citing alleged violations of Belarusian airspace as justification.

These actions were prompted by Ukraine’s operation in the Kursk region and accusations in Russian media that Lukashenko had deliberately withdrawn troops from the Ukrainian border in July, thereby allowing the Armed Forces of Ukraine to open a new front. To deflect the wave of criticism and demonstrate its commitment to allied obligations, Minsk resorted to symbolic actions, sending only 1,400 troops to the Ukrainian border.

In addition to troop movements, the Lukashenko regime has also employed nuclear-related narratives as part of its information and psychological operations (IPSO). Despite the joint announcement by Moscow and Minsk in early 2023 regarding the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, there is no concrete evidence confirming that such weapons are actually present in Belarus.

According to statements by Belarusian and Russian officials, the intended delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons were to be the Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile system and modified Su-25 attack aircraft. However, this approach raises several questions. First, the Su-25 is not structurally designed to carry nuclear weapons, primarily because it is a subsonic aircraft. This means that in the event of deploying a nuclear warhead, the aircraft would likely be unable to exit the blast zone in time, resulting in the death of the pilot. Second, it is unclear why efforts would be made to modify these aircraft when the Belarusian military already possesses platforms that do not require such modifications—such as the MiG-29, Su-35, and Su-24—which are capable of carrying nuclear payloads more effectively and safely. These factors cast doubt on the practical readiness of Belarus to serve as a nuclear base and suggest that the nuclear deployment narrative may be more about psychological signaling than actual military capability.

The Iskander-M missile system appears to be a more realistic delivery platform. Belarusian military personnel have reportedly trained in the use of non-conventional weapons with this system, but there is no concrete evidence to confirm even training launches. A key example in this regard was the joint exercise held in June 2024 to test non-strategic nuclear weapons systems. During these drills, the Belarusian side did not conduct actual launches from Iskander-M systems, and the Belarusian Ministry of Defense attempted to present external fuel tanks mounted on Su-25 aircraft as if they were nuclear warheads.

Another indicator suggesting that the purported deployment of nuclear weapons in Belarus is largely an information and psychological operation (IPSO) is the sheer number of public statements made by both Belarusian and Russian officials on the matter. If the deployment were driven by genuine military necessity, the weapons would likely have been stationed without any public disclosure. Furthermore, from a strategic standpoint, deploying nuclear weapons in Belarus offers Russia no tangible military advantage. Moscow already possesses a vast arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons capable of striking any location on the globe. The strategic depth required for deploying non-conventional weapons is already ensured by the heavily militarized Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Therefore, the primary utility of the Belarus narrative lies in its value for nuclear blackmail of Western countries and exerting pressure on Lukashenko to remain compliant within the Kremlin’s strategic framework.

A similar approach is used regarding the so-called “Oreshnik” — a Russian experimental medium-range ballistic missile, which Russia employed during its attack on the Ukrainian city of Dnipro, and also as a tool of politico-nuclear intimidation against Ukraine in November 2024. The Lukashenko regime has actively pushed the narrative about the deployment of this weapon on Belarusian territory. It is highly likely that Minsk will continue to reference the “Oreshnik”, especially in the context of the upcoming large-scale joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises “Zapad-2025.”

Therefore, with high probability, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the “Oreshnik” system in Belarus serves as one of the instruments of Russia’s information and psychological operations (IPSO). At the same time, the actual deployment of such systems on Belarusian soil remains a possibility in the future, contingent on an even deeper erosion of the neighboring country’s sovereignty.

 

 

CHAPTER 3. THE “REGIONAL GROUP OF FORCES” OF BELARUS AND RUSSIA

 

According to bilateral agreements, the “Regional Group of Forces” (RGF) of the Union State of Russia and Belarus is a joint military structure that both countries may activate in response to escalating threats. In practice, however, this structure had not been deployed or mentioned much until the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The first official statements regarding the deployment of the RGF came in October 2022 from Alexander Lukashenko and Russian Ministry of Defense representatives. Essentially, the RGF gives Russia a legal way to redeploy a large number of troops to Belarus at any time. This creates a constant risk of escalation and poses a persistent challenge to regional security, independent of the ongoing war. Furthermore, current doctrines and agreements stipulate that, in the event of deployment, Russian military command would effectively control the RGF.

