Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian authorities have systematically reoriented the country’s economy toward alternative international markets. From a trade and resource perspective, this shift has primarily involved redirecting exports-especially oil and gas-to China and India, effectively replacing traditional European markets with Asian ones. The Western sanctions imposed on Russia have severely affected the technological dimension of its economy. In practice, this has led to serious disruptions in several sectors: a critical state in the aviation industry, the inability to advance the liquefied natural gas (LNG) sector without Western technology, and, most importantly, the constant need to expand resources to sustain the ongoing war against Ukraine.

 

Author:

• Anton Oksentiuk, Research Fellow of the “Russian and Belarusian  Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

Editor:

• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director of the “Russian and Belarusian  Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

Art and Technical Editor:

• Anatolii Chernysh, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.

 

In this context, it is necessary to examine the state and prospects of one of the cornerstones of not only Russia’s economy, but also its ability to continue the war against Ukraine – military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. It must be recognized that Beijing has, to a significant extent, become a lifeline for the Russian government. Increasingly isolated under the pressure of Western sanctions targeting its defense and high-tech sectors, Russia has come to rely on China as a key economic and technological partner. This cooperation goes beyond energy dependence and trade to the strategic realm, where China provides Russia with critical components and technologies that can be used for military purposes – such as semiconductors, drones, and other high-tech items.

The relevance of this topic is further underscored by the fact that the current relationship between China and Russia can be described as a limited form of military alliance that lacks formal legal status. This study will show how relations between the two countries – once characterized by cautious cooperation and latent competition – have evolved over the past decade into a stable political axis based on converging interests, primarily directed against the West. Although China’s official rhetoric avoids openly supporting Russia’s invasion, Beijing’s actions at the bilateral level indicate a pragmatic approach. The consequences of this approach, as well as the structure of military-economic relations between Russia and China, raise concerns about the future of arms control. Moreover, the current configuration of the Russia-Ukraine war suggests that China’s indirect military support may serve as a model for future proxy wars, in which great powers avoid direct confrontation while influencing conflicts through technological and strategic means. All these factors underscore the need for Ukraine and the West to develop a deeper understanding and more effective mechanisms for sanctioning relevant actors. More broadly, this paper examines the medium- and long-term prospects for Russia-China relations, with a particular focus on military-technical cooperation and its implications for the security of the European continent.

To gain a deeper understanding of the current state of military-technical cooperation between China and Russia, it is necessary to briefly examine the origins of their relationship. These relations largely reflect China’s broader development trajectory, particularly in the economic dimension. Over the past 30 years, this cooperation has undergone a fundamental transformation: while China initially imported Russian weapons, today it is Russia that is forced to procure a number of technological components from China in order to maintain the functioning of its own military-industrial complex. This process can be divided into four main stages in the evolution of bilateral relations.

 

ORIGINS OF CHINA–RUSSIA MILITARY COOPERATION

In general, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation (RF) began developing military cooperation almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is important to note that in the early stages, this partnership was far more advantageous for Russia: faced with a dire economic situation, Moscow was desperate for sources of revenue. One such stable source was the sale of surplus Soviet weapons. Not surprisingly, the initial agreements between the two countries were not political in nature, but purely commercial – focused on arms deliveries.

This cooperation also provided China with several important benefits. First, it helped mitigate the impact of Western sanctions imposed after the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Second, it allowed China to accelerate its military modernization by importing foreign weapons systems.

In 1992 and 1993, the two sides signed two agreements that laid the groundwork for the first phase of arms sales:

• The Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation (1992) 
• The Intergovernmental Agreement on the Supply of Military Equipment and Technologies (1993) 

These documents opened the door to large-scale exports of Russian weapons to China. These included combat aircraft, naval systems, air defense systems, and related missile technologies.

 

System	Years of Delivery	Details
Su-27SK / Su-27UBK	1992-1996	76 aircraft delivered; licensed assembly in China began in 1996.
Sovremenny-class destroyers	1998-2000	Two ships equipped with SS-N-22 missiles; significantly enhanced China’s navy.
S-300PMU surface-to-air missile systems	1993-1997	At the time, Russia’s most advanced air defense systems were available for export.
Kilo-class submarines	1994-1999	Four diesel-electric submarines intended for coastal defense.

