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Dear friends,

We are pleased to present you the first issue of the annual analytical paper "Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2015", which was created by the team of "Ukrainian Prism" Foreign Policy Council in partnership with the Regional Representation of Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine together with some independent experts.

Our initiative is called to evaluate the progress in the implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine during the last year. Using the system of objectively measured indicators, we have identified not only success stories, but also the directions and certain aspects of foreign policy activities that need more attention, some corrections, and sometimes even radical change of approaches. Henceforward, annual ranking of foreign policy of Ukraine directions will provide experts and practitioners with relevant, dynamic, and wholistic picture of foreign policy achievements.

The achievements of the Revolution of Dignity have become the main impulse and inspiration for our study. The revolution has laid the foundations for new Ukraine, built on the democratic principles of governance. Firstly, civil society in Ukraine has clearly voiced out its will to be an active member of agenda-setting in the country, including in foreign policy sphere. Secondly, the representatives of political parties who came to power have agreed on the absence of alternative to the European and Euroatlantic vector of country development. Thirdly, after Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has reinstated some provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, taking into account the amendments of December, 8 2004, parliamentary-presidential form of government was renewed and the balance of powers between the state bodies shifted towards the powers of parliament.

The new social and political reality can be considered as a reference point in establishing democratic system of foreign relations and diplomatic service, oriented toward national interests. We hope that our study will contribute to the building of proactive, open foreign policy, focused on the interests of the citizens of Ukraine.

Hennadiy Maksak,
chairman of the Board, Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism"
"Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2015" project lead
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology

In the course of its own methodology development, the working group of the “Ukrainian Prism” carefully studied experience of the foreign analytical centres in the field of foreign policy assessment. We gave special priority to the projects of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and the Czech Association for International Affairs (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO). None of these methodologies is multi-purposed, and their principles directly depend on peculiarities of the object under research. They reflect either peculiarities of particular member states in the EU foreign policy (ECFR) or internal aspects of the Czech Republic government (AMO). That is why after the methodological consultations with the ECFR experts, we decided to develop our own methodology taking into account Ukrainian conditions and particular elements of the existing methodologies of the Western colleagues.

Our research methodology of Ukraine’s foreign policy takes into account actual foreign policy situation, disadvantages and advantages of the constitutional division of powers in terms of the foreign policy implementation, established political and institutional practices in the field of international relations, documents of strategic and operational nature in the sphere of foreign policy and security, official analytical materials that form the basis for foreign policy position of high-ranking officials, expert and academic knowledge on optimal models of foreign service, as well as priorities reflected in the relevant mass media materials.

Although methodologically the research period is 2015, this time there was a certain extension of the period, taking into account that it will be a “zero year” and a starting point to build dynamic foreign policy in subsequent years. Therefore, the following documents were also assessed: official policy statements, manifestos, policy documents, strategic documents, institutional forms of cooperation and coordinated efforts in foreign policy implementation, connected with the formation of a new political reality in the country in 2014 and rapid change of Ukraine’s foreign policy environment.

Foreign policy directions of Ukraine

For the assessment, we selected 31 practical directions of the Ukraine’s foreign policy and divided them into the following thematic blocks:

- relations with the key partners (USA, Canada, People’s Republic of China, Poland, Romania, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Turkey);
- European integration (EU, Eastern Partnership, Visegrad Four, the Baltic States, the European Energy Community);
- Russian Federation;
- Regional cooperation (Black Sea Region, Asia-Pacific Region, Middle East, CIS, Latin America, Africa);
• International organizations (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO);
• Multilateral initiatives (international security, non-proliferation, climate change, human rights);
• Economic diplomacy;
• Public diplomacy.

Assessment indicators of the Ukraine’s foreign policy in particular directions:

Given the above, we developed five assessment indicators for foreign policy implementation in each of these directions:

(1) Political interest or involvement of political actors in particular directions of the foreign policy.
(2) Effectiveness of cooperation and coordination between Ukrainian institutions that should carry out foreign policy tasks.
(3) Strategic vision of implementation of a particular direction.
(4) Specific action steps regarding a particular direction during the year.
(5) Results and achievements on a particular direction during the year.

Each of five key indicators shall be assessed at five-point system, where 1 point is the minimum score and 5 points is the highest possible score. Each point in the assessment of a relevant direction by a specific indicator is linked to the presence or absence of a certain condition, which can be fixed. The regulatory and evidence base, required to calculate a score, was set for each indicator.

1. Political interest / engagement

The basis for the analysis: programs of the political parties’ represented in the Verkhovna Rada of VIII convocation, parliamentary parties’ election programs, parliamentary parties’ statements, statements of political parties’ leaders, the Coalition Agreement, Analytical report to the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, statements of the Head of the Government, interviews of the heads of parliamentary parties, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, the President of Ukraine, election programs of presidential candidates of the political parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

Points:

1 point means the lack of references to a foreign policy direction in official or unofficial statements, policy documents and manifestos of the main political actors;
2 points means there is an informal declarative reference of a foreign policy direction that has not acquired the form of a political position;

3 points means there are official statements regarding events or certain aspects of activity regarding the direction under research;

4 points means there are official positions of various political entities represented in the higher authorities, but they are not mutually agreed;

5 points means there is political consensus on Ukraine’s activity in a certain direction of foreign policy, common official policy statements or official documents.

2. Institutional Cooperation

The basis for the analysis: statements and resolutions of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, heads of parliamentary committees, parliamentary parties’ leaders, decisions of the President of Ukraine, the NSDC of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, press releases on results or development of joint initiatives.

Points:

1 point means there are documented facts on confrontation of some institutions to others in policy development or conflicts between authorities in implementation of a particular direction of foreign policy, failure of coordinating bodies’ activities;

2 points mean a lack of cooperation and coordination between certain bodies involved in implementation of a particular direction of foreign policy, but without any competition or conflicts;

3 points mean individual facts of non-system cooperation, which are not based on agreed issues, coordinating documents and not covered by coordinating structures;

4 points mean there are declared agreed positions of foreign policy actors regarding activities in a particular direction, adopted coordinating documents;

5 points mean full coordination of relevant institutions’ activity, creation of special coordinating bodies to implement foreign policy in a particular direction.

3. Strategic Vision

The basis for the analysis: The Law of Ukraine “On the basis of domestic and foreign policy”, National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Military Doctrine of Ukraine, Strate-
Points:

1 point means the complete absence of references of a relevant foreign policy direction in strategic documents, effective at the time of the research;

2 points means there are references available, but they do not serve the interests of Ukraine anymore in the implementation of a relevant direction, given the change in the country’s foreign policy, or the new conditions of the international security environment.

3 points means that references correspond to current interests and objectives of the foreign policy entities in Ukraine, but formulated in general terms and listed with other priorities, thus a relevant direction is not identified as a priority;

4 points means there are detailed bilateral (multilateral) medium-term documents, which are up-to-date or were updated during the research period;

5 points means there are references in general strategic documents, along with presence of up-to-date bilateral (multilateral) medium-term documents, which are agreed and meet the current interests.

4. Activities

The basis for the analysis: Reports of the MFA of Ukraine, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, Ministry of Information Policy, Ministry of Culture, statements and press releases of the Administration of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, bilateral committees and working groups, information on activities of Ukraine’s diplomatic missions.

Points:

1 point means there is neither active, publicly registered diplomatic mission’s activity related to the implementation of a relevant direction of foreign policy, nor other forms of cooperation or official contacts;

2 points means individual non-systematic activity, which are not based on current strategic or operational documents for implementing a relevant direction of foreign policy, maintaining dialogue exclusively through available diplomatic missions of Ukraine;

3 points means that along with diplomatic, trade and economic relations there are multilateral or “field” meetings, a relevant direction of foreign policy is implemented in reactive manner;
4 points means visits of the MFA leadership, interdepartmental and other committees and working groups work according to bilateral (or multilateral) mid-term action plans and road maps;

5 points means joint international initiatives, visits at the highest level, signing of international strategic agreements, chairmanship in international organizations or initiatives, joint military exercises, economic and energy security projects.

5. Results

The basis for the analysis: International agreements and memoranda signed for a relevant direction of foreign policy, statements of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Administration of the President of Ukraine, MFA of Ukraine, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, statistics of trade and investment relations, information and analytical materials on meetings’ results, sittings etc.

Points:

1 point means termination of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from an international organization, termination of cooperation in an initiative’s framework, open military aggression or official support of an aggressor, trade, energy wars against Ukraine;

2 points means reducing the level of a diplomatic mission or discriminatory policy in the field of trade, lack of significant joint projects on economic and energy, lack of dynamic political dialogue;

3 points means slight positive dynamics at the level of political dialogue, economic contacts, cooperation at non-governmental and trans-border level;

4 points means an active political dialogue, partial support of Ukraine’s position, signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements, but of a non-strategic nature, presence of large-scale projects in the economic, energy, military sphere;

5 points means full support of the Ukraine’s position, increasing trade turnover, results’ correlation with available strategic, operational and program documents regarding implementation of a relevant direction of foreign policy.
General assessment of a relevant direction of foreign policy (direction’s rating)

After giving points for all indicators, a direction’s general score shall be identified by calculating an arithmetic mean value. General score (rating) shall be then reflected in the form of Latin letters (A, B, C, D, E) with arithmetic signs (+/-) depending on the obtained value.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating score</th>
<th>Indicator value</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A -</td>
<td>4,6-4,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B +</td>
<td>4,1-4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B -</td>
<td>3,6-3,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C +</td>
<td>3,1-3,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>C -</td>
<td>2,6-2,9</td>
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<tr>
<td>D +</td>
<td>2,1-2,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>D -</td>
<td>1,6-1,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E+</td>
<td>1,1-1,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall assessment of the Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation during the year (overall rating of Ukraine’s foreign policy implementation for the relevant year)

Overall assessment of successful implementation shall be calculated by obtaining an arithmetic mean value of the general scores in all directions of foreign policy under the research. Overall rating shall be calculated similarly to the assessment of relevant directions of foreign policy.
FOREIGN POLICY OFUKRAINE IN 2015: GENERAL SCORE
Foreign policy of Ukraine in 2015: general score

Political interest / engagement

The involvement and interest of most of domestic policy actors in the foreign policy discourse was defined by the conditions of the armed conflict in the East and the need to overcome Russian aggression. The direction of such involvement was formed by the approval of the European integration and Euro-Atlantic security initiatives as key priorities of the Ukrainian foreign policy. It is also important that in the context of credit and reform obligations, connection between internal and external policy increased substantially, particularly in obtaining credit and technical aid, implementing reforms. There was especially active political interest of the key players to Ukraine’s relations with the European Union, Poland, Canada, the United States, the Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, France, and Germany. The economic and public diplomacy was important topic to discuss. At the same time, regional cooperation as a direction of foreign policy was engaged least of all, especially in such regions as Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The Analytical report to the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine describes in details the priority directions of the foreign policy, but it is not a binding document.

However, despite the practical activity of particular members of parliament and their associations ("Eurooptimists") in the key areas of foreign policy, it is worth noting traditionally low interest of political parties to the development of a full-featured block of political or election programs and to the formulation of a detailed part on foreign policy of the Coalition Agreement.

Average level of political interest / engagement can be graded "3+".

Institutional cooperation

Institutional cooperation during the studied period was defined by traditional division of competence in foreign policy, but in conditions of the conflict, the NSDC’s role increased. Specific forms of inter-institutional cooperation were established in the strategic areas, particularly in the context of creating the implementation mechanism for the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the Association Agenda updated in 2015. Some forms of interdepartmental institutional cooperation were envisaged by the Program of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2015, activity plans of relevant ministries to implement the government program, the Coalition Agreement and the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine 2020”. Also there was an update of some MFA regulatory documents on coordination of central executive authorities in terms of participation in international events.

Deepened connection between domestic and foreign policy agenda contributed to the significantly increased level of cooperation between the MFA, the Administration of the President and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the institutional context of the
National Reform Council, the establishment of inter-institutional and inter-sectoral working groups on reforms, institutionalization of economic and public diplomacy (the Department of Public Diplomacy was established in the MFA), foreign media projects (project of the State target program on promoting Ukraine’s interests abroad and branding of the country in 2016-2018).

The active position of some MPs who headed the VRU committees and participated in the VRU delegations to the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, in coordination of activities with the executive foreign policy structures, especially with the MFA, brought positive results in promoting Ukrainian interests and consolidated positive cooperation practices in relations with certain states: in 2015 inter-parliamentary groups were established not only with the EU countries (Germany, Poland, France, etc.), but also in other regions (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile). The relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada and delegations to the international organizations (permanent delegation to the Council of Europe, NATO PA, etc.) worked actively.

At the same time, there were also conflicts and competition, which led to ineffective implementation of certain directions of foreign policy. The problem in this context was the delay in the appointment of ambassadors to several countries and international organizations.

**Average level of institutional cooperation can be graded “4 -“.**

**Strategic vision**

In 2014-2015 Ukraine updated a number of strategic documents in the area of foreign policy, security and defence. In 2014, changes were introduced to the Law of Ukraine “On the foundations of internal and foreign policy” of 2010, and during 2015 a new National Security Strategy of Ukraine and Military Doctrine of Ukraine were adopted. These documents radically changed the perception of Russia from a strategic partner to a aggressor state, recognized a long-term character of the Russian threat and the need for Ukraine to move towards joining NATO and the EU as the basis for security.

For certain directions, bilateral documents of medium- and short-term nature were adopted; they substituted a full strategic vision of relations (Declaration of Heads of the State of Ukraine and France, the Action Plan for Ukraine for 2015-2017 in Council of Europe, etc.). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was implemented according to the Action Plan on the Association Agreement Implementation for 2014-2017 and a number of other implementing documents. The Strategy on Sustainable Development “Ukraine - 2020” and the corresponding action plan of the Cabinet of Ministers on its implementation in 2015 also paid attention to certain directions and instruments of foreign policy.

However, most geographic and thematic directions of foreign policy are not legislat-ed in the strategy papers, thus they have no long-term vision. At the national level, there was no comprehensive vision of foreign policy priorities for the medium term.
perspective in a form of systematic document, which could be a basis for the development of most geographic and thematic directions of the Ukraine's foreign policy. Such situation harms cooperation with the key countries, weakens regional cooperation and implementation of the multilateral initiatives.

Despite the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine - 2020” as a priority, the diplomatic reform was also not legislated in a single systematic document that would define the direction and task of the reform.

**Average level of strategic vision can be graded “3+”**.

**Activities**

Activities during 2015 were quite intense and generally met the stated priorities in the Coalition Agreement, the Program of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2015, the implementation plans of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, action plan to implement the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine - 2020” and others. The main directions of foreign policy predictably focused on resolving the conflict with Russia (the Normandy format and the Minsk process, cooperation with the OSCE, the UN, bilateral relations with the United States, Germany, and France). The positive dynamics of political dialogue at the highest level, along with the presence of joint economic and energy projects, participation in joint multilateral initiatives, allowed recording significant foreign policy activity of Ukraine in relations with the UK, Canada, Poland, and the Baltic States. Cooperation with NATO became much more active. It is worth noting strengthening of foreign initiatives (meetings of intergovernmental commission on economic and scientific-technical cooperation, business forums, investment forums and economic conferences). Measures on information policy and public diplomacy were actively introduced, the MFA presence in social networks increased. The visit of the President to Israel was an important milestone.

However, in 2015 Ukraine’s participation in the regional security initiatives weakened (including the “5+2” talks on Transnistria), participation in peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy, tasks within BLACKSEAFOR. Cooperation with the OSCE is actually limited to Ukrainian issues only and is passive in other directions. In fact, the relations in the frames of the CIS were frozen, which are gradually transferred into bilateral relations with certain countries. Relations with China, India and Pakistan slowed down. Policy results on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and climate change were weak.

**Average level of activity can be graded “4 -”**.

**Results**

The greatest success was achieved in the European direction, where Ukraine has managed, despite Russian pressure to ensure ratification of the EU Association Agreement, also the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area entered into force since January 2016. Also, in late 2015 the European Commission issued a positive
final 6th report on the implementation of the Action Plan on visa liberalization, which gave Ukraine a perspective of obtaining a visa-free regime with the EU in 2016. At the key partners’ level, Ukraine had a successful year in relations with Canada, Poland and the Baltic states. A significant amount of humanitarian, technical and macro-financial assistance was obtained (EU, Germany, Japan, etc.). Election of Ukraine as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in October 2015 become a success in the context of cooperation with international organizations; and cooperation with the Visegrad countries had a significant impact on reducing Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas due to reverse from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland.

However, despite the fact that the existing European sanctions against Russia were preserved, they were not stiffened. In the security policy, there was also a failure in obtaining the status of a special US ally outside NATO, ensuring allies’ agreement in principle to supply lethal weapons and peacekeepers of the UN or the EU at Donbass, forcing Russia to fulfil its part of the Minsk agreements, achieving significant progress on the occupied Crimea issue and getting clearer commitment of the European partners on the future prospects of the European integration of Ukraine. Trends on Western allies’ dissatisfaction with the course of Ukrainian internal reforms intensified, there was a warning that further assistance will be conditioned by the internal transformations in Ukraine.

In terms of economic diplomacy, the following documents are important: Agreement on signing the FTA with Israel in the first half of 2016, initialling of the FTA with Canada and intensification of the talks on this issue with Turkey. However, despite the course to foreign policy economization and the significant efforts in terms of investment and business forums, the objective economic situation showed a further drop in decline in foreign trade, foreign investment and so on. At the same time, it was managed to avoid default by restructuring the external debt.

**Average level of foreign policy’s effectiveness can be graded “4 -”**.

The overall arithmetic mean value of success of Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2015 was 3.6 points, that according to the rating corresponds to the lower limit of the rating index "B -"
UNITED KINGDOM

B-

Political interest /engagement  4
Institutional cooperation  3
Strategic vision  2
Activities  5
Results  4
In 2015, relations with the United Kingdom significantly intensified owing to its engagement into the processes of Ukraine’s internal reforms and development of its statehood potential. UK active support of Ukraine at international forums was important; yet, it was only supplementary, as this country did not engage in the main mechanism of conflict resolution and is generally playing a passive role in the foreign policy of the EU. Also, the relations were developing in absence of the Ukrainian party’s strategic vision.

Political interest /engagement

Political interest towards the relations with the United Kingdom in 2015 was determined in the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the United Kingdom status as a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum. Despite UK non-participation in the international mechanisms for the conflict resolution, in the public space MPs and experts are periodically voicing their hopes that the United Kingdom would join the negotiation process. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President directly referred to this necessity, but at the same time, the President himself and the Minister of Foreign Affairs continue to emphasize that the Minsk format has no alternatives. The United Kingdom is widely present in the media and in the political agenda also due to its active involvement into the projects of reforms, technical assistance, support of civil society, etc. Currently, there are no significant disputes concerning UK place and role in Ukraine’s foreign policy: its role is generally perceived positively, but there is no broad public or expert discussion concerning concrete directions for cooperation. Programs of political parties do not address the issue of relations with the United Kingdom (other than postulating the general course towards the European and Euro-Atlantic integration). At the same time, in its election manifesto, the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom (April 2015) identified Russia as the main threat, and listed resolution of the problem of annexation and occupation of part of the territory of Ukraine as one of its foreign policy priorities.

Institutional cooperation

The main problem of institutional cooperation was the fact that during 2015, the Ukrainian Embassy to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was headed by a Charge d'Affaires, and the Ambassador appointed in August, Natalia Hali-barenko, started working only in the end of December. Nevertheless, the contacts were so essential that the Embassy’s press secretary was rated as the best press secretary in the rating of the British magazine “Diplomat” (April 20). It is noteworthy, that at the same time the magazine called the Ambassador of the Russian Federation as the diplomat of the year in the region of Eurasia. In this situation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine did not play a key role in the bilateral relations that were based on direct contacts of the President, and in fewer cases – of the government, interparliamentary and other cooperation groups.
Strategic vision

Ukraine’s major strategic documents do not contain any references to the United Kingdom. The primary documents on bilateral cooperation were adopted yet in the first years of independence. They are the Treaty on the Principles of Relations and Co-operation between Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ratified in 1994, and the Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as of 1992. They contain the general guidelines of peaceful coexistence and cooperation (without defining any concrete priorities) and are not in line with the recently emerged security situation. At the same time, in his speech in Carnegie Center in March 2015, the Minister of State for Europe at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom David Lidington identified directions of response to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which determined the progress of British-Ukrainian relations in 2015: 1) diplomacy (UK withdrawal in favor of France and Germany); 2) pressure on Russia (stern rhetoric and stance in international organizations, in particular, regarding the sanctions); 3) support of Ukraine (supporting the reforms of public administration, combating corruption, and support in energy sphere); 4) communication policy.

Thus, the bilateral agenda was set by the British vision, and the Ukrainian side only tried to correct these directions.

Activities

The first dimension of activities in 2015 was the highly intensive bilateral contacts. Despite absence of state visits, the President Petro Poroshenko maintained constant contact with the Prime Minister David Cameron (meeting within the framework of the 51st Munich Security Conference (February 8), the session of the EU Council in Brussels (February 12), the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in New York (September 27). London was the destination of working visits by the Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk (a meeting with David Cameron on July 15), the MP group for interparliamentary connections with the United Kingdom (meetings with the Ministers and British MPs, September 8-9), the First deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy (October 23). In their turn, the following British high officials visited Kyiv with working visits: the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Philip Hammond (a meeting with the leaders of the state, March 5) and the Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon (August 11); on February 16-18, there was a visit of the delegation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union headed by John Whittingdale. In addition, there were active communications at multilateral forums.

The Embassy concentrated on less ambitious tasks — informational (a meeting with the British group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (June 17), a briefing for representatives of the Conservative Foreign and Commonwealth Committee (December 14), celebration of the 10th anniversary of establishment of the Ukrainian-British City Club (November 18), cooperation with the Association of Ukrainians in the United Kingdom, promotion of economic forums, cultural events, etc.).
The intensive activities were caused not only by the necessity to respond to the military conflict, but also by the UK involvement into the process of internal reforms and state-building in Ukraine. It included the following:

1) the security dimension, and namely providing non-lethal assistance to the Ukrainian military (fuel, armored vehicles, medikits, etc.), providing instructors (75 individuals) and conducting short-term trainings, providing to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine a UK advisor for the issues of administrative and financial management in the sphere of defense, facilitation to the process of reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

2) facilitation to the reforms, and namely providing technical, expert, and organizational assistance for reforming in many sectors, development of the anti-corruption policy, creation of mechanisms to monitor reforms, reforming state-owned enterprises and specific sectors;

3) the initiatives on strategic communication and counteraction to propaganda, in particular, the joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the UK Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Office in the sphere of communications (November 2014 — April 2015): joint projects on counteraction to Russian propaganda were announced, e.g. funding the initiative StopFake;

4) the post-conflict restoration and reconciliation, in particular support of IDPs and residents of the occupied territories (in particular, funding of UNDP projects), technical assistance for the State Agency Ukraine for Donbas restoration.

Results

In 2015, the United Kingdom ratified the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, and continued fulfilling the formal requirements of the Budapest Memorandum. The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the bilateral agreement on air travel signed in 2011 (June 17). The United Kingdom was consistently taking a pro-Ukrainian stance at the sessions of the EU Council, the UN Security Council, the G-7, and the Eastern Partnership Summit.

At the same time, due to the UK withdrawal from the main formats, its influence was limited: it failed to lobby tougher sanctions against Russia after the attack on Mariupol in January 2015. We can also currently consider a failure the plans to create a general European tool to counteract Russian propaganda (initiated by Denmark, the United Kingdom, Estonia, and Lithuania), mainly due to other EU countries’ passive stance. In this situation, Ukraine did not manage to get from the United Kingdom assistance in the form of lethal weapons, public support in the issue of sending peacekeepers to Donbas, or enhancement of the OSCE mission’s military component, or determination of clearer prospects of Ukraine’s future membership in the EU (in the context of the Riga Summit). At the same time, the United Kingdom is one of the Ukraine’s international partners that most consistently and actively expresses its official position
concerning the annexation of Crimea. In this situation, its focus on long-term tasks and bilateral relations, on proper support of internal transformations in Ukraine in the four directions mentioned above seems to be the most effective, in spite of the fact that practical results of such cooperation will become visible only in several years. Economic relations show a tendency to decline (the amount of export to, and import from the United Kingdom in 2015 were correspondingly 62.8% and 82.3% compared to the indicators of 2014; the amount of British investments shrank by 293 mln USD and amounted to 1852.5 mln USD, and their share in relation to all investors reduced from 4.7% to 4.3% compared to 2014). The progress in economic relations will be determined by success of the reform and growing investment attractiveness of the Ukrainian economy (including the changes brought about by the UK active participation), and the general progress of the conflict and the world economic trends (declining prices for raw materials). An important milestone in cultural relations is the fact that the British Council decided to include Ukraine into the list of priority countries.
CANADA

B+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 3
Activities 5
Results 5
2015 saw Ukrainian Foreign Policy under the sign of unity concerning the vision and implementation of strategic policy regarding Canada. Intensive contacts at the high and highest levels helped initialing of the Free Trade Agreement and extended Canadian assistance in the financial, technological and military technical spheres.

Political interest/engagement

During 2015, Ukraine relied on Canada as on one of its most trusted allies and partners on the international arena, especially in the UN, OSCE and NATO. Thanks to the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy and its strong diaspora, since the moment of the Crimean occupation and the destabilization of the situation in the east of Ukraine, the Canadian government was one of the first ones to implement sanctions against the Russian Federation and attempted to exclude Russia from the G8. After the change of the Canadian government from conservative to liberal, the new Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau announced his intention to continue the pressure on the Russian Federation, as “there is a further price that Russia will pay for violating fundamental norms and principles of the international law”.

The importance of building long-term partner links with Canada is recognized and shared by the majority of political powers represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of VIII Convocation. For instance, according to the initiative of the party “Samopomich”, a proposition was included to the Coalition Agreement regarding extended cooperation in the spheres of weapons and military equipment development with key countries, namely with the countries of North America – the USA and Canada. Despite the fact that the political programs of other political parties do not mention Canada directly, this situation is determined more by the tightness and generality of these programs especially concerning the issues dealing with the aspects of international cooperation than by the lack of interest regarding extended connections to this country.

This state, however, is mentioned many times in the Annual Address of the Ukraine’s President to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and in the Parliament addresses to national Parliaments asking them to support Ukrainian position in international organizations.

Institutional cooperation

The level of institutional cooperation between the government authorities in Ukraine in relations to Canada corresponds to the declared intentions. The Administration of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and other specialized government authorities are involved into improving of partner connections.
The foreign policy of Ukraine regarding Canada became especially proactive since the moment of appointing, after quite a long absence, the ambassador of Ukraine to Canada – A. Shevchenko. Choosing a non-career diplomat for this position confirms moving away from conventional norms and traditions, which is positively seen by the Canadian side taking into account the patriotism and professionalism of the accredited head of the foreign diplomatic mission of Ukraine to Canada. Journalistic experience and acting as a Member of Parliament of several convocations in a row help the newly appointed ambassador to secure the role of Ukraine as a country that is developing at a fast pace.

At the parliamentary level, Ukraine and Canada, according to the long-time tradition, maintain contact with the help of the MP Group of the Interparliamentary Relations with Canada and their Canadian vis-à-vis.

Strategic Vision

The legal foundations of the Ukraine-Canada relations are quite inclusive and contain approximately 50 documents, however, the majority of them were signed in the early 1990s and in the middle of the same decade. Namely, the key bilateral documents are the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Canada (signed 24.10.1994), the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Canada for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (signed 24.10.1994), the Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Canada on Economic Cooperation (signed 24.10.1994).

There is no direct mention of Canada in any Ukrainian documents of strategic nature (the Law of Ukraine “On Basic Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy”, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, Strategy Ukraine-2020, the Energy Strategy 2035). However, despite the absence of the strategic vision, there is no discrepancy when talking about the cooperation and national priorities of Ukraine, since a permanent political dialogue at the highest level is taking place. However, in order to be fair, it is worth mentioning that the trade potential of both states is not being used to the full extent, especially when it comes to sphere of services, therefore, despite the declared success, the real trade and commerce turnover remains rather low, and the balance is negative for Ukraine. Furthermore, the amount of Canadian investment makes up only 0.2% from the total volume of direct foreign investment in the economy of Ukraine.

Activities

In 2015 the contacts at the highest and higher political levels experienced a much more active bilateral dialogue, what started in 2014. June saw the third visit to Ukraine in the last two years of then acting Canadian Prime Minister S. Harper. In July, the Prime Minister of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk visited Canada. The President P. Poroshenko and the new Prime Minister of Canada J. Trudeau first met at the end of November in Paris during the 21st UN Conference on Climate Change.
Furthermore, the first Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine A. Parubiy had a working visit to Canada in February, while in June the Prime Minister of Ukraine A. Yatsenyuk had meetings with the Minister of Defense and State Secretary for Multiculturalism of Canada J. Kenney. In October, the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine O. Turchynov met with the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada R. Fadden and the Foreign and Defense Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Canada J. Hannaford.

The essential fact for the development of the bilateral relations is that the new Canadian government has two ministers with Ukrainian ethnic background, namely the Minister of International Trade of Canada Ch. Freeland and the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour M.-A. Mihychuk. Moreover, the federal elections resulted in electing 10 MPs with Ukrainian ethnic background to the Parliament.

Furthermore, the self-organization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada is exemplary, with its significant humanitarian, financial and material help to Ukraine in the context of taking countermeasures to the Russian aggression via direct or indirect activities of more than 1000 Ukrainian organizations. What’s more, there is a public petition registered in Canada on the visa free regime with Ukraine.

**Results**

The following can be considered as the most important result of 2015: finalization of the negotiating process and the initialling of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Canada. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine names potential directions for Ukrainian export to Canada, such as chocolate, food products, confectionery, alcohol, juices, caviar and oil.

After signing the Agreement Ukrainian goods will have an opportunity of preferential access to the 98 % of the Canadian market, which means annulled tax tariffs, equal possibilities for state procurement for Ukrainian and Canadian suppliers in the Canadian government, the absence of custom tax or other tax on electronic goods sold via the Internet. Moreover, the Canadian market will open the North American free trade zone to Ukraine, and in the case of signing, a similar agreement between the EU and the USA there will be a bigger window of opportunities for Ukrainian foreign trade.

In its turn, Canada today keeps a leading position in providing bilateral help to Ukraine in financial, technological and military technical spheres.
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

B-

Political interest /engagement 3,5
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 3
Activities 3,5
Results 4
In 2015, Kyiv and Beijing managed to make a number of important steps for normalizing their relations and returning to implementation of the tasks planned in the strategic documents as of 2013. Owing to the efforts of the Ukrainian authorities, some directions of practical interaction with China that were under threat of failure after 2014 were restored. But the risks of contracts breach still remain and the political dialogue is rather sporadic.

**Political interest /engagement**

The current government of Ukraine acknowledged partnership with China as strategic and practical. Practicability, especially in the sense of developing trade relations, became the priority in Ukrainian political discourse concerning China in 2015.

In their election programs, Ukrainian political parties hardly ever went as far as to determine the priority of cooperation with China. In the best case, they stated a necessity of developing investment and trade relations with this country. Among the most often mentioned topics of bilateral interaction are: China as a source of investments (head of the “Petro Poroshenko Bloc”, Yury Lutsenko), as a partner in construction of large-scale infrastructural projects: a deep-water sea port, a high-speed monorail Odesa-Kyiv (Mikheil Saakashvili). The Coalition Agreement states the necessity of facilitation of attracting investments to the agro-industrial complex, where China is mentioned as a strategic partner for Ukraine along with the USA and EU. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine mentions importance of China’s position for successful resolution of the situation around the Ukrainian Donbas. In some speeches of the Prime Minister, development of cooperation with China was presented as a counterbalance to wind-down of relations with Russia. This was related, in particular, to products of the agro-industrial complex, and in the prospect — to attracting investments.

**Institutional cooperation**

We should give proper respect to the consolidated efforts of the President and the Government of Ukraine concerning restoration of the directions of interaction with China that were under threat of failure after 2014. First of all, this relates to the Chinese loan in the amount of 3.656 bln USD, which was granted for energy projects yet in 2012, and frozen in connection with the events in the East of Ukraine, until recently. After the leaders of the two states reached an agreement in Davos, the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine and the “Naftohaz” company have been working on re-profiling of the project. After it became impossible to build the deep-water port in Crimea, the Ukrainian Ministries and agencies are taking effort to develop an option, where it is constructed in Odeska or Mykolaivska oblast.

However, the Ukrainian policy with China has also considerable shortcomings. For
instance, despite the favorable situation for increasing the export of Ukrainian agricultural products to the Chinese market, there are risks of failure for the contracts that are related to the internal struggle between business structures in Ukraine for an opportunity to use the situation in their own interests. The above-mentioned process of re-profiling of the Chinese energy loan has been slowed down due to postponements in conducting a session of the Ukraine-China intergovernmental commission. The Memorandum on relaxation of the visa granting procedure for citizens of the People's Republic of China signed in 2013 still has not been implemented. In the current Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, there is a large group for interparliamentary relations with the People's Republic of China headed by the Member of Parliament Andriy Pavelko. Still, in 2015, the Parliamentary committee for foreign affairs paid no significant attention to China at its sessions.

Strategic vision

The only strategic document where China is mentioned is the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, where it is postulated that the state intends to strive for strategic development of interactions with key centers of influence, in particular, with the People's Republic of China. The last considerable update of the legal framework in the bilateral relations was in 2013 — when the Treaty on friendship and cooperation between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China was signed as well as the Program for development of strategic partnership relations for years 2014-2018. In 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Treaty that, according to the opinion of the Chief scientific and expert department of the Verkhovna Rada, will facilitate development of cooperation between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China in political sphere, trade, economic, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, aviation and space, humanitarian sector and in the sphere of security.

Activities

Last time, the dialogue on the highest political level between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China was taking place in December of 2013 (visit of Viktor Yanukovych), when protests were underway in Ukraine. It was then, when the priorities for bilateral development in the relations were established for the nearest years. China formed its attitude to the military conflict in Ukraine based on the neutrality principle, although, especially on the initial stage, this neutrality was friendly to Russia.

Obviously, sooner or later the necessity of a new “time check” in the relations of Kyiv and Beijing would arise. It actually took place in the beginning of 2015, when the President Petro Poroshenko held a meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang on the sidelines of the Davos forum. The Chinese leader confirmed that his country respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and this was a sign that the parties were prepared to step over some disagreements in views on the events in Donbas. The leaders agreed to continue implementation of the agreements signed before, and to implement the contacts on the highest level. Still, not only the visit of the leaders of
the state did not happen in 2015, but also the visit of the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada to China, planned several years ago, was not conducted. The third session of the Intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation between the countries also failed. The official negotiation process was conducted only at the level of the meetings of sub-commissions: on the issues of trade and economic cooperation, on the issues of cooperation in the sphere of agriculture and in the sphere of culture. Within the framework of interparliamentary contacts, in June of 2015, a group of Ukraine’s MPs headed by Yuriy Lutsenko conducted a visit to China. In September of 2015, the Chinese Trade Association started functioning and its opening signified China’s growing role as a trade partner for Ukraine. But lack of the informational policy in China impaired a full-fledged development of relations between the countries, and this had a negative impact on the commercial and investment-related image of our country.

Results

According to the data of the State Statistics Service, China is one of the five largest business partners of Ukraine both as an exporter (2126 mln USD, or 33.6% of the total export to the countries of Asia and the Pacific region), and as an importer to Ukraine (3050 mln USD, or 57% in the total import from APR). At this, since the time of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the volume of trade between Ukraine and China in the agricultural sector grew by 56%, and in the Ukrainian grain export, China went up in the list from the 18th place to the 4th.

In 2015, the Chinese and Ukrainian parties reached an agreement on investment into housing construction projects. The relevant memorandum was signed in Kyiv by the authorized official from the Ministry of Regional Development of Ukraine (on assignment from the Vice Prime Minister Hennadiy Zubko) and the authorized official of the subsidiary company of the Chinese State International Trust and Investment Corporation CITIC Construction Co. Ltd. The Ministry of Regional Development informs that the loan is provided with minimal interest for the period of 15 years, with a right of prolongation. In April of 2015, connection by air was established to transport passengers on route Kyiv-Beijing-Kyiv (the air carrier “Ukrainian International Airlines”). The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was conducting negotiations on joining the Chinese project of construction of the “New Silk Road”, and the practical result of this was launching an experimental container train on route Ukraine-Georgia-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-China – and that is very important for development of strategic trade relations.

In July of 2015, at the first in history Chinese-Ukrainian Forum on Scientific and Technical Cooperation, it was announced that China would help to advance the Ukrainian sector of informational technologies. The plans of supplying Ukrainian airplanes An-178 to China are recorded in the protocol of intentions signed by the Chinese company Beijing A-Star Aerospace Technology Co. and the State Enterprise “Antonov”.
POLAND

B +

Political interest/engagement 5
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 4
Activities 4
Results 5
The year 2015 showed that Ukraine and Poland are interested in developing productive mutual relations. Poland continued to be a consistent strategic partner to Ukraine in both political and security spheres. Unfortunately, Ukrainian authorities grew accustomed to this and accept the situation as something given. Instead, Poland produces new approaches, and with the change of the leadership of Poland, changes in the bilateral relations in other spheres of cooperation, too, have been announced. This becomes a serious challenge for Ukraine.

Political interest /engagement

Poland’s success on the way of economic development and Euro-integration were always an example for Ukraine. Although, in political and election programs generally there is no evaluation of bilateral cooperation with some specific countries, in their speeches and interviews concerning the level of economic and social development desirable for Ukraine, Ukrainian politicians often refer to Poland as an example. For instance, Petro Poroshenko in his election program in 2014 emphasized the necessity to use Polish successful experience. The President of Ukraine several time mentions Poland in his interviews to the journalists of mass media and in the Analytical Report to the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On domestic and international position of Ukraine in 2015”, in particular envisioning Poland as a strategic partner, first of all, in the sphere of security. Moreover, Petro Poroshenko places the Polish-Ukrainian partnership as a foundation for the Baltic-Black Sea system of cooperation, which is supposed to start forming in the nearest future.

Institutional cooperation

Institutional cooperation concerning Poland generally has a very high level, because it is completely in line with Ukraine’s Euro-integrational course. Governmental agencies conduct activities of bringing the governmental policies in line with the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in a coordinated way (however, the process is not always successful). Ukraine receives from Poland assistance in reformation of the governmental agencies and local self-government.

One of the negative examples of the poorly planned institutional cooperation was the so-called “Komorowski casus”, when in April 2015, during the visit of the President of Poland Bronisław Komorowski to Kyiv, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a package of Laws of Ukraine “On legal status and honoring the memory of fighters for Ukraine’s independence in the 20th century” that was taken by the Polish party as a very painful blow. In response to several requests of Polish public servants to amend these laws, the Ukrainian party promised to do it, but did not fulfil the promises.
Strategic vision

In the official strategic documents, Poland is mentioned in connection with different sectors that are important for Ukraine. These are, first of all, defense and security, as well as the energy and social spheres. For instance, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine as of May 06, 2015 emphasized that for ensuring the national security in the foreign policy sphere at the subregional level, Ukraine will continue cooperation with the Visegrad group (V4), of which Poland is a member. Also, the document indicates the necessity to bring Ukrainian social standards closer to the level of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for ensuring economic security. One more strategically important sector of cooperation is the power industry. For instance, both the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine-2020” and the Energy Strategy-2035 indicated that it is necessary to integrate Ukraine’s energy systems into the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), which includes Poland.

Activities

Foreign policy in relation to Poland is conducted in different formats, among which the format of intensive bilateral relations is prevalent, and Ukrainian diplomats are conducting significant work to ensure it. A significant number of meetings, telephone conversations on the highest level, bilateral consultations and contacts is conducted. In particular, during 2015, several meetings were held on the highest level: the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko met the President of Poland Bronislaw Komorowski (January 27, February 22, April 8-9, May 7, July 2), and the newly elected President of Poland Andrzej Duda (September 28, December 14-15). Leaders of the Governments of both countries contacted several time, also there was communication on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and leaders in the spheres of national security and defense. The issues discussed included, first of all, the issues of European integration of Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s security and defense in the conditions of the threat of Russia.

In 2015, constant communication of the Members of Parliament Ukraine with their colleagues from Poland was taking place – first of all, with the purpose of supporting Ukraine’s Euro-integration policy. In April 29-30, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Volodymyr Hroisman had an official visit to Poland. In the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, on February 18, 2015, the MP group for international connections with Poland was created; also, the Interparliamentary Assembly of Ukraine and Poland is functioning, its scheduled session was held on June 21-22 in the city of Warsaw. Also, cooperation in the format of the Interparliamentary assembly “Ukraine-Poland-Lithuania” continues – on May 28-29 its seventh session was conducted in Vilnius.

Intensity of contacts does not prevent serious drawbacks in the activities, however. For instance, both the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, by his support to Bronislaw Komorowski at the Presidential elections, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, by adoption of the laws on honoring the combatants of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
as fighters for Ukraine’s independence, affected the intensity of bilateral relations since the new President of Poland Andrzej Duda was elected: the meeting between the Presidents of the countries took place only in December of 2015. Lack of agreement between the two parties and Petro Poroshenko’s reluctance to accept the Polish party’s attempts to join the peaceful settlement of the conflict in the East of Ukraine in the “Normandy Four” format also hurts the strategic partnership.

Results

In 2015, the foreign policy concerning Poland was fruitful (although not always due to merits of the Ukrainian authorities). Poland continued staying a consistent strategic partner for Ukraine. Its role is especially noticeable in the political, economic and energy spheres. Poland supported all sanctions packages of EU against Russia that have the goal to stop the latter’s aggressive foreign policy. Moreover, Poland, despite severe economic losses in 2015, spoke in support of toughening the sanctions against Russia.

Ukraine’s Euro-integration efforts were completely supported by Poland — on March 2, 2015, the President of Poland approved the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement that became a final step in the process of the ratification by Poland. Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas was reduced down to 36% owing to the reverse of gas from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Important success in the sphere of military cooperation is conducting a joint military exercise and creation of the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade, with the headquarters in the city of Lublin (Poland). On January 19, 2015, the Agreement on cooperation in the sphere of education was signed between the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Education of the Republic of Poland.

Poland provided to Ukraine a 100 mln USD long-term loan for restoration of the country’s economy and for reformation of the political and economic system, as well as significant humanitarian aid. Treatment and rehabilitation for the military personnel, who were injured in the course of conducting ATO in Donbas, as well as recreation for children who suffered from the hostilities in the East of Ukraine, is conducted at the cost of the Polish party.

Negative outcomes include: despite the active political dialogue, the goods turnover between the countries shrank. The issues of the ethnopolitical and historical nature still remain unresolved.
GERMANY

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 3
Activities 5
Results 4
During 2015, Ukraine and Germany experienced an unprecedented intensity of political contacts, in particular within the framework of the Normandy format of negotiations concerning settlement of the situation in the East of Ukraine. The Federal Republic of Germany significantly intensified its financial and economic/investment support of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian party shows a certain lack of a realistic approach in the relations.

Political interest /engagement

Today, Germany is the key partner of Ukraine in EU, and this is being constantly emphasized by all political forces represented in the current Ukrainian power structures. Almost all political forces in Ukraine are univocal in defining the important role of the Federal Republic of Germany in the issues of supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, denouncement of the unlawful annexation of Crimea, consistency of its position concerning the economic sanctions against Russia, as well as the financial support that it is providing to Ukraine. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Germany is never mentioned in most election program documents of political parties, or in the Coalition Agreement.

It should be noted that there are certain reservations in the position of different political forces, but not on the official level. There is a diverging reaction to Germany’s position concerning the settlement of the situation in the East of Ukraine. Some point out that the German government’s position in assessment of Russia’s responsibility for starting the conflict is somewhat ambiguous: the FRG firmly acknowledges that the Russian Federation is an aggressor in the issue of annexation of Crimea, but is much less firm about Russia’s role in the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine (the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada, 2015). Others justify such policy by the fact that the German government needs to seek compromise with Russia (the Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany). Most political forces indirectly express their profound skepticism concerning the German government’s capacity to resolve the conflict within the framework of Minsk-2 due to the agreements’ imperfect character and limited tools for pressuring Russia.

Institutional cooperation

Leadership of the state’s foreign-policy-related activities, including relations between Ukraine and Germany, is part of the Presidential mandate. Implementation of the policy is vested in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The priority of development of bilateral relations with the Federal Republic of Germany secures completely harmonized positions of the top government agencies concerning this issue, and this consistently manifests in continuing declarations of the leaders of the state – although these declarations are not reflected in any of official documents in effect. There was a certain negative impact in this context, caused by a six-month delay with appointment of the new Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany.
in 2014, which is unacceptable, especially in the context of the Russian aggression and launch of the Normandy format.

The intergovernmental and interparliamentary dialogue shows a high level of intensity on the levels of the Ukrainian-German high-level group on economic cooperation (the last session was held on April 1, 2015), and of the corresponding MP groups in the parliaments of both countries. The MP group of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for interparliamentary relations with Germany was established on March 11, 2015, and includes a record number of parliamentaries (91, compared to the German-Ukrainian parliamentary group in Bundestag, consisting of only 16 representatives). However, the activities of the Ukrainian group call for a number of questions, because these activities leave almost no trace in the media space. The same can be said about the activities of the group leader — the non-affiliated MP Serhiy Taruta.

At the same time, lack of agreed and declared positions did not cause breakdown of the systematic nature of the cooperation: the bilateral relations are highly constructive.

**Strategic vision**

Relations between Ukraine and Germany, despite Ukraine’s attempts, do not have a status of strategic partnership. However, although the solid bilateral international treaty framework has been set up (85 international legal documents), the topical strategic documents (the law “On the Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policy”, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine-2020”) not even once refer to the Federal Republic of Germany. The comprehensive strategy of further development of bilateral relations with Germany is almost non-existent, as are current bilateral middle-term documents. But the only document that regulates cooperation between the parties in the military and political sphere is the annual Cooperation Plans between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular for 2015.

**Activities**

In 2015, there was a historical level of the political dialogue between Ukraine and Germany: Ukrainian high officials paid 8 official and working visits to FRG; also, 10 meetings on the highest level were held within the framework of international events; there are regular meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both parties (including those in the Normandy format). According to the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, a group of the Verkhovna Rada parliamentaries for interparliamentary relations with Germany is actively working. On April 1, 2015, the 8th session of the high-level Ukrainian-German Group on Economic Cooperation was held. On October 23, 2015, following the initiative of Ukraine and Germany, the largest in the times of Ukrainian independence high-level bilateral economic conference was held. The key goal of this forum was to facilitate German-Ukrainian economic relations as
a sign of solidarity with Ukraine, and to discuss opportunities to develop trade and investments.

Germany is one of few countries, with whom Ukraine is developing military and technical cooperation. The Intergovernmental Ukrainian-German Commission on Military and Technical Cooperation has been established and is actively working. In 2015, the Ukrainian and German military participated in several international military exercises together.

Results

Despite a generally moderate progress in implementation of the Minsk agreements, Ukraine’s participation in the Normandy format to a significant degree facilitated restoration of relations between Ukraine and Germany, and considerably intensified the dialogue in most spheres of mutual interest — political, security, economic and energy ones.

In June of 2015, the German government approved the comprehensive Action Plan focused on supporting political and economic stabilization in Ukraine. During 2015, Germany provided to Ukraine significant financial support and loans in the amount of 700 mln Euros, in particular, loans for supporting reforms in the sphere of decentralization of public administration, facilitation of development of the economy, for rebuilding the power industry and for increasing the energy efficiency and intensified use of renewable energy sources. Based on the results of the economic and investment conference in October of 2015, the Agreement to establish a German Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine was signed. This is an important step in the direction of improvement of the quality of consulting and investment conditions for German enterprises in Ukraine. The session of the high-level Ukrainian-German Group on Economic Cooperation resulted in signing of the Memorandum of joint intentions of the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning unrelated financial credit total 500 mln Euros and the Framework Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Reconstruction Credit Institute (KfW) about granting individual loans within the framework of the German Scheme of state guarantees concerning unrelated financial credit for Ukraine.

Germany remains one of the most important partners for Ukraine in the sphere of trade and economic cooperation: the 8th place by the amount of export and the 2nd by the amount of the import of goods. However, the amount of trade of goods between the parties shrank by 23% in January-November of 2015 compared to the corresponding period of 2014. The situation in the sphere of foreign trade in services is significantly worse: it reduced by almost 33%. In bilateral trade, there is a traditionally negative net balance. As of October 1, 2015, Germany was on the 3rd place (after Cyprus and the Netherlands) by the amount of foreign direct investments in Ukraine.
ROMANIA

B -

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 3,5
Activities 4
Results 4
In 2015, there was a considerable intensification of relations between Ukraine and Romania. For the first time in the last 7 years, the President of Romania came to Ukraine with an official visit. Romania consistently supported Ukraine on the bilateral level and in international organizations.

**Political interest /engagement**

In the programs of the parliamentary political forces “Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc “Solidarnist”, the Opposition Bloc, “Narodny Front”, Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna”, and the party “Vidrodzhennia”, there are no mentions about relations with Romania. There are also no direct mentions of Romania in the Coalition Agreement, either.

As to the mentions in the declarations of factions and leaders of political parties, during 2015 the mentions about Romania appeared in the statements of the leader of “Samopomich” Oleh Bereziuk, who, in particular, proposed to use Romania’s experience concerning “outsourcing the customs to Swiss, German, or even American customs services”, and also in the declarations of the leader of the faction “Narodny Front” Maksym Burbak, who co-chairs the interparliamentary group «Ukraine – Romania».

In the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015, the President expressed gratitude to Romania for a powerful support in Ukraine’s stand against Russia, and expressed interest in the in-depth bilateral cooperation and also cooperation in multilateral formats (including formats with participation of the Republic of Moldova). At the same time, the Report mentions competition with Romania for cargo traffic, although the authors of the Analytical report emphasize that on the background of negative dynamics of relations with the Russian Federation, competition between Ukraine and Romania should become a non-priority consideration.

The catalyst of mentions about Romania in the declarations and speeches of high officials – the Prime Minister and the President – was the visit of the President of Romania Klaus Iohannis to Kyiv in March of 2015. The statements of Ukrainian officials did not contain any contradictions and manifested interest for development of relations and interest in the Romanian experience of reforms and European integration.

In summary, on the one hand, political parties show lack of interest towards Romania, but at the level of the leaders of the state and leaders of separate factions, the interest and engagement are evident.

**Institutional cooperation**

There is a quite high level of institutional cooperation in formation of Ukraine’s policy concerning development of relations with Romania. In particular, the Parliament and
the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine showed effective interaction.

**Strategic vision**

Direct mentions about Romania are absent in the Law of Ukraine “On Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy”, in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, and in the Strategy “Ukraine-2020”. At the same time, Romania is mentioned in the Energy Strategy 2035, but the wording is rather unspecific, as it is mentioned in a list along with other priorities.

**Activities**

The work of the Embassy of Ukraine in Romania is effective. The Ambassador of Ukraine in Romania Teofil Bauer is effectively cooperating with the representatives of the Ukrainian community in Romania; also, the Embassy regularly informs the public about key issues of Ukraine’s foreign policy via Romanian media.

In February of 2015, there was a visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin to Bucharest. In the course of the visit, the Minister conducted negotiations with the President of Romania Klaus Iohannis, the Vice Prime Minister, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Romania Gabriel Oprea, the Chair of Senate Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu, and met with representatives of the Ukrainian community.

On March 17, 2015, the President of Romania Klaus Iohannis visited Ukraine with an official visit.

In the course of the Iohannis’ visit to Ukraine, Ukraine and Romania agreed on renewing the work of the joint Presidential commission (its session is expected to take place in the course of Petro Poroshenko’s visit to Bucharest in 2016). During the time that passed since the meeting of the two Presidents, there was a series of meetings/consultations in Kyiv and in Bucharest at the level of specialized Ministries and agencies. In particular, during 2015 there were working visits at the level of the Mixed Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Romanian Commission on national minorities. Also, in 2015 the Head of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau Artem Sytnyk officially visited Romania.

There was a noticeable dynamics in development of interparliamentary institutional cooperation. In particular, during 2015, the head of the Ukraine-Romania interparliamentary cooperation group, Maksym Burbak visited Romania twice.

We should separately mention the visit of the head of the Committee for Foreign Policy of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of Romania László Borbély to Kyiv.
in March 2015, in the course of which he met the Vice Speaker of the Parliament of Ukraine Andriy Parubiy, as well as participation of the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation headed by Liudmyla Denysova at the PABSEC session in Bucharest in November 2015.

The Minister of Energy of Ukraine and the Minister of Transport of Ukraine invited their Romanian counterparts to visit Ukraine in the beginning of 2016. Also, in the first half of 2016, a visit to Romania is planned for the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament.

Cooperation has been established in the security sphere, too. In particular, the military of Ukraine and Romania participated in the broad-scale joint military exercise: in June-July 2015 –Saber Guardian/Rapid Trident 15, in September 2015 – Sea Breeze-2015.

**Results**

Based on the results of work in 2015, we can mark out that Romania supported Ukraine’s positions both on the bilateral level and on international forums. In 2016, visits to Romania are planned for the President and for the Prime Minister of Ukraine. Work is being conducted on approval of an agreement on cancellation of payment for Romanian national visas for citizens of Ukraine.

At the same time, in 2015, a series of bilateral documents was approved and came into effect between Ukraine and Romania, which updated and actualized the legal framework for bilateral cooperation. In particular, these were the following documents of national significance: the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Romania on mutual protection of restricted information, the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Romania on measures for improving mutual confidence and security, the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Romania on the local near-border transit, as well as the agreements that are required for development of near-border cooperation: the Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Romania about opening an international checkpoint across the Ukrainian-Romanian state border for ferries, passenger and cargo transit between populated localities Orlivka (Ukraine) and Isakcha (Romania), the Agreements (in the form of note exchange) between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of Romania about laying the optic fiber cable across the Ukrainian-Romanian state border in the region between populated localities Orlivka (Ukraine) and Isakcha (Romania).

If the positive dynamics persists, we can expect further rapprochement between the states, up to the level of strategic partnership.
UNITED STATES

A-

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 5
Strategic vision 5
Activities 5
Results 4
In 2015, Ukraine perceived the United States as its main strategic partner and coordinated with them the issues of both foreign and domestic policy. Still some directions of the interaction — trade, investments, security guarantees from the United States — are somewhat lacking for a strategic partnership.

**Political interest /engagement**

Ukraine’s cooperation with the United States possesses a strategic and, at the same time, asymmetric nature. Concerning the first definition, the Ukrainian political environment shares a wide consensus. Earlier (before 2014), the American vector, to a significant degree, was balanced out by the Russian vector, but the conflict with Russia brought the Washington-Kyiv relations to the level of a strategic partnership. The President of Ukraine and other political leaders acknowledge the United States’ leading role in combating the Russian aggression on the international arena, supporting the internal reforms in Ukraine, military-technical cooperation, including training of Ukrainian detachments. The elections programs of the parties that are members of the coalition state directly or indirectly the course towards strengthening of relations with the United States and Ukraine joining the Euro-Atlantic space (Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc “Solidarnist”, “Narodny Front”, “Batkivshchyna”). Both the speeches of politicians and the party documents clearly manifest their unambiguous orientation towards the integration to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, “Samopomich”). The only dissident among the parliamentary parties is the “Opposition Bloc”, which endorses the notion of preservation of Ukraine’s non-bloc status. At the same time, bilateral relations are asymmetric as the initiative to set the agenda in general belongs to Washington. In 2015, Ukrainian high officials did not come up with any initiatives that would contradict the United States’ vision. Still, the advancement of the reforms in Ukraine gives no grounds to believe that the Ukrainian authorities treat responsibly the American calls for internal changes.

**Institutional cooperation**

During 2015, the accents in determining priorities in the relations have been clearly shifting. At the very beginning of the year, Ukraine saw as the most urgent the issues of gaining the status of a major non-NATO ally of the United States and obtaining lethal weapons. The latter issue is already more or less settled as the United States approved the laws S2828 and HR5859; the former issue was heavily discussed, in particular, in the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada on foreign affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By the end of the year, the attention shifted to the issues of internal development of Ukraine, and the United States expressed some significant critical comments. The Ukrainian leaders Petro Poroshenko, Arseniy Yatseniuk and Volodymyr Hroisman made a joint statement, in which they emphasized shared vision as to development priorities. It is rather telling that the issue of strengthening relations with the United States became for them, probably, one of the most consolidating factors.
The declared goals — continuing cooperation with IMF, completion of the anti-corruption and constitutional reforms, urgent approval of the amendments to the Tax Code and to the budget for 2016 — fall in line with the prompt measures the United States are expecting from Ukraine.

**Strategic vision**

Relations with the United States were determined as the foreign-policy priority in a series of the primary documents concerning the current development of Ukraine: the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine, and in the form of declaration of the course towards the Euro-Atlantic integration in the Coalition Agreement and the Program of activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Cumulative assessment of the relations with the United States as given in these documents presents them as a permanent movement towards further development of the partnership based on the “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership” as of December 19, 2008. The Military Doctrine specifies that in the conditions of the armed conflict in the East, “Ukraine can rely, first of all, on its own resources and the support from the United States, EU member states, and NATO.” In the current version of the Law of Ukraine “On the fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy”, cooperation with the United States is not mentioned explicitly (as well as in the law “On Foundations of National Security of Ukraine”), but it clearly outlines the desire to conduct reforms in Ukraine in compliance with the North Atlantic Alliance’ requirements.

**Activities**

In 2015, the ongoing conflict in the East of Ukraine and necessity of conducting the urgent transformation in Ukraine under pressure of time determined intensive communication on the level of the Presidents, US Vice President, as well as the regular dialogue between US State Secretary and Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs. In September, the Presidents Petro Poroshenko and Barack Obama had a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly; in July the Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk came to the United States with a working visit, where he had an opportunity to talk to the President Barack Obama, the Vice President Joe Biden, and other high officials of the United States. At the same time, the President of Ukraine and the Vice President of the United States Joe Biden had an intensive dialogue over the phone; contacts on the intersectoral level, in particular, between the foreign-policy agencies of the two countries, were developing actively. In February, the United States State Secretary John Kerry visited Ukraine and in May he had a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin within the framework of the NATO ministerial events in Antalia. The position of the Ukrainian Ambassador in Washington stayed vacant till the middle of the year. To the contrary, the American Ambassador in Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt deployed extremely active work with the Ukrainian authorities. During of the year, both the President and the Prime Minister of Ukraine were keeping in touch with him regularly, which gives reasons to say that foreign-policy and domestic-policy actions are in coordination.
Results

The year 2014 in the foreign-policy sphere was marked by Ukraine escaping the international isolation, which set in during the last years of Victor Yanukovych’s Presidency, as well as abandonment of the usual dichotomy to clearly prefer the European and Euro-Atlantic integration. And the year 2015 became the year of adaptation of the foreign-policy objectives to the conditions of the conflict in the East of the country. Engagement of support from the United States, which was especially prominent in providing of financial and expert assistance, military equipment and comprehensive facilitation on the international arena, became the determining factor in this process.

The sheer volumes of this support give grounds to consider the United States the main strategic partner for Ukraine. Especially noteworthy were the United States’ expansion of sectoral sanctions against Russia and the financial assistance to Ukraine (658 mln USD, of them 300 mln USD — for the needs of the military nature) that was allocated in the United States’ budget for 2016. The historical change in the IMF internal guidelines on loans, which became possible with support from Washington, can be called unprecedented. The American President Barack Obama and other American high officials were consistently emphasizing that they consider the situations in Ukraine and in Syria as separate issues not related between each other, and thus there can be no talks about any compromise regarding the Ukrainian issue for the purpose of engaging Russia to active combat against the Islamic State.

Last year, Ukraine and the United States signed a series of important agreements: on assistance in the sphere of law enforcement activities and criminal justice, loan guarantees, air freight, and improvement of the border control service. Joint military exercises were held in Lvivska oblast and in the Black Sea.

At the same time, the hopes of the Ukrainian authorities in regard to engagement of the United States in the negotiation format concerning resolution of the conflict in Donbas or providing lethal weapons to Ukraine did not come true. In the United States, the tendencies of dissatisfaction with the course of Ukrainian internal reforms became more prominent; some warnings have been made that providing of further assistance will be contingent upon internal transformations in Ukraine. Goods turnover between Ukraine and the United States in 10 months of 2015 shrank by 19.1% in comparison to the similar period of 2014 and amounted to 1487 mln USD, at that the decline affected both the export of Ukrainian goods to the United States — by 3.6% and the import from the United States — by 30.7%. According to the data of the Ukrainian Ambassador in the United States Valeriy Chaly, in bilateral trade positions on trade preferences are not realized, 9 antidumping processes are underway. As to the volume of direct investments in the Ukrainian economy, the United States is on the 12th place (the secured funds amounted to 705 mln USD, what constitutes 1.6% of all direct foreign investments in Ukraine). Conducting of the Ukrainian-American business forum in Washington aimed to lay the foundations for improvement of Ukraine’s investment attractiveness and to facilitate development of trade and economic relations. Whether it was fruitful will become clear already next year.
TURKEY

B-

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 3
Activities 4
Results 4
The year 2015 laid the foundations for intensification of Ukrainian-Turkish relations in the form of negotiations concerning the Agreement on the Free Trade Zone, cooperation in the sphere of the regional security and power industry, etc. It can be considered as a belated preparatory stage for the long-declared strategic partnership with Turkey. At the same time, the impediment factors still are the discordance of countries’ positions concerning the future of the regional security system, cooperation with Russia and the energy security.

**Political interest /engagement**

Content-analysis of programs of political parties represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the 8th convocation, of the Coalition Agreement, of statements made by the heads of the government and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, by the President of Ukraine etc. shows that the issue of cooperation with Turkey does not appear as a separate priority in the political discourse of the country. The foreign-policy agenda predominantly concentrates on Ukraine's European choice, aspects of EU association, confrontation with Russia, etc.

