Both Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (2022), as well as the European Defence Industrial Strategy (2024) indicate that “a stronger and more capable EU in security and defence (…) is complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members”.
To reinforce strategic partnership with NATO, the EU strategies seek to generate financial resources to develop capabilities by the EU Member States in line with NATO capability targets, regional defence plans and command and control structures. The White Paper on the future European defence follows the same logic. After the recent expansion of NATO, 23 of the 32 allies are members of the European Union, which may lead to increased acceptance of NATO standards and common defence policies.
With the start of a full-blown Russian war against Ukraine, a dialogue between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has intensified in various domains. In 2023, the parties signed the third Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation, outlining directions for cooperation, including assistance to Ukraine. Seven ‘Structured Dialogues’ were established between the EU and NATO, covering Military Mobility, Resilience, Emerging and disruptive technologies, Climate and defence, Space, Defence Industry, and Cyber. Till the beginning of 2025, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and NATO International Military Staff (IMS) held 22 bi-annual conferences. The tenth progress report on implementation is due to appear in the spring of 2025, assessing more than 70 priority directions of EU-NATO interaction.
Despite the profound political declarations of both sides strategic significance of the EU-NATO bond, the level of cooperation is still insufficient when it comes to the search for joint responses to the most severe challenges, including Russian full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
The situation is further aggravated by the inconsistency in the US public position as a core NATO member, undermining unity and trust between allies, and weakening NATO’s defence and deterrence posture in Europe and worldwide.
But one can argue that coordination formats between two organisations regarding assistance to Ukraine may bring benefits also to Member States and Allies in the area of capabilities development and facilitation of coordination efforts of the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
EU-NATO-Ukraine cooperation since 2022
On the bilateral inter-organisational track, the start of full-scale aggression prompted the EU and NATO to search for closer cooperation and coordination of support to Ukraine. In February 2022 the European External Action Service, the European Commission, and NATO launched the EU-NATO Staff Coordination on Ukraine. As of February 2024, eight meetings took place, focusing on a wide range of issues, including military and humanitarian support, energy security, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) preparedness, demining etc.
In February 2023, during the first high-level dialogue EU-NATO-Ukraine, foreign minister of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba proposed to launch a tri-lateral format EU-NATO-Ukraine. The initial idea was to create a coordination mechanism at the level of arms producers, buyers and national governments. This initiative, unfortunately, did not come to fruition. Partly, it might be explained by the existence of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (“Ramstein format”) where all NATO allies and 25 EU member states participate.
Despite high-level declarations about further alignment of policies towards support to Ukraine, the European Union and NATO act, predominately, in parallel.
The EU utilised the European Peace Facility (EPF) for covering military support to Ukraine through its Member States, Ukraine Facility, EU Civil Protection Mechanism, Foreign Policy Instruments, and The Common Security and Defence Policy missions (EUMAM, EUAM).
At the same time, NATO increased and fine-tuned the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine as a multi-year program to streamline defence and security reforms in Ukraine and increase interoperability with NATO.
In 2024 Allies agreed to set NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) to inherit from the US, the leader of the “Ramstein Format”, coordination of military equipment provision and training for Ukraine.
Within the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine, in 2024 Allies provided support to Ukraine worth EUR 50 billion, surpassing the minimum baseline funding of EUR 40 billion (60% European Allies and Canada).
Both the EU and NATO have launched their respective offices tasked with studying the experience of the battlefield in Ukraine. In September 2024, the European Commission launched the Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv, a step envisaged in the European Defence Industrial Strategy. In February 2025 in Poland, Ukraine and NATO opened the Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre (JATEC) to collect combat experience and transform it in future NATO’s defence planning.
Role of Ukraine in deepening relations between EU and NATO
As the European Commission prepares the White Paper on the Future of European Defence, it is crucial to mention areas where cooperation with Ukraine may bring benefits for common European defence.
A transfer of administrative powers of the Ukrainian Defence Contact Group (UDCG) to the NSATU creates new opportunities to foster EU-NATO cooperation, especially in the capability development area.