 

3.1. Timeline of the Deployment of the Regional Group of Forces (2022–2025)

 

On October 10, 2022, Alexander Lukashenko announced the deployment of the joint Regional Group of Forces with Russia, citing “escalation along Belarus’s western borders” as justification. Over the next few days, Belarusian officials provided more details, stating that approximately 9,000 Russian troops were arriving in Belarus. However, the focus was on the large-scale transfer of military hardware, including 170 tanks, up to 200 armored vehicles, and up to 100 artillery systems and mortars.

 

It was noted that Russian units would be stationed at four training grounds in eastern and central Belarus. By early January 2023, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced that the RGF had been fully deployed and was operationally ready. However, the total number of Russian troops in Belarus had reached 11,000–12,000 by that time. This included a permanent Russian military presence at two bases: the 43rd Navy Communications Center (VLF transmitter) in Vileyka and the “Volga” radar station north of the city of Hantsavichy.

 

Additionally, it is worth noting that the initial deployment of the RGF in Belarus included units from Russia’s 1st Guards Tank Army in the Western Military District. These units had sustained casualties in Ukraine and were undergoing replenishment and training at Belarusian training grounds. By December 2022, these units had been redeployed to positions near the city of Svatove in Ukraine’s Luhansk region. In early 2023, elements of the Russian Armed Forces’ 3rd Army Corps replaced them within the RGF. This shows that the Russian leadership was using the RGF not only for troop deployments but also to rehabilitate and retrain its forces on Belarusian soil.

 

In June 2023, an attempted coup by the so-called “Wagner PMC” took place in the Russian Federation, as a result of which about 5,000 Wagner fighters were relocated to Belarus by agreement with Lukashenko. As early as July 2023, the Russian army had withdrawn most of its regular troops from Belarus. According to data from the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine and the monitoring group “Belaruski Hajun,” nearly all Russian units had left Belarus by early July. This withdrawal included not only personnel but also aviation assets—11 helicopters and 9 aircraft previously stationed at the Machulishchy and Baranovichi airfields.

 

Belarusian and Russian mobile artillery systems on the “Zapad-2021” military exercises on the territory of Belarus. September 2021, Belarus. Wikimedia Commons.  

The Belarusian training grounds that hosted Russian units as part of the Regional Group of Forces (RGF) during this period were dismantled. The latter was later used by militants from the Wagner Group, who conducted and potentially continue to conduct training for Belarusian military personnel (some of whom, apparently, were subsequently integrated into the internal troops under the command of Nikolai Karpenkov). By autumn 2023, following the death of Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the remaining Wagner elements (numbering a few hundred) were employed by Minsk to train Belarusian special forces and exert psychological pressure on Poland and Lithuania, as they were also stationed near the city of Grodno at Belarusian military bases, the deployment sites of the 6th Belarusian Separate Mechanized Brigade.

 

According to monitoring data from March 2024, the total number of Russian troops in Belarus remained at around 2,000. This contingent includes instructors, air defense units, and elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). It is important to note that these are permanent forces, not part of the RGF structure. The current limited Russian military presence in Belarus is clearly a consequence of the ongoing war with Ukraine. The intensity of combat operations, coupled with growing manpower challenges within the Russian Armed Forces, constraints Moscow’s ability to deploy larger forces to Belarus.

