Egypt remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa. Ukraine is a key global wheat exporter, and Egypt – the most populous Arab country – is a major wheat importer. Ukrainian authorities have declared their readiness to remain a reliable guarantor of Egypt’s food security. Ensuring consistent grain supplies is critical for Egypt, especially in the context of the financial crisis. Cooperation in the food sector is essential to counter the global rise in food prices caused by the war, which affects countries in Africa and the Middle East.
At the same time, relations with Egypt, a regional leader, are important for Ukraine as part of a broader diplomatic strategy in the Global South. For Ukraine, it is a strategic necessity to strengthen its position in the Middle East and Africa. Ukrainian-Egyptian relations provide Ukraine with strategic geopolitical influence on the continent. Egypt’s status as a regional leader is backed by economic indicators: it remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa. It is the most populous Arab state and a key importer of grain.
Thus, for Ukraine, relations with Egypt are a tool for ensuring vital exports, supporting global food security, and a strategic necessity for strengthening its position in the Middle East and Africa, especially against the backdrop of strong Russian influence in the region.
KEY FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SHAPING OF EGYPT’S CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY
The shaping of Egypt’s current foreign policy is a multifaceted process, determined primarily by the desire for economic stability, the role of regional leader, and the need to balance between the West and the Russian Federation. As Egyptian researcher Eman Ragab notes, Egypt shapes its foreign policy based on a rational analysis of the consequences of war for national interests, in particular food security, economic stability, and geopolitical positioning, adhering to the principle of ‘consequentialism’ and assessing actions based on their consequences for national interests.
Cairo’s foreign policy is characterised by an official ‘balance’ and equidistance regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, this proclaimed position is accompanied by a ‘noticeable practical shift and demonstrative bias in favour of the Russian Federation’ in real political dialogue and cooperation.
The key drivers of Egypt’s policy are economic and strategic factors.
Food security and economic stability are key strategic aspects of Egypt’s foreign policy. Egypt is the most populous Arab country and a major grain importer, making it critically dependent on stable supplies of agricultural products. Ukraine is a key global wheat exporter, and Egypt was among the countries most affected by the crisis caused by the suspension of Ukrainian grain exports after February 2022. The need to ensure stable grain supplies and price controls, especially in the context of the financial crisis, is critical for Cairo.
Despite efforts to promote the theory of non-alignment and maintain a neutral position in the conflict, Egypt finds maintaining this line of conduct challenging. The fact that its two main allies are indirectly opposed to each other in the Russian-Ukrainian war and that its internal situation has a significant impact on its position means that it cannot remain truly neutral. Egypt’s dependence on Russia and the need for the West to resolve crises are fundamental to its position.
Egypt’s foreign policy aims to strengthen its position in the Middle East and Africa. Egypt’s accession to the BRICS association in January 2024, especially given Moscow’s chairmanship in 2024, underscores its desire for multipolarity and cooperation with anti-Western alliances.
Cairo rejects the approach of unilateral economic sanctions against Russia as an effective mechanism and avoids direct negative actions towards Russia. Russia, in turn, sees cooperation with Egypt as a means of resolving economic problems caused by Western sanctions.
Egypt’s foreign policy is indirectly shaped by Russian propaganda, which finds fertile ground in the Egyptian media space. Russian narratives resonate with local sentiments, presenting Russia as a counterweight to the West.
A common argument is that Russia is a natural ally of the Global South, and the Russian-Ukrainian war is often presented as a confrontation between Russia and the West/NATO, which increases the geopolitical weight of the Russian Federation and diminishes the role of Ukraine as a sovereign state.
Egypt’s foreign policy is shaped at the highest state level. The main actors determining this course are:
President of Egypt (Abdel Fattah el-Sisi): As the supreme leader, he engages in dialogue with international partners, including discussions with President Zelenskyy on creating a logistics hub. Head of Government (Prime Minister M. Madbouly) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (S. Shukri / B. Abdelatty): They engage in direct political dialogue. For example, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt visited Kyiv in June 2023 as part of the ‘African Peace Initiative’.
In its cooperation with Egypt, Ukraine must consider that, despite its declarations of neutrality, Egypt adheres to a course of ‘pro-Russian neutrality’ and is guided primarily by its own economic and geopolitical interests.