Most often, Turkey is mentioned indirectly in the context of violations by Russia of the power balance in the Black Sea region and necessity to find partners to restore it, cooperation with NATO countries for achievement of mutual compatibility of the armed forces, necessity to attract investments to the defense-industry complex, looking for ways to diversify the energy supply, etc. It should be pointed out that the situation somewhat shifted at the end of 2015 – early in 2016 as a result of deterioration of the Russian-Turkish relations, when the Ukrainian political establishment was captured by the wave of interest towards Turkey as a potential partner to combat the Russian aggression.

**Institutional cooperation**

Within the framework of negotiations on signing the Free Trade Zone Agreement with Turkey, coordination of activities can be observed among several institutions, for instance, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Agricultural Policy and Food, as the sensitive issue that was hindering the negotiations, was Turkey’s high custom dues on agricultural produce. The representatives of the Ministry of Informational Policy and the Ministry of Defense discussed with the Turkish Embassy the opportunities for cooperation in the sphere of combating against Russian disinformation. However, to our opinion, there are few examples of consistent cooperation and interinstitutional coordination.

**Strategic vision**

Strategic partnership with Turkey remains predominantly on the level of diplomatic rhetoric invoked during official meetings. The strategic documents outline the issues
of cooperation with Turkey in very broad terms. Turkey is not mentioned separately, although the priorities these documents set correspond to the main directions of the Ukrainian-Turkish cooperation. For instance, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine emphasizes the necessity of military-technical cooperation with the strategic partners, in particular, NATO member countries. The National Security Strategy singles out the security in the Black Sea and using such regional formats as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) as a priority. The Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine-2020” places priority on the energy independence program and on the reform of the system of national security and defense. The Analytical Report to the Address of the President to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine does not mention Turkey in the section “Interaction with key allies and partners.” In a different part of the report, Turkey is referred to as “an important regional partner”, and the “special” nature of its relations with Russia is acknowledged. The most concrete of them is the Program of activities of the Cabinet of Ministers, which singles out the task of conducting negotiations concerning the permission for passage of tankers carrying liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Bosporus, as well as signing the Free Trade Zone agreements with several countries, including Turkey.

Activities

A series of important meetings was held: in particular, the first official meeting of the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko and the President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in March 2015 within the framework of the Fourth session of the High-Level Strategic Council between the Republic of Turkey and Ukraine in Kyiv, the previous session of which in 2014 was cancelled by Ukraine due to the events in the East of the country. At this meeting, besides support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, “Turkey’s significant potential in facilitation to stabilize the situation in Ukraine” was emphasized and the prospects of engagement of Turkish construction companies to reconstruction of the destroyed areas in Ukraine were outlined.

Moreover, it is a positive sign that the negotiations have resumed on signing the Free Trade Zone Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and Ukraine that has to facilitate development of mutual trade and investments. The issue of cooperation concerning development of the freight traffic transport corridor from the Baltic to the Black sea was in discussions. The parties agreed to continue groundwork on implementation of the joint projects in the sphere of aeronautics, in particular, concerning joint manufacturing of engines for aircraft and airborne vehicles. Cooperation in the sphere of the space satellite launch systems was deemed a top priority task. In the sector of the power industry, the parties agreed to cooperate in the spheres of construction of underground gas storages, nuclear power generation industry, alternative energy sources, energy efficiency technologies, etc. Agreements have been reached concerning expanding the military-technical cooperation (within the framework of the visit of the delegation of the National Security and Defense Council and the representatives of the defense-industrial sector’s enterprises of Ukraine to Ankara in April 2015). In 2015, the Ukrainian and Turkish Naval Forces continued their cooperation within the framework of the multinational exercises.
A consolidating link in the bilateral relations was the problem of Crimean Tatars, whom Turkey has been traditionally providing support. In particular, the unofficial delegation of Turkish scientists and experts visited Crimea to assess the situation on the occupied peninsula. Of great symbolic importance was Ukraine’s official support to the second session of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, which was held in August 2015, and the visit to Ankara by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin.

Results

The year 2015 was rather testing for the relations between Ukraine and the Republic of Turkey. The political dialogue on urgent security and economic issues intensified, a series of the meetings on the highest level took place, the negotiations concerning signing of the Free Trade Zone Agreement resumed, etc. On the other hand, certain objective factors that are restraining the cooperation still persist: among them, the military conflict in the East of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea contributed most to recession of goods turnover between countries and the volume of investments in the Ukrainian economy.

In general, 2015 can be characterized – with cautious optimism – as having accumulated a certain potential, which can be achieved if Ukrainian diplomacy acts effectively. The Turkish authorities maintain their principled position: they insist on non-recognition of the annexation of Crimea and condemnation of actions of the so-called Crimean authorities against the activists of the Crimean-Tatar movement. Turkey provides humanitarian assistance for the needs of internally displaced persons and stays one of the largest international donors of technical assistance to Ukraine.

At the same time, before the deterioration of the Russian-Turkish relations in the end of 2015, Ukraine had to bear with the traditionally Russia-centric approach of the Turkish authorities to the region and deepening economic interaction between these countries, in particular in the energy sphere. Despite the official rhetoric, the energy policies of Ukraine and the Republic of Turkey are not coordinated. This is made evident by the fact that Turkey continued to study opportunities for pipe-laying of the “Turkish Stream” with Russia, which intends to redirect transit of Russian gas from the territory of Ukraine, the same way as it used to support the already cancelled “South Stream.” The issue of passing of LNG tankers through the Bosporus for the planned LNG terminal near Odesa is still unresolved, too.

In the conditions of the economic recession, the indicators of bilateral trade stay modest, goods turnover shrank (about 5 bln USD) and falls short compared to the milestones declared in the early 2000-s (10 bln USD by 2010). In connection with the large-scale sanctions Russia introduced against Turkey after the November incident, the opportunities to expand export of Ukrainian agricultural goods are being discussed. The cause for concern is the fact that the Ukrainian authorities are reactively looking for the ways to replace Russia on the Turkish market, instead of approaching Turkey with competitive proposals regardless of the climate in relations between Moscow and Ankara. The government of Ukraine introduced an initiative concerning the idea of cooperation with Turkey in the sphere of informational security and combating Russian propaganda as a response to the Russian-Turkish confrontation, but it looks belated.
FRANCE

B+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 5
Strategic vision 3
Activities 5
Results 4
The year 2015 brought the breakthrough in French-Ukrainian relations: number and quality of contacts spiked, new directions for cooperation emerged. However, the crisis-related nature of this enhancement and differences in the two countries’ strategic targets render the cooperation unstable, and this became evident after the Paris terrorist attacks on November 13. The main task is still to find the strategic framework to align the interests and enhance the economic and informational components of bilateral relations.

**Political interest /engagement**

Political interest to relations with France in 2015 stayed high, considering France’ key role in the Normandy format, achievement and implementation of the Minsk agreements. Virtually all political forces remarked on the important role of France in the context of the Minsk process (for instance, they expressed gratitude for sanctions / the decision not to sell «Mistral» helicopter carriers, the criticism of the pressure concerning changes to the Constitution of Ukraine or the French parliamentaries’ visit to Crimea). Most political players expressed official condolences in connection with the Paris terrorist attacks in January and November of 2015.

At the same time, most these statements and comments were mere reactions: neither political /elections programs of the parties, nor the Coalition Agreement managed to articulate the official position concerning relations with France beyond the wide framework of the Euro-integration course. The Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine points out the important role of France, but is somewhat hasty with the assessment of “reconsideration of the French foreign policy’s traditional preferences.”

**Institutional cooperation**

In 2015, cooperation and contacts with France were developing at all levels; there were no observable significant contradictions or crucial divergences between the institutions. For instance, after the President’s visit to Paris in April, the Prime Minister went there in May for a working visit (during which the issues outlined in the joint Declaration of the Presidents as of April 22 were developed further), as did some sectoral Ministers (of Agricultural Policy, of Economy etc.). Parliamentary friendship groups interacted with the French Embassy in Ukraine in the issues of ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and use of French experience in regard of the decentralization policy; the Embassy and the diaspora organizations were cooperating actively (joint events, commemorations, cultural and volunteer initiatives). Old institutions resumed their operation (the revived Mixed Ukrainian-French intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation will begin working again in the first half of 2016) and new ones emerged (the French-Ukrainian university forum, June 2015). The Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the
Ukrainian part of the Trilateral Contact Group were closely cooperating in the context of the Minsk process.

Strategic vision

The overall strategic documents (the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine) do not consider bilateral relations between Ukraine and France separately. However, the larger problem here is the absence of the primary bilateral treaty and the short-term and tactical planning of bilateral relations in general: since 2005, only the biennial roadmaps have been signed regularly. During the President Petro Poroshenko's visit to Paris on April 22, 2015, the Declaration of the Presidents was adopted, which was also declared the cooperation roadmap for the nearest months. It listed the priority spheres of bilateral interest in the political and economic relations (agriculture, nuclear power industry, energy efficiency), cooperation in the sectors of education, culture and sports, facilitation to the process of reforms (decentralization, privatization) etc.

At the same time, such a roadmap in the form of a declaration may herald an ambitious beginning of a significant intensification of the bilateral relations, but it cannot substitute a strategy and thus risks a prompt throwback in case the political environment changes. Such a change may result from France placing priority on cooperation with Russia to resolve the Syrian conflict after the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, or the ruling political force’ precarious position only a year away from the Presidential elections in 2017.

Activities

In 2015, activities were rather energetic and had two interconnected components — participation of France in the negotiations in the “Normandy format” and parallel development of bilateral relations in the directions outlined in the Declaration of the Presidents as of April 22.

In summary, intensity of the meetings and initiatives was historically huge and deserves appreciation: the President’s official visit (in April 2015) and the Prime-Minister’s working visit (in May 2015), the meeting of the Ministers of Economy and Agriculture with the representatives of French business circles (MEDEF) concerning reforms and investment prospects for Ukraine (June 22, 2015). In May-June 2015, several parliamentary delegations visited France (facilitation to Association Agreement ratification, meetings with mass media and experts, participation in Senate debates etc.). In their turn, the head of the Senate French-Ukrainian friendship group Herve Maurey, the delegation of senators (sharing experience in the issues of the territorial reform, June 2015), and the Minister of State for Foreign Trade Matthias Fekl (economic policy, preparation to the investment forum, July 2015) visited Ukraine.
With personal participation of the Presidents in the context of the Normandy format and the Minsk process, in 2015 the negotiations were held in Kyiv on February 5, in Minsk on February 12 and in Paris on October 2; the Presidents met in Aachen on May 14 and during the Republican March in Paris on January 11. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs had a meeting on February 24, April 8, and June 23 in Paris. The Ukrainian Embassy in France was proactive: it talked to French mass media on numerous occasions, was present and visible in social networks, ran targeted neutralization of Russian propaganda’s influences, worked proactively outside Paris to increase audience coverage (Clermont-Ferrand, Marseille, Aix-en-Provence, and Lyons, October 29- November 2).

At the same time, after the terrorist attacks in November 2015 and France’ inclination to cooperate with Russia within the framework of resolution of the Syrian problem, the dynamics of bilateral relations declined: the Investment forum was postponed, and Petro Poroshenko’s participation in the UN Conference COP 21 on Climate Change on November 29-30, 2015, did not envisage bilateral contacts. The invitation for an official visit to Kyiv for François Hollande was accepted, but the date has not still been determined.

Results

Ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (May 7 — by the Senate, June 29 — by the National Assembly) can be considered one of the positive results of the bilateral relations. The political consultations and arrangements resulted in resolution of uncertainty concerning delivery of the “Mistral” helicopter carriers to Russia. With immediate participation of France, the Minsk agreements as of February 12, 2015, were signed and are being implemented, the directions for economic and scientific cooperation have been intensified and specified, cooperation concerning the reforms has been established. Consent as to conducting of the investment forum was received and activities of the Mixed Commission were resumed: this could have provided an impetus to the currently minimal economic cooperation (according to the data of 2014, for France, Ukraine is the 67th exporter and the 54th importer, and these indicators keep shrinking due to the economic crisis and decline of the markets for raw materials). Some failures of 2015 can be explained by different strategic priorities, lack of mutual knowledge, and slow reforms: Ukraine failed to convince France of necessity of sending peacekeepers to Donbas, providing military assistance or changing its position concerning Ukraine’s integration in NATO and EU. The countries still do not see eye to eye as to interpretation of the implementation sequence for the Minsk agreements: France exerts constant pressure on Ukraine in the issue of making amendments to the Constitution and conducting elections on the territories outside the governmental control (the scandal around the Morel Plan) with no regard to the security situation. Despite best efforts, Ukraine’s informational policy in France stays weak due to lack of resources.
VISEGRAD GROUP

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 4
Activities 4
Results 4
The year 2015 showed that Ukraine and countries of the Visegrad Group (V4) are interested in further development of their relations. This is manifested in institutional cooperation between Ukraine and these countries in all spheres of social life, which has been already formalized in treaties and agreements, and in concrete examples of cooperation in the region. The V4 countries express interest in providing assistance in reforming of various spheres of the Ukrainian state, but sometimes there is an impression that Ukraine neglects to observe its interests, leaving them to volition of its Western partners.

Political interest /engagement

Success of the countries of the Visegrad Group (V4) on their Euro-integration way is a solid guide for Ukraine on that very road. All pro-European Ukrainian politicians admit this. Although in their election programs not all political forces use names of concrete countries, when Ukrainian politicians in their speeches and interviews measure the target level of economic and social development for Ukraine, as the model they use our Western neighbors that are part of V4, most often Poland. Petro Poroshenko mentions the Visegrad Group countries most often: he emphasized the necessity to use their successful experience in his election program in 2014. The V4 countries are also mentioned many times in the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On domestic and international position of Ukraine in 2015” and in the President’s interviews to mass media. Moreover, the President declares Ukraine’s intention to join the Visegrad Group in future.

Institutional cooperation

Institutional cooperation of governmental bodies of Ukraine concerning relations with the V4 countries has a very high level, because it aligns completely with Ukraine’s course towards Euro-integration. However, there are certain problems in cooperation between different agencies, and this negatively affects the implementation of Ukraine’s foreign policy concerning the V4 group, but these are the problems of governmental bodies’ operation in general, and dealing with them requires in-depth reformation.

One of the examples of inter-institutional cooperation can be organizing of the meeting on April 20, 2015, at the level of Vice-Ministers of V4 countries in the city of Chernihiv, with the purpose of discussing the reform of local self-government. However, sadly, the previously planned second V4 meeting in Ivano-Frankivsk city dedicated to the issues of energy efficiency never happened due to lacking institutional cooperation between the governmental agencies of Ukraine. Also, quite regrettably, Ukrainian high officials were not present at the anniversary security forum GLOBSEC-2015 (in Bratislava city, June 19-21, 2015). Similarly sadly, the leaders of the committee for foreign affairs of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine attended the meeting with the V4 representatives on October 12, 2015, but, for some reason, there were no representatives of Ukrainian executive bodies.
Strategic vision

In official strategic documents, the countries of the Visegrad Group are mentioned in connection with various sectors important for Ukraine, first of all defense and security, as well as energy and social sectors. For instance, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine as of May 6, 2015, emphasizes that to safeguard national security in the foreign policy sphere on the subregional level, Ukraine will continue cooperation with the V4 countries, and to ensure economic security, it is necessary to bring Ukrainian social standards to the level of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Another strategically important branch of cooperation is power industry. For instance, both the Sustainable Development Strategy “Ukraine-2020” and the Energy Strategy-2035 indicate the necessity to integrate Ukraine’s energy system into the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), of which our direct neighbors from V4 are members.

Activities

Foreign policy concerning the countries of the Visegrad Group has been conducted on all levels and in various formats. The prevalent one is the format of intensive bilateral relations, and the Ukrainian Embassies in the capitals of the V4 countries carry out significant work required to secure it. During 2015, there was a significant number of meetings between Ukrainian high officials and the officials of the V4 countries. In addition, there were telephone conversations on the highest level, bilateral consultations and contacts.

A number of events were held in the V4+ format, the most important of which were the following:

On May 15, 2015, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin participated in the session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in the format “V4 + EP” (EP – Eastern Partnership);

On June 16-17, 2015, there was a meeting of secretaries of state for regional development in the format “V4 + 4” (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine);

On June 18-19, 2015, the head of HQ of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Viktor Muzhenko participated in the session of HQ heads in the format “V4 + Ukraine”;

On June 22, 2015, there was a meeting of Ministers responsible for the issues of youth policy, in the format “V4 + EP”.

In February of 2015, in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, MP groups were created for international relations with each of the V4 countries; there is the Interparliamentary
Assembly of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland consisting of 21 representatives from each of the countries. Visits of the parliamentaries to our partners in the V4 countries also take place. For instance, in May 2015, the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation visited Prague with the mission to facilitate ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement by the Chamber of Parliamentaries in the Parliament of the Czech Republic. However, all this intensity of contacts does not preclude some serious drawbacks or shortcomings. An example of this can be absence of the Ambassador of Ukraine in Hungary, as the authorities failed to appoint one since June 2014.

Results

Ukraine’s foreign policy concerning the Visegrad Group countries in 2015 was quite fruitful. The V4 countries, despite huge pressure from Russia and the pro-Russian lobbies inside these countries, remain the main political and economic partners of Ukraine (especially in the energy sphere). Ukraine’s dependence from Russian gas reduced thanks to the reverse of gas supply from Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The V4 countries are supporting Ukraine’s Euro-integration efforts. In 2015, the last of the V4 countries, Czech Republic, finalized the process of ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement.

In April and May of 2015, business forums “Ukraine: Just Business” were held in Czech Republic and Hungary. On May 14-15, 2015, the First Ukrainian-Slovak forum in Kyiv took place. On September 10, 2015, two Ukrainian-Slovak bilateral memoranda were signed: on cooperation in the spheres of energy efficiency, energy saving, and renewable energy industry, and about cooperation in the sphere of physical training and sports.

The V4 countries provided significant humanitarian assistance to Ukraine; at the cost of the host countries, they organize medical treatment of wounded Ukrainian soldiers and bring over children, who suffered from the hostilities in the East Ukraine, for recreation.

Some of the negative results: the goods turnover between Ukraine and the V4 countries has a tendency to decline (data for January-September of 2015 indicate 30% decline in turnover of goods). Some issues of the ethnic policy remain unresolved (the Rusyn movement and the movement for Hungarians’ autonomous status in Zakarpattia oblast). Also, an issue of concern is that the V4 countries are interested in ensuring stability and security in Ukraine sometimes more than Ukrainian public servants and politicians. Most initiatives come from our partners and are implemented with their financial support, and Ukraine just acts as a beneficiary, and does not produce any brand new ideas.
ENERGY COMMUNITY

C+

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 4
Activities 4
Results 3
2015 saw significantly intensified cooperation between the Energy Community and Ukrainian authorities, first of all, the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine, in elaboration and approval of legislative drafts and legal documents regarding reform of the energy sector.

**Political interest/engagement**

The energy sector is traditionally within a range of interests of all political parties in Ukraine, with the focus on the need to reform the energy sector and the general direction towards the single European market. The Energy Community is mentioned as the institutional partner in the Coalition Agreement which also contains a sufficiently precise list of obligations and expected results.

It is necessary to mention that the Energy Community is a highly specialized institution, therefore the absence of information about it in the programs of the parties, unsystematic fragments of mentioning it in speeches and interviews of political figures should not be interpreted as lack of political interest. In absolute terms, there needs to be more information available for domestic political figures regarding the Energy Community in the perspective, as it is a format of Ukrainian cooperation with partner countries as well as the general level of education concerning special features of the European energy policy.

The interest for the Energy Community work can be observed on the level of some members of the Verkhovna Rada who, in their turn, work in the Parliament Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety, as well as government institutions and some political figures who are involved in the energy sector or business in it.

**Institutional cooperation**

The Coalition Agreement determined fundamental approaches to the cooperation with the Energy Community within the context of modifying Ukrainian legislation in accordance with the European legal boundaries.

The institutional cooperation is developing first and foremost on the level of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine, directly responsible for the development of legal drafts and legal acts to reform the energy sector. The cooperation is represented on the level of the Minister of Energy taking part in the meetings of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community, the participation of the deputy ministers and department heads in the working meetings of the Secretariat of Energy Community, and the Head of the Secretariat of Energy Community and experts visiting Ukraine.
The cooperation also involves the State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving of Ukraine, the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Ministry for Regional Development, Building and Housing of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian government institutions need better internal coordination regarding the foundations of cooperation with the Energy Community which faces a long-time issue of weak work coordination.