 

Therefore, the main focus regarding the activities of the IRF should be on the medium and long term. First of all, it should be noted that, according to current information, Russia and Belarus are actively preparing for the “Zapad-2025” military exercises. Plans indicate that up to 13,000 Russian troops are expected to arrive in Belarus in September 2025 for the maneuvers, representing the largest deployment of Russian forces to Belarusian territory since the war began. Considering that active combat in the Russo-Ukrainian war may have ceased by that point, the issue of whether these Russian troops will remain in Belarus after “Zapad-2025” becomes a pressing concern. It is worth recalling that the last iteration of these exercises took place on the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A similar scenario is possible within the framework of the RGF.

 

In practical terms, the Regional Group of Forces will immediately become relevant to Ukraine and the countries of NATO’s eastern flank as soon as the Russo-Ukrainian war ends. If the Russian leadership plans to use Belarusian territory to renew aggression against Ukraine or exert direct pressure on Poland and Lithuania, it is likely that Moscow will use the legal and operational framework of the Union State’s RGF. This possibility underscores the need to monitor and analyze RGF infrastructure, which could potentially be used in the future.

 

3.2. Military Infrastructure of the Regional Group of Forces of Russia and Belarus

 

As expected, the Regional Group of Forces does not currently have a fixed, formally regulated permanent composition. The core of the RGF consists of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. At the time of its announcement, President Lukashenko stated that over 70,000 troops would be deployed. Despite Moscow’s formal declaration of its full involvement in the group, the “regional forces” have not been deployed in the specified numbers. This is primarily due to the lack of available Russian forces amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Belarusian army has about 60,000 personnel. Back in 2022, Alexander Lukashenko publicly announced plans for Russia to allocate 10,000-15,000 soldiers to serve in the group, although he acknowledged that there were no real possibilities for sending them at that time.

 

When the RGF was deployed, its Russian component included motor rifle and tank units, artillery battalions, air defense elements, and an aviation group. However, as previously noted, a significant portion of these forces was later redeployed to participate in the war against Ukraine. The status of hundreds of ground equipment units reportedly transferred to Belarus in late 2022 remains unclear. In October 2022, Russia stationed a flight of MiG-31K interceptors armed with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in Belarus, but they were subsequently withdrawn. In 2023, Russia delivered at least 10 trainloads of Iskander-M missile systems and S-400 air defense systems to Belarus, which were likely returned to Russia in May 2025.

 

As part of the RGF, Belarus provided Russian forces with access to military infrastructure for deployment, training, and logistical support.

 

Training grounds and field camps. A number of field camps were used during the deployment of Russian troops to Belarus at the end of 2022 as part of the RGF. These include:

• Obuz-Lesnovsky (Baranavichy district). This was the largest camp for Russian troops, with 150 tents accommodating up to 3,000 personnel.
• Lepelsky (Lepelsky district). Hosted 75 tents for up to 1,500 personnel.

• Repishche (Mogilev region). A camp where artillery training took place. It had 30 tents for 500-600 soldiers.

There is also information about a number of training grounds where Russian troops, together with the armed forces of Belarus, conducted exercises. The training grounds used were Domanovo (Ivatsevichi district), Gozhsky (Grodno district), Borisov (Borisov district), Osipovichi (Osipovichi district), and Brest (Brest district). Although RGF Russian troops withdrew from Belarus in the summer of 2023, the training grounds’ infrastructure (facilities, storage areas, and training fields) remains in place and could be used again if forces are built up further. It is also noteworthy that around the same time as the Russian withdrawal, the Belarusian military constructed an additional field camp in the village of Tsel near Repyshche. As of summer 2023, it contained 303 tents capable of accommodating up to 15,000 troops.

 

It should be noted that the configuration of the deployment and participation of Russian troops within the RGF was carried out in such a way as to be located on the Brest-Vitebsk line, which is about 500 kilometers that corresponds to a standard operational march distance. This positioning enables the rapid redeployment of forces to the western borders of Belarus if necessary. Overall, the Russian component of the RGF could potentially reach 20,000–25,000 personnel under current conditions. 

 

As a result, this situation allows Russia to create a permanent threat to both Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank simply by deploying its own forces on Belarusian territory. Most likely, in the future, Belarusian military infrastructure will be capable of deploying 30,000 troops on its territory, as this was the size of the army stationed in Belarus in February 2022.

