Russia’s escalation of war against Ukraine to full-scale invasion in February 2022 among many dramatic consequences has led to the mass displacement of Ukrainians both internally and internationally. For the EU, whose member states currently host over 4 million fleeing Ukrainians, elaborating a long-term strategy that will replace the current temporary protection mechanism is of critical importance.
Necessity to decide on the future policies towards displaced Ukrainians is conditioned by many factors. Key factors include protracted security threats on the entire territory of Ukraine stemming from russia’s war of aggression; a provisional nature of the temporary protection mechanism; plea of some member states who host either the largest number or proportion of Ukrainians to be rewarded or helped additionally; as well Ukrainian authorities’ calls to cooperate with Kyiv in returning men to be conscripted to Ukrainian Armed Forces now and Ukrainian citizens at large for post-war reconstruction later.
Despite many unknowns, the paper aims at considering most plausible and pragmatic solutions for all parties concerned. To do so, this paper applies a comparative scenario analysis framework by considering five potential scenarios for the integration or return of temporary protection holders beyond the expiration of their permits in March 2026. These scenarios are informed by an analysis of the prevailing security and economic conditions in Ukraine and range from mainstreaming a special legal status for Ukrainians into the current EU legal framework on either protection or immigration to assisting Ukrainians with return should the security and economic conditions allow for it. While prioritizing EU-wide comprehensive approach, it also considers a scenario where no EU compromise is reached and where extension of legal residence for Ukrainians in the EU becomes conditional.
Our paper suggests that granting Ukrainians a ten-year non-renewable (re)integration residence permit is the most sensible solution. It is also consistent with the recommendations set forth by Lodewijk Asscher, the European Commission’s former Special Adviser on Ukraine. This approach leverages existing EU frameworks, such as the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), and enables facilitating both integration and eventual repatriation. It also avoids creating extra administrative burdens leading to potential collapse of member states’ migration and asylum systems as well as unwieldy monitoring systems creating disproportionate differentiation among applicants.
Authors
- Maryna Yaroshevych, European Integration Study Program Director, Ukrainian Prism
- Maria Korban, Ukrainian Prism Brussels Office
Introduction
Russia’s war in Ukraine, which began in 2014 and escalated significantly in 2022, has resulted in one of the most extensive and rapid refugee migrations within Europe since the Second World War. The imminent security threat has forced millions of Ukrainians to seek refuge across the continent and beyond. The European Union has rapidly responded by activating the Temporary Protection Mechanism (TPM) on 4 March 2022 for a period of up to three years to manage the mass influx and provide immediate relief to displaced Ukrainians. It was established under Directive 2001/55/EC and facilitated not only the legal entry and stay of displaced persons but also granted access to employment, education, and social welfare systems within the host countries.
Contrary to the commonly accepted interpretation that the TPM cannot be applied for more than three years (otherwise it loses its “temporality”), in June 2024 the European Council adopted a decision to extend temporary protection for displaced Ukrainians for one more year until 4 March 2026. The European Council justified the move by the lack of sufficient security framework enabling safe and durable return home of Ukrainian population. However, despite positive assessment of the TPM by expert community and its unproblematic prolongation, it is increasingly evident that the clock is ticking to find a more permanent solution or, at least, to bridge the gap between these interim provisions and a long-term settlement compatible with EU migration policies.
The paper is structured as follows. It first provides an overview of the demographics of Ukrainians with temporary protection status in the EU and explains Kyiv’s interest in their return. In view of the unpredictability of security developments as well as complexity and variability of the TPM implications across the EU, the paper in its second section places scenario analysis at the core of its methodological approach given its wide application in studying social systems where significant uncertainty in future events exists.
The rationale for adopting a scenario-based approach is rooted in the necessity to acknowledge the pronounced disparities in the ways temporary protection affects EU member states and refugee populations. The economic impact, integration capacity and social cohesion of the refugees vary significantly across the EU, yet constitute but a few variables that play into prompting one decision over the other when it comes to the future of Ukrainians in respective host states. Other variables also include geographical proximity to Ukraine, economic stability, political climates and demographic compositions of EU member states. By examining a variety of potential scenarios, this paper seeks to elucidate the diverse outcomes and identify robust strategies that can accommodate the varied capabilities and constraints of individual member states while promoting a unified EU-wide response.