It is important to note that this period laid the groundwork for future interstate disputes. China actively used the transferred technologies to reverse engineer and replicate Russian systems. While this decade marked a normalization of military relations and effectively ended the antagonism of the Soviet era, it also prompted Moscow to adopt a more cautious approach to future arms transfers. Nevertheless, the influx of Russian weaponry gave the PRC a significant technological edge, advancing its military development by decades relative to its domestic capabilities at the time.

 

DEEPENING COOPERATION AND THE ONSET OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

By the late 1990s, China had acquired enough technological knowledge to begin adapting foreign systems for its domestic needs—most notably with the J-11 fighter jet, developed on the basis of the Su-27. Russia came to realize that simple arms sales did not yield long-term benefits without deeper cooperation. This realization paved the way for the signing of the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, which institutionalized a broader strategic partnership. The treaty expanded the scope of collaboration from arms sales to intelligence sharing and joint military exercises. This marked a political shift—from a transactional arms trade relationship toward strategic convergence and technology transfer.

This evolution took place against a backdrop of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, driven by Moscow’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Over time, this dynamic intensified, leading Russia to further reorient itself toward China. In the 2000s, Russia began to transfer its own military technologies to China for the first time. Despite public statements from Moscow emphasizing joint innovation and licensed production, in practice these transfers amounted to the outright transfer of key military developments. In just over a decade, China gained access to Russian technologies for engine production, sensor systems, and electronic warfare modules — all of which were integrated into Chinese platforms. Cooperation on engine technologies was particularly crucial, as China was then heavily dependent on Russian analogues.

The transfers included:

• Jet engine technologies (such as AL-31F and D-30) for fighter jets and bombers 
• Gas turbine engines for naval vessels 
• Stealth coating technologies

This collaboration led to the development of several major Chinese weapons systems:

• J-11B fighter jet (based on the Su-27) 
• HQ-9 surface-to-air missile system (based on the S-300) 
• Type 054A frigate

As a result, China became much more self-sufficient in the production of fighter aircraft and naval vessels. This development changed the dynamics of bilateral military-technical cooperation. China’s accelerating economic development, combined with Russia’s increasing international isolation – culminating in the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine – deepened Moscow’s dependence on Beijing. At the same time, political ties strengthened, based on a shared interest in countering U.S. influence.

 

RUSSIA AFTER 2014: THE BEGINNING OF MOSCOW’S DEPENDENCE ON BEIJING

The period following 2014–2015 marked the beginning of the type of relationship between Russia and China that we observe today. Under the pressure of geopolitical isolation after the annexation of Crimea—and against the backdrop of China’s rapid economic rise—Russia’s actions in the sphere of military cooperation increasingly revealed a growing dependence. Many analytical reviews post-2014 focused on political declarations. Indeed, after the annexation of Crimea and the imposition of broad sanctions on the Russian economy, the formalization of bilateral agreements significantly expanded in both scale and ambition. The two sides declared cooperation across all sectors of the economy and expressed intent to further develop their strategic partnership.

However, it is equally important to understand that this period marked a return to the practices of the 1990s – namely, the renewed direct transfer of even more advanced Russian weapons to China. In the same period, the Roadmap for Military-Technical Cooperation of 2017 was signed, and in 2021 it was extended for the period until 2025. While formally focused on areas such as missile defense cooperation, air force interoperability, and joint development of naval and submarine technologies, in practice the Roadmap served as the basis for the continued transfer of high-tech military products from Moscow to Beijing.