Eight capability coalitions have been formed in the framework of the UDCG, featuring the current and future needs of Ukraine in modern warfare. They cover: Air Force Capability; Maritime Capability; Integrated Air and Missile Defense; Artillery; Armored Vehicles and Maneuverability; Drone; Demining Capability; IT. The structure and thematic orientation of the coalitions make them natural pilot initiatives for generating common approaches to capability development within the European Defence Agency (EDA) and NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA).
Provided that these eight coalitions reflect the vital needs of Ukraine on the battlefield, these areas are also in line with NATO capability needs. Each of them is led by the EU Member State and NATO allies, presuming that some countries might act as a framework nation in the process.
Also, it fits the EU’s priority to enhance partnerships with third states, which are at the same time Allies, including Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the US. Additionally, capability coalitions set preconditions for such partners of both EU and NATO as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
As NATO prepares to endorse new capability targets in June 2025, the Joint Analysis, Training And Education Centre (JATEC) and EU Defence Innovation Office must provide a comprehensive assessment of not only Ukraine’s current needs for weapons and ammunition but also the potential of the Ukrainian Defence Technological and Industrial Base to meet European defence capabilities goals.
Recommendations
- Tri-lateral structured dialogue EU-NATO-Ukraine. Despite the current political moment when some allies are reluctant to invite Ukraine to join NATO, strong tri-lateral political dialogue would benefit both EU-NATO coordination efforts to assist Ukraine, and facilitate interoperability and development of European military capabilities. Many EU-NATO Structured Dialogues cover areas of bilateral cooperation, where the Ukrainian experience and expertise from the battlefield are vital to be taken into consideration.
- Standardisation of the European types of hardware and ammunition. The Russian war in Ukraine demonstrated the problems of “free interpreting” of NATO standards on ammunition, produced by different European arms manufacturers. The time is ripe for generating political will within EU MS and NATO allies to strengthen European military preparedness by easing regulations, production standardisation, and shifting bureaucratic obstacles. This unpopular moves among big defence manufacturers may be facilitated with financial incentives from the European Defence Agency.
- More trust between EU and NATO in information exchange. The situation with the absence of sufficient flow of classified information between the European Union and NATO not only slows down the practical level of cooperation but also leaves the European Union in a disadvantage compared to other partners.
- Two-way military trainings to boost motivated and prepared manpower both in Europe and in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Armed Forces benefitted largely from the military preparation of Ukrainian manpower in the framework of the EUMAM and other NATO allies. Now that it is obvious that the US support for Europe might have a prospect of scaling down incrementally or abruptly, the European capitals should pay more attention to tailor special military training for their active duty army and reservists. It should be done based on practical experience the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine), the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), and the Joint Analysis Training and Education Centre (JATEC).
- Both EU and NATO should be consistent and transparent in providing assistance to Ukraine. It is a positive development that the allies raised 10 billion more than the pledge’s baseline in 2024. At the same time, this pledge is made in a very non-transparent way, which is very difficult to understand even for the Ukrainian side. Currently, each ally uses its own approach to calculate its contribution to the pledge, sometimes far from market prices for equipment and services provided to Ukraine. On the EU and NATO level, the parties have to elaborate a clear methodology of assessment to be utilised in assistance initiatives, led jointly or by one of the organisations
The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” has initiated a consortium of Ukrainian think tanks to prepare contributions that reflect the battlefield experience of modern warfare and to make a specific contribution to the discussion on the White Paper preparation process. The group also includes: the Sahaidachnyi Security Centre, the Analytical Centre of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, Reforms Support Office, the NGO Aerorozvidka, the NGO Price of Freedom.
The set of short contributions “Blue and Yellow Annex to the White Paper on the Futureof European Defence” addresses the issues of modern drone warfare, rethinking the air defence architecture to meet the challenges of mass hybrid drones and missiles, mobilisation and recruitment practices for next-generation warfare, and high-tech military procurement in modern warfare.
The aim of this initiative is to present key ideas on current and future military doctrine, the future force concept and the development of military capabilities from the perspective of Ukrainian experts.
The set of policy briefs is prepared within the framework of ‘Strengthening Ukrainian expert voice in the European Union and EU member states and partners’ project, supported by a grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations.