The Russian Federation started actively investing in the development of the UAV sector immediately after the invasion of Georgia in 2008. This helped Russia have a well-established drone production system and a developed approach to their use. The availability of UAV complexes in the Russian army made it possible to ensure the effectiveness of rocket and cannon artillery during the 2014-2015 war in Eastern Ukraine. Subsequently, after the transition of the Russian-Ukrainian War into a phase of low intensity, experiments with the use of civilian copters and testing of kamikaze drones began.

Although the Russian Federation had an advantage in the army UAV sector at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the extremely active use of commercial drones forced the Russian Federation to adapt to new conditions. Key changes took place in 2023 when the Russian government approved the Strategy for the development of unmanned aviation of the Russian Federation to 2030 and prospectively to 2035.

 

The analytical report was prepared within the Russian and Belarusian Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation 

 

Authors:

• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director, Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
• Pavlo Rad, Junior Fellow, Russian and Belarusian Studies Program, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
• Anatolii Chernysh, Junior Fellow, Russian and Belarusian Studies Program,
  Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Editor:

• Hennadiy Maksak, Executive Director, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

Reviewer:

• Mykhailo Samus, Director, The New Geopolitics Research Network

 

Contents

Summary

Introduction

Chapter 1. Evolution of the use of drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War

1.1. The Use of UAVs for Guiding Artillery Fire and Reconnaissance (2014-2020)

1.2. The Appearance of Attack and Kamikaze Drones in Parallel with the Use of Reconnaissance Drones (2020-2022)

Chapter 2. Unmanned Platforms in Service with the Russian Armed Forces

2.1. Strategic vision of the development of the UAV Sector

2.2. Nomenclature of Russian Drones

2.2.1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

2.2.2. Ground Drones

2.2.3. Naval Drones

2.3. Tactics of Using Russian UAVs

2.4. Industrial Capacities and Foreign Components

2.4.1. Industrial Capacities

2.4.2. Foreign Components and Supply Chains

2.4 Methods of Countering UAVs

Chapter 3. Drones in War: Present and Future

3.1. The Impact of UAVs on the Battlefield

3.2. Prospects for Further Use of Unmanned Complexes

Conclusions and Recommendations

 

 

Summary

• Consequently, the Russian Ministry of Defense began to invest more actively in the UAV sector and cooperate with private initiatives. 
• Despite the availability of a wide range of military UAVs and active development and modernization of the FPV drone sector, the Russians have not yet made significant progress in the context of the development of sea and land drones. The announced naval drones have not been used in combat, while the land drone sector is still in the process of formation.
• There are approximately 70 manufacturers of drones in the Russian Federation, including 20 large companies engaged in the production of military unmanned complexes. FPV drones and other small UAVs are mostly manufactured by private/volunteer initiatives that receive assistance from the Russian Ministry of Defense.
• Although the Russian Federation is trying to conduct import substitution of components for its drones, Moscow is still heavily dependent on foreign parts. This is especially true for critical components such as microchips, microprocessors, electric motors, etc. Most of the components are manufactured in China, in particular at enterprises owned by Western companies. China is also the main supply route for components.
• Current trends indicate that drones will remain an important part of warfare, while the need to develop solutions will contribute to the further development of unmanned systems, not only aerial ones. Consequently, greater automation, changes in approaches to personnel training, and further integration of unmanned systems into existing systems of types of troops are expected.

 

Introduction

A characteristic feature of the Russo-Ukrainian war is the constant introduction of new methods of warfare, conducting reconnaissance, and protecting one’s own infrastructure and combat units. The mass use of various types of unmanned systems, the scope of which is wide – from defeating enemy personnel to transporting ammunition – only underpins this trend. Following the intensification of the use of drones by Ukraine, the Russian Federation has also begun to pay considerable attention to the introduction of such weapons in combat operations and is already taking significant steps to increase their effectiveness and number to gain an advantage over Ukraine in the so-called “drone war”.

Considering the fact the use of drones is gaining a larger scope and the Kremlin does leave opportunities to invest in the production of its drone models receiving a significant benefit from their use on the battlefield, the research of the development of drones and their use by Russia is relevant.

The integration of unmanned systems into Russia’s military strategy reflects global trends in the development of military technologies where autonomous systems play an increasingly important role. The Russian Federation is actively investing in the production of drones seeking to reduce dependence on imported technologies and create its own high-tech models. These efforts include not only the production of drones for reconnaissance and strike missions but also the development of naval and land-based unmanned platforms that have the potential to change the balance of power in various theaters of war.

Russia’s growing use of unmanned systems creates new challenges for Ukraine’s defense capabilities and requires an adequate response to new threats. Implementation of effective methods of combatting and protecting from drones is becoming critically important for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This study is aimed at analyzing the current state and prospects for developing unmanned systems in the Russian army, formulating recommendations for limiting their effectiveness on the battlefield, and countering their production and supply.

 

Chapter 1. Evolution of the use of drones in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Drones have become an integral part of the battlefield, however, it is a mistake to think that they were not actively used until the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Russia began to develop this sector immediately after the invasion of Georgia in 2008, so at the time of the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Russian Federation had an established system for drone production and its use. At the same time, the approach to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) during the first phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war was constantly evolving, so the development of the UAV sector can be divided into two stages.

 

1.1. The Use of UAVs for Guiding Artillery Fire and Reconnaissance (2014-2020)

In 2014, almost immediately after the start of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, the Russian side began to actively use drones. While Russia-controlled militants could use mainly self-made copters for guiding artillery fire on Ukrainian positions, Russian servicemen had at their disposal entire complexes developed at Russian defense enterprises, with trained combat crews. This became a key factor in the effectiveness of Russian rocket and cannon artillery.

Name	Application Level	Flight Characteristics	Functions
Granat-1	Tactical	Flight range – up to 15 km, flight altitude – до 3500 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and fire guidance
Granat-2	Tactical	Flight range – up to15 km, flight altitude – up to 4100 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and fire guidance
Granat-3	Tactical	Flight range – 25-40 km, flight altitude – 2000 m	Reconnaissance, radio monitoring of cellular communication networks
Granat-4	Tactical	Flight range – 70 km, flight altitude – 2000 m	Reconnaissance, radio monitoring of cellular communication networks
Eleron-3SV	Tactical	Flight range – 25 km, flight altitude – 5000 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and retransmission of radio signals
Zastava	Tactical	Flight range – 10 km, flight altitude – 2200 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Takhion	Tactical	Flight range – 40 km, flight altitude – 3600 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Orlan-10	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 120 km, flight altitude – 6000 m	Reconnaissance and retransmission of radio signals
Forpost	Operational	Flight range – 350 km, висота flight altitude – 6000 m	Reconnaissance

Fig. 1. UAVs used by the Russian Federation during the first phase of the Russian-Ukrainian War.

The Kremlin had an opportunity to test a whole range of reconnaissance UAVs in combat conditions. So, back then, one of the most used drones was Orlan-10 which was deployed almost along the entire frontline for reconnaissance, fire control, as well as detecting and determining the location of sources of very high and ultra-high frequency radio radiation. In particular, Orlan-10 drones were used by fighters of the 83rd Separate Air Assault Brigade and the 19th Separate Air Assault Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces during the battles in Eastern Ukraine. According to the most modest calculations, Russia lost 17 units of such UAVs in Eastern Ukraine.

Also, the Russian Federation resorted to the use of rather specific Forpost UAVs which, despite the greatest range at that time, needed an airstrip. That is why drones of this type were launched from the airbase in Millerovo in the Rostov region. Because of its size, Forpost became a fairly easy target for Ukrainian air defense systems, so at least 5 drones of this type were shot down.

