Some EU member states’ intelligence services claim there is a high probability of large-scale Russian aggression in Europe within five years. Against the background of the bloody war waged by the Russian aggressor against Ukraine, European governments must do everything possible to prepare for a possible conventional war and to acquire sufficient military capabilities for defence and deterrence.
It is a basic scenario that the United States, while remaining the guarantor of Europe’s security within NATO, is now demanding that European allies rebalance their capabilities and take greater responsibility for their own security decisions on the continent.
European NATO allies need to reconsider their current levels of troops and weapons needed to repel a potential aggressor with military parameters similar to those of Russia.
In terms of combat-experienced personnel, Ukraine could become a real security provider in the coming years. In a positive scenario, Ukraine could join the EU by 2030, if all political and technical conditions are favourable. This step will strengthen the EU’s defence potential in general and on its eastern border in particular.
But even at this stage, EU members need to further align their defence policies and synchronise their elements of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in order to be credible.
The EU’s over-dependence on the US military presence and dominance in command and control was based on the premises of the post-World War II arrangements. Now, the unpredictability of the new Trump administration in global affairs is prompting European allies to take definitive responsibility for their preparedness for conventional risks and threats emanating from Russia and the so-called Axis of Evil, including North Korea, Iran and Belarus.
Only these steps, taken swiftly and together, can provide a reliable basis for the Defence Union as a solid international security actor, capable not only of conflict resolution but also of self-defence.
Autonomous collective defence of European nations
The European Union has taken several strategic steps to build sovereign defence capabilities and strengthen defence partnerships. The Strategic Compass, a kind of prototype defence doctrine, laid certain foundations for the development of the EU’s security and defence governance mechanisms.
However, this document was finalised before Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, making it no longer relevant to the level of threats that have emerged in the immediate neighbourhood as well as the increased risks to the EU itself. The Strategic Compass confirms the EU-NATO synergy approach and the division of security roles between the two organisations. While the EU focuses on crisis management, peacekeeping missions and the development of the defence industry, NATO provides collective defence and military capabilities. In this light, the EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity, a 5,000-strong modular force, is a purely crisis response mechanism that is unlikely to be equipped and capable of dealing with the military threat to any EU member state.
Based on the EU’s authentic analytical toolkit of the Capability Development Plan (CDP), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Commission started a search for defence capability gaps in 2022. The identification of priority areas led to the emergence of several financial instruments, such as the Instrument for the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIP (still in preparation). These programmes have shown that the EU can act quickly and propose new financial instruments to support the European defence industry.
The European Defence Industry Strategy (2024), the White Paper on European Defence and the future EU Preparedness Strategy may lay the foundations for the creation of the Defence Union as a natural response to the level of threats posed by Russia and its allies.
But in order to proceed towards the creation of the Defence Union, the European institutions and Member States will have to agree to move away from the traditional definition of the Union as a peacekeeper. To begin with, the Strategic Compass should be revised as a long-term document, since in its current form it is unclear how the EU intends to strengthen its collective defence mechanism and pool its capabilities. The Defence Union should be visible in the EU’s strategic policies.
All financial and technical calculations made in the White Paper should be committed to the EU’s future collective defence mechanism, compatible with the mutual defence clause described in Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union.
In the current geopolitical environment, it is strategically correct for the EU to align itself with NATO’s Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA). At the same time, however, the European Union must benefit from the military capabilities to act autonomously in all areas to defend Europe’s borders.
In this respect, autonomous military mobility in Europe is another important part of the EU’s preparedness for potential military threats. The European Union has launched a number of initiatives aimed at developing military mobility within the EU. The PESCO project on military mobility is one of the most popular, attracting a large number of Member States and third countries. It could be argued that the complexity of the problem and the need for large investments in the existing European transport and logistics infrastructure make it difficult to implement. At the same time, Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the weak links in European military mobility, which need to be addressed urgently.
European allies need to consolidate their ownership in areas where the US has traditionally led, including C2, intelligence, satellite imagery and precision strike. These strategic enablers are critical to the defence and deterrence of European nations. In these areas, Ukraine’s participation can accelerate the pace of progress in the co-development of the above-mentioned advanced military or dual-use technologies.
The Ukrainian DTIB will undoubtedly contribute essential technological know-how and deliver much-needed capabilities in the timeframe and to the extent defined by EU and NATO capability development goals. To achieve this, Ukraine will need greater access to European funding and decision-making.
Recommendations
- Norway-type status for Ukraine in defence cooperation with the European Union. In order to create stable conditions for Ukraine’s participation in EU defence programmes and initiatives, the European partners need to set an inclusive framework with full access to decision-making and financial resources. In this respect, it may be possible to grant Ukraine the status of an Associated Partner. This type of partnership is currently being extended to Norway. Such a mechanism will allow Ukraine to participate on an equal footing with EU Member States.
- To fill the gaps in modern defence capabilities, it could be beneficial to follow the capability coalitions under the UDCG with EU financial instruments. A revised Permanent Structural Cooperation (PESCO) could serve as a model to bring some of these activities under the EU financial umbrella. These coalitions now include between 14 and 21 members, mostly European NATO allies. Ukraine can contribute new technologies and experience to new PESCO initiatives.
- The temporary cut-off of Ukraine from US satellite intelligence as a bold move to press Kyiv for concessions has prompted European concerns about long-term US credibility, especially in areas of traditional US dominance. In this context, European and Ukrainian producers of weapons and dual-use products and technologies have a legitimate interest in improving autonomous capabilities. Member States and Ukraine need to combine efforts to modernise and expand satellite imagery capabilities, air defence systems and sufficient levels of munitions for them, as well as long-range precision strike capabilities.
- Threatening messages from European intelligence services about a possible scenario of a Russian attack on European countries by 2030 make it critical for EU members to rapidly strengthen their defence capabilities while increasing military assistance to Ukraine. Ukraine has repeatedly spoken of the need to confiscate Russia’s sovereign assets located in the EU and use them for defence purposes. More than €200 billion could provide the necessary long-term guarantee for arms and ammunition producers, as well as investment for Ukrainian arms manufacturers, which currently face an annual funding shortfall of €15-17 billion.
- In addition to increased defence spending, European partners should also come up with a fixed national contribution to support Ukraine’s military and humanitarian needs. In this context, the proposal by some European partners to set aside 0.25% of GDP to support Ukraine seems to be a good expression of solidarity with the Ukrainian army, understanding that in the future this army could become an important part of a common European defence union.
The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” has initiated a consortium of Ukrainian think tanks to prepare contributions that reflect the battlefield experience of modern warfare and to make a specific contribution to the discussion on the White Paper preparation process. The group also includes: the Sahaidachnyi Security Centre, the Analytical Centre of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Reforms Support Office, the NGO Aerorozvidka, the NGO Price of Freedom.
The set of short contributions “Blue and Yellow Annex to the White Paper on the Futureof European Defence” addresses the issues of modern drone warfare, rethinking the air defence architecture to meet the challenges of mass hybrid drones and missiles, mobilisation and recruitment practices for next-generation warfare, and high-tech military procurement in modern warfare.
The aim of this initiative is to present key ideas on current and future military doctrine, the future force concept and the development of military capabilities from the perspective of Ukrainian experts.
The set of policy briefs is prepared within the framework of ‘Strengthening Ukrainian expert voice in the European Union and EU member states and partners’ project, supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations