The “Union State” of Russia and Belarus remains the only practical element of integration between the two countries. Although this organization has still not been sufficiently institutionalized, it raises concerns regarding its impact on the security situation in Eastern Europe. The “Union State Treaty” was signed as early as 1999, but real progress has been hindered by divergent interests. Moscow sought to control Minsk, while Belarus aimed to preserve and increase its economic benefits without actually losing political independence.

Following the 2020 protests and the escalation of international isolation, Lukashenka became more dependent on the Kremlin, which led to accelerated economic integration. With the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the situation has only deteriorated, as there are clear practical signs that the Union State is beginning to transform from an economic project into a military instrument of the Russian Federation. In this context, for Ukraine and the countries on NATO’s eastern flank, the “Regional Grouping of Forces of the Union State,” deployed in 2022 on Belarusian territory, is becoming a potential threat. In the short term, Lukashenka’s continued hold on power guarantees the continuation of integration, while in the longer term, Moscow may consider options for the complete absorption of Belarus.

Authors:

• Anton Oksentiuk, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Pavlo Rad, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director of the “Russian and Belarusian  Studies Programme”, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

Art and Technical Editor:

• Anatolii Chernysh, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

 

Content

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 
2. THE STATE OF INTEGRATION IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE 
3. COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS 
4. INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
6. RECOMMENDATIONS

 

GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

 

In the 1990s, Aliaksandr Lukashenka became the initiator of the integration union between Russia and Belarus, skillfully taking advantage of the prevailing sentiments among the Russian elites, who saw this step as a way to boost Boris Yeltsin’s electoral ratings. However, Lukashenka, whose ambitions extended beyond Belarus, viewed the formation of a union space as an opportunity to lead a united Russian-Belarusian state.

 

Despite the signing of the treaty on the creation of the “Union State”, the situation changed drastically with Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, and any active negotiation process on integration remained frozen due to differences in the interests of Moscow and Minsk. Lukashenka’s regime was interested in access to Russian markets and preferential energy prices, which were particularly important for the oil refining industry. However, this interest did not extend to sacrificing its own foreign policy positions.

Thus, noticeable progress in the integration process occurred only after the 2020 presidential elections and the subsequent political crisis, which weakened Aliaksandr Lukashenka. The Russian Federation provided political and financial support to the regime in order to revive the integration process, as a result of which, in September 2020, negotiations between the two sides intensified regarding the integration roadmaps.

In April 2021, information emerged about the first serious outcomes of the negotiations, and already in November of that year, the “Supreme State Council of the Union State” signed Decree No. 6, which became the foundation for the first stage of deepening integration for the period 2021–2023. The decree outlined 28 union programs covering almost all strategically important sectors, including transport, trade, industry, finance, taxation, and others. Russia’s main goal was to establish unified and standardized approaches to the functioning of the transport, banking, and taxation sectors, among others, in particular through the creation of integrated information management systems.

 

In January 2024, the two sides announced the completion of all 28 integration programs, which was formalized in Decree No. 1. That same month, the “Supreme State Council of the Union State” approved Decree No. 2, which sets out the implementation plan for the “Treaty on the Creation of the Union State” for 2024-2026. The integration plan for this period focuses on areas such as the creation of a joint financial market, coordination of tax policy and cooperation in customs affairs, implementation of a unified industrial policy and cooperation in trade, agricultural policy, functioning of integrated energy markets, operation of a unified transport system, development of a common information space of the Union State, cooperation in cultural, humanitarian, scientific-technical, and social fields, activities in the field of statistics, as well as the formation of a unified legal space.

 

At the same time, a defining feature of integration within the Union State remains the lack of transparency in the process. In particular, no public reports are available regarding the implementation of the aforementioned 28 integration programs. In addition, there is no publicly accessible unified contractual framework of the Union State, and the current state of integration in many areas can only be roughly assessed based on the statements of Belarusian and Russian officials.