In addition, during the first phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Russian army quite often used Eleron-3SV drones and all UAVs of the Granat family. Such rare UAVs as Zastava and Takhion were also spotted at the frontline. It is known that the Russians even organized training courses on the territory of the Kuzminsky training ground in the Rostov region in order to prepare UAV operators of the Granat family UAVs.

 

1.2. The Appearance of Attack and Kamikaze Drones in Parallel with the Use of Reconnaissance Drones (2020-2022)

Later, when the Russo-Ukrainian war took on the character of low-intensity trench warfare, both militaries began experimenting with military and civilian drones. This phenomenon became especially widespread after 2019 when approaches to the use of UAVs became more similar to what is common today.

In the fall of 2015, the Russian Armed Forces for the first time used the Orlan-10 UAV to drop explosives and destroy Ukrainian depots in Svatovo. Although such an atypical use of a reconnaissance drone was effective, the Russians began to practice dropping explosives on a more regular basis somewhat later. Thus, in 2020, Russians used repurposed Chinese civilian drones to drop VOG-17 and VOG-25 grenades, as well as 82-mm mortar mines.

Moreover, this period marked the beginning of the use of kamikaze drones in combat conditions. It is known that the Russians deployed homemade kamikaze drones, the cavities of which were filled with explosives to strike Ukrainian positions. In addition, the Russian army tested the KUB-BLA barrage munition which became the basis for a more technologically advanced Lanced drone.

Therefore, the widespread use of drones immediately after the start of the Russian full-scale invasion was natural, given years of experimentation and testing. Moreover, since 2022, approaches to the use of drones have been constantly evolving to meet new realities of warfare. Thus, the following general reasons for the widespread use of drones can be identified:

• Drones embody important trends of modern warfare: the transition to small, cheap, disposable weapons, the growing use of civilian technology, and the desire for autonomy in combat.
• The development of the UAV sector, in particular the commercial sector, has made drones cheaper and more accessible.
• Adaptability of technologies to changes in the nature of war. In conditions of the beginning of the full-scale invasion, when the frontline was not static and both parties did not have a large number of deployed air defense systems and electronic warfare systems, it became possible to use drones close to enemy troops. With the transformation of the war into a more static one, drones have not become less relevant because they remain the main means of conducting reconnaissance, adjusting fire, and controlling units. Moreover, unmanned aerial vehicles have become an integral means of defeating enemy forces and assets both on land and at sea.
• Intensification and transition to a new phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war, as well as the previous experience of effective use of drones. It is not surprising that in the conditions of a significant increase in the theater of operations, there was an increase in the use of not only conventional weapon systems but also drones.
• Transformation of combat tasks. The beginning of the full-scale invasion forced to resort to complex operations, in particular in the enemy’s rear, to undermine logistics, destroy or damage important industrial facilities, as well as destroy expensive equipment. 

 

Chapter 2. Unmanned Platforms in Service with the Russian Armed Forces 

2.1. Strategic vision of the development of the UAV Sector 

The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation states that the characteristic features of modern armed conflicts are the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous sea vehicles, controlled robotic weapons, and military equipment. The 2020 Foundations of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence states that the Russian Federation takes into account the location of a potential adversary’s attack drones. However, there is no mention of unmanned aerial vehicles in the 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

At the time of the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian army had a well-established system of drone application. The organizational structure of general military brigades and divisions, as well as separate reconnaissance brigades included UAV battalions. Each UAV battalion in general military brigade or division consisted of two platoons: one using operational-tactical level UAVs such as Orlan-10 and Granat-4, and the other using tactical level UAVs such as Granat-1/2/3, Eleron, and Takion among others.

The same organizational structure of UAV battalions was typical for airborne troops and marine corps. Additionally, UAV units were found in artillery, engineer, and railway brigades. Sappers used drones for reconnaissance of minefields and enemy fortifications, railway workers for assessing the conditions of the rail track, and missile brigades for selecting and guarding the positions of the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile complex.

In artillery brigades, in addition to the already mentioned Orlan-10 UAVs, there were also Orlan-30 UAV units. Even within the structure of the Russian Air Force and Navy, alongside the standard Orlan-10 UAVs, there were several squadrons of Forspost UAVs.

The onset of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the significantly increased use of drones, in particular commercial ones, forced Russia to adapt to new conditions. The uncontrolled use of commercial drones for both reconnaissance and targeting purposes, as well as their presence in nearly every unit of the Russian Armed Forces, led the Ministry of Defense to attempt to take control of this process. As of today, UAV regular units with both reconnaissance and strike drones have been established in almost every formation.

Despite these changes, Russia does not yet have a fully developed approach to drone integration as new operational concepts have not been developed, new technological capabilities have not been fully integrated into broader military systems, and the organizational structure has not been entirely adapted to new needs.

At the same time, Russia recognized the potential for further development in the UAV sector. Therefore, in June 2023, the Russian government approved the Strategy for the Development of Unmanned Aviation of the Russian Federation to 2030 and prospectively to 2035. According to the basic scenario outlined in this document, 330,000 people will be involved in the development, production, and operation of UAVs by 2026, while 1 million and 1,5 million will be involved in the same activities by 2030 and 2035 respectively. Consequently, the quantity of produced UAVs is also expected to increase significantly. By 2025, it is planned to produce 52,100 drones, by 2030 – 105,500, and by 2035 – 177,700 units.

Indicator Name	Scenario	Plan for 2023-2026	Flan for 2027-2030	Prognosis for 2031-2035
The number of specialists involved in the field of research, development, production, and operation of unmanned systems	Basic	330,000	1 million	1.5 million
	Progressive	450,000	1,1 million	1.6 million
The number of unmanned aviation systems produced in Russia	Basic	52,100	105,500	177,700
	Progeressive	55,400	116 ,00	199,100

Fig. 2. Target indicators of the development of unmanned aviation in the Russian Federation. Source: the Russian government.

It is clear that not all specialists involved in the development of the UAV sector will work for military needs but the fact that the Russian government is gradually establishing control over the industry, which until recently developed on its own indicates that the Russian Federation is aiming at achieving long-term results.

 

2.2. Nomenclature of Russian Drones

2.2.1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

The concept of drones is broader than commonly understood and includes not only UAVs but also surface and underwater drones, as well as ground drones. However, UAVs are the most prevalent and are used most frequently. 

The Russian military possesses a diverse range of UAVs that are already in service or are expected to be widely provided to brigades soon. Russian defense industry enterprises produce reconnaissance, strike, and kamikaze drones. Additionally, Russian forces do not shy away from various civilian devices, including FPV drones and quadcopters that are used for both targeting and reconnaissance purposes. 

As of 2022, the core of the Russian UAV fleet consisted of such drones as the Orlan-10, Granat-1/2/3/4, Eleron, and Takhion, among others. However, starting in 2023, the Russian Armed Forces began to actively use reconnaissance UAVs such as SuperCam S150 and SuperCam S350. Reconnaissance drones from the ZALA family, including ZALA 421-16E, also gained popularity which is indirectly confirmed by the number of their recorded losses. Furthermore, Ukrainian military reports indicate a growing frequency in the use of ZALA and SuperCam UAVs, with fewer sightings of Orlan-type drones along the frontline.

In addition to their developments, the Russians are using Iranian UAVs such as Mohajer-4/6 at the operational-tactical level. However, these drones are not widespread and are mainly used near the Black Sea coast.

Russian Armed Forces rarely deploy operational-level UAVs. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, flights of Forpost and Orion UAVs have been infrequently recorded, while the use of strategic-level UAVs has not been spotted during the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is no secret that the Russians have been trying to develop long-range UAVs, specifically the  Altis and the S-70 Okhotnik but it seems that these drones exist only as prototypes, and it is unclear whether they will ever be used in actual operations.

Name	Application Level	Flight Characteristics	Functions
Granat-1	Tactical	Flight range – up to 15 km, flight altitude – up to 3500 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and fire guidance
Granat-2	Tactical	Flight range – up to15 km, flight altitude – up to 4100 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and fire guidance
Granat-3	Tactical	Flight range – 25-40 km, flight altitude – 2000 m	Reconnaissance, radio monitoring of cellular communication networks
Granat-4	Tactical	Flight range – 70 km, flight altitude – 2000 m	Reconnaissance, radio monitoring of cellular communication networks
Eleron-Т28МЕ	Tactical	Flight range – 25-40 km, flight altitude – 5000 m	Reconnaissance, target designation
Eleron-3SV	Tactical	Flight range – 25 km, flight altitude – 5000 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and retransmission of radio signals
Eleron-10	Tactical	Flight range – 60 km, flight altitude – 4000 m	Reconnaissance, target designation
Eleron-3	Tactical	Flight range – 25 km, flight altitude – 3000 m	Reconnaissance, target designation, and retransmission of radio signals
ZALA 421-16E	Tactical	Flight range – 50 km, flight altitude – 3600 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
ZALA 421-08	Tactical	Flight range – 15 km,  flight altitude – 3600 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
ZALA 421-04М	Tactical	Flight range- 50 km,  flight altitude – 3600 m	Reconnaissance, target designation
Takhion	Tactical	Flight range – 40 km, flight altitude – 3600 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Zastava	Tactical	Flight range – 10 km, flight altitude – 2200 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Грифон-12	Tactical	Flight range – 40 km, flight altitude – 4000 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Orlan-10	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 120 km, flight altitude – 6000 m	Reconnaissance and retransmission of radio signals
Orlan-10Е	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 120 km, flight altitude – 6000 m	Reconnaissance, performing the role of the radio-electronic warfare system, retransmission of radio signals
Orlan-20 Kartograph	Operational-tactical	Flight characteristics are unknown	Reconnaissance
Orlan-30	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 200 km,  flight altitude – 4500 m	Reconnaissance, performing the role of the radio-electronic warfare system, retransmission of radio signals
БЛА-08 Tipchak	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 120 km, flight altitude – 4500 m	Reconnaissance, performing the role of the radio-electronic warfare system, retransmission of radio signals
Mohajer-4	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 150 km, flight altitude – 3500 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, fire damage tasks
Mohajer-6	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 200 km, flight altitude – 5400 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, fire damage tasks
Corsair	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 120 km, flight altitude – 5100 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Merlin-VR	Operational-tactical	Flight range – unknown, flight altitude – 5000 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Supercam S150	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 110 km, flight altitude – unknown	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Supercam S350	Operational-tactical	Flight range – 240 km, flight altitude – 5000 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, target designation
Forpost	Operational	Flight range – 350 km, висота flight altitude – 6000 m	Reconnaissance
Orion	Operational	Flight rangeу – 300 km, flight altitude – 7500 m	Reconnaissance and surveillance, fire damage tasks

Fig. 3. Russian reconnaissance and multi-purpose UAVs used during the Russo-Ukrainian war.

In 2021, the Russian company Zala Group launched the production of KUB-BLA and Lancet kamikaze drones which were deployed for the first time in the Joint Forces Operation zone. After being adopted into service in 2022, they became an integral part of the battlefield posing a serious threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Moreover, Russia has focused on modernizing and reducing the cost of its kamikaze drone fleet.  For instance, the Barnaul-based Special Design Bureau “Vostok” developed the kamikaze drone Scalpel, which has a range of 40 kilometers. The advantage of the Scalpel over the Lancet is expected to be its cost, as Russian designers plan to use primarily civilian components that are not subject to sanctions. Russia has also announced the modernization of the KUB-BLA kamikaze drone by equipping it with a more powerful warhead. However, it is currently difficult to assess the actual outcome of these modifications.

At the same time, the most widely used kamikaze drones are the Iranian Shahed-136/131, which Russia has adapted for local production under the name Geran-2/1. Over time, it appears that the Russians have developed several versions of these localized Iranian drones, each differing in certain technical characteristics. For example, the Geran-K (Герань-К) is equipped with a non-standard 40-kilogram warhead with fragmentation-explosive elements. There have also been instances of this drone version being used with a cumulative warhead. The Geran-Y (Герань-Ы), on the other hand, is equipped with a Russian navigation system, although the warhead is of Iranian origin. Additionally, it has been reported that the Russians have released another modification of this drone type, installing a jet engine on it. This modification increases the drone’s flight speed but potentially reduces its range.

Name	Application Level	Characteristics	Functions
KUB-BLA	Tactical	Weight of the warhead – 3 kg, flight range – 10-15 km	Target destruction in the immediate vicinity of the frontline
Lancet-1	Operational-tactical	Weight of the warhead – 1 kg, flight range – up to 40 km	Target destruction in the immediate vicinity of the frontline
Lancet-3	Operational-tactical	Weight of the warhead – 3 kg, flight range – up to 40 km	Target destruction in the immediate vicinity of the frontline
Scalpel	Operational-tactical	Weight of the warhead – up to 5 kg, flight rang – up to 40 km	Target destruction in the immediate vicinity of the frontline
Shahed-131	Strategic	Weight of the warhead – 10-15 kg, flight range – up to 900 km	Target of military and civilian objects in the enemy’s deep rear
Shahed-136	Strategic	Weight of the warhead – up to 40 kg, flight range – up to 2000 km	Target of military and civilian objects in the enemy’s deep rear
Geran-1 (Russian localized version of Shahed-131)	Strategic	Weight of the warhead – 10-15 kg, flight range – up to 900 km	Target of military and civilian objects in the enemy’s deep rear
Geran-2 (Russian localized version of Shahed-136)	Strategic	Weight of the warhead – up to 40 kg, flight range – up to 2000 km	Target of military and civilian objects in the enemy’s deep rear
Shahed-238 (reactive version of Shahed-136)	Strategic	Weight of the warhead – up to 25 kg, flight range – 1200 km	Target of military and civilian objects in the enemy’s deep rear

Fig. 4. Russian attack UAVs used during the Russo-Ukrainian war.

The Russian army is also actively using FPV drones and quadcopters to drop explosives on Ukrainian equipment or positions. Both commercial drones from the Chinese company DJI (such as the Mavic and Matrix families) and Russian-developed models are in use. The Russian Armed Forces employ various drones, such as Hortensia, VT-40, Piranha, Upyr, and many others, which can be used for reconnaissance, dropping explosives, or even as kamikaze drones. Some of these drones have been upgraded or were initially equipped with thermal imaging cameras, allowing them to operate at any time of day or night.

FPV drones capable of nighttime operations have become a serious problem for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as the Russians have significantly saturated the front line with these devices. Moreover, there is a constant search for technological solutions that would allow the use of drones at frequencies not covered by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Initially, enemy FPV drones operated in the 850-930 MHz range, but a recent trend has emerged toward drones that operate in the 730-760 MHz range. The overall frequency range for Russian FPV drones is 720-1020 MHz. Furthermore, the Russians are seeking technological solutions that would allow them to change the frequency range during combat missions, particularly toward lower frequencies, around 430-600 MHz. In such cases, the standard trench EW system Kupol, which operates in the 850-930 MHz range and is used by Ukrainian forces, is rendered ineffective.

2.2.2. Ground Drones

While 2023 saw active development and enhancement of FPV drones, 2024 has brought new technological solutions to the field of ground drones. The development of ground systems is not new to the Russians. Before the full-scale invasion, the Russian Armed Forces had robotic systems like the Uran-9 at their disposal. However, these systems performed poorly in Syria and did not participate in combat operations in Ukraine. Moreover, it is unclear whether serial versions of these machines even exist. The same applies to the robotic system Marker, which was equipped with 4 Kornet ATGMs. Although it was announced that these systems would be deployed to combat zones, they have yet to be spotted on the front lines. It is known that the Russian Armed Forces used the less technologically complex Uran-6 for mine clearance but questions remain about its effectiveness. Thus, the robotic systems presented by the Russian Ministry of Defense are, at best, still at the prototype or experimental stage, and their further development and enhancement are hindered not only by objective reasons but also by the need for more efficient use of funds.

The significant advancement in the FPV drone sector has spurred the development of ground drones. With some areas of the front line saturated with a large number of FPV drones used for destroying equipment and infantry, reaching enemy trenches has become increasingly difficult. As a result, the Russians have actively sought ways to get infantry closer to Ukrainian positions and develop technological solutions that allow tasks to be performed without direct human involvement.

The emergence of new needs has driven the Russians to develop small multi-purpose ground drones rather than expensive and cumbersome robotic systems with questionable effectiveness. Initially, Russian engineer enthusiasts led the experimentation and search for new solutions. They developed remotely operated devices for cargo delivery or evacuation of the wounded, as well as ground drones with turrets designed to target Ukrainian troops. Although most of these developments, being experimental, existed only in single copies and were rarely used in combat, signs of a qualitative shift in the development and application of Russian ground UAVs were observed in the first half of 2024.

Ukrainian operators of UAVs have recorded the destruction of several Russian robotic platforms equipped with AGS-17 grenade launchers, as well as the destruction of Russian tracked ground UAVs that delivered ammunition and acted as mobile electronic warfare systems. Additionally, since spring, the Russians have been using serially produced devices, such as the Zhaba and Scorpion-M robotic systems, intended for cargo delivery and carrying out explosions.

Furthermore, it is quite likely that within the next few months, Russian defense enterprises may establish mass production of ground drones. For example, the High Precision Complexes holding, part of the Rostec corporation, developed two multifunctional robotic systems, Depesha and Buggy. These systems are characterized by their payload capacities of 150 and 250 kilograms, respectively. These drones can be used for ammunition delivery, casualty evacuation, destroying fortifications, fortified firing positions, and strongpoints, targeting personnel, and remote mine clearance.

Therefore, it can be anticipated that by the end of 2024, ground drones will become an important component of combat operations, with their mass production and enhancement being primarily handled by defense enterprises rather than engineer enthusiasts.

2.2.3. Naval Drones

However, drone warfare is not only happening in the air or on land but also at sea. Russia is trying to catch up with Ukraine in the field of manufacturing and deploying naval drones. Back in March 2023, the Russians announced the creation of the underwater drone Skat, intended for reconnaissance and mine clearance. However, it seems that it never went into serial production. Later, Russian engineers shifted their focus to a slightly different area, concentrating on developing surface drones. By August 2023, the Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant unveiled the GRK-700 Vizir, which was initially meant for civilian functions but the manufacturer later announced its potential use for military purposes, specifically as a “hunter” for enemy naval drones.

In December 2023, Russian media reported that the same Kingisepp Machine-Building Plant developed a new strike naval drone – Oduvanchik, which was intended to be the first in a series of 10 similar naval drones produced for the Russian Ministry of Defense. Oduvanchik externally resembles Ukrainian naval drones quite closely, which is not surprising considering that the Russians analyze the wreckage of Ukrainian kamikaze naval drones and try to incorporate their features into their designs.

In February, among the announced Russian developments was the kamikaze naval drone Afalina which differs from its predecessors by featuring artificial intelligence. In addition to its strike capabilities, it will be able to perform reconnaissance and patrolling. The start of serial production for the Afalina is scheduled for summer 2024.

So far, there have been no recorded results of the use of Russian naval drones, but it can be expected that over the next few months, they will begin to appear on the battlefield in significant numbers. Moreover, their use is likely to differ from the tactics employed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Given that the Ukrainian Navy does not possess a large number of vessels, most of which are patrol boats, the Russians will focus on countering Ukrainian kamikaze naval drones. This is particularly relevant for reconnaissance and patrolling, which in theory should help to detect Ukrainian drones more quickly, thereby increasing the chances of successfully repelling an attack. Another aspect is that Russia might use kamikaze drones to strike vessels entering Ukrainian Black Sea ports, aiming to block the maritime corridor and access to the global ocean for Ukraine.

Furthermore, the development of the Russian naval drone sector could pose a threat to other Black Sea region countries, including Romania, whose energy projects might face certain difficulties.

2.3. Tactics of Using Russian UAVs

The tactics for using Russian UAVs are directly dependent on their type and characteristics. For the purposes of this study, the tactics of deploying large and small radius strike drones, reconnaissance UAVs, and FPV drones have been analyzed. It should be noted that the approaches to using UAVs within the same category are quite similar, so the tactics are analyzed based on the most common Russian UAVs. At the same time, it is important to note that UAVs do not operate in isolation but in conjunction with other UAVs and types of weaponry.

Drones of the Shahed-136/131 type or their localized versions called Geran-2/1 are primarily used to target military and civilian infrastructure deep within Ukrainian territory. This is done either by bypassing the location of air defense systems or by overwhelming them, when air defense systems are simply unable to cope with a large number of drones in one area.

Launches are generally conducted at night, as this complicates the visual detection of drones, makes it harder to determine their numbers, and reduces the effectiveness of countermeasures. Most flight paths of Shahed-136/131 drones follow roads, riverbeds, and estuaries to mask the sound of UAV engines and allow flight at the minimum possible altitude, avoiding obstacles such as power lines, tall buildings, forests, etc.

However, there is also a potential dual purpose for using these drones, where they not only attack targets deep behind enemy lines but also perform some reconnaissance functions. For instance, combined attacks by Russia are quite common, using both cruise missiles and UAVs simultaneously. In such cases, Shahed-136/131 drones serve as decoys for air defense systems, depleting their resources and determining coordinates for adjusting subsequent strikes.

Attacks using multiple groups of Shahed-136/131 drones coming from different directions and then circling in non-standard routes are also possible. This overloads the Ukrainian air defense system and reveals its coordinates. This data is then used in planning future attacks, whether combined or using only drones.

Drones of the Lancet type perform diametrically opposite tasks, as they are battlefield assets designed to target objectives in close proximity to the front line. They are typically used by Special Operations Forces or mobile reconnaissance-diversion groups, aiming to strike locations of air defense systems, artillery, and ammunition depots.

For greater effectiveness, this type of drone is used in coordination with UAV complexes such as Orlan-10/Orlan-30 or Mohajer 4/Mohajer 6, which hover at a height designated by the operator behind Ukrainian lines and act as relay stations, providing precise coordinates for guiding Lancet drones, which then directly strike the target.