As Egypt remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa, Ukraine should leverage this economic cooperation to secure vital exports and support global food security.
Given the above circumstances, Ukraine should avoid putting pressure on Egypt to take a clear pro-Ukrainian stance, so as not to push it towards Russia. Instead, it should focus on mutually beneficial cooperation, particularly in the economic and humanitarian spheres, and emphasise Ukraine’s role as a reliable grain supplier to ensure Egypt’s food security.
To this end, it is necessary to actively promote the resumption of grain exports to Egypt via the ‘grain corridor’ or alternative routes through ports in Romania or Poland, as well as to encourage cooperation through long-term contracts for grain supplies at competitive prices to reduce Egypt’s dependence on Russian supplies.
Supporting Egypt’s participation as a mediator in the African Peace Initiative, it is necessary to insist on more explicit statements of support for Ukrainian initiatives, as well as to involve Egypt in humanitarian projects (e.g., assistance to African countries affected by the grain crisis, such as Sudan) to strengthen its role as a partner of Ukraine.
In interactions with Egypt, it is important to avoid rhetoric that could be perceived as anti-Russian, so as not to complicate its position. Instead, Ukraine should focus on the economic and humanitarian benefits of cooperation.
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND THE OVERALL STATE OF UKRAINIAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
Egypt recognised Ukraine’s independence on 3 January 1992, and diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 25 January 1992 by an exchange of notes. The Embassy of Ukraine in Egypt and the Embassy of Egypt in Ukraine were opened in 1993.
Over the years of independence, there have been no fundamental differences between Ukraine and the Arab Republic of Egypt in their approach to pressing issues on the international and regional agenda. Both states sought to promote their resolution through peaceful means, within the framework of existing international law and the United Nations, where countries interact on a wide range of issues.
Prior to the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, regular contact at the highest levels occurred. The first visit of a Ukrainian president to Egypt took place in December 1992, when Leonid Kravchuk visited the country. After that, President Viktor Yushchenko visited Egypt in April 2008. At the level of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs, Egypt was visited by Ukrainian delegations headed by the Foreign Minister. Zlenko (December 2002), Foreign Minister B. Tarasyuk (December 2005), Prime Minister M. Azarov (November 2010), Foreign Minister P. Klimkin (April 2018), and others.
On the Egyptian side, Ukraine was visited by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Aboul Gheit (December 2010), a delegation headed by Minister of Investment and International Cooperation Sahar Nasr (June 2018), a government delegation (June 2018), a delegation led by Minister of Tourism and Antiquities Khaled Anani (July 2020).
Humanitarian contacts were developing.
Economic cooperation was seen as highly promising, offering Ukraine broad opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation and the implementation of large-scale economic projects. The Middle East market, particularly Egypt, was attractive for the sale of Ukrainian machinery and rolled metal products, as well as for the supply and joint production of agricultural products.
The ratification by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in October 2000 of the agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt on merchant shipping (signed in 1997) resolved problematic issues such as potential barriers to shipping (customs procedures, discrimination against ships, threats of disruption of trade through the Suez Canal) to ensure freedom of navigation and stability of Ukrainian exports (grain, rolled metal).
During the 8th meeting of the Ukrainian-Egyptian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation (14–17 December 2021, Cairo), the parties discussed expanding cooperation in the defence and military and technical sectors (including the supply of equipment and joint projects), high technologies (innovation, IT, space), as well as Ukraine’s involvement in the construction and modernisation of infrastructure facilities (energy, industrial zones, ports). It is a part of a broader strategy to diversify trade and investment, focusing on Egyptian megaprojects (e.g., the ‘New Administrative Capital’ and the Suez Canal).
After Russia launched a full-scale invasion in February 2022, relations between Ukraine and Egypt underwent significant changes, which can be described as a paradoxical mix of stronger economic cooperation, driven by the food security crisis, and Cairo’s complex, nominally ‘neutral’ political stance.
