However, the current electoral campaign is unique for the Belarusian dictator’s regime. For the first time, it is taking place amid a large regional war, in which Belarus is indirectly involved, as well as against the backdrop of unprecedented rapprochement with Russia and regional isolation.
Lukashenka’s next presidential term could bring significant changes not only for Belarus but for the region as a whole. The architectural security of the region will depend, in particular, on whether Belarus continues to remain an independent state.
The 2025 elections will also influence the functioning of Belarusian democratic forces, which will also have to face these unique conditions for the first time. Lukashenka’s re-election will be yet another step toward transforming the political identity of the Belarusian democratic movement in exile, given that the events of 2020 are becoming a distant past.
All of this creates the need for the development of a proactive and comprehensive approach by Ukraine, its regional partners, and Belarusian democratic forces to respond to the processes that could unfold after January 2025.
Pavlo Rad,
Analyst, “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Program,
Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
Iaroslav Chornogor,
PhD in History, Director, “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Program,
Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
Content
- Logic of the 2025 Presidential Elections
1.1. Internal Policy-Related Considerations
1.2. Foreign Policy-Related Considerations
- The Effect of the Elections on the Development Trajectory of the Lukashenka Regime
2.1. Belarus’s Unchanging Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War
2.2. Belarus’s Further Attempts to Enhance Its Foreign Policy Stance
2.3. Transformation of the Political System
- The Effect of the Elections on Further Activities of the Belarusian Democratic Forces
3.1. Reaction of the Belarusian Democratic Forces on the 2025 Presidential Elections
3.2. Potential Difficulties with Preserving Political Subjectivity
Conclusions
Recommendations
1. Logic of the 2025 Presidential Elections
1.1. Internal Policy-Related Considerations
On October 23, 2024, the House of Representatives of the Belarusian Parliament scheduled the presidential elections in the Republic of Belarus for January 26, 2025. This decision is unusual in terms of shortening the presidential term of Aliaksandr Lukashenka by six months, which, according to the Belarusian Constitution, does not exclude the right of Lukashenka to run for a new term, and does not create a need for extraordinary elections.
Ihar Karpenka, the head of the Central Election Commission, explained that such a decision was made to allow the newly elected President of Belarus to exercise his powers at the initial stage of the strategic planning of the next five-year socio-economic development plan. However, the actual reasons may be caused by different internal and external political considerations.
The Lukashenka regime views any elections, even fraudulent ones, as a source of potential internal destabilization. Under current conditions, internal stability is based on three pillars: repressions, economic growth, and the absence of war in Belarus. Thus, the decision to hold elections early next year is prompted by the need to enhance those pillars and minimize potential risks.
Firstly, taking into account the 2020 mass protests, it is better for the regime to hold elections in winter to reduce the possibility of public discontent. Basically, that was the reason why the 2022 constitutional referendum and the last parliamentary and local elections took place in the winter season.
Secondly, even though the Belarusian economy has been growing for the last two years, independent economic experts note that this growth is artificial and creates imbalances in the Belarusian economic machine. Some of the imbalances are expected to manifest themselves in 2025, so it makes sense to hold elections before the existing problems become visible to an average citizen.
Thirdly, Belarusian political elites take into consideration the factor of Russian UAVs that have been regularly entering Belarusian airspace since July 2024. This causes a real danger for civilians, as there have already been several cases of Russian drones crashing near populated areas. So, as long as there have been no casualties, Minsk is hurrying up with the presidential elections. Otherwise, in case of an emergency, the public stance of Lukashenka and his internal legitimacy will be undermined.
1.2. Foreign Policy-Related Considerations
However, the Lukashenka regime’s rush is caused not only by internal political reasons but also by foreign policy-related considerations. As it is important for Lukasneka to preserve internal legitimacy, it is also needed to enhance external legitimacy and look for the potential mechanisms of mitigating reputational losses.
The 2025 presidential elections in Belarus will occur in the shadow of the United States presidential inauguration with the aim of attracting as little attention from the international community as possible. It is important for the regime to get out of the legitimacy vacuum that occurred after the 2020 rigged elections and ensure a smooth transition to the next presidential term which will not be seriously condemned by the international community.