Additionally, there have been cases where Orlan or Mohajer drones have diverted Ukrainian air defense systems away from their concentration areas, allowing these reconnaissance UAVs to be destroyed. Following this, kamikaze drones like the Lancet would target Ukrainian air defense systems. Other aircraft-type kamikaze drones, such as the KUB-BLA, operate similarly, working in tandem with reconnaissance drones designed to illuminate targets and record the impact results.

At the same time, the Russians attempt to inflict maximum damage even after the strike drones have completed their mission. It is quite common to encounter wreckage of drones that have hidden explosives in their modules. When Ukrainian specialists take the remnants of UAVs for examination and further study, there is a risk that the contents of these parts might detonate, causing serious injuries or even death to Ukrainian servicemen.

Russian reconnaissance UAVs are used not only in conjunction with strike drones but also with tactical missile systems or other long-range strike means. Tactical-level reconnaissance drones pose a serious problem for Ukrainian forces as they have become the primary means of conducting reconnaissance at operational and tactical levels, allowing Russian forces to gather extensive information about the situation behind Ukrainian lines. This enables Russian forces to target not only logistical routes, troop concentrations, and manpower but also to strike at Ukrainian aviation bases.

In addition to strike drones developed and manufactured by Russian defense enterprises, Russia regularly uses much cheaper FPV drones, often civilian quadcopters equipped with various types of munitions to target armored vehicles, bunkers, fortifications, and personnel. Furthermore, the use of FPV drones is constantly evolving. In recent months, they have primarily been used for strikes against Ukrainian positions and infantry, while targeting equipment with FPV drones has become less frequent.

Additionally, the Russian military is experimenting with the use of FPV drones, and tactics may vary depending on the terrain or situation on a specific section of the front. One possible approach involves a group of FPV drones moving 100-300 meters behind an assault group.

As Ukrainian forces begin to destroy Russian infantry, FPV drone operators target newly discovered Ukrainian firing positions. This continues throughout the assault. Although such tactics require a large number of drones, which is a drawback, Ukrainian electronic warfare systems are unable to handle such a large influx of UAVs.

Moreover, after several hours of continuous combat, the batteries of trench electronic warfare systems become depleted, and under heavy enemy fire, they cannot be recharged. Alongside UAVs, it is evident that artillery and mortar fire are directed at Ukrainian positions. Specifically, this tactic has been actively used by the Russians on the Avdiivka front during assaults on Ukrainian fortifications.

Recently, a new approach to preparing for assaults has emerged. The tactic involves the mass use of FPV drones and bomber drones with powerful munitions that destroy bunkers in several strikes.

Essentially, a new layer of warfare has emerged that did not previously exist. Aerial reconnaissance identifies the target, followed by the use of bomber drones that severely damage the bunker. Once Ukrainian forces abandon the partially destroyed fortification, the Russians begin to deploy FPV drones selectively. The main assault phase then begins with the use of infantry and heavy weaponry. Essentially, the use of “carpet bombing” with UAVs allows the enemy to complement artillery preparation, thereby causing more precise and targeted losses to Ukrainian forces.

The Russian army is also increasingly using FPV drones with machine vision. Machine vision enables the drone to “acquire” the target, and the UAV can reach it even if communication with the operator is lost. Essentially, such technical innovations make the UAV semi-autonomous, increasing the likelihood of hitting the target even under active enemy electronic warfare.

Another example of experimentation is the use of FPV drones equipped with hibernators, allowing the drones to be turned on and off remotely. Essentially, such a drone can be deployed to dangerous front-line areas or behind enemy lines, where it remains inactive until the operator awakens it from “sleep mode.” Such drones are difficult to detect with electronic warfare tools, and their small size complicates physical searches. However, mass use of these devices has not yet been observed, making it difficult to assess their effectiveness.

 

2.4. Industrial Capacities and Foreign Components

2.4.1. Industrial Capacities

In the context of analyzing Russia’s industrial potential in drone production, only the UAV sector has been analyzed. This is due to the lack of evidence for the mass use of marine or ground drones, and consequently, no realistic data regarding the scale of production.

Last year, Russia shifted focus to developing the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sector and scaling up production. In December 2023, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin reported a twofold increase in UAV production. As of August 2023, Russia had approximately 70 drone manufacturers, including 20 large companies. The Russians planned to increase production to 18,000 large and medium UAVs by 2024.

Regarding FPV drones, the numbers are even higher. Exact figures are not available, but the most modest estimates suggest that up to 40,000 FPV drones are produced monthly. In one video, representatives of the Russian volunteer initiative Judgment Day claim they produce 30,000 FPV drones per month. This implies that actual production volumes may be significantly higher. Early in 2023, Russia lagged significantly behind Ukraine in drone production, but substantial progress seems to have been achieved not only through significant financial investment but also through collaboration with private initiatives, something the Russian Ministry of Defense initially avoided. Thus, the UAV production sector in Russia today operates as follows:

• FPV drones and other small UAVs are produced by private/volunteer initiatives with support from the Russian Ministry of Defense.
• More advanced tactical and operational-tactical UAV systems, including kamikaze drones, are manufactured at relevant defense enterprises, some of which are private.

In recent months, the Russian Ministry of Defense has actively collaborated with private startups, the most notable being the Judgment Day project. Some of these initiatives do not even have a name or legal entity but still fulfill orders for Russian defense needs. Likely, some of these drone development teams work individually with Russian security forces, who act as intermediaries between the manufacturer and the Ministry of Defense.

Regarding the production of larger and more technologically complex UAVs, the situation is as follows. In the special economic zone of Alabuga in Tatarstan, Russia has built a factory for manufacturing Shahed-136/131 kamikaze drones, known in the Russian version as Geran-2/1. Furthermore, new production workshops are regularly constructed on the factory premises as the shift from assembling drones to full in-house production of airframes occurs. It is expected that starting from 2024, Alabuga Machinery will be able to produce additional core components locally, including navigation devices, interference and spoofing protection models, engines, and propellers. If so, monthly drone production could rise to 226 units, with total production reaching 6,000 drones by September 2025.

These figures seem close to reality, as by early 2024, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense estimated the production rate at 330-350 Shahed-136 drones per month. Additionally, over 1,600 such drones have been produced and 2,600 units have been received from Iran.

The production of Lancet drones is handled by the Izhevsk company Zala Aero Group. After Zala Aero Group joined the Kalashnikov Group, management decided to build a new factory on the existing Kalashnikov facilities in Izhevsk, where there are already two production buildings.

Following the start of the full-scale invasion, Zala Aero’s chief designer Alexander Zakharov proposed repurposing shopping centers that sold Western goods for UAV production. This idea was soon implemented, and drone production was established in one of Izhevsk’s shopping centers. It turns out that this was not the only solution, as at least five shopping centers in Russia have been identified as repurposed for UAV production (three of which produce Lancets). As for production volumes, exact figures are not available, and the numbers reported in the media vary significantly: from 65 to 94 units per month. Ukrainian military sources report that Russians use approximately 200 Lancets per month.

Zala Aero has also developed the KUB-BLA UAV, which has been serially produced for the Russian Armed Forces since 2022. At the end of 2023, the Kalashnikov Group reported that it had delivered all KUB-BLA systems specified in the contracts. Furthermore, the enterprise claimed it had doubled its production volumes of these drones.

The same company also produces reconnaissance UAVs of various versions and modifications, the latest of which is the ZALA Z-16. Production volumes of ZALA reconnaissance drones are not known, but it seems that they, along with Supercam UAVs, have begun to replace the well-known Orlans.