High- and top-level contacts after 2022 were generally irregular, mainly by telephone or multilateral format. For example, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt visited Kyiv on 16 June 2023 as part of a delegation of African leaders (the ‘African Peace Initiative’). Since September 2024, dialogue between foreign ministries has intensified. Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Sybiha met with his Egyptian counterpart B. Abdelatty on the sidelines of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly in New York (25 September 2024), had a working visit to Egypt (26 October 2024), and also had meetings within the framework of the G7 and EU/African Union in 2024–2025. During the negotiations, the Roadmap of Priority Actions for the Development of Relations between Ukraine and Egypt was approved. It covered priority trade, investment, energy, security and humanitarian aid measures. In addition, the parties agreed to establish a joint working group to develop a detailed roadmap for addressing current issues such as grain trade, logistics hubs, defence cooperation and support for Ukraine in the context of the war. The visit was part of Sybiha’s African-Arab tour to promote Zelenskyy’s ‘’Peace Formula’’ and diversify partnerships.
Ukraine, a key food supplier, actively cooperates with Egypt to ensure food security. The parties are discussing the establishment of a logistics hub for Ukrainian products in Egypt. This is a response to the threats posed by Russia’s aggression, as the war puts millions of people outside Ukraine at risk.
EGYPT’S POSITION ON RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE
Egypt’s position towards Russian aggression against Ukraine is ambivalent. Egyptian officials declare balance and equidistance in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
In general, Egypt emphasises respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence, particularly within the framework of the UN. Although Egypt abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on Ukraine between 2014 and 2021, after the start of the full-scale invasion, Cairo supported five ‘Ukrainian’ UNGA resolutions, including the resolutions on ‘Aggression against Ukraine’ (March 2022), ‘Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine’ (March 2022), ‘Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the UN Charter’ (October 2022), ‘Principles Underlying a Comprehensive, just and durable peace in Ukraine‘ (February 2023) and ’Promoting a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace in Ukraine” (February 2025). It abstained from voting on all other UNGA draft resolutions on Ukraine during 2022-2025. In particular, Egypt abstained during the vote on the resolution on the payment of reparations (November 2022).
However, Egypt also demonstrates a noticeable practical shift and a clear preference in favour of the Russian Federation, maintaining a high level of direct political dialogue. In January 2024, Egypt became a member of the BRICS (in 2024, it was Russia that chaired this association) and was actively represented at joint events held in Russia, in particular at the BRICS summit in Kazan (October 2024).
Despite its declared neutrality, Egypt’s affinity for Russia is driven by the high dynamics of direct political dialogue and the implementation of large-scale joint projects, which Russia uses to consolidate its influence.
In addition, Egypt maintains a high level of direct political dialogue within the framework of the Agreement on Partnership and Strategic Cooperation with Russia, signed in 2018. Russia, in turn, sees cooperation with Africa, where Egypt is Ukraine’s largest trading partner, as a means of solving economic problems caused by sanctions, as well as expanding anti-Western multilateral alliances. Moscow’s goal is to push Ukraine out of the global food market.
Egypt is part of a group of African countries that have joined forces in the so-called ‘African peace mission’. Prime Minister M. Madbouly and Egyptian Foreign Minister S. Shukri visited Kyiv on 16 June 2023 as part of a delegation of African leaders.
The African Peace Initiative, a diplomatic proposal from the leaders of several African countries (South Africa, Zambia, Senegal, the Republic of Congo, and Egypt), aimed to end Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. The initiative comprised ten key points and focused on an immediate ceasefire, humanitarian aspects, and long-term reconstruction. In this geopolitical context, Russian propaganda finds fertile ground in the Egyptian media space, actively spreading narratives that undermine the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and justify aggression.
The overall goal of the Russian disinformation campaign in the Middle East, and in Egypt in particular, is to undermine the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood, devalue Ukrainian resistance, and shape a pro-Russian geopolitical orientation. Specific propaganda talking points aimed at demonising Ukraine and justifying the Kremlin’s actions have been recorded in the Egyptian media space.
Among the narratives actively promoted by Russian propaganda in Egypt are, for example, propaganda articles accusing Stepan Bandera of collaborating with the Nazis. The media spread messages that ‘Russia is not at war with the Ukrainian people, but with the Nazis in the Ukrainian government,’ and that Russia’s goal is to ‘destroy the Nazi regime’. These narratives, which are among the most frequently used in Russian propaganda regarding events in Ukraine, aim to shift responsibility for the atrocities onto ‘Ukrainian Nazis’.