Within a few years of the onset of sanctions and Russia’s confrontation with the West, China gained access to a number of advanced Russian weapons systems:

 

Weapon System	Chinese Acquisition/Integration	Strategic Significance
Su-35 Fighter Jets	24 units (delivered between 2016–2018)	Russia’s most advanced export fighter; used to modernize the PLAAF
S-400 Air Defense Systems	Delivered in 2018	China became the first foreign recipient

A key feature of this period was China’s expansion into strategically sensitive sectors of the Russian military-industrial complex. Particularly notable was cooperation in space technologies and missile defense. While the focus had previously been limited to specific weapon systems, after 2014 Russia began helping China develop its early warning system for missile attacks. In 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly confirmed that Moscow was assisting Beijing in creating such a system-an indication of a new level of Chinese involvement in Russian technology.

It is worth recalling that Russia had formally expressed its dissatisfaction with China’s copying of its military technologies, especially those derived from Russian systems. However, under the current circumstances, a qualitative leap in this interaction is evident. This reflects the fact that as Moscow’s dependence on Beijing deepens in various dimensions of bilateral relations, the Russian leadership has increasingly shown a willingness to transfer its core strategic technologies to China. In this context, it is important to note that Moscow is fully aware of the implications. As early as 2019, Yevgeny Levadny, a project director for intellectual property at Rostec Corporation, openly stated that China has effectively absorbed a large number of Russian military technologies in recent years. These include aircraft engines, Sukhoi aircraft, carrier-based fighters, surface-to-air missile systems, man-portable air defense systems, and equivalents of the Pantsir air defense complex. Since 2014, bilateral cooperation has also developed in the areas of intelligence sharing and cybersecurity. Although concrete examples of such cooperation have not been officially confirmed, its potential – and actual existence – is increasingly difficult to doubt. For example, American media have reported that during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow received assistance from China in the form of enhanced satellite and space-based capabilities.

In the early 2020s, Russian authorities sought to portray relations with China as a “quasi-alliance” – an alliance without a formal legal basis – and to position the partnership as a geopolitical counterweight to the West. But China, with its deep economic ties to both the United States and Europe, has consistently avoided the appearance of open global confrontation. Nevertheless, the fact that Beijing continues to acquire advanced military technologies from Moscow reflects the Chinese leadership’s desire to reap the benefits of cooperation with Russia without taking on political commitments.

 

WARTIME PERIOD. RUSSIA’S DEEPENING DEPENDENCE ON CHINA’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally altered the economic paradigm on which the country had previously relied. The military-industrial complex (MIC), which had previously obtained the necessary equipment and technologies with relative ease, was forced to seek alternative supply channels following the imposition of sweeping international sanctions. Under these circumstances, Russia had little choice but to turn to China to obtain critical resources for its defense sector.

Even without taking political factors into account, the volume of trade between the two countries has continued to grow year after year since the beginning of the war. At the same time, Western sanctions which Beijing is reluctant to violate openly have forced the Russian authorities to develop a complex import system. Its goal is to secure dual-use goods such as optics, electronic components, precision machinery for weapons manufacturing, as well as radio and communications systems. Throughout the course of the war, Moscow has actively exploited so-called “grey zones” of international law and weaknesses in export control mechanisms. This includes the use of shell companies, proxy financial intermediaries, and fictitious distributors. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Chinese electronics are often shipped disguised as civilian products or are relabeled.

At this stage, the Russian Federation is heavily dependent on China for the supply of goods that may have military applications. According to data from the Kyiv School of Economics, by 2023, 49% of items on the Common High Priority List (including chips, semiconductors, and other microelectronics) were being delivered to Russia from China. The rest were either produced in the West and routed through Chinese intermediaries, or manufactured by Western companies operating on Chinese territory.

It is important to emphasize that effective export controls can indeed limit such shipments. For example, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, between January and May 2024, imports of goods from the CHPL list to Russia declined by approximately 28% compared to the same period in 2023. This likely reflects a decline in the flow of Western electronics previously supplied through front companies. Nevertheless, such schemes still allow Russia to import critical electronics for the production of missiles, drones, and communications equipment.

It is worth noting that there are currently industries in which China’s share of imports to Russia is dominant. This means that targeted sanctions against these categories could significantly affect the combat capability of the Russian army.