The company Izhevsk Unmanned Systems produces the Granat and Takhion UAV families. The enterprise plans to increase UAV production by tenfold in the near future. The company has commissioned a workshop with a total area of 5,800 square meters and created 360 additional jobs. The presence of nearly 60 vacant positions, more than 10 of which were opened recently, also indicates an increase in staff. Additionally, the company is developing a long-term HR policy aimed at continuously replenishing its workforce. Izhevsk Unmanned Systems, together with Izhevsk State Technical University, has developed an engineering training program in which students will undergo production and postgraduate internships at Izhevsk Unmanned Systems.

The Unmanned Systems group of companies, associated with Izhevsk Unmanned Systems, manufactures Supercam UAVs. As of now, they exist in two versions: reconnaissance and kamikaze (the latter is currently undergoing testing), but exact production volumes are not known. However, based on Ukrainian military testimonies, Russians have saturated the front line with Supercam drones, using them even more frequently than Orlan UAVs.

Orlan-type drones are produced at the Special Technology Center in St. Petersburg. According to the company’s chief designer, as of 2024, the STC has increased production volumes 3-4 times and now manufactures over 1,000 Orlan-10 drones per year. This data seems to be close to reality, as before the full-scale invasion, there was information about the production of 200-300 units of this type of drone per year. According to Ivanov, production of the Orlan-30 UAV has increased 25 times compared to 2021. However, since the Orlan-30 was only adopted in 2020, the double-digit figures are more indicative of the rarity of the device than a scale-up in production.

Eleron-type drones are produced by the Enix enterprise, which is also among the few that manufacture pulsed jet-air engines. The total area of production and administrative facilities is 4,170 square meters, allowing Enix to produce approximately 70 UAVs per year.

Orion UAVs are manufactured by the company Kronstadt. In 2021, the construction of a new serial factory for Kronstadt and the renovation of several buildings at the neighboring Dubna Machine-Building Plant began. The goal was to create a UAV production center in Dubna. The factory was expected to reach full capacity in 2024 and produce several dozen UAVs per year. Although the factory has started operations, its future is uncertain due to the parent company’s debt, which is on the brink of bankruptcy. It is known that 30 of these UAVs were produced from 2016 to 2020. Production volumes may have increased since the start of the full-scale invasion, but the Orion remains a very rare device and is not often seen in the combat zone.

Company	Name	Dislocation	Production Rates
Zala Aero Group	KUB-BLA Lancet, Zala	Izhevks	Approximately 300 UAVs per month
Izhevsk Unmanned Systems	Granat and Takhion	Izhevks	Production rates are unknown
Unmanned Systems	SupeCam	Izhevks	Production rates are unknown
Special Technology Center	Orlan	St. Petersburg	Approximately 100 UAVs per month
Enix	Eleron	Kazan	Approximately 10 UAVs per month
Albatros	Geran-2/1	Alabuga	Approximately 300 UAVs per month

Fig. 5. List of the main Russian UAV manufacturers

 

2.4.2. Foreign Components and Supply Chains

Despite Russia’s efforts to achieve import substitution for some of its drone components, it remains heavily reliant on foreign parts. This is particularly true for critical components such as microchips, microprocessors, electrical motors, and more. In August 2023, the Yermak-McFaul sanctions group, in collaboration with experts from the Kyiv School of Economics, analyzed the origin of foreign components in Russian drones, using Shahed 136/131, Lancet, and Orlan-10 UAVs as examples. It was found that 69% of the components were produced by companies owned by Americans.

In terms of geographical origin, approximately 60% of the components were manufactured in China, including 3% produced in Hong Kong. This is due to the trend of companies from the US and the EU setting up their manufacturing bases in China. As a result, a significant portion of components originating from China are controlled by companies from countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia. Regarding the origin of components from the EU and the US, their shares are 11% and 4%, respectively. Important suppliers also include Taiwan, Malaysia, and Vietnam (7%, 4%, and 3%, respectively).

Moreover, China’s role extends beyond being just a manufacturing base; it is a crucial supplier for Russia. China is the primary channel for supplying components to Russia, with its share totaling 67%, of which 17% entered Russia through Hong Kong. The UAE and Turkey have also carved out their niches in supplying components for Russian drones, accounting for 5% and 2%, respectively.

Additionally, despite formal Chinese restrictions on the export of its drones for military use, Russia has access to supply channels from China for both ready-made drones and their components. Military drones are likely being exported through the company iFlight. This is facilitated by collaborators in China, the Middle East, and Europe. Furthermore, when there is a shortage of certain types of components in the Chinese market, Russian companies have the opportunity to purchase most of the components in advance.

Fig. 6. Countries of origin of foreign components in Russian UAVs. Source: KSE

The import of sanctioned goods occurs through several schemes. The first scheme involves Russians setting up companies abroad. These newly established companies purchase all necessary goods and then re-export them to Russia. Such companies are most commonly established in trade-active countries like China and Turkey. When electronic components are needed, Chinese or Hong Kong addresses are typically used. Additionally, Moscow frequently registers such companies in traditional sanction-busting jurisdictions, such as Central Asian countries.

Another method involves listing an intermediary – such as a logistics company – on customs invoices, and then listing the actual sender as a legal entity with a slightly altered company name. This creates the appearance that the shipment is coming from a different company.

In China, Russian clients can order goods without intermediaries, as banks accept payments from Russia. However, when ordering goods from the West, companies with Chinese beneficiaries are established.

Another import scheme for drones and their components involves Chinese companies ordering goods either for themselves or for subsequent shipment to another country. Once the goods arrive at Chinese ports, the companies purportedly abandon the cargo in favor of another buyer or decide there is a more promising customer. The containers are then immediately transferred to other ships and sent to Vladivostok or Sakhalin, from where they are delivered to the actual customer in Russia.

 

2.4 Methods of Countering UAVs

The increased use of various types of UAVs has prompted the development and application of different methods to counter them. Additionally, combating UAVs has certain complexities that make it challenging. Firstly, the overall number and mass deployment of UAVs is greater compared to manned combat aircraft. Secondly, drones significantly vary in size, characteristics, and methods of application, requiring different approaches and means to counter them. Among the existing means of countering UAVs used by Ukraine and Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war, the following types can be distinguished:

1. Firepower Means – stationary and mobile fire installations (machine guns, automatic cannons, missile weapons), small arms, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS);
2. Electronic Warfare Means – these means aim to disrupt or impede the functioning of UAVs by affecting their navigation systems, spatial control, and communication with operators. These include so-called “anti-drone rifles,” “jammers,” and derivative complexes of stationary or mobile deployment;
3. Passive Protection Means – special equipment that obstructs drone surveillance or attacks and minimizes their consequences. For example, mesh barriers on structures and military equipment that complicate drone attacks from the air;
4. Other Countermeasures – such as the use of “hunter drones” against enemy UAVs, which can neutralize them in various ways.

Using firepower to counter UAVs is one of the standard methods; however, its effectiveness significantly depends on the type of targets and their use. One of the most common applications of this method is fighting large UAVs of attack and reconnaissance types that fly at high speeds and medium or high altitudes. Due to their higher speed and flight altitude, intercepting such UAVs with electronic warfare means is complicated. Moreover, passive protection methods may be ineffective due to the large amount of explosives in the warhead of a drone, which can cause significant damage to the target almost in any case. Therefore, eliminating such UAVs with firepower as far away from their target as possible is an effective way.

To intercept large UAVs, both Ukraine and Russia use anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft missile systems on stationary and mobile platforms. Specifically, the Russian and Ukrainian armies use automatic cannons like the ZU-23-2, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns Shilka and Tunguska, which can engage targets at medium and low altitudes.