**Strategic Vision**

The Energy Community is an intermediary for the cooperation between the EU and some partner countries in the energy sphere within the medium-term period for the adaptation and integration into the single energy market. Ukraine signed the Energy Community Treaty and has a fairly clear structured action plan regarding the cooperation in determined directions and within relevant timeframes.

The basic documents on foreign policy of Ukraine do not directly point out Energy Community as a partner in the energy sector, policy and security, but contain clear references as to the nature of interaction and integration, approaches to adaptation of European energy legislation, partnership development and a list of threats.

**Activities**

2015 saw a fairly intensive cooperation with the Energy Community that started already in 2014 within the frames of Ukraine’s presidency in this organization. In fact, the Minister of Energy of Ukraine took part in the 13th meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community, and the Deputy Minister of Energy and the Director of the Government Office for European Integration participated in the series of sessions and meetings with the representatives of the Secretariat of the Energy Community in Kyiv and Vienna.

Intensive cooperation was observed on the level of structural departments of the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine and the Secretariat of the Energy Community on the issues of developing legal drafts regarding the energy market and the national regulator in the sphere of energy, with working meetings including independent experts taking place within its framework.

Work was also done regarding the development of legal acts and bylaws on improving energy efficiency, energy resources and energy statistics audit, environmental standards and work coordination in fulfilling other obligations.
Results

The cooperation of the Energy Community and Ukraine involves a significant range of spheres. 2015 saw the biggest progress achieved in the issue of reforming the gas market. Moreover, much work was done to prepare legal acts relating to energy market, the national regulator in the sphere of energy, better energy efficiency, fulfillment of environmental safety requirements, social issues etc.

On the other hand, moderate progress was observed regarding reform of the energy sector, namely in the spheres of fighting monopolies, investment protection, better business conditions, the implementation of bylaws and regulations did not provide an opportunity to extend mutual cooperation in the sphere of implementing joint projects with neighboring countries. The death of a Polish businessman Jan Kulczyk stopped the negotiations regarding the extended export of Ukrainian energy to the EU; the reduction of prices for natural gas and delays in launching the functional market restrained the implementation of the project of a common gas pipeline with Poland in order to access condensed gas; the half-hearted approach to the energy efficiency limited the opportunities to receive financial and technical support to launch projects to modernize housing.
EUROPEAN UNION

A–

Political interest /engagement 5
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 5
Activities 4
Results 5
The ambitious agenda of relations between EU and Ukraine in 2015 was mostly implemented. The EU’s financial support to Ukraine, along with the sanctions against Russia enabled a certain political stabilization in the country. Yet, the slow process of implementation of reforms and corruption scandals cause discontent of European structures and some member countries, and this makes the positive results from EU’s support in 2015 a notable manifestation of political good will.

Political interest /engagement

In his pre-election program, the current leader of the country Petro Poroshenko announced his goal to achieve, by the time his mandate expires, the necessary political decisions of the European Union to start negotiations about Ukraine’s full-fledged membership in EU. This position was articulated in official declarations and included into the annual Address of the President to the Ukrainian Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).

In fact, all political forces in Ukraine represented in the 8th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine agree that securing Ukraine’s European integration is a key priority for the Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy — and it was reflected in the Coalition Agreement. According to official statements of the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, legislative support of economic growth and European integration are the priority tasks for the Ukrainian Parliament’s activities. To optimize the process of implementation of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement (AA) on the legislative level, on February 3, 2015, the Inter-faction group "Euro-Optimists" was created in the Verkhovna Rada.

Institutional cooperation

Today, the European integration is one of the spheres, which is one of the most institutionally supported in Ukraine. To secure implementation of tasks in this sphere, the Governmental Office for European Integration under the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was established in 2014. During 2014-2015, the format was approved for interaction between the bodies of executive power in the sphere of European integration; also, new positions of Vice-Ministers for European integration were introduced. The working groups were created for AA implementation and securing the work of sub-committees for association, and the procedure for their work was established. In July of 2015, the Governmental office started to function as the Ukrainian Party’s Secretariat for the joint association bodies (Association Council, Association Committee, and sub-committees), which improved its organizational capacity.

Implementation of some of the reforms described in AA or in the Association Agenda is also considered from time to time at the meetings of the National Reforms Council under the President, which is an interdepartmental body open for the public.
In 2015, the Parliament continued to work systematically on adapting the legislation within the framework of commitments assumed by the country. The VRU Committee on European integration was also actively working on harmonizing the government’s draft laws with the laws of EU and AA provisions. Yet, in October 2015 the Verkhovna Rada failed to adopt the «visa cancellation» package of draft laws that were required to meet the criteria of the second phase of implementation of the Action Plan concerning EU’s liberalization of the visa regime for Ukraine; it can be an indicator that the representatives of executive and legislative power may lack a clear and complete understanding of the importance of these issues.

In 2015, there was no practical implementation of the issue of establishment of the position of Vice Prime Minister for European integration, despite an active community campaign in support of this idea. Unofficially, it was believed that the initiative was blocked by the governmental leaders, although the idea was supported by the Administration of the President of Ukraine.

**Strategic vision**

The European integration policy may be the only state development priority included into all official strategic documents: the Law «On The Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policy», the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, and the Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine-2020». The most important bilateral strategic document today is the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. To implement it, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved an important middle-term document — the Action Plan for AA implementation for 2014-2017 (as of September 17, 2014). To implement this Plan, plans of adopting EU acquis were developed. In addition, on March 16, 2015, the Ukraine-EU Association Council approved the updated Association Agenda.

Some separate strategic directions for building relations with the EU were developed in practice through the Action Plan for implementation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Program of Activities and the Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine-2020» in 2015.

**Activities**

Domestically, Ukraine’s European integration course concentrated mostly on implementing the AA provisions, and was quite highly evaluated. A number of important laws was adopted to comply with the Association Agreement provisions; some important international agreements were signed and ratified (for instance, the agreement on Ukraine’s participation in the EU program «Horizon-2020» and «Creative Europe», and others). On May 22, 2015, during the Eastern Partnership summit, the Memorandum of Understanding and Credit Agreement were signed concerning launching the third program of EU’s macro-financial assistance for the total amount of up to 1.8 bln Euro.
During 2015, the Ukraine-EU summit was conducted, as well as a meeting in a form of a mini-summit and sessions of the Ukraine-EU Association Council, the Parliamentary association committee, the Association Committee, and sub-committees. In 2015, there was a series of official and working visits of the Ukrainian high officials (the President of Ukraine, the Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, the Prime Minister of Ukraine) for participation in the sessions of the European Council, and also a considerable number of scheduled visits of Ukrainian high officials to the EU institutions, as well as return visits (by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Parliament, and the President of the European Commission).

At the beginning of 2015, an agreement was ratified on the status of the the EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), which was established in 2014. With its extended functions, the Mission actively joined the work with the relevant Ministries concerning reforms in the law enforcement sector. A considerable progress can be also observed in other key spheres of cooperation between Ukraine and EU: in the sphere of justice, freedom, and security, in sector and regional cooperation, parliamentary dialogue, etc.

As it was mentioned already, the activities of the bodies of executive and legislative authorities were dubious in implementing the requirements of VLAP (Visa Liberalization Action Plan), and this caused a number of negative political statements by EU, and was undermining the perspectives of implementing the visa-free regime.

Results

The key result of 2015 is that from January 1, 2016, in spite of the pressure of Russia for further postponement, the Association Agreement provisions came into effect in part of implementing an advanced and comprehensive free trade area (FTA). From November of 2014 to December 31, 2015, EU had in effect autonomous trading preferences for Ukraine, that made a minor positive effect on improvement of Ukrainian export positions. In 2015, the trend of reduction of the volume of bilateral trade between EU and Ukraine persisted, in spite of the fact that EU remained the main trading partner of Ukraine (35% from the total amount of trade). Ukraine received in 2015 850 million Euro only within the framework of the program of macro-financial assistance, along with other EU capabilities.

In the end of 2015, for the third time the European Union continued the regime of sanctions against Russia, which can be considered one of the factors that are critically important for Ukraine, taking into account «active work» of Russia in some EU countries. The European party was actively participating in the trilateral consultations Ukraine and Russian Federation in the issues of FTA and energy security, which made it possible for Ukraine to defend its positions and to minimize losses.

During 2015, there was a positive dynamics of the process of ratification of Association Agreement by the EU members. As of December 31, 2015 it was finalized by 25 EU coun-
tries out of 28. Countries of the EU are participants of the Normandy format (with a mandate from EU), and also the main partners in formation of Special Observatory mission of the OSCE in Donbas.

An important result is also publication by the Eurocommission of Final Report on December 18, 2015 about the progress of implementation by Ukraine of Action Plan concerning liberalization by EU of visa regime for Ukraine.
BALTIC STATES

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 3
Activities 5
Results 5
In 2015, the dynamics of relations between Ukraine and the Baltic states remained quite high. High-level visits were exchanged. The Baltic countries consistently supported Ukraine on bilateral level and at the forums of international organizations.

Political interest /engagement

In the programs of parliamentary political forces — «Petro Poroshenko Block «Solidarnist», "Opposition Block", «Narodnyi Front», Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, the All-Ukrainian Union «Batkivshchyna», the party «Vidrodzhennia» — relations with the Baltic states are not mentioned. Also, in the Coalition Agreement the Baltic states or the Baltic region as a whole were not explicitly mentioned. The statements of parliamentary faction leaders also lacked the mentions of the Baltic region.

In the analytical report under the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015, the Baltic region is mentioned in the context of Ukraine’s initiative: in 2014, Ukraine produced a draft of an intergovernmental agreement on development of the international transport corridor «Baltic Sea-Black Sea» sent for approval to Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgarian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldovan, Polish, and Turkish parties. Also, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are mentioned as Ukraine’s reliable allies and partners as the states that provide Ukraine with considerable assistance and support.

Cooperation was quite intensive with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on the level of leaders of states, governments, and Parliaments. In the process of mutual visits of high officials from the Baltic countries to Ukraine, and from Ukraine to the Baltic states, the parties declared their common vision for the future and shared understanding of current challenges to the international system. The statements released by Ukrainian officials did not have any controversies, and showed their interest to developing relations and cooperation with the Baltic countries.

In other words, in spite of lack of interest in cooperation on the level of parliamentary parties and faction leaders, there is interest and engagement on the level of the leaders of the state.

Institutional cooperation

The level of institutional cooperation is quite high in formation of the policy of Ukraine for the Baltic region and for development of relations with the Baltic countries. In particular, there is an effective cooperation between the Parliament and the President, MFA, the Ministry of Economy and Development of Trade and the State Reserves Agency, the Ministry of Agro-Industrial complex, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the Ministry for Regional Development, Construction and Housing Services.
In particular, the proper level of institutional cooperation enabled effective work of the Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Lithuanian Commission for issues of Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in 2015.

Strategic vision

There are no overt mentions of the Baltic states or the Baltic region in the Law of Ukraine «On Fundamentals Of Domestic And Foreign Policy», the Strategy «Ukraine-2020», or the Energy Strategy-2035, yet the Strategy of National Security of Ukraine does mention the Baltic region, although in a broader context: among the topical threats to the national security of Ukraine, there is «a temporary occupation of the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, and further actions related to destabilization of the situation in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region». The main tendency that affects the military and political situation in the region around Ukraine as defined in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, is «the Russian Federation’s active destabilizing foreign and security policy in relation to neighboring states», which is also applicable to the Baltic states.

Activities

The activities of Ukrainian Embassies in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were acceptable. The Ukrainian Ambassadors in these countries are quite effectively cooperating with the representatives of Ukrainian communities in the countries of stay and informing the public about Ukraine’s international political position.

In 2015, several Ukrainian high officials visited the Baltic countries – and Baltic officials visited Ukraine, too. In particular, in January, the Prime Minister of Estonia Taavi Rõivas visited Kyiv with a working visit. In May, the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament participated in the Interparliamentary assembly of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Seimas of Lithuania, the Senate and the Seym of Poland. In August, Kyiv was visited by the Prime Minister of Lithuania Algirdas Butkevičius. In October, Ukraine was visited by the President of Latvia Raimonds Vējonis, who came with an official visit (it should be mentioned that it was the first international visit of the newly elected President of Latvia). In November, the Prime Minister of Ukraine visited Latvia with a working visit, and attended the meeting of Prime Ministers of the Baltic states. In December, the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko visited Vilnius with a working visit, where he met the President of Lithuania and chair of this country’s Seimas.

Cooperation in the security sphere also intensifies. In particular, in February of 2015, Petro Poroshenko signed the Law of Ukraine «On Ratification of Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Government of the Lithuanian Republic and the Government of the Republic Of Poland about Establishing a Joint Military Unit». Cooperation has been established to provide the Ukrainian military an opportunity to learn English at the courses for headquarter officers in the Military Academy of Lithuania and international courses for instructors in Military College of Lithuania. In addi-
tion, consultation of Ukrainian experts is planned on the issues of designing a cybernetic defense system. Lithuanian military instructors provided combat training to Ukrainian motorized infantry and conducted staff exercise. Lithuanian instructors also participated in the exercise «Fearless Guardian-2015» that was held in the period from April to November of 2015 at Yavorivskyi training grounds in Lvivska oblast. In November of 2015, Lithuania hosted the international military exercise «Maple Arch-2015» attended by over 250 servicepersons of the armed forces of Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine.

In addition, in their statements the Presidents of the Baltic states emphasize that under the excuse of fighting ISIS, Russia wants to get rid of political isolation and to shift the West’s focus away from Ukraine; for this reason the Baltic leaders ask the international community to stay vigilant and not to allow Ukraine to be forgotten.

In 2016, Ukraine and Latvia will hold the meeting of the intergovernmental trading and economy commission. Among other things, its agenda includes increase of the transportation project ZUBR’s capacity. In October of 2015, the Memorandum on cooperation in the agricultural sector was also signed to deepen cooperation of the two countries.

The parliamentary cooperation is being established between the legislative bodies of Ukraine, Baltic countries, and Nordic countries. In particular, in March of 2015, the Chairman of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Volodymyr Hroisman conducted a meeting with the delegation of the Parliament Chairs of the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltic region, and in November, Volodymyr Hroisman reported that in 2016, a meeting of the Baltic states and Northern European countries parliament chairs is planned and to be held in Kyiv.

In addition, in December 2015, the leaders of defense agencies of Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia signed a joint declaration on cooperation in the military sphere. The document provides for joint participation in measures of military training, military medicine, and military technical cooperation in bilateral and multilateral formats, as well as conducting joint military exercises.

Results

Based on the results of work in 2015, we can point out the Baltic states’ support to Ukraine’s position both on the bilateral level and on the international forums. Security and military cooperation between the Baltic states and Ukraine intensified. The Baltic states support Ukraine in its stand against the Russian Federation consistently and firmly, and insist that the sanctions regime against RF continues, the prisoners of war are released, and RF upholds its commitments under the international law and Minsk agreements. The Baltic states will provide practical assistance to Ukraine by sharing their experience related to implementation of reforms in the sphere of regional policy, agriculture, education, and combating corruption. In 2016, this dynamics of international policy activities in relations between Ukraine and Baltic countries is expected to continue, and the relations in the format of the Baltic Assembly and the Northern Council are expected to grow. The relations between the states continue to remain on the strategic partnership level.
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

C+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 3
Activities 3,5
Results 4
The following events in Ukraine’s relations with the countries of the Eastern Partnership should be considered as key events: Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga (May 2015); deepening political dialogue with Moldova and Georgia in the context of the common goals of European integration and security in the region; intensifying political cooperation with Belarus; achieving fundamental positions on economic relations in the context of a free trade zone between Ukraine and the EU and beginning of a new stage of dialogue with Azerbaijan.

Political interest / engagement

In 2015 the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the relationship between the initiative’s participants started assuming a totally new level of practical character for Ukraine, especially in the context of the started implementation of the part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA), preparation for introducing a free trade zone (FTZ) in 2016 and the final stage of the Action plan on visa liberalization. However, Ukrainian leading political players did not accentuate the multilateral dimension of the EaP as a separate sphere of foreign policy. The importance of the bilateral dimension observed in particular in the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The analytical report to the Address indicates the need for differentiation in the EaP frames, due to qualitative differences in the pace of integration of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, on the one hand, and Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan - on the other. In addition, the deepening relations with Moldova and Georgia and thus the strengthening of the new “core” of the EaP are defined by common interest as a counter to Russia’s aggressive politics of the region. At the same time, the multilateral dimension of the EaP, as well as relations with the member countries are not considered as a priority for the Coalition agreement, the programs of parties (the Coalition’s members) and the Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers for 2015, although the integration course and implementation by Ukraine lie in the basis of the Coalition activity and government policy. In 2015, the most important strategic event was the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga, where the President of Ukraine officially called for greater effectiveness of the EaP mechanism, also the need for greater internal flexibility of this EU initiative became apparent.

Institutional cooperation

The consensus on the priority of the European integration as a foreign policy direction and the “road map” for internal reforms is officially presented at the level of the key state institutions of Ukraine: the Administration of the President, the Cabinet of Ministers in general and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, the Verkhovna Rada. However, there is no stable coordination system of the state policy implementation in the EaP multilateral dimension, and it is not institutionally set. The main forms of Ukraine’s policy implementation in the EaP region remain traditional mechanisms of multilateral dimension: participation in the Eastern Partnership Summits (Riga Summit, May 2015), meetings of Foreign Ministers (6th meeting was held in April 2015), and thematic platforms. The other form for policy implementation is traditional bilat-
eral interstate relations. Systematization of relations with the EaP countries (in particular with Moldova and Georgia) and development of internal coordination system for European integration policy in general remain extremely important tasks.

Strategic vision

In the strategic documents focus is primarily given to the European integration course in general, without separating the EaP or Ukraine’s policy regarding other participants of the initiative. This formula is applied, in particular, in the Law of Ukraine “On the basis of internal and foreign policy” and the National Security Strategy of Ukraine. In the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, only Moldova and Belarus are briefly mentioned in the context of Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine and potential risks connected with the demarcation of the state border. The Strategy on Sustainable Development “Ukraine–2020” reviews the implementation of AA by Ukraine as a tool for internal transformations, but it does not facilitate deepening relations with the EaP member. Therefore, at the strategic documents’ level the EaP region remains ignored, giving way to bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU both within the EaP and outside of it.

Activities

Despite the emerging new challenges and interests both in the frames of the EaP, and of the EU as a whole, bilateral relations between Ukraine, on one hand, and the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, on the other, developed in 2015, however were not systemic. The multilateral platform, Riga Summit in particular, becomes the most powerful platform for diplomatic contacts. In the course of the preparation for the summit, a trilateral interparliamentary conference took place, where associated EaP members agreed on their positions. The summit revealed the significant differences in political positions of the potential “new core” of the EaP, on the one hand, and of the “rear echelon” countries of the initiative on the other. It was demonstrated, in particular, by the refusal of the latter to support the territorial integrity of Ukraine in the final declaration of the EaP summit on behalf of the EaP platform. Despite some political differences, in 2015 bilateral relations between Ukraine and Belarus enhanced significantly, particularly due to the influence of Russia’s aggression and the consequent conflict in Ukrainian Donbas. Belarus did not only provide a political platform for talks under the Trilateral Contact Group, but also actively demonstrated its interest in preserving close relationships with Ukraine and the EU. In August 2015, the President of Ukraine and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus Vladimir Makey discussed the prospects of cooperation. In addition, Belarus did not join Russia’s economic sanctions against Ukraine. In late December 2015, the following results of the second meeting of the high-level Belarusian–Ukrainian working group on mutual trade were achieved: any of the parties shall not apply any restrictive measures in the presence of the FTA between Ukraine and the EU. In late 2015, Ukraine’s foreign policy in terms of Azerbaijan intensified. Thus, the key idea of the mutual interest in deepening relations was agreed upon by the presidents of Ukraine and Azerbaijan during a phone call, and in December 2015 Ukrainian delegation paid a visit to Azerbaijan pursuant to these agreements.
The main results of the meeting were the recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine by Azerbaijan and declared readiness for enhanced political dialogue. There were no drastic changes in relations with Armenia in 2015, but in 2016, the Armenian direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy should be strengthened in view of the resumption of Armenia-EU dialogue.

Results

In 2015, Ukraine’s foreign policy on the Eastern Partnership political space was mostly determined by two factors: new realias of the European integration of the participating countries and the conflict with Russia. Thus, in 2015 Georgia and Moldova reached an agreement in principle on deepening cooperation in approximation to the EU and security in the region. With Georgia, there was a strategic discussion of the energy security problems and joint efforts in this direction (at ministerial level), and economic security (preparations for the next meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Georgian intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation in 2016 started). In 2015, the relations with Belarus demonstrated the ability of Ukraine’s diplomacy to enhance bilateral relations, even if the state did not give an official consent to openly support Ukraine in the situation with Russia’s aggression or be ready for European integration course. As for the relations with Azerbaijan, there is a high probability to move to a new level of cooperation due to the agreements reached in late 2015. A meeting of the intergovernmental Ukrainian-Azerbaijani commission for economic cooperation is expected to take place as a preparatory phase before the official visit of the President of Ukraine to Azerbaijan.
UNITED NATIONS

B

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 4
Activities 4
Results 5
Despite a low level of political interest to the issues of cooperation with the UN, except for some problems of conflicts resolution and human rights protection, this organization is clearly positioned in the strategic documents and holds a significant place in Ukraine’s foreign policy. Intensive activities of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UN in 2015 led to a significant achievement — election of Ukraine as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2016-2017, which was the cause of the Results' highest rating.

