Ukrainian Experience in Civil-Military Cooperation: Lessons for Europe

Facing hybrid threats, Ukraine’s Armed Forces were compelled to develop a dedicated CIMIC capability to manage interactions with civilians, authorities, and humanitarian actors in active conflict zones.

Subscribe for Newsletter

The concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) emerged and gained strategic importance for NATO during the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, where the need for coordinated civil-military engagement became evident in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. Since then, CIMIC has evolved into a well-established function within NATO’s operational planning and execution structures. Currently, CIMIC is defined by NATO doctrines as a “joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors”. It plays a key role in facilitating effective engagement between military forces and civilian actors in complex operational environments.

Ukraine’s first practical interaction with NATO CIMIC structures came in the early 2000s through participation in multinational operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, during these missions, civil-military coordination remained a peripheral issue for Ukraine’s own defence planning. The Russian aggression in 2014 marked a turning point in this regard. Facing hybrid threats, Ukraine’s Armed Forces were compelled to develop a dedicated CIMIC capability to manage interactions with civilians, authorities, and humanitarian actors in active conflict zones. This was the first structure within Ukraine’s military to be formed entirely according to NATO standards. However, its development was at the same time accompanied by a unique societal and operational context of Russian aggression, setting it apart from the NATO experience. These differences only deepened after the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022, which demanded even more extensive and multi-level coordination between the civil and military sectors.

The following sections will explore the distinctive path of CIMIC development in Ukraine and identify key lessons European countries can draw as they prepare for complex security challenges in an increasingly unstable regional environment.

 

Evolution of Ukrainian Civil-Military Cooperation 

By early 2022, before the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Civil-Military Cooperation in Ukraine had matured into a structured component of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since its formal establishment following the outbreak of Russian aggression in 2014, Ukrainian CIMIC has developed in line with NATO doctrines, particularly drawing from Allied Joint Publication 3.4.9. With direct support from NATO member states, Ukraine adopted the structural, training, and conceptual foundations typical for Western civil-military cooperation units. This allowed CIMIC to conduct a host of activities during the Anti-Terrorist Operation and Joint Forces Operation that, for the most part, corresponded to those of NATO forces.

Ukrainian CIMIC units maintained liaison functions with civil authorities and local populations, facilitating cooperation and trust in conflict-affected regions. They played an active role in coordinating humanitarian efforts, enabling access for aid providers, organising evacuations, and addressing urgent civilian needs. CIMIC personnel were responsible for civil environment assessments, gathering data on humanitarian conditions, infrastructure damage, and social dynamics to support military planning. They also contributed to restoring public infrastructure and services, often operating in tandem with or on behalf of local administrations. 

However, while Ukrainian CIMIC activities aligned with NATO standards in form and purpose, the operational context in which they evolved introduced fundamental differences. Particularly, unlike the case of NATO units that were deployed in foreign territories, Ukrainian CIMIC operations developed within Ukraine’s own territory amidst an ongoing conflict with a powerful neighbouring state. This defining feature shaped both the nature and demands of Ukrainian civil-military cooperation. 

Operating within national borders, Ukrainian CIMIC had to engage directly with civilian populations exposed to the realities of occupation, shelling, and displacement. Their work was concentrated in near-frontline areas and de-occupied territories, requiring a level of social and political sensitivity. Coordination with local governance structures was a central part of their mission, with many civil institutions being either overwhelmed or non-functional. In such instances, CIMIC officers had to not only support local authorities but also fill critical governance gaps, facilitating the provision of basic services and public order during a crisis.

Ukrainian CIMIC units operated as part of the national crisis response system, integrating closely with institutions such as the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, and the National Police. This multi-agency coordination gave CIMIC a broader mandate, embedding it within Ukraine’s internal security and humanitarian framework rather than functioning solely as a military support role. Besides, CIMIC officers were partly responsible for managing internally displaced persons, organising evacuations and temporary shelters as well as participating in broader reintegration efforts. Unlike NATO missions, where CIMIC personnel are often deployed on rotational assignments, Ukrainian CIMIC officers were engaged in long-term national defence efforts. Such continuity allowed for the establishment of deep local ties, institutional memory, and a sustained presence.

Another complex challenge facing Ukrainian CIMIC was the hybrid nature of the conflict itself. Russian disinformation, propaganda, and psychological operations targeted both military personnel and civilians, while attacks on civilian infrastructure further blurred the lines between combatants and non-combatants. CIMIC officers had to navigate this environment, operating at the intersection of military, civil, and information domains. Thus, they also played a role in strategic communication and information operations aimed at sustaining public morale, countering Russian disinformation campaigns, and supporting trust in the Armed Forces among Ukrainian citizens. 

It is also important to mention such a uniquely Ukrainian factor as the scale of the volunteer movement. From 2014 onwards, both formal volunteer battalions, which were later incorporated into the Armed Forces, National Guard, or police structures, and informal networks of civilians provided extensive logistical, medical, and humanitarian support. CIMIC units often acted as bridges between these efforts and the formal military system, coordinating supply chains, information flows, and public outreach. 

 

Impact of the full-scale invasion and the current state 

The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a fundamental transformation in the structure and role of Civil-Military Cooperation within the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The invasion brought not only an exponential escalation in the intensity of warfare but also the shift to a new approach to national security based on the principles of total defence and whole-of-society resilience. The lines between military and civilian domains became increasingly blurred, and CIMIC became a crucial element within this integrated system.