 

THE STATE OF INTEGRATION IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

 

Despite declarations by both parties regarding the implementation of the previously mentioned 28 integration roadmaps, the actual state of their execution across various sectors remains incomplete. Many of the implemented roadmaps still face significant bureaucratic hurdles in subsequent stages of integration. For instance, Belarusian officials acknowledge that the desired integration in macroeconomic and monetary policy will not be achieved before 2030, despite the implementation of Roadmaps No. 1 and No. 2 under the 2021–2023 integration program. Official documents from the Russian government also indicate that as of January 2024, 14 roadmaps from the 2021-2023 plan were still undergoing additional revisions, despite official claims that all had been implemented.

 

Although the previous integration package required further refinement, in January 2024, Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenka signed a decree outlining a new three-year development plan for the “Union State” for 2024-2026. The new decree prioritizes macroeconomic integration, the creation of a common financial market through the unification of Russia’s and Belarus’s approaches to monetary policy and foreign exchange regulation, the harmonization of tax policies, the development of cooperation in industrial policy, the establishment of joint markets for gas, electricity, oil, and petroleum products, and the creation of a unified information space.

 

The decree also introduces three new roadmaps that had not been previously discussed publicly: a roadmap for cooperation in microelectronics, likely aimed at supporting Russian import substitution of dual-use goods under Western sanctions; a roadmap in machine tool manufacturing, likely intended to promote import substitution of precision machinery; and a roadmap for the creation of a common commodity market within the Union State. Integration processes are thus proceeding along several directions.

 

Unification of Customs and Tax Policies. Significant progress in economic integration began following the adoption of the roadmaps in November 2021. The Kremlin launched an initiative to reduce Belarus’ss control over its customs policy by establishing the Intergovernmental Belarusian-Russian Customs Center in December 2022. It also succeeded in initiating the formation of a Supranational Tax Committee to exert direct control over elements of Belarus’s fiscal policy, with the treaty on the principles of its creation ratified in 2022. By March 2023, an integrated system for administering indirect taxes was established, as outlined in Roadmap No. 11. In November 2023, Russia and Belarus agreed to establish the Supranational Tax Committee, also provided for in Roadmap No. 11, to coordinate the harmonization of tax policy between the two countries.

 

This development creates a situation where the formation of unified Russian-style taxation approaches may deprive Belarus of opportunities for technological advancement (given Russia’s raw-material-based economy) and limit its transit potential (as Belarus, unlike Russia, relies on customs privileges for technology parks and transit development).

 

Unification in the Production of Technological Goods. Russia is using Belarus to circumvent Western sanctions and procure dual-use goods that are critical to its war effort against Ukraine. Russian and Belarusian officials openly acknowledge Belarus’s role as a key partner in supplying and producing microchips and precision machinery, among other sanctioned items essential for weapons manufacturing. In March 2023, Lukashenka announced that Belarus and Russia had signed an agreement to establish a joint center for the development and production of photomasks (a component in microelectronics). He also stated that the two countries had compiled a list of critical electronic components and that Belarusian industry supplies Russia with a certain quantity of microelectronic products.

 

Unification of Industrial Policies. Russian and Belarusian officials are discussing the unification of their industrial policies to enable Belarus to develop import substitution capabilities aimed at achieving so-called “technological sovereignty”, a term the Kremlin uses to describe independence from Western technology. As of November 2023, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Belarusian Ministry of Industry had agreed on at least 23 import substitution projects. Plans were also underway to implement a Union State program on microchip and electronics import substitution in 2024. The Belarusian chemical company Mogilevkhimvolokno and the Russian oil and gas company Tatneft plan to establish a joint venture in Belarus for polyester production. Belarusian industry is also reportedly exploring the possibility of producing reduction gear drives for Russian vehicles.