The Egyptian media also reported that the US had withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan to ‘take part in the war on the side of Ukraine’. It is part of the overall propaganda narrative about NATO’s alleged direct or indirect involvement in the war. Statements such as, for example, that the Russian-Ukrainian war is not Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but Russia’s confrontation with the West, increase Russia’s geopolitical weight and diminish Ukraine’s role as a sovereign state.
In addition to obvious propaganda slogans, Russians wrap their propaganda in a broader geopolitical framework that successfully resonates with local sentiments, as they present Russia as a counterweight to the West.
Another common theme is that Russia is a natural ally of the Global South. The media essentially promotes the view that anyone who opposes the West is a friend of the Global South, and the Kremlin has skilfully exploited this postcolonial perspective.
The economy is another critical factor influencing Egypt’s policy towards Russia and the Russian-Ukrainian war. Egypt’s economic interest in Russia has grown in recent years due to the need to reorient towards Russian grain to maintain national food security amid the Black Sea blockade. However, Egypt has criticised Russia for withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
Egypt’s tourism sector, which has been affected by the war, particularly focuses on Russian customers. The dynamics of Egypt’s relations with Russia in the trade, economic and investment spheres are intensified by the implementation of joint large-scale projects that create long-term economic dependence. These include the construction of the first nuclear power plant in El Dabaa and creating a Russian industrial zone in the Suez Canal area.
Therefore, the political course of the Egyptian authorities can be characterised as ‘pro-Russian neutrality’. Cairo rejects the approach of unilateral economic sanctions against Russia as an effective mechanism and avoids direct negative actions against Russia.
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND EGYPT
Economic cooperation between Ukraine and the Arab Republic of Egypt has historically been a top priority and mutually beneficial area of bilateral relations, which has become crucial in the context of global food security since the outbreak of the full-scale war. Establishing diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Egypt in January 1992 paved the way for active economic cooperation. The Middle East region, including Egypt, has always been rather promising for Ukraine politically and economically. Egypt became an important partner, and the Ukrainian authorities emphasised establishing bilateral economic relations, hoping for significant economic dividends. The Middle East markets were promising for selling Ukrainian machinery and rolled metal products. Ukraine could also actively participate in the construction of production infrastructure facilities and large energy and industrial sites.
In the field of agriculture, Ukraine considered the possibility of supplying and jointly producing agricultural products. In the current context, after 2022, this idea has evolved into discussions about creating a regional logistics hub for Ukrainian food products in Egypt, which is a response to the threats posed by Russia’s aggression and the need to mitigate risks to food security.
The military and technical sphere and high technologies were also deemed promising areas for cooperation. For example, Ukraine considered Egypt as a market for the export of armoured vehicles (modernisation of T-84 or T-62 tanks) , artillery systems or aviation technologies. Cooperation was expected to include joint production or modernisation of equipment, as well as training of Egyptian specialists by Ukrainian experts.
In addition, discussions were held on cooperation in the fuel and energy sector (with an emphasis on the export of liquefied natural gas from Egypt), the modernisation of industrial facilities (metallurgical, chemical and mining industries), nuclear energy, shipbuilding, and the creation of a joint bank and insurance company.
As of 1999, trade turnover between the two countries amounted to US$170 million.
From 2000 to 2021, economic relations between Ukraine and Egypt developed based on agreements concluded in the 1990s and early 2000s. The primary focus was on trade in goods, investment and scientific and technical cooperation. Bilateral agreements created the legal basis for cooperation, with Ukrainian exports of agricultural products (grain, sunflower oil) and metals to Egypt, as well as Egyptian imports of citrus fruits, petroleum products and services (tourism) becoming the key drivers.
Trade volumes gradually increased, peaking in 2021, despite global challenges such as the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.
As of 2021, there were 31 bilateral agreements between the countries, mainly of an economic nature. Of these, the key documents are:
- Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation (1993) – the basis for the functioning of the Intergovernmental Commission.
- Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1992) – stimulates investment.
- Trade Cooperation Agreement (1994).
- Convention on the avoidance of double taxation (2000).
The Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation, established in 1993, held regular meetings. However, the last (8th) meeting took place in December 2021 in Cairo, where preferential trade and investment issues were discussed.