Russia also widely uses the mobile air defense complex Pantsir-S1, equipped with automatic anti-aircraft guns and a missile system capable of independently tracking and eliminating targets. This complex is widely used by the Russian army both on the front lines and in the rear to protect strategic infrastructure. There are also widespread cases of using medium and long-range anti-aircraft missile systems to counter UAVs. Specifically, such families of air defense systems as S-300, S-400, Buk-M1, Strela, and their modifications are involved in covering cities and infrastructure from drones. Similarly, Ukraine uses Western SAM systems like Patriot, NASAMS, and others. The drawback of using such air defense means is that they cannot counter small UAVs, and they can become easy targets for attacks by such UAVs.

Light small arms, conversely, are usually used against light UAVs, but hitting a target with such weapons is problematic due to the high speed and maneuverability of small UAVs. Despite this, it remains a possible method of defense, and infantry groups strive to equip themselves with types of small arms that can highly likely hit the target. Specifically, the Russian army is considering equipping infantry units with automatic shotguns like the Vepr to fight drones.

Prospective firepower means for drone countering include laser countermeasure complexes. They can directly destroy or “blind” UAVs with a focused beam of laser radiation. Russia has already established industrial production of such complexes, and some are already being used on the battlefield. These include systems like Peresvet, Zadira, and other prospective installations. The drawback of this weapon is its cost and the complex production technology, which makes its mass use impossible.

An innovative and widespread method of countering UAVs, especially small ones, has become electronic warfare means. They can both detect and track UAVs and suppress control and navigation signals, resulting in UAV neutralization. The advantages of electronic warfare are ease of use, speed, and the possibility of mass use. Currently, both the Russian and Ukrainian armies use the following electronic warfare means:

• Stationary electronic warfare means – designed to protect positions, capable of detecting and neutralizing drones simultaneously;
• Portable and mobile electronic warfare means – used by mobile units and soldiers individually. These include “anti-drone rifles” that directly neutralize UAVs at close range;
• Electronic warfare means mounted on military equipment.

The nomenclature of stationary and mobile electronic warfare used by the Russian army is significant. Examples of stationary electronic warfare in the Russian army include complexes “STOPDRON-HORIZONT”, “STRIZH-2”, and “SNEGIR” among others. Among “anti-drone rifles”, Russians have domestic models like “PARS STUPOR”, “HARPIA PRO”, and “HARPUN-2M”.

To protect armored vehicles, the Russian army uses special signal-jamming generators installed directly on the equipment. They disrupt UAV navigation systems nearby, thus disabling the drones. Common electronic warfare systems for equipment are Triton, Volnorez, which are actively used to protect tanks, APCs, and automotive equipment.

Passive protection against UAVs is also gaining popularity due to its simplicity of use and production. Currently, many samples of passive protection against UAVs in the Russian army are makeshift protection structures mounted on equipment directly in the combat zone. A standard method of passive protection is mesh metal structures installed on the top or sides of armored vehicles at a certain distance from the main armor protection.

Thus, in the event of an attack by a strike drone, passive protection has the probability of protecting the crew from explosive or cumulative ammunition. However, the effectiveness of such protection largely depends on the placement features and assembly quality. To protect positions, along with electronic warfare means, masking, placing various types of mesh barriers, or additionally fortifying positions with concrete barriers to reduce the consequences of UAV strikes is used.

Overall, the nomenclature of means of protection against drones is quite broad, and its use is actively increasing proportionally to the increased use of UAVs on the battlefield. It should be noted that a large number of UAV countermeasures are used interrelatedly to achieve maximum effect. At the same time, none of them guarantees full protection against the use of UAVs.

 

Chapter 3. Drones in War: Present and Future

3.1. The Impact of UAVs on the Battlefield

Over the two years of full-scale war, drones have become an integral part of combat due to their size, ease of control, and accessibility. The transformational effect comes not only from attack drones designed to strike forces and assets but also from reconnaissance drones. The massive use of a wide range of UAVs capable of conducting reconnaissance behind enemy lines makes it increasingly difficult to concentrate significant forces and assets in one sector of the front, achieve the element of surprise, and conduct offensive operations. Moreover, reconnaissance drones play a crucial role in fire adjustment and targeting valuable equipment, and their cost and remote control capabilities allow for taking greater risks. The reconnaissance functions that UAVs can perform are perhaps the most important aspect of their widespread use, despite the abundance of videos showing the destruction of forces and assets.

However, attack drones used on the front line, including FVP drones, have also significantly influenced warfare approaches, although their impact should not be overestimated. Small, maneuverable drones can precisely hit mobile targets, personnel, and fortifications, and the time between detection and target engagement has significantly decreased. At the same time, they cannot fully replace artillery with its range and ability to cover entire sectors with fire. Furthermore, small drones are challenging to use in bad weather and are sensitive to both friendly and enemy electronic warfare (EW) measures, especially when it comes to multiband installations used by both armies.

Neither side has achieved air dominance through the use of more technologically advanced UAVs such as the Bayraktar TB2 or Orion, which showed high effectiveness only when air defense systems and EW measures were not fully deployed by both sides in February-March 2022. Long-range kamikaze drones have demonstrated their effectiveness not only in striking military and civilian objects deep in the rear but also in conducting reconnaissance and exhausting air defense systems.

Thus, the changes that drones bring to warfare are evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Years of experiments, numerous developments, and specific combat conditions have turned UAVs into an effective tool for achieving set tasks. Unlike anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), mass use of which in close combat during the early months of the full-scale invasion predicted the obsolescence of tanks, the UAV sector has proven more favorable for experiments and various innovations. Drones will continue to be an important component of warfare, and the need to find new effective solutions will drive the evolution and further development of the UAV sector, not only in the air.

3.2. Prospects for Further Use of Unmanned Complexes

The use of air, ground, and sea-type unmanned systems significantly impacts the course of combat operations, and their expanded use in the future is quite logical. Currently, Russia continues to actively develop the use of drones in its armed forces. For this purpose, Russia utilizes and increases both its drone production capabilities and leverages partner support, particularly in supplying components for unmanned systems through official purchases or parallel imports circumventing sanctions. Therefore, the following prospects for the further use of UAVs by the Russian army can be highlighted:

1. Increasing the Production of UAV Countermeasures and Enhancing Their Effectiveness. EW measures, in particular, can become the basis for countering various types of UAVs due to their mass production capability and ease of use. Therefore, it can be predicted that the Russian army will pay special attention to developing new EW methods and strive to equip as many units as possible with them. Russia is expected to seek ways to obtain information about Western EW systems, their operating principles, and apply this knowledge in developing its own EW means.

Russia is also interested in developing means to counter sea drones, as they are effectively used by Ukraine’s Defense Forces against the Russian Navy. A possible solution for this is creating multi-contour systems for detecting and neutralizing sea drones around Russian Navy ships, which will include drone detection means, EW devices, and systems for transmitting information about approaching drones to ship combat systems.

2. Developing New UAV Models and Their Practical Use. A potential option is expanding the use of ground-based unmanned systems and robotic installations for fire support of combat groups on the battlefield. There are already known cases of ground-based unmanned systems on the battlefield from the Russian army, remotely firing at Ukrainian positions. Ground-based unmanned systems can also be used for transporting ammunition, and supplies, and evacuating wounded soldiers. Considering that these systems reduce the risk to personnel through remote control, it can be predicted that their use will significantly expand.

Another possible use of UAVs is the implementation of so-called “transport drones”, which can carry smaller attack drones to the battlefield, facilitating their use and reducing risks to UAV operators. Additionally, converting conventional aircraft into UAVs for long-distance supply transportation or using them as “kamikaze drones” with a large warhead is a promising prospect.

