Throughout the 2000s, cooperation between the two sides expanded, including participation in joint defense projects. By the mid-2010s, it had reached its peak level, becoming an essential foreign policy tool for official Minsk.
This study aims to analyze the state of Belarus–China security relations through the lens of the erosion of Belarusian sovereignty, brought about by the suppression of protests in 2020 and the country’s involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The policy brief examines the main areas of military cooperation between Belarus and China through the implementation of joint defense projects, assesses the impact of Minsk–Beijing defense cooperation on the course of the Russia–Ukraine war, and explores the structural changes in their cooperation after 2022. It also outlines Belarus’s key military-political interests in the context of developing security cooperation with China.
Author:
- Pavlo Rad, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
Editor:
- Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
Art and Technical Editor:
- Anatolii Chernysh, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
1. JOINT BELARUS-CHINA MILITARY PROJECTS
While the initial foundation of security cooperation between Belarus and China was based on the transfer of Soviet-style weaponry, the development and modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army created a demand for additional technologies. Thus, by the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, cooperation between the two countries expanded: Belarus assisted Beijing in the development of command, control, communications, and intelligence systems, and also transferred technologies for the production of heavy chassis used for mounting various missile systems. Since then, Belarus and China have been implementing joint military projects in three main areas: the production of heavy wheeled vehicles, the production and modernization of missile weapons, and cooperation in space technologies and electronics. After 2022, cooperation in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) was added to this list.
Production of Heavy Wheeled Vehicles. In 1997, Sanjiang Volat Special Vehicle Company, a joint Belarusian-Chinese enterprise, was established to produce heavy and super-heavy military vehicles, as well as specialized chassis under the WANSHAN brand. As of today, the People’s Liberation Army of China uses a number of transporter-erector-launchers and missile systems mounted on WANSHAN chassis. Specifically, this includes the WS2300, WS2400, WS2500, and WS2600 chassis types.
Cooperation in this direction continued, and in 2009, a joint venture was established in Minsk to produce hydromechanical transmissions for heavy and specialized equipment called Volat-Santszya. The company manufactures automatic transmissions of the MZKT-2361, MZKT-3361, MZKT-4361, MZKT-5561, and MZKT-6561 types. These transmissions are used not only in Belarusian army vehicles but also in Russian military systems. In particular, this refers to the MZKT-7930 family of special wheeled chassis and tractors equipped with the MZKT-5561 automatic transmission, which serve as platforms for weapons systems such as the Iskander ballistic missile system, the Bal coastal defense system, and the Uragan-1M multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS).
Production and Modernization of Missile Weaponry. In the early 2010s, security cooperation between Minsk and Beijing intensified significantly, and the nature of their collaboration underwent a major shift: Belarus transitioned from being a donor to becoming a recipient of technologies.
One of the most well-known projects of Belarus–China military cooperation was the development of the Polonez multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in 2014, carried out by the Precision Electromechanics Plant in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), a branch of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). It was CASC that transferred the technology needed for the production of A200 missiles (with a range of up to 200 km), which are used in the Polonez system. At present, the Precision Electromechanics Plant has also mastered production of the upgraded Polonez-M MLRS, capable of carrying missiles with a range of up to 300 km. After testing was completed, the system began to enter service: according to open sources, the Polonez and Polonez-M MLRSs are currently deployed with 13 units of the Belarusian Armed Forces.
However, there are doubts as to whether Belarus possesses sufficient production capabilities to manufacture the ammunition for these systems. For example, the Polonez missiles are reportedly assembled manually, raising concerns about the overall quality of the rockets, the consistency of Chinese component deliveries, and the Belarusian defense industry’s capacity to scale up production.
Nevertheless, the Polonez and Polonez-M systems are generally regarded as the most successful examples of Belarus–China defense cooperation, though not the only ones. Missile cooperation has also involved the modernization of Belarusian surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs). In 2017, the Chinese defense company ALIT (Aerospace Long-March International Trade) signed a contract to supply solid-fuel rocket engines for the modernization of Belarus’s Buk SAM systems to the Buk-MB2 version. The upgraded 9M318 missile is capable of intercepting stealth aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles at distances of up to 70 kilometers. The missile is currently undergoing testing, and the modernized Buk-MB2 systems will likely begin entering Belarusian military units soon.
Electronics and Space Technologies. As with the production of heavy wheeled vehicles and cooperation in missile technologies, Belarus and China began establishing cooperation in the field of space technologies in the early 2000s. This cooperation primarily focused on the exchange of technologies in the production of aerospace electro-optical equipment and photogrammetric systems used for creating digital electronic maps of the Earth’s surface, as well as for providing navigation support for precision weaponry.
By 2012, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) became a partner of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus within the framework of a satellite development program. The flagship project of this collaboration was the creation of the National Satellite Communication and Broadcasting System of the Republic of Belarus, named Belintersat-1. In 2016, the satellite was launched into Earth orbit from China’s Xichang Satellite Launch Center.
After 2020, cooperation in this area continued but on a more modest scale. For instance, there have been relatively small contracts signed for the supply of electronics. One example of such cooperation was the 2024 delivery by OJSC Integral, one of the key enterprises in Belarus’s military-industrial complex, of electronic products to China worth over USD 7 million.
Cooperation in the Field of UAVs. Following the full-scale Russian invasion, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense began partially adopting modern combat practices and aligning with current defense trends. One such area is the procurement and production of drones, which has taken place with certain support from Beijing. In July 2024, the Belarusian defense ministry purchased Chinese FPV drones, Chimera CX10, which are likely intended for training UAV operators. In August of the same year, information surfaced about Minsk’s plans to acquire an additional 9 units: (1) 4 EVO MAX 4T UAVs, (2) 4 EVO MAX 4N Standard Bundle UAVs, and (3) 1 Dragonfish Standard UAV. In October 2024, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced tenders for the purchase of 13 Autel EVO MAX 4T systems, 6 Autel EVO MAX 4N systems, and 5 FIMI X8 SE 2022 Megaphone Combo systems.
It is known that the Chinese Chimera CX10 drones have already been delivered to Belarusian military units. For instance, the 11th Independent Mechanized Brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces, based in the town of Slonim in the Grodno region, has been equipped with these drones. Belarusian arms manufacturers have also attempted to develop a domestic drone of comparable quality, including by integrating Chinese components into some prototype models. One such case was recorded during the development of the “Mirotvorets” UAV prototype, which was fitted with a Chinese engine. However, there is no evidence of widespread use of Chinese components in Belarusian drone production.
Overall, cooperation with China has enabled Belarus to gain access to new technologies and initiate the modernization of certain types of weaponry. At the same time, defense cooperation between Belarus and China extends beyond joint military projects and encompasses a broader range of initiatives that, to some extent, influence the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
2. IMPACT OF BELARUS-CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION ON THE COURSE OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR
It is well known that Belarus actively supplies Russia with military-grade products, primarily heavy wheeled vehicles, as well as optical devices, control systems, and various types of electronics. Minsk plays a rather specific role in supporting the military capabilities of the Russian army, which is largely due to the particular structure of the Belarusian military-industrial complex, as most enterprises do not carry out a full production cycle of military equipment.
Although the Belarusian defense industry is capable of producing some modern weaponry, such as a wide range of light armored vehicles like the BRDM “Caiman” or heavy wheeled armored vehicles (classified by NATO as MRAPs) like the “Defender”, these systems have not been observed in the Russian Armed Forces. The same applies to several modernized Soviet-era systems, such as the “Uragan-M” MLRS or the BM-21B “BelGrad”, which could prove useful in a conflict of such scale and intensity. The transfer of joint Belarusian-Chinese developments, such as the previously mentioned “Polonez” and “Polonez-M” MLRS or the “Buk-MB2” SAM system, is unlikely without Beijing’s approval, and China has refrained from such actions during the three years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. Therefore, Belarus plays an important role not as a direct supplier of weaponry, but rather as a subcontractor with its area of specialization and responsibility.
Given the outlined limitations and Beijing’s cautious approach toward supplying weapons to the Russian army, covert sales of critically important components to Belarusian defense enterprises needed for the production of high-tech military goods as well as the strengthening of defense industry production capacities (in part through the transfer of equipment), remain among the few means by which China can indirectly support Russia’s military capabilities while also expanding its sources of revenue.
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, there have been multiple flights of Chinese cargo aircraft to Belarus. The highest intensity of such activity was recorded in January 2024, when planes operated by the Chinese cargo airline Air China Cargo made several flights to Minsk, reportedly delivering cargo of military significance. The aircraft likely carried machinery and equipment essential for expanding the production capacity of certain Belarusian defense enterprises.
This theory is supported by developments observed in early 2024, when several factories in Orsha began preparing to scale up production for the defense sector. For example, a new workshop was opened at the Orsha Tool Plant to fulfill orders for military needs, while the Legmash plant installed new Chinese equipment for shell production. New machinery was also placed at one of the renovated buildings of the Krasny Borets machine-tool plant. This equipment supply was probably coordinated closely with Moscow, which, during 2023 and the first seven months of 2024, purchased machine tools worth USD 2.6 billion from China.
In addition to machine tools, Beijing is selling critically important components for the manufacture of high-tech products. It is known that no fewer than a dozen Chinese companies are involved in the military cooperation scheme between Belarus and Russia. These firms supply Belarusian enterprises, sometimes through intermediary shell companies, with parts used in targeting systems for armored vehicles and firearms. Moreover, Chinese companies act as intermediaries in procuring semiconductors and precision equipment of Western origin on behalf of Belarusian defense companies such as BelOMO and Peleng. These components are essential for the production of the aforementioned guidance and targeting systems.