A smooth transition is also needed for the preparation for potential peace negotiations over the Russo-Ukrainian war. Lukashenka has been regularly emphasizing that Belarus should also participate in this process, trying to expand his role as an intermediary between the two conflicting parties and somewhat reanimate Belarus’s undermined geopolitical position in the region.
For this need, Belarus has been involved in the procedure of the prisoner-of-war exchange between Russia and Ukraine and used by Kyiv and Moscow as a channel to exchange notes, transmit legal and consular documents, as well transmit military and political signals.
Without participation in the post-war settlement of Europe, Lukashenka will not be able to establish a new framework of engagement with both Ukraine and Western states and ensure the effectiveness of further steps in the process of political transformation in Belarus.
2. The Effect of the Elections on the Development Trajectory of the Lukashenka Regime
2.1. Belarus’s Unchanging Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War
An important signal was that the decision to hastily hold elections in Belarus was made against the backdrop of reports about North Korea sending its troops to participate in the Russian-Ukrainian war on the Kremlin’s side.
The fact that Russia is involving North Korea in the war rather than its CSTO and the Union State ally indicates that the risks of direct involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are not likely to increase in the near future. Disruption of the status quo would lead to serious internal destabilization in Belarus and would force the Kremlin to allocate some resources to regain control over the situation. Given the active combat operations, the Kremlin, which has already publicly supported Lukashenka’s candidacy, is not interested in this outcome. Thus, a quiet victory for Aliaksandr Lukashenka is in Moscow’s favor.
However, Belarus is likely to remain Russia’s crucial supplier of military-purpose products. Although the Lukashenka regime may not provide Russians with offensive weapons as it did in 2022-2023, transferring over 200 T-72A tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, “Ural” trucks, and nearly 132,000 tons of munitions, Belarus will remain a crucial supplier of high-tech products such as optical devices, sighting complexes, fire control systems, radio-electronic equipment, and software complexes.
It is not a secret that Belarusian military developments are integrated into Russian aviation and ground equipment, including main battle tanks, air defense systems, and missile systems. Belarus’s involvement in the production of military equipment for Russia has helped the latter put its military-industrial complex on a war footing.
Consequently, it would be disadvantageous for Russia to put production capacities on Belarusian soil at risk, taking into consideration the fact that Ukraine refrains from conducting sabotage operations deep in Belarusian territory or from targeting military facilities as it does in Russia.
2.2. Belarus’s Further Attempts to Enhance Its Foreign Policy Stance
Although Belarus is likely to remain one of Russia’s largest military partners, Minsk is also interested in enhancing its foreign policy stance. In order to do so the Lukashenka regime has been employing several mechanisms, and is likely to continue doing it in the future.
The first mechanism is related to the previously mentioned Belarus’s attempts to insert itself into a potential negotiation process between Ukraine and Russia. Although the suppression of protests in 2020, the creation of a migration crisis at the borders with EU countries, and later involvement in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine undermined Minsk’s efforts to position itself as a donor of regional security, Belarusian officials seem undeterred in their attempts to restore Belarus’s status as a negotiation platform.
This concerns not only Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s previously mentioned statements about his intention to participate in negotiations but also efforts to enhance Belarus’s diplomatic activities. For instance, from October 31 to November 1, Minsk hosted the 2nd International Conference on Eurasian Security which was attended by 600 participants from 45 states, including Hungary’s Foreign Minister Peter Szijjártó. The event was important not only as a tool for portraying Belarus as a peacemaker but also as an indicator that Minsk is ready to participate in broader diplomatic efforts.
No wonder that Russia supports the initiative, as this is evidenced by the fact that for the second consecutive year, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov attended the conference and complimented the Belarusian authorities. Taking into consideration the possibility of peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow’s interest may lie in reviving the Minsk negotiation platform in case of a need, as it is currently the most loyal and safe option for Vladimir Putin outside of Russia.
The second mechanism is the continuation of the exchange of signals with the Western states. Since the beginning of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarusian officials have been periodically sending contradictory signals such as the letter of the former Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makey to the EU counterparts in which he expressed the readiness to reestablish dialogue with the West.
However, this year the regime in Minsk resorted to unprecedented measures in today’s conditions. For the purpose of adjusting the direction of diplomatic activities, in June 2024, Lukashenka made significant government changes, including appointing Zmicer Krutoy, a former ambassador to Russia, to head the presidential administration, and Maxim Ryzhenkov as foreign minister.