 

In the medium and long term, the development and modernization of Belarus’s railway infrastructure is a significant factor, and Russia is actively involved in this effort. In late November 2023, Russia and Belarus signed a program aimed at modernizing rear-area support facilities intended for joint use by the Regional Group of Forces, covering the period from 2023 to 2027. Funding for this initiative was officially set to begin in 2024. Although the specifics of the agreement have not been published, it is highly likely that railway infrastructure is a central focus, especially considering the adoption of a resolution in early 2024 regarding the “modernization and development of the railway infrastructure of the Union State.”

 

CONCLUSIONS

 

The current political and security situation in Eastern Europe clearly shows that years of military cooperation between Russia and Belarus have led to a significant and ongoing threat along their borders with Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank. Evidence of this includes the formation of joint military structures, the deployment of Russian troops, and the development of military infrastructure in Belarus. In addition to these elements, which existed prior to the full-scale invasion, a production component has been added to this cooperation. Belarus actively supports Russia by repairing and refurbishing military equipment, manufacturing components, assembling and testing systems, supplying fuel to the Russian Armed Forces, and playing a significant role in circumventing international sanctions.

 

Today, the most critical and potentially dangerous element of military cooperation between Russia and Belarus is the Regional Group of Forces (RGF), which is formally tasked with ensuring the security of the Union State. In practice, however, it allows Russia to freely deploy substantial military assets and personnel on Belarusian territory, posing a direct military threat to both Ukraine and NATO member states. The experience of RGF deployments in 2022–2023 demonstrated that Belarusian infrastructure is already capable of hosting at least 20,000–25,000 Russian troops, and ongoing modernization of railway and logistical facilities by 2027 will only expand this capacity.

 

It must be noted that the RGF is currently underutilized due to the high intensity of combat operations in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Russia’s military leadership lacks sufficient reserves to simultaneously sustain its front-line forces and conduct a full-scale RGF deployment in Belarus. In the event of a pause or end to hostilities in the Russian-Ukrainian war, provided that the Russian Federation achieves at least its minimum military objectives in Ukraine, the Regional Group of Forces will most likely become a mechanism for the long-term deployment of Russian troops on Belarusian territory, further complicating threat assessment and response planning.

 

An important aspect of the current format of interaction between Moscow and Minsk is Belarus’s participation in Russian information and psychological operations. Within these operations, Belarus is used by Russia to create additional psychological pressure on Ukraine and Western countries. Additionally, the Lukashenko regime promotes a regime of strategic ambiguity.

 

Taken together, these factors have effectively transformed Belarus from a nominal Russian ally into a logistical and operational rear base, increasingly integrated into the Russian military system. Effective deterrence of this process will require Ukraine and its partners to pursue coordinated sanctions, conduct targeted monitoring of Belarusian logistics and support elements of Belarusian sovereignty as a key barrier against further military absorption by Russia.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Considering the situation surrounding Belarus, two key objectives and recommendations for achieving them can be identified, which are relevant for EU and NATO member states.

1. Eliminating the potential threat of direct military confrontation between Western countries and Belarus and Russia, as well as creating obstacles to the escalation of their cooperation. This can be achieved through the following actions:

• NATO member states should plan national, regional, and NATO-level exercises involving Ukrainian contingents over the next five years, addressing security challenges in the region (with scenarios that could be both defensive and offensive). This approach will help achieve a higher level of coordination and preparedness, while also sending a clear signal to Moscow about the Alliance’s readiness to counter Russian ambitions.

 

• The Alliance should pay additional attention to NATO initiatives and capabilities: strengthen the capabilities of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and their deployment in the region to increase the number and reduce the reaction time of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VHRJTF); initiate a five-year VHRJTF response plan with a focus on the Baltic region; create a regional logistics support base for NATO operations, which will help address issues of supply, military equipment, and other needs; strengthen airspace patrol capabilities; improve and adapt elements of NATO’s strategic communication according to the security situation in the region. Also, Alliance countries should realize that Ukraine is the cornerstone of the regional security system, and supporting the capabilities of the Ukrainian army is a key factor in countering and deterring Russia’s aggressive actions.