3. POLITICAL DIMENSION OF COOPERATION
Military-technical cooperation with the PRC is important not only in terms of security interests, but also as it allows the official Minsk to address a range of military-political and economic objectives.
Development of the defense sector: Due to closer interaction with Beijing, Belarus has been able to obtain new weapons systems that the domestic defense industry is unable to produce on its own due to some limitations. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the aforementioned difficulties in the full cycle of military equipment production. This process is important in the context of the planned rearmament of the Belarusian Armed Forces, especially components for the Air Force and Air Defense forces.
Expansion of exports and finding new markets: Given the export-oriented nature of the Belarusian economy, the production of more technologically advanced weapons enables Belarus to expand the geography of its exports. From 2014 to 2023, official Minsk was among the top 25 largest arms exporters globally, with Belarusian developments being in high demand in Asia and Africa. Moreover, some weapon systems have proven their effectiveness in combat conditions. Most notably, the aforementioned “Polonez” MLRS, which was used by the Azerbaijani army during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Creating a counterbalance to the Russian Federation: However, the main reason for cooperation with China lies in its ability to help Minsk balance Russia’s influence and diversify international partnerships. Specifically, between 2015 and 2020, the Lukashenko regime made significant progress in reducing Belarus’s defense industry dependence on the Russian market and components. In 2019, the Russian market accounted for 26% of Belarus’s defense exports (a figure that had halved since 2015, thanks to the diversification of partnerships). However, after the suppression of the 2020 protests and the weakening of Belarus’s sovereignty due to its involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion, the situation changed: in 2022, the share of the Russian market in Belarus’s defense exports rose to 60%, and the geography of defense product deliveries shrank.
In the current complex foreign policy environment, the Lukashenko regime continues to regard the PRC as a crucial pillar of its regime and hopes for an intensification of military-technical cooperation. Some signs of this renewal were noticeable over the past year, especially starting in July 2024, when official Minsk pursued a course of limited de-escalation in relations with Western countries and a measured release of political prisoners, followed by political negotiations.
During the last year, the two sides held regular consultations regarding the development of defense cooperation, and Belarus hosted around 10 Chinese military delegations. Importantly, some discussions focused not only on the material component but also on coordinating efforts in military education, as representatives from the defense ministries of China and Belarus discussed the possibility of expanding the list of specialties for which cadets from both countries could be trained. The Belarusian military education system likely does not hold particular interest for China, but for Minsk, whose cadets have few other opportunities for foreign education except in Russia, this may be a potential opportunity to help remove Russia’s monopoly, at least in terms of obtaining military education in the most important specialties for the Belarusian Armed Forces.
The quintessence of this renewal, in addition to the visit of two Chinese delegations, was the first joint military exercise since the establishment of diplomatic relations, held on Belarusian territory. Although these were counter-terrorism exercises and thus limited in scope, this move can be interpreted as China’s attempt to demonstrate its willingness to act in a country that Russia traditionally considers within its sphere of influence. Today, China is perhaps the only player that can at least partially reduce Moscow’s influence over Belarus, and the future of the neighboring country’s sovereignty will largely depend on its relationship with Beijing.
CONCLUSION
The change in the geopolitical landscape, driven by Belarus’s increasing dependence on Russia and Moscow’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy, has triggered a process of deterioration in political and security relations between Minsk and its immediate neighbors, as well as a slowdown in further cooperation with China.
Although the two sides formally maintain a high level of bilateral relations, their interaction in several sectors, including security, indicates a real decline in the quality of contacts. After the peak of cooperation from 2015 to 2019, the sides have not implemented large-scale joint military projects, and the successes of official Minsk in reducing Moscow’s role in the country’s defense sector were nullified after 2022.
However, cooperation has not been completely halted and has taken on somewhat different forms. In parallel with the work of joint enterprises, Beijing focused on the covert transfer of critical components to Belarusian defense enterprises, necessary for the production of high-tech products, as well as strengthening the production capabilities of Belarusian companies, particularly through the provision of machines and equipment.
Despite the existing difficulties, regular contacts continue between defense ministries, and Beijing closely monitors trends in Belarus’s defense sector in case the conditions for intensifying relations emerge. Belarus’s exit from the escalation spiral in relations with the West and the formation of favorable geopolitical conditions after the end of the Russo-Ukrainian War could serve as additional factors that will encourage Beijing to take more active steps in the Belarusian direction.
The policy brief was prepared within the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the “International Renaissance Foundation”. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the “Ukrainian Prism” and do not necessarily reflect the position of the “International Renaissance Foundation”.