The aforementioned methodology not only anticipates potential divergences with regards to the regional impacts and responses in question, but also aids in the formulation of adaptable policy recommendations that can be applied to a spectrum of possible future conditions. Each scenario reflects a plausible path that EU policy might follow, based on current data and trends. Furthermore, it offers actionable insights that could assist policymakers in preparing for various future challenges in managing the displaced Ukrainian population effectively.
The paper concludes by summarizing the key comparative strength and weaknesses of each scenario and provides recommendations on the most sensible policy choice based on the findings.
1. Ukrainians under temporary protection in the European Union
Almost three years into the full-scale Russian invasion, the total number of Ukrainians scattered around Europe equals to 6,02 mln with a sizeable proportion of 4,3 mln hosted by the EU member states. The distribution of Ukrainian refugees is not uniform: neighbouring countries carry the highest hosting burden as the ratio of Ukrainian refugee population reaches up to 3,3% (i.e. in the Czech Republic) to the national population.
In terms of absolute numbers, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic are in the lead, with Germany alone providing shelter to almost 1,195 million Ukrainians, representing around 28.45% of the total number of TP beneficiaries (TPBs) in the EU. All these three states are strong proponents of a greater and more merit-based EU approach to supporting them in their asymmetrical care for displaced Ukrainians.
In the demographic profile of TPBs dominate adult women (46%), followed by children (32%) and adult men (22%). Around 40% of refugee families include single parents, mainly single mothers. This group faces particular difficulties in terms of employment, childcare and housing, and requires targeted support in ensuring security and addressing the psychosocial needs of women and girls.
With around 750,000 Ukrainians already employed across Europe and over 300,000 actively seeking jobs through public employment services, a significant integration challenge but also a substantial (potential) contribution to the labour market are both observed. For drafting long-term strategies, Ukrainians’ fluctuating intentions to remain or return are also key. The longer the war lasts, the more displaced persons integrate to host societies and express intention to get a permanent residence in respective EU member states. While some families torn apart by war may want to reunite in Ukraine, the others are likely to do so in the EU.
1.1. EU’s take on displaced Ukrainians
While there is a consensus within the EU that support for Ukrainian refugees is necessary, there is a divergence of opinion as to the optimal approach. Experience with former migration crises compounded with radicalizing public opinion and shifting political sceneries not only turn the situation to unfavorable among Ukraine’s antagonists.
Often times, deteriorating political, economic and social circumstances play against the positive outlook on handling legal stays by Ukrainians even among the most pro-Ukrainian EU member states. Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic, mentioned above are the cases in point.
They all at some point have expressed concern about the potential long-term implications of hosting a large refugee population. Their authorities are most worried about the possibility of straining public services and the political challenges of integrating refugees into local communities. These concerns render some countries more reluctant to commit to long-term solutions without additional support or guarantees from the EU.
1.2. Ukraine’s position on Ukrainians displaced abroad
From Ukraine’s perspective the situation is similarly complex. Restriction of consular services provided to Ukrainian men without sufficient justification of conditions under which they fled Ukraine as well as the unofficial quests by President Zelensky to his EU vis-à-vis to assist with returning men home to defend Ukraine against russia’s attack have faced much criticism. While different options are still under consideration, it is doubtful Ukraine’s pleas would be satisfied even partially if at all.
In parallel, the Ukrainian government maintains hope that its citizens will eventually be able to return home safely. However, given the ongoing war and the uncertain future, there is also a pragmatic recognition that many Ukrainians entitled to freely leave Ukraine may require an extended period of residence in the EU. Consequently, Ukraine endorses measures that enable its citizens to reside and work in the EU while also preparing for the potential facilitation of their return when conditions permit.
2. No longer temporary? Future scenarios beyond temporary protection status
With unclear prospects of either Ukraine’s victory or russia’s ceasing military activity and air strikes on civilian population and critical infrastructure in the foreseeable future, it is a high time to consider policy options for after the expiration of four-year temporary protection of Ukrainians in the EU. Each scenario is based on the existing circumstances and potential future developments, with the aim of providing a comprehensive overview of how the situation could evolve and what the consequences might be for both the refugees and the host societies. What follows is the general overview of five divergent scenarios with a comparative outline.
