Ukraine-NATO and IP4: Do we have joint interests?

Over the past few years, NATO has begun to step out of its traditional Euro-Atlantic confines as member states and partners seek to coordinate their response to security concerns in the Indo-Pacific.

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On 11 July 2024, during the NATO Washington Summit, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy held his first meeting in the five-party format with the leaders of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partner states.[1] While each of these countries supported Ukraine, even if on a different scale, the reasoning varied.

While Australia and New Zealand talked about values and the necessity to protect democracy, Japan clearly identified security and the possibility of the Russian aggression spillover into their unresolved conflict. The Republic of Korea appeared to be the one that expressed its support but tended to be slightly aside in terms of security cooperation because its immediate challenge was Russian support for North Korea, not Russia itself. Still, it has been actively involved in the reconstruction of Ukraine and increased intelligence cooperation after the North Korean military involvement became evident and also searched for variants to support Ukraine via third-party partners – NATO member states with which it already had cooperation.

Over the past few years, NATO has begun to step out of its traditional Euro-Atlantic confines as member states and partners seek to coordinate their response to security concerns in the Indo-Pacific.[2] One of the reasons is China, but even more so is the increased Russia-China cooperation, to which the Russia-North Korea alliance has been added in the last two years. These ties and new challenges have made it necessary not only for bilateral cooperation but also to consider perspectives of trilateral interactions between NATO, Indo-Pacific Partners, and Ukraine. Yet one question that all IP4 are asking is how reliable their bilateral security guarantees are and whether partners will come to help in times of a real crisis. That is when cooperation with NATO takes its role.

Each IP4 partner has its own bilateral agreements with NATO, committing to a range of cooperation activities tailored to their priorities (such as strategic communication, space, interoperability, and non-proliferation).[3]

In addition, in Washington, the IP4 agreed to four new ‘flagship projects’ supporting Ukraine in military healthcare and fostering cooperation on cyber defence, countering disinformation, and technology such as AI. In addition to the unique insights and perspectives on the region these partners bring, they boast qualities that make them attractive counterparts for NATO nations: professional militaries subject to the rule of law, high levels of economic development among others.[4] Adding Ukraine to this NATO-IP4 dialogue can broaden the agenda and make it less China-only oriented, as some of the NATO member-states have been afraid of. At the same time, considering the significant possible Russian support provided to North Korea (technologies, including nuclear, drones, and real-war experience), the IP4 need knowledge and lessons learned regarding Russian tactics and equipment so as to be prepared for a threat. North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs are what receive a new impetus with the Russian involvement, so the accumulative efforts, both regional and with NATO and Ukraine, may be needed to address the matter.

However, there are also issues that may not have a direct impact from the Russian-Ukrainian war but provide lessons learned, in case the IP4 would like to be prepared for potential threats. These include maritime security to avoid port blockades and asymmetric warfare on the sea, cyber security, disinformation, IT and innovations in war, and drone production—just to name a few.

As NATO’s potential contributions of hard power to the Indo-Pacific are limited, deterrence should be already built.[5] As the main element of the IP4 deterrence – US support is becoming questionable after the new administration’s position towards the Russia-Ukrainian war, it is time to consider more regional, agile, asymmetric and autonomous solutions.

For NATO as a whole, these partners not only provide insight and access to a region of growing strategic importance but also enable the alliance to pull together a more global, like-minded coalition of the kind that has proven critical for Ukraine.[6] The development of the military industry capacity, joint production, sharing technologies, etc., is one of the most prominent possible fields for trilateral Ukraine-NATO-IP4 cooperation. The technological and financial capacities of the partners, along with the possibility of Ukraine bringing real-time testing of any production or the effectiveness of measures taken, would be of crucial importance. Moreover, under the conditions of increased US disengagement from world affairs with China and Russia advancing their ambitions, it is logical to expect hybrid warfare of provocations in other parts of the world, first of all, the Asia-Pacific. In such a case, increased interoperability, intelligence sharing, joint training and military-security cooperation between NATO, Ukraine and IP4 is a timely matter to be on the agenda for the next NATO summit in the Hague in 2025. 

 

 

[1] Office of the President of Ukraine. 2024.“President of Ukraine Met with Indo-Pacific Region Leaders.”
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-zustrivsya-z-liderami-indo-tihookeanskih-92125.

[2] RUSI. 2024. “NATO Emerges as a Platform for Coordinating Indo-Pacific Security Policies.” https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/nato-emerges-platform-coordinating-indo-pacific-security-policies.

[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2024. “Individually tailored partneships programmes” https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_225037.htm.

[4] United States Institute of Peace. 2024. “Report of the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific Partners.” https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/report-expert-study-group-nato-and-indo-pacific-partners.

[5] Council on Foreign Relations. 2024. “NATO’s Indo-Pacific Aspirations.” https://www.cfr.org/blog/natos-indo-pacific-aspirations.

[6] United States Institute of Peace. 2024. “Report of the Expert Study Group on NATO and Indo-Pacific Partners.”
https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/report-expert-study-group-nato-and-indo-pacific-partners.