Political interest /engagement

Personal participation of the President of Ukraine in the general debates of the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015 was the evidence of the highest level of Ukraine’s interest in using the mechanisms of this organization. Presence of a separate provision on cooperation with the UN in the Program of Activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine also confirms the interest on cooperation with this organization. At the same time, the issues related to the UN predominantly remain in the sphere of activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or specialized institutions that are responsible for certain areas of activities. The interest of political parties can be observed only on the level of expressing their attitude to a potential UN peacekeeping mission in the East of Ukraine. The attitude to the UN as to a global organization is not controversial, and therefore is not mentioned in the program documents of parties or the documents like the Coalition Agreement.

Institutional cooperation

Issues of the UN agenda and Ukraine’s activities within the framework of the UN system do not cause any disagreements in different branches of power and among political parties. In fact, for today, participation of specialized institutions, Ministries, as well as Ukrainian MPs, when necessary, in various meetings and conferences under the UN auspices is secured. At the same time, this sphere remains the prerogative of the MFA and of the corresponding diplomatic missions of Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers and the President Ukraine coordinate their activities in the mentioned sphere.

Strategic vision

The strategic vision of Ukraine’s cooperation within the UN framework was rated ‘B’ because in the main documents that establish the agenda of the Ukraine’s foreign policy, it focuses only on the issues of security and reform of the UN Security Council. At the same time, existence of a separate document — the Strategy of International peacekeeping activities of Ukraine (as of 2009), — in which significant attention is given to the UN operations, boosts the assessment of detalization of the vision of Ukraine's activities within the framework of the organization. This issue is also sepa-
rately defined in the Military Doctrine. However, the UN is not mentioned in the Law «On main foundations of domestic and foreign policy»; in fact, no document mentions any activities within the UN framework that are not related to the problems of conflict resolution. No attention is paid to the work in other institutions of the UN system.

Activities

Ukraine’s activities within the UN framework were rated highly owing to the Ukrainian mission’s active participation in the sessions of the Security Council, the petition for sending to Ukraine a peacekeeping mission, and the visit of the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon to Ukraine (in May of 2015). Of the three missions of Ukraine to the UN (New York, Geneva, and Vienna), New York and Geneva remain the most active. The Permanent Mission in New York covers the issues of international security and resolution of conflicts, and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the UNO branch and other international organizations in Geneva concentrates its attention on the issues of human rights. However, except of New York Mission, others do not invest sufficient efforts in covering their activities.

The somewhat reduced level of participation in peacekeeping operations and absence of any robust activities in other directions of work in the UN does not allow giving it the maximal rating.

At the same time, the UN activities related to Ukraine intensified, first of all, in the sphere of humanitarian aid (during 2015, humanitarian aid from the organizations of the UN system was provided within the UN Humanitarian Response Plan’s framework). In addition, the Monitoring Mission continues its activities – its reports are priority materials in consideration of the Ukrainian issue in the UN Security Council.

Results

Despite the fact that Russia used its right of veto in the UN Security Council and thus blocked adoption of certain decisions important for Ukraine (for instance, concerning the international tribunal for investigation of the catastrophe of the Malaysian Airlines airplane), we still can give the highest rating to the results of the Ukraine’s activities within the UN framework. This is due to the Ukraine’s election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2016-2017, as well as permanent presence of the Ukrainian question on the agenda of the Council’s meetings, as well as prevention of the Russian version of the events in Ukraine promotion.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE

B+

Political interest /engagement  5
Institutional cooperation  4
Strategic vision  4
Activities  4
Results  4
In the course of 2015 there could be seen cooperation with the Institutions of the Council of Europe (The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities). The Action Plan for Ukraine 2015-2017 was agreed upon, with its implementation being financed by the representatives of the European Commission in Ukraine in the framework of the Eastern Partnership funding. Despite the high level of activity and the Commissioner for Human Rights’ visit to Ukraine, the monitors of the Council of Europe did not have the access to the occupied Crimea.

**Political interest /engagement**

The political interest in cooperation with the Council of Europe can be traced in the addresses of the members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), who took part in the work of the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the Council of Europe regardless their political orientation. The political interest in using the framework of the Council of Europe could also be found on the side of the opposite parties which can be observed in the contradicting addresses of the MPs from the Opposition Block at the January session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

At the same time the Parliament factions of political parties making up the majority actually agreed to use the Council of Europe for attempting to confront Russia. In fact, the Coalition Agreement contains a norm on including the Ukrainian MP Nadia Savchenko to the Permanent Mission of VRU to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regardless the quota of MP factions.

The Council of Europe is actively mentioned in the Analytical report for the Annual President’s Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, yet the attention paid to it was not significant.

**Institutional cooperation**

There is a constant systematic institutional cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA) and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In fact, MFA provides materials for including the relevant projects of resolutions by the Ukrainian side. There is cooperation between the Council of Europe and the Ministry of Justice, the VRU Committee on Foreign Affairs, the VRU Commissioner on Human Rights, the VRU Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations.

**Strategic vision**

Despite the fact that the strategic necessity of cooperation with the Council of Europe is not directly mentioned in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Strategy-2020,
the law of Ukraine “On Basis of Internal and Foreign Policy of Ukraine”, strategic goals determined in the mentioned documents are moderately reflected in the implementation of the 2015-2017 Action Plan for Ukraine agreed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (constitutional reform, good governance, electoral reform, fight against corruption, money laundering, cyber security support).

Activities

On January, 21, 2015 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe agreed upon 2015-2017 Action Plan for Ukraine (developed on the basis of a similar 2011-2014 Action Plan), which is a joint initiative of the Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine. The projects in the framework of the Action Plan will be financed using different sources and will be coordinated with the Mission of the European Union. Financing will come from the organizational budget of the Council of Europe, as well as from donations of donor countries and international organizations including the Program framework cooperation of the Council of Europe and the European Union using the format of the Eastern Partnership. A special representative to support the Head of the VRU by providing expertise for the issues of constitutional reform and electoral legislation reform was appointed. According to the Plan of the Ukrainian government there will be consulting support in implementing constitutional reform, electoral legislation reform, decentralization, good governance, preventing and fighting corruption, money laundering and cyber crime by improving consulting practices.

On November, 25, 2015, a new project of the Council of Europe “Further Support of Reforms in Criminal Justice in Ukraine” started to be implemented. Furthermore, the implementation of the projects “Developing institutional capacities of local authorities in Ukraine”, “Preventing and fighting women abuse and domestic violence in Ukraine”, “Consolidation of reform development in the Justice system of Ukraine” continued.

On May, 20, 2015 the Ministry of Regional Development saw the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe presenting the Road map of Ukraine developed in accordance with the results of post-monitoring Congress recommendations fulfillment, regarding local and regional democracy in Ukraine.

The work was continued by the International Advisory Panel created according to the order of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in order to supervise the fulfillment of all requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights and expertise of the European Court on Human Rights regarding the investigation of violent activities taking place in Ukraine starting from November, 30, 2013 (the report published on March, 31, 2015) and in Odessa – from May, 2, 2014 (the report published on November, 4, 2015).

During 2015 the MFA of Ukraine took part in the meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Permanent mission of Ukraine took part in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

On October, 28, 2015 Ukraine signed an addendum to the Convention of the Council of Europe on preventing terrorism (needs to be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine).

On October, 8, 2015 in the course of the session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Permanent mission of Ukraine raised the issue of the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russia and serious systematic violations of human rights by the occupation authorities. The Ukrainian side called to put more political and diplomatic pressure on the Russian Federation as a country-occupant in order to secure full and unlimited access of international monitoring missions and non-governmental human rights organizations to the peninsula.

Results

On March, 4, 2015 in the course of the 1221st session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe an issue was raised regarding the illegal arrest of Nadia Savchenko on the Russian territory. The discussion resulted in the decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which contained a call to the Russian Federation to immediately release N. Savchenko due to humanitarian reasons.

On April, 15, 2015 a complex decision of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe was taken to support the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine while strongly disapproving the illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, with a call to fulfill Minsk agreements. This decision also welcomed the steps of Ukrainian government taken to fulfill a wide range of reforms.

On January, 27, 2015 a PACE 2028 resolution was adopted on «The humanitarian situation of Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons». In the resolution, the Assembly stated that only political decisions on the foundations of securing the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Ukraine can improve the humanitarian situation. PACE, along with recommendations aimed to secure the rights and needs of persons forced to leave their homes as a result of the illegal annexation of the Crimea and actions of terrorist groups supported by the Russian Federation on the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, called to fulfill Minsk agreements by all the parties, including the Russian Federation, and also urged Russia to stop destabilizing the situation in Ukraine and the military support of illegal armed groups. The resolution contains a call to immediate release of Nadia Savchenko and other Ukrainian citizens, who are illegally kept on the territory of the Russian Federation.

On January, 28, 2015 a PACE 2034 resolution was adopted on “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratiﬁed credentials of delegation of the Russian Federation
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe”. The resolution contains the majority of the requirements of the Assembly to the Russian Federation: to stop escalating violence in the east of Ukraine and supporting illegal armed groups, to withdraw troops and machinery from the territory of Ukraine as well as the requirements regarding the frozen conflicts in the countries - neighbors of the Russian Federation. The resolution contains a call to the Russian Federation to free Nadia Savchenko within 24 hours.

At the June part of the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by the efforts of the VRU Permanent Delegation to the PACE the amendments were made to the resolution draft “Missing persons during the conflict in Ukraine”.

On June, 24, 2015 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted the resolution «Consideration of the annulment of the previously ratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation (follow-up to paragraph 16 of Resolution 2034 (2015))», which, in fact, contains a call to the Russian Federation to withdraw its troops from the territory of Ukraine; stop the illegal annexation of the Crimea; fully fulfill Minsk agreements; free Nadia Savchenko and other persons who are being illegally kept on the territory of the Russian Federation; and to provide assistance to observers visiting the occupied Crimea to evaluate human rights respect.
ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

B+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 4
Activities 4
Results 5
Ukraine’s cooperation with the OSCE in 2015 was marked by a high level contacts, visits and interaction within the framework of different institutions. The most active one was the interaction with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, the participation of Ukrainian representatives in the Trilateral Contact Group on the peaceful settlement of the situation in Donbas. Yet there is a problematic issue concerning the full implementation of the mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission, monitoring on the entire territory of Ukraine including the Ukraine-Russia border territories and the temporarily occupied Crimea.

At the same time, Ukrainian activities regarding other OSCE priorities and Ukraine’s involvement in resolving other issues in the framework of the OSCE outside the country is minimal.

**Political interest / engagement**

In 2015, the acknowledgement of the necessity of complex cooperation with different OSCE institutions at the highest level (the President of Ukraine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister of Ukraine) signalled about the high level of political interest to this institution. Among political parties, the biggest interest to the OSCE cooperation was demonstrated by “Petro Poroshenko Block “Solidarnist”, especially in the context of this party representatives participating in the negotiating process concerning the Minsk agreements implementation. Some activity was also observed from the Ukrainian MPs in the Parliamentary Assembly of OSCE. Yet the representatives of other parties forming the Coalition demonstrate a significantly lower level of interest in these issues within the public discourse. The fact that the representatives of some political parties criticize the activities of the Special Monitoring Mission does not provide us with an opportunity to affirm that a full consensus regarding OSCE cooperation has been achieved.

OSCE significance as one of the leading institutions aiming to implement the monitoring of the realization of the complex of activities within the frames of the Minsk agreements, is highly evaluated in the Analytical Report to the 2015 Annual President’s Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

**Institutional cooperation**

As for the OSCE cooperation, there is an institutional agreement between the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Minister of Ukraine (mostly the cooperation is fulfilled by the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of Ukraine). There is active cooperation of the Office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) as well as with the Office of the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine. The main positions of the institutions are agreed upon, however, not all ministries demonstrate awareness concerning the international commitments of Ukraine.
Strategic vision

Despite active cooperation within the OSCE and using the present mechanisms of the organization in all three directions of its activities, in fact, this organization falls out from the strategic vision of the foreign policy of Ukraine. It is only the National Security Strategy that recognizes OSCE, in line with the Council of Europe, as an instrument of “creating an effective system of interaction in Central and Eastern Europe with an aim for better security and stability”. While security and humanitarian dimensions of OSCE cooperation are indirectly mentioned in the strategic documents, the economic and environmental dimensions are not spoken of.

The Memorandum of Understanding between Ukraine and OSCE on deployment of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission was signed in Vienna on April 14, 2014.

Activities

2015 saw continued active cooperation between Ukraine and OSCE institutions. The indication of the active work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and especially the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the International Organizations in Vienna is the prolonged mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission, despite the efforts of the representatives of the Russian Federation to limit the mission’s mandate. Cooperation with the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and OSCE ODIHR also continued in 2015. Namely, on July 6-8 2015 there was a visit of the representatives of these institutions to Ukraine on invitation of the Ukraine’s government. It resulted in a joint report of the abovementioned institutions concerning human rights in the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which highlights human rights violations in the Crimea, naming Russia as actual government and calling for guaranteeing respect for human rights. Furthermore, the project “Supporting National Dialogue for Reforms, Justice and Development” initiated by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine, was implemented.

Ukraine’s interaction with the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is of the highest significance, with the President of Ukraine and the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs numerous highlighting its special importance.

The cooperation with the OSCE Special Representative is realized within the Trilateral Contact Group and concerns joint steps aimed at the implementation of the Minsk agreements. 2015 saw a series of meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group on the peaceful settlement of the situation in Donbas.

Yet there are no active efforts in other directions of OSCE work. In fact, the main activity in 2015 was concentrated inside Ukraine.
It can be observed that other prioritized directions of OSCE activities are characterized by much more active efforts of the Office of OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine than Ukraine’s participation in solving issues outside its borders.

Results

In general, the results of Ukraine’s cooperation with OSCE institutions can be evaluated as positive. Namely, it should be pointed out that there is a prolonged mandate of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission which makes it possible to continue the monitoring of the Minsk agreements implementation under the conditions of the unresolved conflict in the east of Ukraine and the occupation of the Crimea. The lack of opportunity to widen the mission’s mandate to cover the monitoring of the entire Russia-Ukraine border, as well as the lack of access of mission monitors to places on the temporarily uncontrolled territories and unlimited access to all border parts with the aim to monitor the actual implementation of the cease-fire regime significantly complicate the mandate’s implementation. Consistent cooperation on the problem of peaceful settlement and involving more OSCE institutions give an opportunity to highly evaluate the level of interaction.

Following an official invitation to observe the local elections in Ukraine, the OSCE/ODIHR has deployed an Election Observation Mission during 2015 local elections in Ukraine. In the previous report of the Mission, the electoral process despite some shortcomings was approved. Furthermore, ODIHR gave a positive evaluation to the Law of Ukraine on “Budget Funding for Political Parties” adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on June, 16, 2015.

In the course of the 24th summer session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (June 5-9 2015), OSCE participating states adopted the Helsinki Declaration which includes among other issues two resolutions to support Ukraine: “Continuation of clear, gross and uncorrected violation of OSCE commitments and international norms by the Russian Federation” and “Abducted and illegally detained Ukrainian citizens in the Russian Federation”.

Yet not all ministries demonstrate awareness concerning the international commitments of Ukraine. As a result, the developers of conceptual documents allow wording which is critically evaluated by OSCE institutions (for instance, the Concept of Information Security, presented by the Ministry of the Information Policy of Ukraine in June-July 2015 for ignoring international standards in the sphere of freedom of media, received a negative feedback from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media).
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

B+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 5
Activities 5
Results 5
Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO is one of the key issues of its foreign policy agenda in 2015. Despite different approaches of some political parties to the issues of the further Euro-Atlantic integration, Ukraine’s decision to abandon its non-bloc status gave a significant push towards invigoration of cooperation that was taking place at the level of the President, Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers, and other governmental agencies. Conducting negotiations, coordination of positions, signing joint roadmaps and the Trust Fund Agreement, and regular joint military exercises provide grounds to give a good rating to the Ukraine-NATO cooperation.

Political interest /engagement

Cooperation of Ukraine and NATO is one of the key foreign-policy issues of political parties and the government agenda. The Coalition Agreement acknowledges «cancellation of the non-bloc status of Ukraine, restoration of its political course to integration into the Euro-Atlantic security space, and acquiring membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization» among the first priorities in the section concerning reform of the system for guaranteeing national security and defense. Significant attention is also dedicated to this issue in Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Action Program and in the supporting documents. The questions of cooperation with NATO and Ukraine’s future membership in the Alliance became one of few separately defined foreign policy priorities in the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine in 2015.

At the same time, there are alterations in how different political forces perceive this issue. In fact, the division goes along the line for/against joining NATO, as well as about desirable speed and procedure of the Euro-Atlantic integration (whether a referendum should be held or no, and whether Ukraine should file application for the membership right away).

Institutional cooperation

The low rating of institutional cooperation is related, first of all, to the conflict, which unfolded between the members of the Parliament of Ukraine — members of the Permanent delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. The issue in question was the accusations that the Ministry of Defense was stalling adoption of decisions related to start of the trust funds that were voiced in March 2015. Delays with approval of separate provisions of the Trust Fund Agreement related to specific issues of taxation and customs clearance for technical assistance, confirmed that non-core ministries lack understanding of the Ukraine-NATO cooperation peculiarities. Due to absence of a Ukrainian coordinating body, the functioning of the Ukraine-NATO Joint Working Group for Scientific and Environmental Cooperation was terminated. Foreign advisors were not cleared for a long time by the Security Service of Ukraine to access information, and this, also, was hindering the process of getting the work on track.
Strategic vision

NATO received significant attention in the strategic documents of Ukraine. The high rating is due to the fact that this issue was separately mentioned in the National Security Strategy as one of the main directions of the governmental policy on national security: this document describes in detail the main directions of the special partnership between Ukraine and North Atlantic Alliance, including the «long-term goal of joining the common European security system, the basis of which is NATO». At the same time, in other strategic documents most statements refer to the issues of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) reform, to bring them in line with the NATO standards, and enhancement of military and political cooperation with its member states. The Military Doctrine is also focused completely on adaptation of AFU to the NATO standards, and the final goal – the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country.

Activities

Ukraine’s activities concerning cooperation with NATO were vigorous at all levels — presidential, parliamentary, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the National Security and Defense Council. Regular visits, joint military exercises, preparation for signing of roadmaps and other documents, activities of NATO advisors in Ukraine — all this formed the agenda of cooperation. At that, activities were not limited to the issues of defense cooperation. For instance, in September 2015, NATO held the international Consequence Management Field Exercise «Ukraine-2015», in which over 1000 emergency response specialists from many member countries and NATO partners participated.

In addition, last year, many academic institutions of Ukraine came out on top by the amounts of grants received for implementation of scientific projects within the framework of the NATO «Science for Peace and Security» Program. Among them, there is an important pilot project on full restoration of pyrotechnic departments of the State Emergency Service in Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Also, a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission was held to address the issues of the energy security.

Unlike previous years, representatives of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine were rather proactive – they regularly visited the sessions of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and actively participated in the debates during these sessions, held meetings with the Alliance leaders, and lobbied creation of trust funds for Ukraine.

In addition, in June 2015, a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Interparliamentary Council was held (in Kyiv) with sessions on the issues of the security situation in Ukraine, threats to the national security, prospects of the Euro-Atlantic integration for the country, accomplishment of annual national Ukraine-NATO cooperation programs, providing international assistance to Ukraine to conduct necessary reforms.
Also, it is necessary to mention the regular meetings of the Ukraine-NATO commission, including on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 2015, Turkey) and the Ministry of Defense leadership, who actively discussed perspectives of the Ukrainian crisis resolution, as well as plans concerning further development of the Ukraine-NATO cooperation, priority of reforms in a security and defense sector of Ukraine, security situation in the East of Ukraine, including the prospects of consistent implementation of the Minsk agreements, the status of implementation of NATO’s assistance to Ukraine. Based on the results of the meeting on the MFA level, a joint statement was approved, voicing the consolidated position of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs — members of the Ukraine-NATO Commission concerning the security situation in Ukraine and the means of its resolution, as well as concerning future cooperation.