 

Coordination in the Energy Sector. On December 29, 2023, Gazprom and Belorusneft, Belarus’s state-owned oil company involved in exploration, development, extraction, and sales, signed a scientific and technical cooperation agreement on hydraulic fracturing in Russian oil and gas fields. In January 2024, Russia and Belarus signed an intergovernmental memorandum to deepen strategic cooperation in the nuclear energy sector. Belarus’s dependence on Russian energy exports and the broader Russian energy sector is likely to grow as economic integration deepens and Western sanctions reduce Minsk’s ties with the West. Since 2022, Belarus has paid for Russian oil and gas in Russian rubles rather than U.S. dollars, as was previously the case.

 

Free Movement of Labor. Russia is promoting agreements that facilitate the free movement of labor between the two countries. A bilateral agreement on the mutual recognition of academic qualifications and diplomas was concluded to standardize how the Union State recognizes educational credentials. This agreement, along with other roadmaps concerning the unification of labor policy, aims to foster the development of a common Union State labor market through unrestricted labor mobility. These integration measures, in practice, treat Russia and Belarus as a single state. Free movement of labor is a provision of the 1999 Treaty on the Union State and constitutes a critical component of any common market.

 

COORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY EFFORTS

 

Following the suppression of the 2020 protests and subsequent complicity in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Lukashenka regime has found itself in regional isolation. As a result, it has lost opportunities for political dialogue with European states as well as for conducting exports. Given the export-oriented nature of Belarus’s economy, the primary objective of its foreign policy is to facilitate access to international markets for Belarusian producers. Consequently, the role of the Russian Federation in Belarus’s foreign policy and economic affairs has become disproportionately dominant.

This trend is most clearly illustrated by trade statistics for 2023. Over 60 percent of Belarus’s exports and imports were tied to the Russian Federation. In contrast, the share of Western countries in Belarus’s foreign trade declined, while trade with Ukraine, which in 2021 was the second-largest market for Belarusian goods after Russia, has virtually ceased. 

 

However, Russia’s role goes beyond that of a key trading partner.

 

• After Belarus lost access to Ukrainian and Lithuanian ports, Russia became the only viable route for exporting Belarusian goods to more distant global regions. In 2023, the volume of rail freight from Belarus through Russian territory doubled, reaching 14 million tons. In addition, Moscow introduced preferential tariffs for transporting Belarusian goods via its territory. For oil products, the tariff discount is 50 percent. For other goods, depending on the direction, it ranges from 10 to 40 percent.
• With cooperation with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development nearly completely suspended, Moscow has become the only source of loans for Belarus. As of now, Belarus’s debt to Russia totals 8.24 billion US dollars.
• Russia also remains the exclusive supplier of energy resources. Oil and gas account for 95 percent of Belarus’s total fuel and energy imports. All of these resources are provided by the Russian Federation.

 

This critical increase in dependence on Russia has led to deeper coordination of the foreign policy agendas of both countries. According to the 2024 to 2026 Programme of Coordinated Actions in the Field of Foreign Policy, both states declare their intention to act jointly on international platforms. This includes addressing the war in Ukraine, opposing the goals of the so-called collective West, and increasing cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS. The programme also outlines a shared commitment to defending historical truth, promoting traditional family values, and other similar positions.

 

Since 2022, Belarus has increasingly oriented its foreign policy toward the East. This direction is the result of the practical absence of alternatives. Nevertheless, through participation in friendly international groupings, official Minsk seeks to partially diversify its foreign policy ties and deepen cooperation with countries in more distant regions. The most notable of these is the People’s Republic of China, which today is the only serious counterweight to Russian influence.

 

At the same time, a shift in Belarusian official rhetoric has become more visible. In addition to advocating for traditional values in the Russian style, Minsk is now compelled to view NATO member states as strategic adversaries. This approach is reflected in official documents. The updated Military Doctrine of Belarus identifies the United States, Poland, and Lithuania as the countries posing the greatest potential threat to national security.

 

One of the core elements of Belarus’s defense policy is the development and strengthening of collective security systems within the framework of the Union State and other allied structures. To achieve this goal, Belarus commits to building military-strategic relations with Russia within the Union State. This military doctrine laid the foundation for the provisions later included in the Treaty on Security Guarantees between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. A key clause in the treaty stipulates that the use of military force against either party will be considered an attack on the Union State as a whole.