The above agreements contributed, in particular, to the opening of more than 100 Ukrainian companies in Egypt (in the fields of industry, construction, IT, agriculture and tourism). For example, in August 2025, Intellias, one of Ukraine’s leading IT companies, announced opening a new office in Cairo.
Trade between Ukraine and Egypt over the past 20 years has been asymmetrical. Ukraine had a significant positive balance (exports exceeded imports by 10–15 times). Ukrainian exports mainly consisted of: grains (wheat, corn – up to 25% of Egyptian grain imports), sunflower oil, metals (semi-finished iron products), and machinery. Egyptian imports: citrus fruits, petroleum (gas), salt, vegetables, and chemicals.
Total trade volumes in 2005-2024
(according to UN COMTRADE, OEC and State Statistics Service of Ukraine; in US dollars)
| Year | Exports from Ukraine to Egypt | Imports from Egypt to Ukraine | Trade turnover |
| 2000 | 150 million | 20 million | 170 million |
| 2005 | 300 million | 40 million | 340 million |
| 2010 | 800 million | 80 million | 880 million |
| 2015 | 1200 million | 100 million | 1300 million |
| 2020 | 1600 million | 120 million | 1720 million |
| 2021 | 1910 million | 145 million | 2055 million |
| 2024 | 1636 million | 219 million | 1855 million |
As seen, economic relations between Ukraine and Egypt have demonstrated consistent positive dynamics, with an average annual growth rate of 9–10%.
In 2021, Ukraine ranked third among grain suppliers to Egypt (3.2 million tonnes of wheat and 2.2 million tonnes of corn). The 2008 crisis temporarily reduced mutual trade volumes by 20%, but recovery ensued due to agricultural exports.
Despite the challenges posed by Russia’s full-scale aggression, economic relations with Egypt remain key for Ukraine in the Middle East region beyond 2022 and have almost reached pre-war levels. Egypt remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa.
Cooperation is critically important in the context of global food security, as Ukraine is one of the leading players in the global grain market. As noted by Ihor Zhovkva, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Ukraine is ready to remain a reliable guarantor of Egypt’s food security. The hostilities in Ukraine have had a dramatic impact on global food and energy markets, disrupting traditional supply chains. Egypt was one of the countries most affected by the crisis caused by the suspension of Ukrainian grain exports.
Trade in services (mainly tourism) added $200–300 million annually, but had a negative balance for Ukraine due to travel expenses. For example, in 2021, 1.4–1.7 million Ukrainians visited Egypt, which was a significant recovery after the decline due to COVID-19 in 2020 (727,000). Tourism remained an important and promising area of cooperation even after the start of full-scale war. According to statistics, the flow of Ukrainian tourists to Egypt recovered after the decline in 2022 and even increased in 2024. According to Ukrainian tour operators and the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism data, the figures are more conservative, around 250,000 in 2023 and 300,000 in 2024.
Ukrainian tourists in Egypt:
| Year | Number of tourists (million persons) | Rate of change | Notes |
| 2021 | 1,46 | +100% (since 2020) | Recovery from COVID, Egypt’s total tourism revenue is 13 billion |
| 2022 | 0,7-1 | -30% | Impact of the war, 30% drop in travel bookings |
| 2023 | 0,25 | -60% | The substantial decrease persists |
| 2024 | 0,3 | + 10% | A modest rise |
The total volume of Ukrainian investments in Egypt is modest. A significant portion of this volume (approximately $200 million) is related to large agricultural companies (such as NIBULON) planning to build logistics infrastructure. As of 2021, Egyptian investments amounted to $50–100 million (food industry, tourism). In 2021, investments in the Suez Economic Zone were discussed. By 2021, Cumulative investments by NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine in Egyptian oil and gas projects have reached about $580 million since the project’s launch in 2006.
Joint projects were implemented in the agricultural sector (construction of grain silos), energy (solar panels), IT, and transport. In 2021, memoranda on AI, manufacturing and infrastructure were signed at the level of the Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine and the relevant ministries of Egypt, or within the framework of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission.
Business forums were held regularly; particularly, the last two Ukrainian-Egyptian business forums took place in 2021 and 2023 under the auspices of chambers of commerce and industry. The Ukrainian-Egyptian business forum, dedicated to the agricultural sector, took place in Cairo in February 2025 as part of the Ukrainian delegation’s visit led by the Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, Vitaliy Koval.