Government changes quickly resulted in creative decisions, with the official Minsk introducing a visa-free regime for citizens of 35 European countries, engaging in negotiations with Poland over the fate of Polish minority activist Andrzej Poczobut, and starting the gradual release of political prisoners.
As for now, nearly 100 political prisoners have been released, and new waves of this process are possible in the future, as it once again was confirmed by Lukashenka during his interview with BBC on the sidelines of the BRICS summit.
Moreover, in mid-October, two representatives from the U.S. State Department visited Minsk, one of whom heads the Belarus affairs section at the U.S. embassy in Vilnius. They were received by Lukashenka, who stated that the conversation lasted four hours. There are reasons to believe that one of the topics discussed was the further release of political prisoners, at least one of whom, Yury Zenkovich, not only holds U.S. citizenship but also has health issues due to his time in prison.
The third mechanism is Minsk’s attempts to intensify bilateral interactions with China which is considered Belarus’s second most important partner and the only player who can minimize the risks associated with a high level of dependence on Russia.
In July, official Minsk not only publicly supported the Chinese plan for a peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian war but also demonstrated signs of increasing military and political cooperation. The newly appointed Foreign Minister, Maxim Ryzhenkov, made his first foreign visit to Beijing, where he met with his counterpart Wang Yi. Additionally, a Chinese military delegation arrived in Minsk, and the first joint Belarusian-Chinese military exercises took place in Belarus since the establishment of diplomatic relations. What is of no less importance for the official Minsk, in July this year, Belarus became a full-fledged member of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization, then obtaining the BRICS partner status in October at the BRICS summit in Russia.
Thus, the events of recent months provide grounds to predict that Belarus will continue to work simultaneously on these three tracks. The search for points of contact with Western countries is necessary, in particular, to open the way for the restoration of the Minsk negotiation platform, which Russia may also potentially have an interest in.
At the same time, a way out of the escalation spiral with Western countries will allow Belarus to enhance its role as a transit route for Chinese goods and increase Beijing’s interest in intensifying relations with the Belarusian incumbent authorities, thus somehow balancing Russia’s influence.
Therefore, the diplomatic efforts of Lukashenka’s regime are not aimed at changing the foreign policy course by 180 degrees or seriously distancing itself from Moscow, but rather to expand the space for foreign policy maneuvering and create conditions for the further transformation of the political system.
2.3. Transformation of the Political System
Currently, a process of transformation of the political system is underway in Belarus. This process is driven by two main factors: the deterioration of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s health and the necessity of carrying out a power transition at some point in the future.
As a result, Aliaksandr Lukashenka has started to implement a set of legislative safeguards that would allow him to preserve the political system he has built. This process has several mechanisms that could be implemented simultaneously.
First, Lukashenka is willing to ensure that after his departure, the so-called destructive forces do not enter the highest echelons of Belarusian politics, and do not claim the position of head of state.
For this reason, in January 2024, the Belarusian dictator signed comprehensive amendments to the law of the Republic of Belarus on the President of the Republic of Belarus. The new version of this legislative act stipulates that to assume the presidency, a citizen must be at least 40 years old, and have lived in Belarus for at least 20 years (10 years more compared to the previous version). Additionally, for the first time, provisions have been added stating that a person cannot be president if they have or have had foreign citizenship, permanent residency, or any other documents that provide privileges in another state.
Second, Lukashenka has also set up a system of safeguards in case of a change in leadership, allowing him to avoid responsibility for actions taken while in office, as well as ensuring a comfortable retirement and life for himself and his family.
The new version of the already mentioned law expands the scope of state support and services for the president and his family members. For the first time, guarantees are provided to a president who has ended his duties, as well as to his family members. These guarantees resemble diplomatic privileges and immunities, but within the state framework, including immunity from prosecution for actions taken in the course of fulfilling presidential duties, as well as the inviolability of housing, property, vehicles, correspondence, etc. Additionally, the president and his family are entitled to lifetime medical care, a lifetime pension, and tax exemptions.
Third, Lukasneka still has the tools for carrying out a power transition, which can be activated in case of serious necessity.