 

On 6 December 2024, during a session of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, the two parties signed the Treaty on Security Guarantees. The treaty contains provisions similar to those found in the strategic partnership agreement between Russia and North Korea, including mutual commitments to provide all necessary assistance if one of the parties comes under attack. This agreement highlights Belarus’s military dependence on Moscow and sends a message to both the West and China that any engagement with the Belarus issue will inevitably require contact with the Kremlin. This development limits the space for Minsk’s foreign policy maneuvering and hampers potential efforts to resume dialogue with the West or to strengthen relations with Beijing.

The mutual commitment to provide military or other assistance in the event of an attack gives Moscow an additional tool to pressure Minsk. This applies particularly in the context of potential Belarusian involvement in the war against Ukraine. For Russia, this mechanism is less about securing additional manpower and more about exerting political pressure in order to achieve concessions from the Belarusian leadership on strategic issues.

 

At the same time, closer coordination in foreign policy is occurring mostly at the bilateral level rather than through Union State institutions. As of now, there are no specific bodies responsible for implementing joint foreign policy. Furthermore, the Lukashenka regime continues to seek room for maneuver by pursuing more active engagement with the People’s Republic of China and signaling to Western countries a readiness for political bargaining.

 

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES 

 

As with foreign policy, military cooperation between the Russian Federation and Belarus within the framework of the Union State currently exists primarily in the political and public domain. This is largely due to fundamental differences in the visions held by the leaderships of both countries regarding the future of the Union State. For the Russian side, the Union State essentially serves as a stepping stone toward deeper integration with the eventual aim explicit or implicit being some form of Belarus’s accession to the Russian Federation. In contrast, Minsk continues to publicly demonstrate that it does not consider the loss of its remaining sovereignty a viable scenario. These divergent perspectives also shape their approach to military cooperation. From Russia’s standpoint, the Belarusian army is not perceived as an independent element and therefore the absence of genuine military integration within the Union State framework is unsurprising. Instead, what exists is cooperation that primarily serves to publicly showcase the Union State’s military activities without leading to substantive integration.

 

Real integration, however, is occurring outside the Union State framework due to the absence of functional structures within it aside from certain isolated elements. As a result, military cooperation between Russia and Belarus is almost always described and implemented independently of the Union State mechanisms. Another factor shaping this limited integration is the lack of a shared strategic vision for the organization which was originally intended as a foundation for political cooperation but has since evolved into a mechanism for economic integration. Despite this, the current geopolitical climate in the region necessitates a careful assessment of how the Russia Belarus Union State might pose a growing threat to Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank in the future.

 

To date, practical coordination between the Russian and Belarusian armed forces within the Union State is based on a set of bilateral agreements. Among these, the most notable is the 2012 Agreement on Joint Protection of the Union State’s External Border in Airspace and the Creation of a Unified Regional Air Defense System. This system is one of the few with a tangible impact on regional security. The challenge with such agreements is that they are not integrated into the Union State’s legal and organizational framework but instead rely solely on direct military to military interactions.

 

There are also areas of cooperation that were relatively dormant prior to Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine but have since gained momentum. For example, the 1995 Agreement on Joint Efforts in Guarding the State Border of Belarus provides the legal basis for collaboration between Russian and Belarusian border troops. Although this document predates the formation of the Union State, both countries now publicly frame this joint structure as part of the Union State’s operations. To reinforce this narrative, regular meetings of the Union State Border Committee are held. In addition, both parties are formally expanding their cooperation in border defense through the Union State Program for Border Security through 2027. While this cooperation remained largely symbolic for years, unlike Russia’s visible air defense presence in Belarus, it began to take a more active form in 2023. In May 2024, over 3 billion Russian rubles were allocated for the construction and reinforcement of defensive lines along the Union State border signaling a renewed commitment to border security cooperation.