Results

Among the key achievements of 2015, we should list cancellation of the non-bloc status of Ukraine (decision was adopted in the last days of 2014), which to a significant degree influenced Ukraine’s further activities relating to its cooperation with NATO.

The main results are: the visit of the NATO Secretary General to Ukraine in September 2015 and the visit of the President of Ukraine to the NATO headquarter; signing of the Trust Fund Agreement – on establishment of five NATO trust funds for the total amount of 5.4 mln Euro, in particular NATO-Ukraine Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Trust Fund (2 mln Euro), NATO-Ukraine Logistics and Standardization Trust Fund (1 mln Euro), NATO-Ukraine Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund (845 thousand Euro), NATO-Ukraine Cyber Defence Trust Fund (815 thousand Euro), as well as NATO-Ukraine Military Career Management Trust Fund (410 thousand Euro).

In addition, we should note signing of the Defence-Technical Co-operation Roadmap (December 2015), the Strategic Communications Partnership Road Map (September 2015), and the Agreement on the Status of NATO Mission to Ukraine.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly approved a number of resolutions in support of Ukraine, in particular, «Solidarity with Ukraine», «Economic sanctions against Russia», «Strengthening Security and Stability through NATO’s Open Doors and Partnership Policies».
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

D+

Political interest /engagement 2
Institutional cooperation 5
Strategic vision 5
Activities 3
Results 1
Year 2015 showed that Ukraine has a rather limited set of foreign-policy and security tools for influencing Russia's aggressive policy against Ukraine. Destruction of the bilateral international treaties framework, winding down the economic and institutional cooperation make the Russian direction of Ukraine’s foreign-policy activities unattractive for individual political investments of the Ukrainian ruling class, and take away the middle-term perspective of the interstate relations.

### Political interest /engagement

In the updated party and pre-election programs of parliamentary political forces «Petro Poroshenko’s Block „Solidarnist”», the party «Opposition Block», the party «Narodny Front», Oleh Liashko Radical party, the All-Ukrainian Union „Batkivshchyna”, the party „Vidrodzhennia», the topic of Ukrainian - Russian relations is in fact absent (in cases, where it is indeed present, these relations are obviously viewed as very problematic on the current stage of the state development). At the same time, the Coalition Agreement provides for «filing international claims against the Russian Federation in the interests of the state of Ukraine». Correspondingly, taking into account the existing status of the Ukrainian-Russian relations, the declarations of all the leaders of parliamentary factions and political parties of the ruling coalition are usually focused on revealing Russia’s aggressive intentions towards Ukraine. On January 27, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a decree «On the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’s Address to the Organization of United Nations, European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, GUAM Parliamentary Assembly, and the Parliaments of the states of the world about acknowledgement of the Russian Federation an aggressor state». This is the tone of all official public positions of the government and Prime Minister of Ukraine concerning the status of the Ukrainian-Russian relations.

In the Analytical Report to the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine - 2015 prepared by the office of the President, «the Russian issue» received a lot of attention (Russia is mentioned 644 times); in particular, it is mentioned that «for over a year, Ukraine has been conducting armed, diplomatic and informational struggle against a cruel and insidious foreign aggressor». Also the report, among other things, mentioned that «Russian troops’ covert and overt armed intervention on the side of terrorists under orders of higher officials and command of the Russian Federation is a proven fact not only for Ukrainians, but also for majority of the world community». Therefore, taking into account the extreme crisis, there is no lack of political engagement to the relations with Russia, yet the «interest» that the Ukrainian ruling class has in this engagement is predominantly negative, and is related to the perspective of substantial roll-out of bilateral contacts.

### Institutional cooperation

Due to the Russian military aggression’s systematic character, Ukraine’s institutional cooperation with the Russian Federation is in fact reduced to zero, and the working
contacts conducted by the executive institutes of power and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, predominantly focus on institutional intermediary forums – the UN, PACE, WTO and others, and also within the multilateral semi-official formats: Normandy, Minsk, and others. Therefore, in the conditions of the Russian military aggression, implementation of a number of agreements concerning bilateral cooperation was rendered impossible. In respect to denouncement of these agreements, the President of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers were acting in accordance to the general national evaluation of the level of threat from Russia, with full consent as to the vision of the prospects of the Ukrainian-Russian relations. For instance, on March 20, 2015, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the decree «On termination of effect of Treaty between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Russian Federation about military and technical cooperation». On March 21, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted five laws: No.463-VIII «About Denouncement of Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation about Transit through the Territory of Ukraine of Military Units of the Russian Federation that are Temporarily Located on the Territory of the Republic of Moldova»; No.464-VIII «About Denouncement of Agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation about mutual protection of secret information»; No.465-VIII «About denouncement of Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and Government of the Russian Federation about Organization of Military Interstate Transit and Settlements for them»; No.466-VIII «About Denouncement of Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation about Cooperation in the Field of Military Intelligence»; No.467-VIII «About Denouncement of Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation about Cooperation in the Military Sphere». The relevant laws were signed by the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko on June 8. Cooperation between the branches of power was just as well-coordinated in the process of denouncement of other agreements concerning cooperation with Russia.

Strategic vision

Russian aggression against Ukraine ruined the strategic nature of the Ukrainian-Russian relations as well as the bilateral agreement framework, which caused substantial strategic and legal corrections. In particular, amendments in the Law of Ukraine «About Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy» in the wording as of 01.01.2015, considerably modified the strategic vision of the prospect of the Ukrainian-Russian relations. In spite of the fact that «the Russian issue» is not mentioned in the Law, the amendments that were made related to «Ukraine’s integration into the European political, economic, and legal space with the goal of obtaining membership in the European Union and in the Euro-Atlantic security space», were, in fact, a strategic response to the Russian aggression and set the foreign policy and security context for further development of the Ukrainian-Russian relations.

The Strategy of National Security of Ukraine as of May 26, 2015 mentions occupation of a part of the territory of Ukraine and the fact that «the Russian threat is of long-term nature», and « Russia’s aggressive actions ... are conducted to exhaust the
Ukrainian economy and undermine its social and political stability with the goal of destroying the very state of Ukraine and seizing its territory». Similarly, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine as of September 24, 2015, mentioned that its main provisions «are focused on counteraction to the Russian Federation’s aggression». Among other things, the Doctrine also mentions the fact of «the RF’s informational war against Ukraine» and «threat to Ukraine’s military security due to the RF’s full-scale armed aggression against Ukraine including land-based, air and space, and naval operations with determined military and political goals».

Activities

In spite of very unfavorable conditions for functioning of Ukrainian diplomatic institutions in the Russian Federation, the Embassy of Ukraine works rather effectively. In the situation of limited access to Russian mass media through web resources, the Russian public is regularly informed about the Ukrainian authorities’ position concerning the Ukrainian-Russian relations and information about the course of Ukrainian foreign policy. The Ukrainian Embassy’s Consular department and General Consulates cooperate with the representatives of Ukrainian community in the Russian Federation; they provide legal and other necessary consular support to citizens of Ukraine (including the Ukrainian citizens that are illegally held in the Russian Federation due to groundless accusations). Among other things, during 2015 there were trilateral ministry-level consultations in format Ukraine-EU-RF concerning implementation of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement in the part of an advanced and comprehensive free trade area (May 19, September 7 and December 21 in Brussels). Negotiations concerning functioning of the FTA in the course of these meetings generally yielded no results, which caused the mutual trading and economic sanctions in the Ukrainian-Russian relations starting from January 1, 2016.

The contacts on the highest level have been reduced to a critical minimum. An exception was the two meetings between Presidents Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin within the framework of «Norman Four» in Minsk and Paris, and several meetings on the Ministry levels, including trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and EU concerning the conditions of supplying Russian gas to Ukraine.

Results

The year 2015 became the year of the continued Russian military and political aggression against Ukraine and further aggravation of the crisis in the Ukrainian-Russian relations. On the international level, Russia vetoed in the Security Council and in the UN (on June 29, 2015) the proposal of Ukraine and other countries concerning establishing an international criminal tribunal for the events related to the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. In the bilateral relations, Russia continued its military occupation of Crimea and some regions of Donbas, funding the terrorism in Ukraine, and show trials against the citizens of Ukraine who were illegally transported to Russia or illegally detained in Russia — Nadiya Savchenko, Oleg Sentsov, Olexander Kol-
chenko, Mykola Karpiuk, and others. In the trade and economic relations, the goods exchange with the Russian Federation more than halved in 11 months of 2015: export of Ukrainian goods to Russia reduced by 53.2% – to 4.4 bln USD, and import from the Russian Federation reduced by 41.6% – to 6.9 bln USD; Russia refused to restructure the Ukrainian debt (3 bln USD), with a threat to bring this issue to court; a new level of mutual trading and economic sanctions started since January 1, 2016.
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION *

C+

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 3,5
Strategic vision 2
Activities 4
Results 4

* - Within the framework of this research, the Asia-Pacific Region section considers relations with Ukraine’s key partners in Eastern – the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea; Southern – India, Pakistan, and Southeastern Asia – Vietnam and Malaysia, as well as Australia and New Zealand.
Among the key events in the relations of Ukraine and APR in 2015 was a notable progress in achieving mutual understanding with China, extension of cooperation with Japan, and several other countries of the Pacific. The Ukrainian party sent a positive signal by the long-awaited appointment of ambassadors to a number of key countries.

Political interest /engagement

The Asia-Pacific region (APR) did not enjoy enough attention from the Ukrainian government in the past. Priority of economic interests was limiting the definition of bilateral relations to the trade and economic cooperation. According to the wording by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, relations with APR are those of «multi-dimensional pragmatic cooperation». In the conditions of war, economic crisis, and a considerable reduction of Ukrainian diplomatic corps in the world, there are indications, as unlikely as it may seem, that the situation is improving. The key events in relations between Ukraine and APR in 2015 include the notable progress in establishing mutual understanding with China and extension of cooperation with Japan, as well as several other countries in the Pacific region.

An impetus for intensification of the relations with the region originates, first of all, from the executive branch of power of Ukraine. The expert report under the Address of the President, says, «on the background of the Russian aggression, Ukraine feels precious political support and solidarity, as well as considerable assistance from such influential countries of the Asia-Pacific region as Japan, Australia, Malaysia, and the Republic of Korea». The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Oleksandr Turchynov said (and he was right, as the course of events proved) that, despite Russia calling China and India its «main friends», his opinion is that they «are unlikely to support Russia in its terrorist provocations and crimes of war». The Coalition Agreement mentions the countries of Southeast Asia as partners for cooperation in the field of development of weapons and military equipment (along with EU, Canada, and USA).

Institutional cooperation

Between the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Verkhovna Rada Ukraine, there is a consensus concerning the necessity to cancel the visa regime for citizens of Australia and New Zealand. Yet, the draft of the corresponding Decree submitted to the Presidential Administration still stays without attention. If the same issue concerning the People's Republic of China is not without some reservations (illegal migration), it is difficult to explain the delays in relation to such highly developed countries as Australia and New Zealand, which, on top of that, are actively supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia.
Strategic vision

In Ukraine’s strategic documents, APR is only superficially mentioned in the Military Doctrine, in the general evaluation of the world security environment. The Law of Ukraine «On Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policy», which superseded the bylaw «On Main Directions of Foreign Policy of Ukraine», fails even to mention this region. In 2013, the Ministry of Economic Development tried to develop a program to intensify cooperation with the APR countries, yet it is unknown what happened to this program after the government changed in Ukraine. On the bilateral level, there are some strategic documents only with China. So, one can say that in spite of this foreign policy direction’s promising potential, it is practically not mentioned in the strategic documents. In 2015, the Law of Ukraine «On ratification of the Protocol Amending the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Treaty on simplifying trade procedures)» came into effect; it will help improve Ukraine’s positions on international markets, in particular, on the APR markets.

Activities

In addition to restoration of contacts with China (see corresponding section), in 2015, Ukraine’s dialogue with Japan intensified, which is very convenient, taking into account that the country will chair the Great Seven in 2016, and the plans are in place to dedicate the club’s next summit to the issues of forceful reconfiguration on the international arena. Tokyo traditionally provides to Ukraine substantial support both financially and with technical assistance in the issues of reforms. During the meeting of the President of Ukraine with the Prime Minister of Japan Shinzō Abe last year in June, one of the key issues was improving interaction between the countries in the international security processes, deployment of the peacemaking mission to Ukraine, and coordinating actions for reformation of the UN. Ukraine and Japan signed a treaty on investments protection, which is a considerable achievement, taking into account the Japanese capital’s potential and manifested interest. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s office established contacts with Japan in the sphere of facilitation to operation of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s office, in particular in regard to training of prosecutors and engagement of Japanese experts. The dialogue took place on both intergovernmental and interparliamentary levels.

Relations with the Republic of Korea were «put on hold» for quite a long time, yet a positive step was taken at last — the Minister of Foreign Affairs Klimkin visited the Republic of Korea. During this visit, he called to support Ukraine in the conflict with Russia (Korea did not join the international sanctions against the Russian Federation, but still expressed support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine). The Malaysian «Boeing», downed over the territory of Ukraine, with all the sad circumstances, managed to bring together the positions of the countries that were really far apart before — Australia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Ukraine: they continue to seek a format to finalize the investigation of the catastrophe after the Russian Federation vetoed the creation of an international tribunal.
At the same time, relations between the countries considerably intensified. With Australia, that lately has been providing a considerable political and humanitarian support to Ukraine, the Chamber of Trade was established in 2015, mutual understanding was achieved in the energy sphere, and the main achievement — the Ukrainian Ambassador was appointed to Australia after a four-year break. Relations with New Zealand also intensified — this country denounced the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, and, what is more, implemented entrance sanctions against certain Ukrainian and Russian individuals, who are believed to be related to «the crisis in Ukraine». Still, the legal and documentary basis of the relations, just like the level of dialogue between Kyiv and Wellington, remain very inconsiderable.

Last year, there was a visit of the Verkhovna Rada’s delegation to Vietnam, where at the session of the Geopolitical Group «12+» within the framework of 132nd Intergovernmental Union Assembly, a Declaration in support of Ukraine was approved. It confirmed that in 2014, Russia started a «hybrid war» against Ukraine, which resulted in occupation of Crimea and armed clashes in the East of Ukraine.

At the same time, the Southern Asian direction – India and Pakistan – suffered a decline. Besides assignment of new diplomatic representatives to these countries, there was a narrow-down of contacts on the political level, although quite recently Ukraine officially identified the nature of development of bilateral relations, in particular, with India, as a strategic partnership, and Pakistan is traditionally one of the largest buyers of Ukrainian military products.

Results

Ukrainian diplomacy managed to secure a broad support from the APR countries within the UN framework, and this was confirmed by the fact that Ukraine was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Several important agreements were signed with the APR countries:

- between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Japan:
  - on granting Ukraine a loan for development of the economic reform policy,
  - on facilitation and protection of investments,
  - on providing a loan to modernize the Bortnytska waste water purification station;
- between Ukraine and the People's Republic of China:
  - on technical and economic cooperation,
  - on providing TV communication equipment to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine.

As to goods turnover, in 2015 it reduced considerably for almost all countries of the region (except for the Philippines). In 10 months of last year, the goods turnover con-
stituted 12.6 bln USD – compared to the same period of 2014, it shrank by 28%. Export of Ukrainian goods to the countries of the region amounted to 21% from the total Ukrainian export, import — 17%. Export of Ukrainian agricultural products is growing at the fastest rate, in particular, to China, India, Pakistan, and Japan. At the same time, export of metallurgy products shrank. Increase of investments of the countries of this region into the Ukrainian economy was inconsiderable. For the first half of 2015, the total amount of the capital inflow was 727 million US dollars. Launching an experimental Ukraine-China container train «Silk Road» bypassing Russia can be a successful base for development of trade with the region.
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
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In 2015, the Middle East was on the periphery of the Ukraine’s foreign policy. There was an exception – development of relations with Israel, Turkey and Arab monarchies, which are acknowledged as priority countries of the region for cooperation.

**Political interest /engagement**

Last year, the situation in the Middle East was characterized by a significant aggravation of the existing regional security problems (the Syrian crisis, the conflicts in Libya and Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and emergence of new challenges (the Islamic State), which constitute a serious threat to the international security system.

Still, the Middle East was not a priority direction for Ukraine’s foreign policy. Taking into account presence of more urgent problems of the socioeconomic and foreign policy development, Ukrainian political actors’ engagement to the region was sporadic and declarative, and the Middle-East problems were mentioned in their statements in a broader security-related context. For example, the President and other political actors several times mentioned in their statements the necessity to increase the international community’s efforts on combating terrorism originating from the Middle East. During the US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Ukraine on December 7, 2015, the President Petro Poroshenko announced that Ukraine is ready to provide maximum support to the forces that stand against the terrorists in Syria. On September 30, 2015, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk strongly criticized Russia sending its troops to Syria. Drawing a parallel with Moscow bringing its troops to Crimea and to the East of Ukraine, the Prime Minister emphasized that such step would cause a collapse of the global security system. In their political declarations, the country leaders and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs particularly emphasized that combating terrorism and conflicts resolution, in particular in the Middle East, will be one of the priorities for Ukraine’s activities as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2016.

The Middle East was also mentioned in the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada in 2015. Among the promising directions for cooperation with the countries of the region, the report authors listed the defense industry, trade, energy industry, aviation, as well as Ukraine’s negotiations on free trade with the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, the Analytical Report of 2015 paid much less attention to the Middle East compared to the previous years; it also lacked concrete recommendations about the means to promote the Ukrainian interests in the region.

**Institutional cooperation**

Due to lack of the comprehensive strategy of the Ukraine’s foreign policy in the Middle East, cooperation between some specific governmental agencies in this direction is inconsistent. It is predominantly the Administration of the President and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs that are determining Ukraine’s foreign policy course for the region, as well as establishing the priority directions of cooperation, and they have good coordination between each other.

Strategic vision

Despite urgency and the sheer number of the security issues originating in the Middle East, as well as the significant potential for cooperation with the countries of the region, the Middle East is not mentioned in the main strategic documents of Ukraine (in the Law of Ukraine «On fundamentals of domestic and foreign policy», in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, in the Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine-2020», or in the Energy Strategy-2035, etc.). There is only a declarative mention of the region in the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, which states that deterioration of the security situation in the countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa, along with growing religious extremism and popularization of the ideas of radical Islam directly affects the security situation in the world.

Activities

Ukraine’s activities in the region of the Middle East in 2015 went along the following directions: visits of the President and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Turkey; development of bilateral relations with some of the countries of the region; work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Embassies of Ukraine. A noteworthy event was Petro Poroshenko’s working visit to UAE on February 23-24, 2015, when the President had meetings with the country’s Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as well as visited the International Defense Exhibition IDEX-2015. On December 22-23, 2015, Petro Poroshenko paid an official visit to Israel, where he held a meeting with the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the President Reuven Rivlin, and the Knesset Speaker Yuli-Yoel Edelstein, and signed a number of bilateral agreements. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin visited Turkey on August 1-2, 2015, to participate in the Second World Congress of Crimean Tatars. He also held a meeting with the Vice Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic Numan Kurtulmush (a separate sub-section covers cooperation with Turkey).

Ukraine’s position on the key regional problems was articulated in the statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Minister Pavlo Klimkin. First of all, these are statements and comments by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning denunciation of the terrorist acts in Tunis, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Turkey, and on the necessity to prevent and counteract the funding of terrorist organizations. Ukraine also welcomed achievement of agreements concerning Iran’s nuclear program based on the results of negotiations in Lausanne, as well as supported international community in the necessity to fight Islamic State as a global threat. Ukraine’s position in relation to the Syrian conflict is a firm belief in the necessity of settling the crisis in this country using only political and diplomatic means, creation of a government of national
unity and restoration of Syria’s territorial integrity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in its statements denounced aggressive actions of the Russian Federation in the region of the Middle East. It also mentioned that considering the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine along with its direct support and funding of terrorism in Donbas, Moscow’s official statements on intentions to combat terrorism in Syria look especially cynical.

The Embassies of Ukraine in the region continued to function actively. Their activities’ main directions were: preparation of the visits of the Ukrainian delegations for discussion of topical issues of bilateral cooperation (the Embassies in Israel, UAE, Egypt, and Qatar); conducting meetings of intergovernmental commissions for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation (the Embassies in Egypt, Kuwait, and Iraq); conducting business forums (the Embassies in Iran, Egypt, and Qatar), discussion of cooperation within the framework of international organizations. We should also mention the work of the Embassies in Tunis, Libya and Yemen with Ukrainian citizens during the emergencies in these countries.