Among other UAV prospects is increasing their autonomy up to full automation. This will minimize the involvement of UAV operators in direct drone control, significantly enhancing their safety.

3. Implementing Comprehensive Training for Personnel on the Use and Counteraction of UAV Systems. To gain an initiative in the “drone war,” Russia may intensify efforts to create special units specializing directly in UAV use on the battlefield or countering UAV threats. There are already examples of such specialized units in the Russian army, and their numbers and presence on the front line are expected to increase. Additionally, the practice of improvised drone production and encouragement of new UAV designs and modifications directly on the battlefield may spread.

In the context of prospects for further use of UAV complexes and robotic systems and organizing this process, it is worth noting the steps taken by the Ukrainian authorities in this direction. Unlike Russia, Ukraine is taking measures to separate unmanned and robotic systems into a distinct branch of the armed forces to accelerate and institutionalize the development and use of such high-tech arsenals.

For this purpose, Ukraine has established the Unmanned Systems Forces, a separate branch of the armed forces focused on the extensive use of unmanned and robotic systems and preparing specialists in this field. Proposals for creating such a branch were announced at the beginning of 2024, and on June 25, 2024, the decree of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine on establishing this branch came into force. Colonel Vadym Sukharivsky was appointed commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces pursues several goals. First, the organization of special units and the creation of special positions aimed at using, developing, and producing unmanned systems. This new branch of the armed forces will be directly involved in the practical development of UAV systems and independently train qualified personnel. Second, the Unmanned Systems Forces will have specific combat tasks of various levels that take into account the specifics of these forces to achieve maximum effectiveness in using UAVs and robotic systems in combat. Third, within the Unmanned Systems Forces, comprehensive training for UAV operators will be organized, and most importantly, experience sharing with other branches of the armed forces and the implementation of innovations. Special training centers and ranges will be created for this purpose, where new developments in this field will be tested.

Vadym Sukharivsky, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, in an interview with the media resource Army Inform, noted the significant prospects of this branch and stated the successful implementation of actions to institutionalize UAV systems as a separate military force. At the same time, Sukharivsky highlighted the challenges and opportunities facing the Unmanned Systems Forces. Among the challenges are finding solutions to expand the use of ground-based robotic systems in the Russo-Ukrainian war and establishing their production. It is also important to create a comprehensive doctrine for using UAV systems and organically integrate the Unmanned Systems Forces as a promising branch within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Overall, the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces is an important step towards accelerating the development of unmanned and robotic systems as a promising type of weaponry in the Ukrainian army. If this branch of the armed forces is properly developed, the Unmanned Systems Forces will significantly enhance the combat capability of the Ukrainian army in using and countering UAVs, unlike Russia, where the use of UAV systems is not as thoroughly institutionalized.

 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Russia continues to actively use and develop unmanned systems that have become an integral part of its military strategy. Since 2008, when the Russian Federation began systematically using drones after the invasion of Georgia, their importance in military operations has been steadily increasing. The Russia-Ukraine war has accelerated this process, and today Russia has an established system for the production and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for various purposes, from reconnaissance to striking enemy targets.

One of the key features of the Russian unmanned systems arsenal is its diversity and versatility. The Russian armed forces use drones to achieve a wide range of objectives: from reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment with tactical UAVs to using long-range drones capable of striking targets deep in enemy territory or identifying weak points in air defenses.

The prospects for the development of Russian unmanned systems include further expanding production and improving technologies. Russia plans to significantly increase the number of produced drones and involve hundreds of thousands of specialists in this process. This indicates the Kremlin’s strategic intent to enhance its capabilities in the field of unmanned aviation and reduce dependence on imported technologies. However, such a policy requires significant investments and time for implementation.

Moreover, Russia aims to comprehensively expand the capabilities of UAVs with more units of the Russian armed forces and to raise awareness of countering enemy UAVs using various means. In the future, the command of the Russian army is also interested in further expanding the use of ground and naval drones. Such drones could be used for reconnaissance, striking the enemy, evacuating the wounded, or transporting supplies.

Given current trends, priority should be given to communication with Ukraine’s partners regarding the supply of modern air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems that can effectively counter UAV threats. It is also important to implement a national strategy for the development of the domestic UAV production sector and to create standardized countermeasures against UAVs. Additionally, efforts should be made to quickly limit Russia’s ability to develop industrial production of UAVs and obtain components for them through imports. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to:

• Develop a strategy for the UAV sector and update the military doctrine. This will allow for the harmonious integration of unmanned systems into the existing military branches, improve coordination between control units, and further increase the use of UAV systems. Significant attention should be given to the development of the Unmanned Systems Forces as a separate branch and provide all necessary opportunities for the effective integration of this branch into the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
• Develop unified standards and instructions for both the production and use of UAVs and countermeasures against them. This will help standardize the approach to UAV production, reduce the likelihood of low-quality products reaching the front, and establish an effective application mechanism.
• Provide comprehensive support to private initiatives that seek new technological solutions for effective drone use and countering Russian UAVs. This includes developing personal anti-drone weapons, ground-based unmanned systems, and other innovations.
• Establish serial and standardized production of combat parts for drones and initiation boards. This will relieve strike drone companies’ personnel from preparing UAVs for combat tasks and ensure the continuous supply of ammunition for Ukrainian UAVs.
• Explain to Western politicians that Russia’s advantage in UAV development and use poses serious threats not only to Ukraine but also to European countries. Potential threats in the Black Sea, especially to Romania and Bulgaria, may increase, and Russia will have low-cost tools for provocations and reconnaissance on NATO territories.

At the same time, Western partners of Ukraine, who also face potential threats from the development of the Russian UAV sector, should focus on actions that will deprive Russia of access to critical components and strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities. These steps include:

• Unifying the approach to forming sanctions lists and creating lists of dual-use components that can be used in Russian drones.
• Preventing Russian companies not yet subjected to restrictions from acquiring Western dual-use goods. For example, Rosatom has not yet been sanctioned, potentially allowing it to import Western components.
• Partially withdrawing such goods from the market to prevent civilian technology from being used for military purposes.
• Increasing the supply of Western components. This will reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Chinese components and minimize risks related to obtaining low-quality products or delivery delays.
• Expanding cooperation with Ukraine within the Drone Coalition framework. This process should be based not only on increasing the supply of Western drones but also on establishing joint ventures for the production, repair, and maintenance of unmanned systems.
• Providing access to scientific and technical developments in military UAV production. Access to advanced UAV production technologies and their operation will enable the Ukrainian defense industry to produce high-quality drones and gain a technological advantage over the enemy. Additionally, this will result in the mutual exchange of practical information on the success of various innovations, improving future research in this field.
• Creating or improving existing training programs for UAV operation for Ukrainian military personnel abroad. Considering the significant number of Ukrainian Defense Forces personnel trained abroad, an additional focus on UAV operation and countermeasures will increase the awareness of the Ukrainian armed forces regarding this type of weaponry.
• Increasing the supply of firepower and electronic warfare means against UAVs. Given the mass use of UAVs by Russia on the front line and for striking critical infrastructure in Ukraine, additional firepower and EW means will significantly enhance the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ ability to neutralize threats from Russian UAVs.
• Emphasizing the exchange of intelligence data on the production of UAVs in Russia. Providing more accurate intelligence information will enable the Ukrainian Armed Forces to more effectively conduct operations to eliminate UAV production facilities in Russia.