 

This level of funding marks a shift from previous years during which such joint expenditures were not approved. Just months earlier, in October 2023, Belarus’s portion of the Union State’s border security program was already funded at 1 billion rubles indicating the start of significant financial investment in the initiative up to 2027. Public announcements from both sides mention the procurement of additional equipment, modernization of alarm system infrastructure, development of stationary radio monitoring units and construction of technical surveillance posts. These efforts are currently aimed at Poland with planned deployments along the Belarus Poland border in the Brest and Grodno regions.

 

Significant attention must also be given to the actual presence of Russian troops on the territory of Belarus within the framework of the Union State. In October 2022, Belarusian self-proclaimed president Lukashenka publicly announced the deployment of a Regional Grouping of Forces based on the Belarusian armed forces. This formation was originally created during the signing of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Union State. At the time of the announcement, Lukashenka declared plans for the deployment of more than seventy thousand troops who were theoretically supposed to be stationed along the western borders of Belarus. Despite Moscow’s formal statements claiming full participation in this grouping, the actual deployment of such a force has not materialized. The primary reason is the lack of available Russian forces due to the ongoing war against Ukraine. The Belarusian army itself numbers approximately seventy thousand troops. In 2022, Lukashenka publicly announced that Russia was expected to provide ten to fifteen thousand troops to support the functioning of the grouping, although he admitted there were no real opportunities for such deployment at the time.

 

It is entirely predictable that if the Russian leadership intends to use Belarusian territory as a launching ground for renewed aggression against Ukraine or for direct pressure on Poland and Lithuania, Moscow would use the mechanism of the Regional Grouping of Forces of the Union State. In October 2022, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense publicly declared that the number of Russian troops in the grouping would be approximately nine thousand. It was also claimed that Russian troops were already being deployed. There were also announcements about the planned transfer of around one hundred seventy tanks, up to two hundred armored combat vehicles, and up to one hundred artillery pieces and mortars to Belarus. Given the severe shortage of military equipment in the Russian army and the challenges in maintaining adequate troop levels on the front lines in the war against Ukraine, the implementation of such large-scale plans currently appears unlikely. Nonetheless, the very existence of a functioning Regional Grouping creates a long-term threat by enabling the permanent presence of significant Russian and Belarusian military forces along the borders with Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine.

 

There is evidence that this structure holds practical significance. Both sides have, over the past two years, begun preparations for establishing the necessary infrastructure to support the Regional Grouping. In March 2023, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement on the creation and operation of joint training and combat centers for military personnel. While not officially acknowledged in Russia, it is widely understood that these training facilities are being established specifically to support the operations of the Regional Grouping. The creation of these training and combat centers serves as proof of the long-term nature of the grouping’s activities. It is not yet known to what extent Union State structures are involved in these centers, but their direct connection to the deployed forces suggests this involvement is likely.

 

There is also available information indicating that Russia and Belarus are planning to launch major military exercises of the Regional Grouping on Belarusian territory in 2025. In December 2023, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin and then Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu signed a protocol outlining the future activities of the grouping. According to the announcement, the document clarified a number of technical issues regarding the functioning of the formation and established the procedures for the deployment of Russian troops and the placement of Russian military infrastructure in Belarus. However, there has been no noticeable change in the frequency of joint military exercises between Russia and Belarus in recent years. This especially concerns large-scale drills, which were traditionally conducted every two years. In fact, there has been a decline in the scale of such activities due to the Russian army’s inability to allocate sufficient personnel and equipment as a result of the war in Ukraine. This was evident in 2023 when Moscow opted not to conduct the regular “Zapad-2023” joint exercises with Belarus. At the same time, in September 2024, reports began emerging through opposition Belarusian media suggesting preparations for the “Zapad-2025” drills.