In 2021, the parties considered signing a free trade agreement (FTA) that could increase trade volumes by 20–30%, focusing on diversifying cooperation (IT, green energy) and tourism. Unfortunately, the agreement was not implemented due to geopolitical factors (full-scale war in Ukraine, global crises, war in Gaza, etc.).
At the same time, Ukrainian businesses still faced a number of challenges in economic relations. These included high tariffs (Egypt had barriers for non-agricultural goods), logistics (through the Suez Canal), and concentration of product range (80% are agriculture and metals).
In addition, it is worth noting that political influence on the Egyptian economy is growing, particularly from Russia. Egypt’s economic interest in Russia has grown due to the need to reorient to Russian grain to maintain national food security in the face of the de facto impossibility or significant disruption of commercial shipping and exports of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea after the full-scale invasion in February 2022 carried out by the Russian Navy.
The dynamics of Egypt’s relations with Russia in the trade, economic and investment spheres are forcing Ukraine to make diplomatic efforts to prevent Russia’s policy of squeezing Ukraine out of the African food market. At the same time, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has entailed critical economic challenges to Egypt’s internal stability and economy. These challenges have become the main incentive for seeking cooperation with Ukraine to overcome them.
Thus, economic cooperation is the most stable and developed element of Ukrainian-Egyptian relations, focused mainly on agricultural exports and logistics hub initiatives, but it exists under competitive pressure from Russia.
EGYPT’S FOOD SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF UKRAINE
The issue of food security is a key and strategically important aspect of relations between Ukraine and Egypt, as it encompasses both Ukraine’s economic stability in wartime and the food security of Egypt, which is Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa.
Cooperation in the food sector is critically important, as Egypt, being the most populous Arab country and a major grain importer, is directly dependent on stable supplies of agricultural products. Egypt consumes 15 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of which is imported from Russia (50%) and Ukraine (almost 30%). The negative consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war for the Egyptian economy, particularly for food security and the tourism sector, are forcing the leadership of the Arab Republic of Egypt to seek ways to mitigate them.
A key element of the current cooperation and an ambitious goal for Ukraine is creating a regional logistics hub for Ukrainian food products in Egypt. This issue was discussed at a high level, in particular by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of Egypt back in February 2023. The initiative to create food hubs in Africa and the Middle East has been actively promoted by Ukrainian representatives since early 2023 and is a driver of further diplomatic activity in the region. The hub’s location in North Africa, particularly in Egypt, is a strategically important decision, as Egypt is a large market and is at risk of famine. It should be noted that the issues of food security and resource scarcity are particularly acute in Egypt. The country, with a population of over 110 million, has additionally taken in millions of refugees, including over 3 million people from neighbouring Sudan and other conflict regions (as of 2023–2024). It is an immense additional burden on the national food security and healthcare systems, making guaranteed supplies of Ukrainian grain a matter of national security for Egypt.
The food aspect of relations is constantly influenced by Russian aggression and geopolitical competition. Russia deliberately uses food as a weapon, in particular, trying to oust Ukraine from the African food market. Moscow is using the grain issue to rally support in the Global South and exert pressure on African countries. Following the Africa-Russia Summit in 2023, Egypt accumulated significant stocks of Russian wheat, importing a record amount.
Disruption of agricultural supply chains due to the war has led to a significant increase in the cost of exporting grain from Ukraine. Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the destruction of Ukraine’s port infrastructure in 2023 are prompting a search for ways to resume exports, creating obstacles to the implementation of the hub idea.
The increased trade and economic relations between Egypt and Russia are partly due to Egypt’s shift towards Russian grain to maintain national food security amid the Black Sea blockade. Egypt was forced to look for alternatives, including negotiations on wheat purchases in Kazakhstan.
Despite its rapprochement with Russia, Egypt criticised Russia for withdrawing from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and stated that it would continue purchasing Ukrainian grain through alternative routes.
Thus, Egypt’s food security and Ukraine’s role as a leading player in the global grain market are key common ground that underpins bilateral relations, even when Cairo’s political position is complex and uncertain.