 

• Individual member states, primarily Poland and the Baltic countries, need to strengthen their national defense capabilities: increase military potential both quantitatively and qualitatively, which will at least partially reduce the advantage of Russia and Belarus in conventional armed forces in the region; consider and develop general mobilization plans; increase the number of conscripts and strengthen the trained reserve. Our partners should learn from Ukraine’s experience gained during the Russo-Ukrainian war and implement joint response projects to security and military threats.

 

• Alongside strengthening their own defense capabilities, European countries, together with Ukraine, should work to hinder military cooperation between Moscow and Minsk. Thus, the European Union needs to slightly adjust its approach to advancing sanctions at the European level, placing greater emphasis on Belarusian defense industry enterprises that collaborate with their Russian counterparts.

 

• The European Union, in cooperation with Ukraine, should unify the approach to creating lists of military and dual-use components that could be utilized in Belarusian defense products. At the same time, it is important to impose sanctions on Belarusian logistics companies whose owners are linked to Lukashenko, as these enterprises are often used as intermediaries for purchasing sanctioned goods.

 

2. As the period before the 2020 protests demonstrated, the best tool to prevent the strengthening of Russian influence in Belarus is to strengthen Belarusian sovereignty. Therefore, the next step should be to ensure Belarus distances itself from the Russian Federation and expands its room for maneuver. This is especially relevant after the end of the active phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war, as the Kremlin will likely attempt to use the operational pause to strengthen its positions in Belarus. Minsk’s distancing from Moscow could potentially become a prerequisite for possible democratic transformations in Belarus.

 

• The European Union needs to develop a comprehensive strategy regarding Belarus that goes beyond pressure and deterrence and encompasses a broader set of tools aimed at creating an influence infrastructure within Belarus.

 

• Poland and the Baltic countries, possibly within the framework of the Lublin Triangle, should consider developing and confidentially delivering to Lukashenko, in coordination with the EU and partners, a pragmatic “roadmap” of potential concessions from the regime and how the West would respond to such actions. This step would not signify an automatic readiness of Western countries to turn the page but would demonstrate to Minsk that a certain window of opportunity remains open.

 

• The EU should maintain differentiated channels of communication with the official Minsk, as keeping an exchange of signals with the Lukashenko regime will allow the EU to monitor developments in Belarus and gauge the sentiments of the elites. Communication will also serve as a reminder to Lukashenko and his regime that relations with the EU offer an alternative path for dialogue and de-escalation. Additionally, it can be used as a tool to address practical issues, such as the release of political prisoners.

 

• At the same time, European countries and official Kyiv need to prepare for scenarios involving a change of power in Belarus, considering that Lukashenko’s current presidential term may be his last. Developing an action plan will allow them to be better prepared to respond to Russian attempts to firmly consolidate their influence in Belarus during this period of uncertainty and to integrate Belarus into Russia’s security space.

 

• Finally, the EU, together with Ukraine, needs to develop a strategy for engaging with the potential future government of Belarus in the period following Lukashenko’s departure from power, specifically regarding Minsk’s return to a non-nuclear status. The foundation of this document should be the restoration of that status, which was removed as a result of amendments made to the Belarusian Constitution in 2021. The key argument should emphasize the lack of broad public discussion at the time these changes were introduced. The EU must consider the need for de-escalatory rhetoric in this strategy and propose that the future Belarusian government conduct a public discussion on the non-nuclear status through a national referendum, involving joint observers from the OSCE and Russia (to prevent accusations from Moscow of falsification).

The policy paper was prepared within the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the “International Renaissance Foundation”. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the “Ukrainian Prism” and do not necessarily reflect the position of the “International Renaissance Foundation”.