Given their absence last year, we can assume that the military maneuvers of the “Regional Grouping”, announced by the Belarusian Minister of Defense, might take place under the pretext of the “Zapad-2025” exercises. The last iteration of these exercises occurred on the eve of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Despite the lack of large-scale current interactions between the armed forces of Russia and Belarus, we are witnessing statements about the intensification of exercises in the air defense and air force format. In 2024 alone, within the framework of the air defense agreements of the “Union State,” two such exercises were announced. The first involved joint flight and tactical training with the air force and air defense forces of the Armed Forces of Belarus and Russia in May 2024 on the territory of Belarus. The second involved similar operational and tactical exercises in August 2024, this time on Russian territory. In previous years, such activity within the “Union State” framework had not been observed.

 

In addition, in 2023, media reports citing leaked Pentagon documents indicated that the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces conducted disinformation operations intended to mislead the Ukrainian military. These included reports of joint Russian-Belarusian tactical exercises that did not actually take place. This aspect should be taken into account. However, despite this fact, Ukraine and the countries of NATO’s eastern flank must prepare for the long-term threat posed by the “Regional Grouping of the Union State.” This is especially important in light of statements about preparing these troops for a permanent deployment format. This implies expanding the grouping to a projected seventy thousand troops, along with a significant amount of equipment and infrastructure.

 

We are also observing the intention of Russia and Belarus to actively exploit the war against Ukraine, as well as Moscow’s open aspirations to reshape the continental security environment. The “Union State” is thus beginning to transform from a purely political and economic structure, which it had remained for decades, into a tool of regional security blackmail. The main factor driving this strategy is the “Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Security Guarantees within the Framework of the Union State,” signed in December 2024. It introduces the following key elements affecting military cooperation within the organization:

 

• The introduction of a framework concerning a “threat to the sovereignty, independence, or constitutional order” of the Union State includes the potential for a military response. Russia and Belarus deliberately avoid providing a clear definition of what constitutes a “threat to sovereignty,” which allows both countries to interpret the term according to their own interests and to continuously pose a direct threat to neighboring states.

 

• The nuclear dimension involving the Union State is also continuing to evolve. According to the treaty, both countries regard Russia’s nuclear weapons as a response mechanism not only in the event of an attack on either country, but also in situations where such a “threat to sovereignty” is perceived. This decision not only contributes to the nuclear militarization of the Belarusian-Ukrainian and Belarusian-Polish borders but also generates a permanent state of political tension. Under these conditions, Russia and Belarus gain the ability to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in combination with their own tools of hybrid aggression.
• There is a formalization of the potential deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory. Although there is still no solid evidence confirming their presence in Belarus, the possibility of such a deployment raises expectations of a further escalation of the nuclear threat from the Union State. In addition, this treaty gives Russia and Belarus the opportunity to insist, in any negotiations on global security, that the presence of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus be taken into account as a factor demonstrating power in the region. 

• The treaty also legally affirms Russia’s ability to place its own military facilities on Belarusian territory in the event of a previously mentioned “threat to sovereignty”.

 

There are also further attempts at broader interaction within the framework of the Union State in the sphere of the military-industrial complex. At present, this takes place through specific examples of enterprises, but not on a full-fledged, formalized basis. At the same time, the greater initiative in this matter comes from the Belarusian side. The problem lies in the fact that Moscow does not show a desire for real integration, instead preferring the possibility of fully acquiring Belarusian defense industry enterprises and their incorporation into the Russian defense industry. The reason for this is Russia’s previously stated vision of the future of the organization as a step toward the incorporation of Belarus into the Russian state. Legally, the “military doctrine of the Union State” includes the aspect of the need for joint development of the defense sector, namely the integration of production in order to create a unified technological base.