HUMANITARIAN AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
Humanitarian and cultural relations between Ukraine and Egypt developed through diplomatic and public initiatives, although after 2022, they faced challenges related to Cairo’s political position.
It is worth noting that the relations between the two nations had historical ties. For example, it is known that among the local Egyptian Mamluk rulers in the 16th–17th centuries, there were people who came from Ukraine. In addition, the famous Ukrainian traveller Vasyl Hryhorovych-Barsky travelled through these lands in the 18th century, laying the foundations for Ukrainian Oriental studies. In the early 20th century, the outstanding Ukrainian poet Lesya Ukrainka had her medical treatment in Alexandria and Helwan and wrote a collection of poems entitled Spring in Egypt. Ukrainian writers (such as Pavlo Tychyna and Maksym Rylsky) translated works by Eastern authors or wrote about the East, and some Ukrainian works were translated into Arabic.
Ukraine, as one of the most industrially developed republics of the USSR, actively participated in major Soviet projects in Egypt. A significant number of Ukrainian engineers, builders, and technical specialists were sent to Egypt to work on key infrastructure projects that had been built with the support of the USSR. The most famous example is the Aswan Dam, which was designed and built with the participation of specialists from the Ukrainian SSR.
Higher education institutions in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Odesa were important centres for training Egyptian students and military specialists. Thousands of Egyptians have obtained higher education in Ukraine in fields that are important for their country (engineering, medicine, military sciences). This has laid a solid foundation for personal and professional ties.
Prior to the full-scale invasion, humanitarian contacts took place in several areas:
There was an Executive Programme of Cooperation in the Field of Culture between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Ukraine and the Egyptian Ministry of Culture for 2010-2012. The programme envisaged cultural exchanges, participation in festivals, exhibitions and conferences, as well as cooperation in the fields of theatre, music, cinema and cultural heritage protection. It expired on 31 December 2012 and was not renewed or extended. Further cooperation took place ad hoc under the 1993 Framework Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the two countries. Despite the absence of a new programme, cultural cooperation between the two countries has developed thanks to individual initiatives supported by embassies, intergovernmental commissions, and international platforms such as UNESCO. Tourism has become a key ‘cultural’ vector, complemented by cinema, literature and gastronomy events.
Scientific and technical cooperation between Ukraine and Egypt is based on the 1992 Agreement on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, supplemented by specialised agreements, in particular on space cooperation (2008), agricultural science (2009) and education (2010), as well as the activities of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. In 2020, the Ambassador of Ukraine discussed with the Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation the expansion of cooperation in AI and infrastructure; in 2021, at the 8th meeting of the Commission, a Memorandum between the State Space Agency of Ukraine and the Egyptian Space Agency on Space and an Agreement on Standardisation were signed; in 2024, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and Egypt signed a Memorandum of Academic Cooperation; in 2025, ministers discussed agricultural science and water management, and presidents agreed on a new meeting of the Commission with a focus on science and trade. These initiatives, supported through embassies, UNESCO, and virtual platforms, strengthen scientific exchange, emphasising space, agriculture, and AI and promoting economic integration.
Educational cooperation between Ukraine and Egypt is based on the 1992 Agreement on Cooperation in Education and Culture and the 2003 Memorandum regulating student and teacher exchanges and research. Prior to the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, approximately 3,000 Egyptian students studied in Ukraine, mainly in medical, dental, engineering, and agricultural fields. Currently, informal estimates suggest that the number of Egyptian students does not exceed 300, given limited student returns and new enrolments. Egyptian children have also been visiting festivals in Ukraine. For example, in the summer of 2013, a delegation of Egyptian children visited Ukraine to participate in the International Festival ‘Let’s Change the World for the Better’ and the OSCE Youth Summit in Artek (Yalta, Autonomous Republic of Crimea).
In the 2000s, an internship programme for Ukrainian Arabic students in Egypt, funded by the host country, was established. Ukrainian students are still studying Arabic at Cairo University. In 2008, the Egyptian Centre was established at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. In 2024, a memorandum was signed between the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine and the Egyptian Institute of Diplomatic Studies.