2.1. (Re)integration permits
Provided that war persists, this scenario foresees, in line with the former Commission’s Special Adviser for Ukraine Lodewijk Asscher proposal on reconstruction permit, that all TPBs are unconditionally granted non-renewable (re)integration permits valid for 10 years post-March 2026. Such an approach will untangle two puzzles inherent to any other option:
- It will prevent an overburden (leading to potential collapse in some member states) of both asylum and migration systems; allowing sufficient time for both bureaucracies, but also Ukrainians themselves to prepare for what comes next;
- It won’t create unfair advantages or differentiation among displaced Ukrainians taking into account their economic input to host societies; family composition; origin in Ukraine; war risks in their places of origin, etc.
To mitigate the opposition from MSs that pay high bills to sustain Ukrainian refugees momentarily, wide consultation will need to be held as to how (1) TP benefits might differ from (re)integration ones; and (2) how to embed a stimulus for Ukrainians to gradually switch to a regular immigration procedure when applicable or (3) how to incentivize Ukrainians to return to Ukraine, possibly retaining the ties with their EU MSs hosting societies.
The finalite of such an approach would be to gain time, reduce bureaucracy, preserve flexibility of the Directive implementation on MSs’ national levels while providing MSs a necessary common denominator. Evidently, such a decision would imply a continuous financial “solidarity” burden for social security as (re)integration permit would inherit both collective (as opposed to individual in asylum system) and protective (as opposed to contribution-based in immigration system) nature of the TPS.
However, considering that initial inflow of Ukrainians and therefore hosting cost was the greatest, overtime the price tag of choosing this path should gradually subside. This will no longer be true, though, if the 2024-2025 winter is particularly harsh and in combination with deteriorating security situation leads to another massive influx of Ukrainian protection seekers. Despite the risk of enabling a growing number of Ukrainians to benefit from EU’s unprecedented protection and support, the approach might remain win-win overtime if right stimuli are put in place for both fast-track integration and voluntary return of Ukrainians back home. EU’s continuous resoluteness to support Ukraine’s fastest possible victory would also have a positive impact on helping streamlining the (re)settlement processes.
Moreover, the ten-year period will expire in 2036 when Ukraine, given current outlook, might already become a member of the European Union. In such a positive scenario, no additional transition or bridging periods would be needed, as while or upon expiration of (re)integration permits all Ukrainians will automatically become EU citizens.
2.2. Long-term residents recast embracing Ukrainians
If the security situation necessitates, the EU will extend temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU for an additional year, bringing the total temporary protection period to five years. In the meantime, the EU takes appropriate legislative measures to finalise the revision of Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term residence (LTR) recognizing temporary protection as a legal stay enabling its holders to apply for a long-term residence. Additional transitional or grace periods (like in case with the UK residence in the EU after Brexit) might be drawn up.
While the burden of processing residence permits for MSs is more manageable than asylum applications, switching Ukrainian applicants from humanitarian approach (based on needs and vulnerabilities) to contribution-based approach (based on merits and economic input) is tricky. Studying or working TPBs who left at the onset of full-scale invasion, under such a scenario would benefit the most, while recently displaced elderly would not “qualify”. Thus, this approach, albeit very pragmatic from a bureaucratic and financial perspective for the EU in general and its MSs, risks leaving substantial number of vulnerable categories out. Providing assistance to them at the place of their residence in Ukraine will not be viable, since healthcare system in Ukraine remains under constant attacks as part of the critical infrastructure. Minors, especially in single-parent families (when a parent didn’t qualify for a LTR) forced back before full security and durable return is established would also suffer the most.
2.3. Transitional protection conditioned by regional origin of Ukrainians
This region-specific scenario differentiates the future status of Ukrainians in the EU based on the security situation in their home regions (oblasts) at the time of their next residence permit application (provisionally referred to as transitional permits in the paper). Under this approach, different residency statuses or integration pathways are available depending on whether individuals come from areas still affected by conflict (i.e., occupied/frequently attached) or from areas considered safe (predominantly oblasts not bordering russia). Put differently, instead of the fast-track collective approach offered by the TPS, each application post-March 2026 will be assessed individually in line with EU regulations on asylum. The principled difference would be for the EU to continuously asses external threat (rather than internal = emanating from Ukraine) and doing so through the EU-wide security monitoring system rather than placing a burden of submitting proof on each applicant.
According to Wagner et al. from ICMPD though a shift towards an individual application assessment might be problematic due to the necessity to sharply increase the workload related to processing individual files leading to longer waiting times, uncertainty among applicants and worsening conditions when it comes to labour market, healthcare and education access. Establishing a fair and comprehensive monitoring system would also be very much complicated since initially Ukrainians provided their places of birth, but evidently this might not coincide with a place where they lived in Ukraine when the full-scale war broke out or a place where they would consider returning in Ukraine to.
As M. Ineli Ciğer from Swedish Institute on European Policy Studies also alarms, “processing millions of asylum applications would cause or exacerbate backlogs in national asylum systems and could even lead to the collapse of asylum systems in countries that have received many Ukrainians […].
2.4. Transition period and assisted return to Ukraine
This scenario is the only one to presuppose that security situation substantially improves to the benefit of Ukraine in the nearest future (throughout 2025) ensuring safe and durable return of Ukrainians home is guaranteed. In geopolitical terms this implies either Ukrainian victory or negotiated peace. Should the war turn into a frozen conflict or Ukraine’s defeat, the approach described below would become redundant.
Only if security conditions are fully met by the end of 2025, the EU might opt for adopting a transition period for Ukrainians in the EU, followed by assisted voluntary return to Ukraine. It will be done through the Council adopting a decision by a qualified majority following the proposal of the Commission.
Ukrainians’ assisted voluntary return could imply financial incentives, vocational training and logistical assistance. As indicated in the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), these measures could facilitate the return of Ukrainians with the requisite skills and resources to contribute effectively to Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Transition period(s) preceding definitive return might be extended by national decisions of member states and their application might start either upon expiration of TPS or another time stipulated by the Council decision. The stark difference in drawing timeline periods for Ukrainians and the UK citizens at Brexit should be the realization that Ukrainians would be coming back to a war-torn country with severely damaged infrastructure and scarce employment opportunities. Therefore, should any differentiation be drawn up, it should first and foremost be based on where returning Ukrainians are going to resettle in Ukraine and only after consider the interest and capacities of their soon-former hosting MSs. In other words, even the most strained MSs should properly cooperate and be supported at the EU level to avoid roll-out of hasty and short-sighted return procedures, especially to regions (oblasts) most affected by war.
2.5. National (EU member state-based) approach
If the temporary protection period ends and no decision is taken on the EU level, the general laws on protection and on aliens in the member states will come into force, including on return. If the EU decides not to pursue a unified approach to the post-TP status of Ukrainians in the EU, or fails to do so, this scenario would allow each member state to devise and implement its own policy beyond TPS.
Albeit being preferable for some MSs because of its loose and non-binding nature, this approach is quite dangerous for the EU as an entity because of its repercussions. First, it would testify to the EU’s disunity which would be in stark contrast to the EU’s solidarity at the outset of russia’s full-scale invasion. Second, it would most definitely create confusion and perceived unfairness thus contributing to a messy relocation of Ukrainians between member states. The effects would be all the worse if security situation in Ukraine would remain precarious disabling safe and durable return of Ukrainians as currently foreseen by TPM.
If nonetheless pursued, the biggest effort should be put on maintaining non-discrimination policies and ensuring equal treatment of all temporary protection beneficiaries across different jurisdictions.
3. Comparative analysis
The five scenarios outlined in the previous section each vary in terms of complexity of its implementation on both legal and practical levels, as well as long-term consequences they will lead to and hypothetical challenges they will create.
Comparative analysis of five scenarios prompts the following conclusions:
- Drawing up a new Ukraine-case specific Directive on (re)integration providing its holders a long-term residence in the EU and entitling them to TPS-like rights will both come at a higher price than other options and present the lowest threshold mechanism for Ukrainians at large to reside in the EU long-term and thus face opposition from at least some MSs.
- At the same time, the long-term benefits not only for Ukrainians, but foremost hosting states can outweigh these costs if further (re)integration is managed effectively. The EU and its member states must balance immediate financial outlays with strategic investments in integration programs to ensure that both refugees and host societies benefit from this humanitarian effort.
- Mainstreaming Ukrainians to general asylum or immigration systems has the potential to increase bureaucracies leading to the systems’ collapse in some cases and putting some groups of Ukrainians at serious disadvantage when a shift from collective to individual approach or humanitarian to contribution-based is made.
- Shifting Ukrainians to some sort of transitional status in case of security situation stabilization enabling safe and durable return should be approach with great caution. Individual circumstances of returnees should be carefully considered and prevail over member states’ self-interest.
- Lack of unified EU strategy bears the risks of generating divergent standards and practices leading to insecurity among displaced Ukrainians and subsequent uninformed decisions due to perceived advantageous conditions in some states and potential chaotic flows of applicants among MSs.
Conclusions and recommendations
The scenario that presents the most pragmatic solution and benefits for all parties concerned – namely the EU, its member states, Ukraine, and Ukrainians abroad – is the pursuit of the (re)integration permit approach. This model implies a 10-year non-renewable residency permit to Ukrainians currently under TPS, thereby securing prolongation of their legal stay while for an extended period and enabling integration while maintaining a pathway to regular immigration processes. On top, it goes in line with the Ukrainian authorities’ quest for welcoming Ukrainians back to support recovery, reconstruction, post-war development and Ukraine’s EU integration.
Issuing (re)integration permits to Ukrainians might create benefits on the following levels:
Economic Contributions:
- Workforce Integration: Ukrainians enter the labour market more sustainably eradicating labour shortages and contributing to economic growth. Businesses benefit from a stable and skilled workforce, which can drive innovation and productivity.
- Consumer Spending: As Ukrainians settle and integrate, their consumer spending increases, boosting local economies. This includes spending on housing, goods, and services, which supports local businesses and generates tax revenue.
Social Stability:
- Community Engagement: Ukrainians engage in community activities, volunteer work, and local governance. This fosters social cohesion and a sense of belonging, reducing social tensions and promoting a harmonious society.
- Cultural Exchange: Ukrainians bring East European cultural perspectives, enriching the host society’s cultural fabric. This can lead to greater cultural understanding and tolerance, enhancing the overall social environment and preparing the EU for future enlargement eastwards.
Administrative Efficiency:
- Reduced Bureaucracy: (re)integration permits reduce the need for frequent renewals and administrative reviews, easing the burden on immigration systems. This allows authorities to allocate resources more efficiently and focus on other critical areas.
- Predictable Planning: With long-term residents, host states can plan more effectively for public services such as education, healthcare, and housing. This predictability helps hosting communities in better resource allocation and long-term planning.
Humanitarian Impact:
- Security and Stability: Providing long-term residence offers Ukrainians a sense of security and stability, which is crucial for their mental and emotional well-being. This stability allows them to rebuild their lives and contribute positively to their new communities.
- Family Reunification: Long-term residence permits have the potential to facilitate family reunification (when the war is over or Ukraine changes its policies on letting men out), promoting social stability and personal well-being. Families can support each other, reducing the social services burden on the host states.
In summary, granting 10-year residence to Ukrainians post-TPS not only benefits the individuals but also significantly enhances the host states’ economic, social, and administrative landscapes. It creates a win-win situation where both refugees and host societies thrive. Getting down to the matter immediately at the onset of the new European Commission term or delaying the decision on the future status of Ukrainian by another year will be a matter of a political choice and will also depend in part on the position and priorities of rotating presidencies of Hungary (Jul-Dec 24), Poland (Jan – Jun 25), Denmark (Jul – Dec 25), Cyprus (Jan – Jun 26) and Ireland (Jul – Dec 26).
Two courses of action that should absolutely be avoided, however, is turning a blind eye on the issue at the EU level and letting it slide and fall on the laps of national authorities, necessitating cumbersome coordination after; and devising a strategy which would disadvantage former TPBs and complicate the matters in light of Ukraine’s EU integration. Hence, post-TPS arrangement needs to be managed efficiently benefiting all parties concerned and laying the firm foundations for Ukraine’s EU integration.