Category	China’s Share in Russian Imports (2023)	Military importance
Radio and telecommunication equipment	~100%	Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)
Optics and laser devices	~100%	Targeting systems, surveillance, missile guidance
CNC machines / metal-cutting tools	~60%+	Missile casings, drone production, weapons manufacturing

 

A positive aspect remains the fact that China has not yet initiated open and large-scale deliveries of military equipment to the Russian Federation. This should be considered in light of Russia’s significant equipment losses and the resulting challenges on the battlefield. Nevertheless, there are documented cases of Chinese military hardware deliveries in the course of the war. For example, Chinese “Tiger” armored vehicles were displayed in Chechnya in 2023 and reportedly used by Kadyrov’s forces. Moreover, in April 2025, for the first time since the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly accused China of having evidence that the Russian army was being supplied with Chinese gunpowder and artillery. As expected, the Chinese government denied it. And if in the case of gunpowder (as well as saltpeter for its production) such supplies are absolutely true, the lack of information about a significant amount of destroyed Chinese military vehicles, in this case artillery, suggests that the Russian army does not have enough of such systems.

The situation with drones, however, is quite different. In late 2024, U.S. State Department officials publicly confirmed the delivery of combat drones from China to Russia. These deliveries were not just individual components, but complete offensive systems, including “Harpy” drones. The U.S. also claimed to have intelligence indicating joint drone production by Chinese and Russian companies on Russian territory. This type of cooperation in the drone sector poses a particularly serious long-term threat due to the high battlefield effectiveness of this technology. Moreover, there is a strong possibility that China is actively studying and adopting Russia’s experience in drone warfare. In this context, we can expect an increase in joint military exercises focused on the use of UAVs.

By 2023, 49% of items on the Common High Priority List (including chips, semiconductors, and other microelectronics) were being delivered to Russia from China. Illustrative photo. RBC-Ukraine.

Another emerging issue is the presence of Chinese citizens on the battlefield and their participation in combat operations on the side of the Russian Federation. This issue has gained attention amid reports of Chinese citizens being captured by Ukrainian forces. However, it is highly unlikely that China will follow North Korea’s example and involve its own military forces in the war. First, there is no legal basis for such action. Second, Beijing’s current foreign policy strategy does not support direct intervention in the conflict. However, it is also unlikely that Beijing will actively oppose Russia’s efforts to recruit Chinese citizens as mercenaries. The presence of Chinese individuals on the front line also raises questions about the possible participation of Chinese officers in the Russian armed forces to gain combat experience. Although such cases have not been publicly documented, their occurrence is entirely plausible. In this context, it would be prudent for Ukraine to address such issues through a non-public bilateral dialogue – especially in light of Beijing’s likely dissatisfaction with the ongoing Russia-U.S. negotiations.

 

CONCLUSIONS

Military-technical cooperation between Russia and China over the past thirty years reflects the gradual transformation of Moscow’s foreign policy strategy. The geopolitical confrontation with the West has reached a point where the Russian authorities are willing to sacrifice strategic interests in the field of military technologies in exchange for support from Beijing.

On the other hand, China has skillfully taken advantage of Moscow’s desire for closer ties, gradually gaining access to all critical components of Russia’s military-industrial complex. As of today, Russia has already transferred a number of key technologies to Beijing and has initiated the process of limited transfer of strategic developments.

Since China has effectively become the main external partner ensuring the survival of Russia’s military-industrial complex during wartime, further deepening of cooperation and technology transfers are entirely predictable. While Beijing is avoiding direct military assistance to Moscow in the war against Ukraine, it is providing indirect support – through the supply of critical goods, equipment and components.

This format of cooperation allows Russia to maintain its ability to produce modern weapons systems even in the face of severe international pressure. As a result, the military-technical partnership with China has become not only important, but decisive for the implementation of Moscow’s modern military strategy.

 

 

The policy brief was prepared within the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the “International Renaissance Foundation”. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the “Ukrainian Prism” and do not necessarily reflect the position of the “International Renaissance Foundation”.