The scale of CIMIC operations expanded drastically and now extended across a frontline that spans thousands of kilometres and constantly shifts due to the dynamics of the hostilities. CIMIC structures were rapidly established and reinforced within operational commands, regular brigades, and especially among the Territorial Defence units. 

The functional scope of CIMIC also broadened significantly. In addition to their traditional liaison roles, CIMIC units became directly involved in the coordination of civil resistance, logistics for community-based defence initiatives, and the mobilisation of local populations in support of military efforts. Moreover, they serve as a channel of communication between the military and the families of serving personnel and play a role in the retrieval and return of the bodies of soldiers killed in action. 

CIMIC units are also vital to Ukraine’s national humanitarian response. They coordinate the creation and functioning of humanitarian corridors, support the evacuation of civilians from active combat zones, and facilitate aid distribution. Their efforts are critical in assisting internally displaced persons. In newly liberated territories, CIMIC personnel played a key role in restoring vital infrastructure, namely electricity, water, communications, and supported the establishment of local governance and public services where it was feasible.

The Ukrainian CIMIC system has been forced to undergo real-time learning and adaptation to the evolving demands of high-intensity warfare with limited resources. The result is a model characterised by a significant degree of agility and responsiveness. 

 

Legal and institutional frameworks

The formation of Ukraine’s Civil-Military Cooperation system has been closely aligned with NATO standards, both structurally and procedurally. It reflects a broader national effort to modernise and harmonise defence planning with Euro-Atlantic integration. A cornerstone of the institutional framework is the Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation, developed by the working group of the Civil-Military Cooperation Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This doctrine was officially approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU on July 1, 2020, under directive №15860/C. The document outlines the principles, tasks, organisation, and procedures for CIMIC activities across operational environments and serves as a foundational guide for the functioning of CIMIC elements in both peacetime and conflict.

The legal and regulatory foundation of Ukrainian CIMIC also includes:

  • The Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine”, which provides the overarching legal framework for military organisation and its interaction with civil society;
  • Directives of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff, detailing the roles and responsibilities of CIMIC units within the chain of command;
  • Other internal regulations and guidelines that align Ukrainian military doctrine with respective NATO documents.

The Ukrainian CIMIC system is now organised as a multi-level structure led by the Department of Civil-Military Cooperation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This department functions as a military command and control body within the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and is directly subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff. It was the first structure in the AFU to be created entirely in accordance with NATO standards, and it serves as the central coordinating authority for CIMIC activities at the strategic and operational levels, responsible for doctrine development, policy implementation, and interagency coordination with national and international actors.

The command structure goes down along the military hierarchy, with CIMIC command and control bodies represented at the operational (branches of the Armed Forces and regional Operational Commands), operational-tactical (brigades and battalions), and tactical (individual military units) levels, thus ensuring the engagement of Civil-Military Cooperation personnel in planning and operational activities at most levels of military decision-making.

Current issues 

Despite its rapid development and growing role in national defence, Ukraine’s Civil-Military Cooperation continues to face a number of structural and operational challenges. Ongoing hostilities are a primary complicating factor. CIMIC units must coordinate under extreme pressure along an expansive and constantly shifting frontline while also supporting liberated territories and managing large-scale humanitarian flows. The urgency of these conditions often undermines effective coordination and planning, especially in frontline areas where institutional capacity is weak or disrupted.

A significant challenge is presented by gaps in legal and doctrinal frameworks. While the 2020 Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation established an important foundation, it no longer fully reflects the current scope of CIMIC activities, particularly in such areas as civil resistance coordination, population mobilisation, and information warfare. Crucially, Ukraine still lacks a unified law specifically governing civil-military cooperation. CIMIC’s roles increasingly intersect with civil defence, psychological operations, and post-conflict recovery – domains that remain underregulated and poorly integrated at the policy level.

Coordination with civilian stakeholders, namely local governments, ministries, NGOs, and international actors, is often ad hoc and based on personal relationships rather than institutionalised mechanisms. The absence of a unified coordination framework hinders the systematic and efficient execution of CIMIC tasks. While this informal model has fostered bottom-up initiatives, it also limits long-term planning and consistent distribution of responsibilities.

Similarly, CIMIC’s integration is not yet fully complete within the Armed Forces. In practice, there are still gaps in understanding its role, particularly beyond humanitarian liaisons. As a result, CIMIC is sometimes underutilised in operational planning, or its functions are duplicated by other branches. 

Finally, while CIMIC structures have expanded since 2022, their growth has outpaced available resources. Given the scale of operations, personnel and logistical capacities remain insufficient. Without strategic investment and clearer institutional backing, these constraints will continue to undermine the effectiveness and sustainability of CIMIC’s vital work in wartime response and long-term resilience.

 

Lessons for the EU 

  • Develop CIMIC structures for operations on national territory.
  • Integrate CIMIC into total defence and whole-of-society resilience frameworks.
  • Ensure legal codification of CIMIC roles and responsibilities through dedicated legislation.
  • Institutionalise interagency coordination mechanisms between the military, civil authorities, and NGOs.
  • Strengthen CIMIC’s information and psychological operations capacity, especially for countering disinformation.
  • Plan CIMIC involvement in post-crisis recovery and reconstruction efforts.