The Ukrainian community in Egypt played a significant role in cultural life. In 2001, on the initiative and with the support of the Embassy in the Arab Republic of Egypt, an informal ‘Ukrainian Women’s Club’ was established, consisting of 40-60 active members. Various cultural and humanitarian events were regularly held within the framework of this club. The last mention of this informal group’s activity dates back to 2020. After 2022, the Ukrainian community in Egypt shifted its focus to humanitarian aid, evacuation, and establishing cultural centres (e.g., the Ukrainian Sunday school in Cairo).
During his visit in October 2024, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha met with the Ukrainian community in Egypt, where they discussed the institutionalisation (formalisation) of the Ukrainian community’s activities, cultural events and maintaining ties with the homeland.
There were also agreements to establish friendly and sister city relations between Yalta and Sharm el-Sheikh, which provided for the exchange of experience in the fields of culture and art, education, and health care.
After 2022, humanitarian and cultural cooperation faced significant restrictions from Cairo. For example, the Egyptian authorities refused to allow the Ukrainian film Butterfly Vision, which won an award at the Cannes Film Festival, to be screened at the Cairo International Film Festival in November 2022. This case is seen as a clear example of censorship.
Despite repeated appeals at the highest levels, Egypt has not provided either military or humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Egypt has distanced itself from a number of key humanitarian initiatives of Ukraine; in particular, it has not joined the Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children Deported or Forcibly Displaced by the Russian Federation from the Temporarily Occupied Territories (TOT) of Ukraine. Egypt has also not joined the humanitarian initiative ‘Grain from Ukraine’.
CONCLUSION
Relations between the two countries are of key interconnected importance for Ukraine, encompassing economic resilience, global food security and strategic geopolitical influence on the continent. Economic cooperation is the most stable and developed element of bilateral relations and has historically been a priority. Trade volumes between the countries have almost reached pre-war levels (over US$2 billion in 2024), and Egypt remains Ukraine’s largest trading partner in the Middle East and Africa. Trade is asymmetrical, with a positive balance for Ukraine, where exports exceed imports by 10-15 times. The key driver of the economy is agricultural exports, with Ukraine being a major global exporter of wheat and Egypt a major importer.
Relations are characterised by a paradoxical combination of enhanced economic cooperation and Cairo’s complex, nominally ‘neutral’ political position. Egypt declares ‘balance and equidistance’ regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war, emphasising respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence. At the same time, despite its declarations, Egypt shows a certain bias in favour of the Russian Federation. This course can be characterised as ‘pro-Russian neutrality.’ Large-scale joint projects and Cairo’s need to reorient itself towards Russian grain amid the Black Sea blockade contribute to the rapprochement with the Russian Federation.
Russian propaganda actively disseminates narratives in the Egyptian media space aimed at undermining the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood and presenting Russia as a counterweight to the West and an ally of the Global South.
After 2022, cooperation in the humanitarian sphere faced significant restrictions from Cairo, which did not join Ukraine’s key humanitarian initiatives.
Given the above factors, Ukraine should be guided by the principle of caution in its relations with Egypt. Instead of insisting on an unambiguously pro-Ukrainian position, which could lead to Cairo’s shift towards Moscow, it would be more expedient to focus on pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation. The main emphasis should be placed on the economic and humanitarian spheres, emphasising Ukraine’s vital role as a guarantor of Egypt’s food security through grain supplies.
To strengthen these ties, efforts to resume Ukrainian grain supplies to Egypt must be intensified. It involves not only using the ‘grain corridor’ but also developing alternative logistics routes through ports in Romania or Poland. In addition, long-term economic partnerships should be encouraged by concluding multi-year contracts for grain supplies at competitive prices, which will help Egypt reduce its dependence on Russian imports.
As for political interaction, while continuing to support Egypt’s mediating role within the African Peace Initiative, Ukraine should encourage Cairo to make more decisive statements in support of Ukrainian peace initiatives. It is also necessary to involve Egypt in joint humanitarian projects (e.g., assistance to African countries most affected by the crisis, particularly Sudan). It will strengthen Egypt’s image as a key partner of Ukraine in the region.
In communications with the Egyptian side, it is necessary to avoid any rhetoric that could be interpreted as anti-Russian, so as not to complicate Cairo’s multi-vector foreign policy. Instead, the primary focus should be on the specific economic and humanitarian benefits that Egypt gains from its partnership with Ukraine.