The main tool which could be employed by the Belarusian dictator is the All-Belarusian Peoples’ Assembly. The initial idea behind the existence of this body was to provide Lukashenka with an instrument for a power transition similar to what was used in Kazakhstan by Nazarbayev. According to this scheme, Lukashenka would have become the head of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly with the possibility of controlling a new president, who would have remained the second political figure after the Belarusian dictator himself. However, after the 2020 protests and the subsequent rapprochement with Russia, power transition was not on the agenda anymore, as Lukashenka regained control over the situation and received political support from Moscow.
Although after the 2020 events, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly became a decorative element of Belarus’s political system, with no significant influence on shaping the country’s political life, it still can be employed when the needed moment comes. If necessary, Aliaksandr Lukashenka could agree to further transform the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly by granting it greater powers to ensure continued influence over the country’s internal political agenda, and consequently, to have an additional guarantee of his immunity.
3. The Effect of the Elections on Further Activities of the Belarusian Democratic Forces
3.1. Reaction of the Belarusian Democratic Forces on the 2025 Presidential Elections
The presidential elections in Belarus are important not only for the Lukashenka regime but also for the Belarusian democratic forces.
On October 23, 2024, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the United Transitional Cabinet, and the Coordination Council published a joint statement regarding the presidential elections scheduled for January 2025. In this document, the representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement encouraged Belarusian voters to express their protest by voting against all the candidates.
In addition, the Belarusian democratic forces presented a list of demands to the Lukashenka regime which included the end of repressions, release of political prisoners, ensuring the electoral rights of Belarusian citizens, etc.
Moreover, Anzhalika Melnikava, the speaker of the Coordination Council stated that the Belarusian democratic forces have already developed a joint strategy for the 2025 presidential elections. She did not reveal any significant details but it is possible to suggest that the democratic forces have alternative mechanisms for expressing their protest depending on how the situation with the presidential elections develops.
At the same time, some representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement proposed slightly different methods of protest. For instance, the leader of the “Free Belarus” movement, Zenon Pozniak, called for a boycott of the elections, while Coordination Council member Aliaksandr Knirovich suggested a tactic known as “smart voting,” meaning that opponents of the Lukashenka regime would have to vote for any formal opponent of Lukashenka.
Although neither of these approaches will affect the election results in any significant way, the Belarusian democratic forces have chosen the best possible option for resistance. Calls to vote “against all” may serve as an example of mobilizing efforts among the population within the country, which could foster a positive response from Western partners.
For Belarusian citizens, on the other hand, this approach will have a significant psychological effect. In this way, people inside the country can use their last legal right to protest against the system, even if it’s a quiet protest. It’s not about creating political stress for the regime. It’s about people preserving their dignity and refusing to acknowledge that they have come to terms with a new reality.
3.2. Potential Difficulties with Preserving Political Subjectivity
At the same time, it cannot be said that the foreign policy aspect of this election campaign is as empty as the domestic one. This is confirmed by the fact that diplomatic efforts of the Belarusian democratic forces are directed at preventing the legitimization of the Belarusian regime in the West.
However, despite Misnk’s attempts to send signals to the Western states, there are no signs that regular contact with Minsk will be resumed and Lukasneka will receive the long-awaited recognition. The regime’s involvement in the war, brutal repression, and other problems that Lukashenka has created for the West is a significant barrier to restoring relations.
In order to reach more positive results, the regime needs not only to make much more serious concessions but also provide Western counterparts with such guarantees that will allow them to believe that Belarus will no longer pose a threat.
Of course, after the presidential campaign, Lukashenka will not face any elections for at least the next three years, and this could give the regime enough internal stability to continue its experiments on the Western front. For example, by continuing to release political prisoners or removing the migration crisis from the agenda. This could potentially lead to the restoration of a dialogue with Minsk, but such a perspective seems distant in the current moment.
The issue that is of a higher priority for the Belarusian democratic forces compared to finding a mechanism for responding to a potential renewal of dialogue between the regime and Western capitals is the question of the legitimacy of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.
In 2025, the term of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as de jure President-elect of Belarus will expire, according to some in the Belarusian democratic movement. Given her inability to participate in the 2025 presidential elections, during the “New Belarus” Conference that was held in August, the Belarusian democratic forces decided to address the issue of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s status by proclaiming her the national leader with a de facto unlimited term of office.