At the same time, for a significant period, there was no contractual or institutional integration of the military-industrial complex of the “Union State.” Only recently have the countries begun to demonstrate certain steps in this direction. Thus, during the meeting of the “Council of the Union State” at the beginning of 2024, it was noted that Russia and Belarus agreed on the “integration of the military-industrial complex.” At the same time, in practice, Belarusian enterprises actively work for the Russian army. This is primarily due to the Soviet legacy and economic ties. According to the Belarusian State Committee for Military Industry, 99 enterprises supply 1,880 types of components and weapon system elements to 255 enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex. This is especially evident in the fields of optical devices, targeting systems, fire and weapon control systems, as well as radio-electronic equipment and software complexes. Modernization and repair of Russian military equipment are also carried out, along with the direct production of specialized wheeled vehicles.

 

CONCLUSIONS

The long game of integration between Russia and Belarus began to show real results only in 2021, when Lukashenka, having received significant political and economic support from Moscow, was forced to make a number of concessions, culminating in the adoption of 28 integration roadmaps for the period 2022-2023. Already in 2024, the parties approved the next integration package, which became a logical and harmonious continuation of the previous stage.

Despite the fact that a characteristic feature of integration within the framework of the Union State remains the lack of transparency in reporting, which complicates the assessment of the real state of the rapprochement process between Russia and Belarus, indirect signs allow the conclusion that the parties have achieved significant progress, primarily in the economic sphere, as evidenced by the first steps toward the creation of supranational structures.

At the same time, it is important to understand that the formation of an institutional and legislative framework for even deeper integration within the Union State is likely to be stretched over time. This is due both to the operational difficulties of unifying economic policies and creating a wide range of relevant institutions, and to the natural desire of the Lukashenka regime to prevent excessive strengthening of Russian influence.

Certain progress has also been made in the context of deepening military-technical cooperation. The rapprochement between the Russian and Belarusian military-industrial complexes and armies mostly takes place not within the framework of the “Union State,” since it practically lacks the relevant structures except for some isolated elements, but rather at the bilateral level. At the same time, the development of the “Regional Grouping of Forces” system and its use as a means of pressure on Ukraine and the countries of NATO’s eastern flank will be a significant factor of regional destabilization even after the active phase of the Russia-Ukraine war ends.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The preservation of Belarus’s independence and sovereignty is a strategic interest not only for Ukraine but also for a number of other regional players, primarily Lithuania and Poland. It is important to develop a flexible policy toward Belarus that could potentially prevent its complete absorption, while at the same time avoiding excessive concessions in exchange for symbolic gestures from official Minsk. The toolkit for achieving this goal includes, but is not limited to, the following elements:

 

• Western countries and Ukraine should view sanctions as a tool, not as an end in themselves. The unification of sanction policies toward Belarus and Russia pushes the former into the Kremlin’s hands, making official Minsk even more dependent on Russian markets and transportation infrastructure. A flexible mechanism is needed that would allow for adjusting sanctions based on the current regime’s willingness to engage in constructive dialogue.

 

• Ukraine and European countries should maintain informal contact with Minsk. The exchange of certain signals with the Lukashenka regime would allow for monitoring developments in Belarus and tracking the mood of the elites. Such interaction would also serve as a reminder to Lukashenka and his regime that relations with Kyiv and European countries represent an alternative path for dialogue and de-escalation. In addition, it could serve as a tool for resolving practical issues, such as the further release of political prisoners.

 

• Ukraine and Western states must prepare for the departure of Lukashenka from power by seeking mechanisms to influence the Belarusian elites. It should be understood that the Belarusian dictator will not rule forever. The transitional period caused by his departure and the subsequent collapse or transformation of his personalist regime will be unpredictable and dangerous, given the likelihood that Moscow will attempt to exploit the moment of uncertainty to its advantage and deprive Belarus of the remaining elements of its sovereignty.

 

The “Regional Grouping of Forces of the Union State” deployed on the territory of Belarus may predictably turn into a site of permanent military tension after the war due to the prospect of a significant Russian military presence. In this situation, Ukraine must take proactive steps to develop a strategy of joint response with European countries to the challenges posed by Russia’s restrictions on Belarusian sovereignty.

 

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This analytical review was prepared within the framework of the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. The analytical review reflects the position of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and does not necessarily reflect the position of the International Renaissance Foundation.