This decision was symbolic in the context of the limited set of tools available to the Belarusian democratic forces to maintain their previous levels of legitimacy. In the conditions of a foreign policy stalemate without serious prerequisites for democratic changes in Belarus and a lack of mechanisms for maintaining influence over the Belarusians inside the country, representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces face a need to rethink and possibly adjust their current approaches in order to effectively address the above challenges.
Conclusions
The electoral period is a moment of challenges for the Lukashenka regime, as it is for any undemocratic regime in general. Today, the Belarusian dictator faces a number of internal and external problems that are forcing him to rush with his reelection.
A potential economic recession, provoked by growing imbalances in the economy, regular violations of Belarus’s airspace by Russian drones, as well as the possibility of starting negotiations to end the Russian-Ukrainian war, are pressuring the regime to hasten the elections.
However, the campaign for Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s reelection is also important in the context of transformational processes within the regime itself as there is a possibility that the 2025 elections will be the last for the Belarusian dictator. It is unknown whether Lukashenka’s health will allow him to continue in office after 2025. It is also unclear whether Russia and China will support the dictator’s eighth presidential term, especially after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
To be prepared for any transformative changes, Lukashenka has prepared legislative safeguards in case he steps down from power. Additionally, he still controls the mechanisms for power transition, which could be activated if necessary. While there are no signs that Lukashenka plans to step down soon, the next presidential term may be a time for more active changes to the existing system.
The presidential elections are also important for Belarusian democratic forces, who will have to find new ways to strengthen their legitimacy after the end of what some in the democratic movement consider to be Sviatlana Tsikhanovskaya’s presidential term. Belarusian democratic forces will likely need to decide on their strategy for responding to the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian war and Belarus’s role in building a new regional order.
For Ukraine and its regional partners, the period of transformation that may begin after 2025 is both a challenge and a window of opportunity. It is needed to reconsider its current approach to the Belarusian issue and be prepared to prevent possible attempts by Russia to further intervene in Belarus’s internal processes.
Recommendations
Considering the reality of further attempts by official Minsk to define the limits of its capabilities in the context of expanding the scope for foreign policy maneuver, Western actors will need to carefully consider how to formulate a unified strategy regarding Belarusian political prisoners. This remains a sensitive diplomatic issue, requiring a balance between making strategic concessions and avoiding the risk of undermining broader negotiations. At the same time, the EU and its allies must remain vigilant, ensuring that they do not offer Lukashenka concessions that allow him to gain maximum benefits while delivering only minimal reforms or token amnesties in return.
In this context, Central European countries can leverage the upcoming Polish EU presidency in January-June 2025 as it offers a crucial opportunity to prioritize the release and rehabilitation of political prisoners on the EU’s agenda. Given Poland’s geographical proximity to Belarus and its longstanding support for democratic movements in Eastern Europe, it is well-positioned to lead a coordinated EU approach in this area. Small, consistent diplomatic actions, along with high-level attention during the Polish presidency, could help raise global awareness about the plight of Belarusian political prisoners.
In parallel, Ukrainian and Western politicians need to prepare for the changes of ruling elites in Belarus, as the Belarusian dictator will not be able to rule forever. The transitional period caused by his departure and the subsequent transformation of his personalized regime may be unpredictable and dangerous, especially considering possible attempts by Moscow to exploit the moment of uncertainty for its benefit. Therefore, Ukraine and its partners need to prepare for such scenarios while simultaneously seeking mechanisms to influence the Belarusian political elites.
Ukraine and its partners should also try to create the prerequisites for democratic changes in Belarus. In order to do so it is necessary to look for additional mechanisms of strengthening the competence of the Belarusian democratic forces and projecting influence on the Belarusian society. This could be done by implementing long-term training programs for Belarusian activists and transmitting successful experience in carrying out reforms. At the same time, Ukraine and its partners should work to shape a positive image within Belarusian society, focusing particularly on the neutral and apolitical segments of the population, who make up the majority.
The policy brief was prepared within the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and presented at the Ukrainian Central European Forum with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Representation in Ukraine. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the Ukrainian Prism and do not necessarily reflect the position of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Representation in Ukraine.