Results

The main achievements of the Middle-East policy of Ukraine were improvement of bilateral relations with Israel and the Arab monarchies, as well as signing of important bilateral agreements. For example, during Petro Poroshenko’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, he signed an agreement on military and technical cooperation between the countries, which, in particular, stipulates providing to Ukraine certain types of weapons and military equipment. During participation in the International Defense Exhibition IDEX-2015 in Abu Dhabi, the Ukrainian enterprises signed several important contracts that will provide necessary resources for enhancement of the Ukrainian Army’s capabilities, speed up its modernization and enable engagement of the best manufacturers for securing the defense strategy. Also, in 2015, the Ukrainian enterprise “Antonov” and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum on delivery of 30 airplanes An-178 to the Kingdom, and joint manufacturing of airplanes An-132. Based on the results of Petro Poroshenko’s visit to Israel, several bilateral documents were signed in scientific and technological, educational, and cultural spheres and in the sphere of infrastructure development. An important achievement was an arrangement concerning signing the Free Trade Zone Agreement between Ukraine and Israel in the first half of 2016 that has been negotiated on for three years.
LATIN AMERICA

D

Political interest /engagement 2
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 1
Activities 2
Results 2
In 2015, the human and resource potential of Latin America was under-evaluated by the developers of the foreign policy strategy of Ukraine in this region. This caused decline of the indicators of Ukrainian export, some image losses (absence of political support to Ukraine in the issue of countering the Russian aggression from the power elites, in particular those of Cuba, Argentina, and Brazil), as well as impossibility to confront Russia’s influence on the situation around implementation of the joint Ukrainian-Brazilian project «Alcantara Cyclone Space».

Political interest /engagement

Analysis of the election programs of Presidential candidates and the programs of political parties represented in the 8th Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine showed that the Latin American vector was not perceived by them as a separate direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Interest to this region was outlined only in general declarations about the necessity to restore Ukraine’s export potential and to provide governmental support to domestic goods manufacturers in advancing to the international market, as well as the need to intensify communications with the Ukrainian diaspora in different parts of the world with the purpose of using this resource for development of the country. This was set forward in the Coalition Agreement as of November 27, 2014. Among the priority tasks on the way of promoting Ukrainian export in 2015, the Coalition Agreement indicated that it is necessary to shift to a more flexible policy concerning limitation of export for the agricultural sector products, establish an export credit agency to support Ukrainian exporters’ advance on foreign markets and facilitate participation of the national goods manufacturers in the international exhibitions. In the humanitarian and cultural spheres, according to the Coalition Agreement, the plan was to secure proper funding for Ukrainian cultural centers abroad in 2015, to provide support in promotion of Ukrainian cultural products in the world, to create a network of broadcasts in foreign languages, and to encourage people to learn foreign languages. These measures could indeed facilitate intensifications of the cultural dialogue with the countries of Latin America. At the same time, these countries were included into neither the list of «potential» partners in the sphere of development of weapons and military equipment, nor the list of «strategic» partners for implementation of projects in the agricultural complex. Instead, in the Analytical report to the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015, Ukraine’s cooperation with the countries of Latin America was acknowledged a promising direction: at that, Brazil and Cuba were called the priority partners. Ukraine’s strategy in this region is to consolidate political support and globalization of economic relations, and to develop bilateral contacts with Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Chile; the focus is on the economic component.

Institutional cooperation

With the present level of cooperation between the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, and the President, delays in establishment of certain regulating agencies –
for instance, the Export credit agency announced yet in summer of 2015 by the trade
representative of Ukraine Natalia Mykolska – stood in the way of working out and
implementing an effective foreign policy for Latin America. Another negative factor
was unfilled staff vacancies: in particular, the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to Cuba,
which is believed to be our key partner in the region, has been headed by a Charge
d’Affaires since October 9, 2014 (appointment of an Ambassador is an exclusive power
of the President, following the initiative by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with the
Parliamentary Committee for foreign affairs facilitating the process).

Strategic vision

The official documents that determine Ukraine’s short-term foreign policy strategy do
not mention the Latin American region among potential objects of regard.

At the same time, implementation of separate programs within the framework of
the proposed reforms strategy, as outlined in the Sustainable Development Strategy
«Ukraine-2020», can happen partly by actively tapping into its potential. In particu-
lar, it is about implementing the declared programs of development of Ukrainian ex-
port, of the Ukrainian space program, of the program focused on popularizing Ukraine
in the world and promotion of Ukrainian national interests in the international media,
and it is proposed to rely on support from the Ukrainian diaspora in implementation
of these programs.

Ukraine declared that it shares the idea of reforming the UN Security Council to in-
crease representation of the Latin American countries in it, by supporting the initia-
tives previously voiced by Brazil and Mexico. This follows the guidelines of ensuring
national security, set forward in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine as of May 6,
2015, and aligns with the position related to limiting the abuse by the Russian Federa-
tion of its status as the UN Security Council’s permanent member in issues concerning
the annexation of Crimea and the aggression in Donbas, and finding allies in address-
ing this problem.

Activities

In the structure of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, neither of
6 intergovernmental commissions for the issues of trade and economic cooper-
atation (Ukraine-Argentina, Ukrainian-Brazil, Ukraine-Paraguay, Ukraine-Peru,
Ukraine-Mexico, and Ukraine-Chile) had any meetings in 2015, at that the reason for
not conducting meetings are not specified.

In 2015, in the Verkhovna Rada, MP groups for interparliamentary connections with
Latin American countries were created for the following countries: Argentina (October
9), consisting of 9 MPs, Brazil (February 17) — 23 MPs, Cuba (March 31) — 6 MPs, and
Chile (June 15) — 11 MPs. Activities of heads of foreign diplomatic institutions (FDI)
in the region were usually limited to the country of stay only, with the exception of the
Ambassadors in Argentina and in Mexico, who tried to fully perform their additional duties. Therefore, the work of diplomatic missions in Argentina and in Mexico can be generally evaluated as effective, in Brazil and in Peru – as insufficient, and of the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic Cuba — as unsatisfactory, due to lack of any positive results.

In 2015, the heads of FDI participated in presentation events of separate provinces (in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and Peru), international agricultural, trade and industry exhibitions; 4 meetings with representatives of the Argentinian-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and industry were conducted.

An important event, due to necessity to improve cooperation with the Ukrainian communities in the countries of Latin America, was the signing of the Plan of events of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ukrainian World Congress within the framework of the Memorandum on cooperation between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Ukrainian World Congress (June 9, 2015).

Results

Within the framework of the political dialogue, the Agreement on friendly relations and cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Paraguay (as of April 26, 2012) was ratified. On November 16-22, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada delegation visited Brazil, and on November 16-20, 2015, visited Chile to conduct negotiations concerning development of bilateral cooperation in priority directions.

The trade and economic field saw a notable decline of the volumes of Ukrainian export of goods to the countries of the region — by 60% in 10 months of 2015, compared to the same indicators of 2014 (in terms of money — decline by 350.9 mln USD), as well as services — by 29% (164.2 mln USD) for 9 months of 2015. In the structure of goods export, the growth was observed only for the products of plant and animal origin, oils and fats, food products, industrial goods, timber and products made of timber, as well as in transportation services and services of organizing travels.

At the level of implementation of bilateral projects, on July 24, 2015, an agreement between Brazil and Ukraine was denounced – the agreement was on cooperation concerning use of the carrier rocket «Cyclone-4» at the Alcantara launching center (Ukraine’s financial losses now amount to 410 mln USD).

Ukrainian FDIs in countries of Latin America in 2015 mostly concentrated their activities on conducting events in the cultural-humanitarian sphere and in the sphere of public diplomacy.

In 2015, citizens of Ukraine enjoyed the visa-free entrance regime to the territory of Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and El Salvador, also an agreement on visa regime liberalization between Ukraine and Chile was signed (April 24, 2015).
COMMONWEALTH OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

C-

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 1
Activities 3
Results 3
In 2014, Ukraine renounced presidency at the CIS, and in 2015 a totally expected considerable decrease in the level of relations between Ukraine and institutions, and countries of the CIS took place. Considering the fact that Ukrainian membership in the CIS is mainly formal, de-facto Ukraine makes its policy to minimize its representation in the organization, where epy Russian Federation plays a key role.

Relations between Ukraine and the CIS-countries are shifted to a bilateral format.

**Political interest / engagement**

In the updated parties' and pre-election programs of parliamentary political powers – Petro Poroshenko's Block “Solidarity”, Opposition Block, People's Front, Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko, Nation-Wide Union “Batkivschyna”, Vidrodzhennya (Renaissance Party) - a topic of relations development with the structures and countries of the CIS is absent. In a similar fashion, the collaboration with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is not mentioned in the Coalition Agreement. Neither is the issue of institutional cooperation with the CIS entities a priority in the statements of political factions and parties.

After the Revolution of Dignity neither the President of Ukraine nor the Prime Minister, nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs have taken part in the work of CIS structures on a political level. During 2015, there was a low-key debate as to the necessity of withdrawal from the CIS. For instance, during the plenary session on January 14 2015 the leader of “Batkivschina” faction Y. Tymoshenko called out to support “resolution 1015, which has passed through the committee and presupposes immediate suspension of the Ukraine’s participation in all the CIS bodies, which means suspension of all membership fees payment from Ukraine to the CIS, which suspends the operations of Ukraine’s Permanent Delegation to the CIS, and besides this suspends Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine participation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the CIS member states”.

Also, on February 4, 2015 during the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine the Minister of Foreign Affairs P. Klimkin, during his discussion with the member of parliament B.Tarasyuk, de facto confirmed a principle position of Ukraine to withdraw from the CIS.

In the Analytical Report to the Annual Presidential Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015, prepared by the President’s Office, it is stated that the crisis character of Ukrainian-Russian relations foregrounds the change of priorities in foreign affairs, specifically as to “the need to master new formats of further interaction between Ukraine and the CIS-countries”. This change is dictated by the foreign policy and security need to ‘radically optimize the activity of Ukraine within the framework of institutions of the CIS, which appears to be under full control of Russia and does not exercise the duty imposed on it’. It is noted that “Ukraine needs to Change its relations with the CIS-countries at large to a bilateral format. Among the CIS member-states, our main partners remain
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan”. Also, taking into account the necessity of priority change in foreign affairs at the post-Soviet territory, it is emphasized in the Analytical Report that “there appears an opportunity to bring into the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM) composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova new quality connected with the processes of deepening integration with the EU”. At the same time due to their geographical remoteness, the countries of the Central Asian area of the CIS (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) are mentioned only in the context of limited collaboration, for example, as transit countries in developing transport corridors from Europe to China.

Institutional cooperation

Amid the political decision on rolling up Ukrainian political presence in the CIS and transforming the cooperation with the CIS member-states into bilateral format, institutional collaboration within the framework of the CIS has appeared de facto suspended. Thus, for instance, on May 8, 2015 the informal summit of the heads of the CIS-states was held in Moscow, and was not attended by the President of Ukraine. On October 16, 2015 at the meeting of the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS (Burbay village, Kazakhstan) Ukraine was represented by the charge d'affaires of Ukraine in Kazakhstan Y. Lazebnyk, which without doubt lowered the level of Ukraine’s presence at this summit.

Alongside with that, institutional cooperation between the president of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine demonstrate an apt level of collaboration and alignment as to the foreign affairs policy in the issues of cooperation with the CIS-countries.

Strategic vision

Area and structure of the CIS in the new geopolitical reality do not acquire any strategic status. In essence, a post-Soviet integration project of “the USSR peaceful dissolution” has been finished after the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. There is no mention of the CIS in the strategic documents (The Law of Ukraine “On the Foundations of Domestic and Foreign Policy”, National Security Strategy of Ukraine, Military Doctrine of Ukraine, Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine-2020”), and Ukraine’s practical activity in the framework of the CIS in 2015 was minimal.

Activities

Taking into consideration general level of the Ukraine-CIS relations, the level of Ukrainian representation in this organization has been brought down to formal and minimal. In 2015, Ukrainian representatives either did not take part in the meetings of the sector cooperation bodies of the CIS, or were present as observers. At present, the level of Ukraine’s representation as a CIS member state is limited to the interim
Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Ukraine at coordinating institutions of the CIS (O.Derybogova).

Amid closing up the activity in the structures of the CIS and the attempts on the part of Russia to force Ukraine out of the CIS free trade zone, it is rather important to strengthen the role of bilateral contacts and cooperation with the CIS countries (first and foremost with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan). Thus, on February 11-12, 2015, President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko visited Minsk in the format of “Misk-2”. On October 8-9, 2015, P. Poroshenko visited Kazakhstan (previously, on July 16, 2015 the 12th meeting of the joint Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Kazakh Committee for Economic Cooperation took place in Kyiv). In the course of the visit, the questions of both trade and economic and international security spheres were discussed. On November 13, 2015, a telephone conversation between the President of Azerbaijan I. Aliev and the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko took place, during which they agreed to accelerate organization of the Intergovernmental Ukraine-Azerbaijan Commission for Economic Cooperation regular meeting. The official visit of the president of Ukraine to Azerbaijan is scheduled for the first half of 2016. On May 6, 2015, during the working visit of the Prime-Minister of Moldova to Ukraine, his official meeting with the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko took place. The meeting was dedicated to coordination of collaborative actions as to the issues of the European integration.

Results

2015 became the year of stagnation in the relations between Ukraine and the CIS. Goods turnover with the CIS countries has decreased considerably for the 11 months of 2015: export of the Ukrainian goods to the CIS fell down by 49.5% - to 7.1 billion USD, and import from the CIS-countries decreased by 40% - to 9.6 billion USD. The biggest drop in trade and economic activity between Ukraine and CIS-countries was observed with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union – the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Armenia, while the decrease in goods turnover with other post-Soviet countries was somewhat slower. Despite the fact that the biggest fall in goods turnover took place between the countries, which are Russia’s satellites in the Eurasian Economic Union, it was due to the position of Belarus and Kazakhstan that Russia was outvoted in the issue of suspending the Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine (of January 1, 2016). At the same time, despite the traditionally pro-Russian vector of the foreign policy of Belarus and Kazakhstan, it was very symptomatic that these states supported the Resolution of the UN General Assembly (of November 17, 2015) supporting the activity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the report of which nuclear objects in the Crimea were assigned to Ukraine (Belarus and Kazakhstan were among 99 countries that voted for the document). Since Ukraine chose the vector of renouncing any integration strategies within the CIS structure and taking into consideration the low level of the Ukrainian representation in this organization, the results of its cooperation with the CIS structures are almost absent. The main achievement is, in our view, the continuation of sector cooperation with some CIS-countries, which is based on legal framework of the CIS, first of all concerning free trade zone with the CIS.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

D+

Political interest /engagement 2
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 1
Activities 2
Results 3
The year 2015 showed that Ukraine is interested in development of relations with the countries of Africa. It shows both in Ukraine’s institutional cooperation with the countries of the African continent in all spheres of social life, which has already been formalized in the treaty framework, and in concrete examples of Ukraine’s activities in African countries. Yet, in spite of all this, a clear manifestation of Ukraine’s interests in the region is still absent.

**Political interest /engagement**

Neither in their pre-election rhetoric, nor after they were elected to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU), did the political parties mention Africa (except for the program of Oleh Liashko’s Radical Party, in which Northern Africa is the subject of Article «Intensifying direct political and economic relations...»). The same goes also for Presidential candidates, leaders of parliamentary factions, the head of the Government and the President of Ukraine. Africa is mentioned only in the Analytical Report to the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On Domestic and International Position of Ukraine In 2015». The Report articulates the main goal of establishing relations with the region as the desire to see Africa become «a source of some raw materials and valuable natural resources and a potential sales market for Ukrainian products». It also refers to the trend of African countries’ GDP growth, the region’s openness to new partners (especially countries of Sub-Saharan Africa), and entering into the free trade agreement with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The document also addresses securing of the Ukrainian trading and economic interests that require establishment and enhancement of Ukraine’s regional diplomatic offices in Egypt, the Republic of South Africa, Nigeria/Ghana, Kenia/Zambia, establishing of the national export guarantee agency and harmonizing the Ukrainian legislation with the international standards.

**Institutional cooperation**

The institutional cooperation between Ukraine and the states of Africa is showing certain dynamics:

- the head of the Verkhovna Rada committee for foreign affairs, Hanna Hopko, held a meeting with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of South Africa (SAR) in Ukraine Christiaan Albertus Basson, where the parties emphasized good prospects for development of relations between the countries (especially in the sphere of agricultural and mining industries);

- cooperation with the African continent through Ukraine’s mission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is of great importance;
at the sessions of the Verkhovna Rada committee for human rights, ethnic minorities, and international relations, participation of Ukrainian parliamentarians in the conference in Cape Town on the issues of statelessness and implementation of African experience for combating violations of the ethnic minorities’ rights was discussed.

Activities of the President of Ukraine were limited to decrees on appointment of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors to a number of African countries and formation of the delegation of Ukrainian high officials for participation in the Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference (October 15-18, 2015, Nairobi, Kenia), which proves interest in supporting diplomatic relations with the countries of the continent.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine continues to implement the Action Plan on implementation of the Facilitation Program for national exporters of agricultural products and products of their processing in entering into export contracts with representatives of importers from the countries of Middle East and Africa, namely: Algeria, Libya, Sudan, Kenya, Tunisia, and Egypt.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine confined itself to comments and statements concerning the most notable events, domestic unrest, and acts of terror in the African countries, among them: the Republic of Chad, Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, Burundi, Burkina Faso. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is informing about conferences, international exhibitions, and fairs, in which Ukraine and African countries participate. This is the evidence of prospects of new sales markets in Africa: the Ministry’s infographics show that in 2015, the total amount of exports to South Sudan, Mozambique, Algeria, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire increased; there are 15 joint intergovernmental commissions for the issues of cooperation for the regions of Middle East and Africa. During the International economic and investment forum «Ukraine-Middle East and Africa», information was released about the joint initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade on implementation of the free trade regime with the ECOWAS countries — expansion of Ukraine’s presence on African markets by establishing trade houses.

Strategic vision

Ukraine’s strategic documents outline what the country’s intentions are concerning the African countries, how it envisions its interaction with them, and what main goals it sets for itself. Still, analysis of Ukraine’s strategic documents shows that they practically fail to mention the problems, tasks, or goals that specifically relate to the African countries.

The National Security Strategy of Ukraine has no mentions of the African countries, while the National Security Strategy of Ukraine «Ukraine in the changing world» (no longer in effect) did contain passages about broadening cooperation with the growth centers in the regions of Asia and Africa. The Law of Ukraine «On the Fundamentals
of Domestic and Foreign Policy», the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine-2020», and the draft Energy Strategy-2035 include no mentions about the countries of Africa. If we take into account the strategic bilateral documents, we see that despite a sufficient number of agreements, protocols, and memoranda concluded between Ukraine and the African countries, the official treaty framework is still on the stage of formation. The concluded agreements mostly relate to trade cooperation (Libya, SAR), military and technical cooperation (SAR), establishing diplomatic relations (Benin, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire).

Activities

Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning cooperation with the countries of Africa in 2015 looks rather formal and non-specific, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine’s warning about visiting the Western African countries due to the Ebola virus epidemics, recommendations for the citizens of Ukraine concerning the countries of Western Africa, congratulations to ambassadors on occasion of their appointment to their positions, comments about the meetings of the Exporters and Investors Council, concerning terrorist acts in some countries (Nigeria, the Republic of Kenya, Chad, and others), concerning the Day of Africa events, and pieces of advice for travelers. Statements and press releases of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration report about ambassadors of several African countries presenting their credentials to the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, about assignment of extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassadors of Ukraine to some African countries (Nigeria, Rwanda, Comoro Islands, Kenya).

On the official website of the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatseniuk, countries of Africa are never mentioned. On the website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the information about the Deputy Group of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on interparliamentary connections includes only the data about relations with the Republic of Congo. As to other African states, they are mentioned only in the Parliamentary reference book of memorable dates.

Ukraine is actively participating in the UN peacemaking operations in five countries of Africa: Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Southern Sudan.

Results

It is necessary to note significant positive dynamics in development of economic, diplomatic, cultural, humanitarian, scientific, and technical cooperation with the countries of Africa. Many events were held in 2015 in the sphere of cooperation with such countries as Egypt, Namibia, SAR, Kenya. Ukraine's diplomatic offices in Kenya, Nigeria, SAR, Egypt, and Ethiopia were conducting active educational activities and cultural events in 2015.
During the open voting on March 27, 2014, on the UN General Assembly Resolution No.68/262 on commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, adopted at the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly, a significant number of the countries of Africa supported the resolution: 18 African countries voted in support of it. This shows that many African countries already possess a certain level of trust in Ukraine. During the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Ukraine was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the years 2016-2017, and the countries of the African continent generally supported Ukraine by voting for it.

According to the State Statistics Service data, for 10 months of 2015, export to the countries of the African continent, not including the Maghreb Union countries, amounted to 7.29% of the total Ukrainian export. The main economic partners for Ukrainian export were Egypt (73.6%), Nigeria (4.5%), Ethiopia (3.8%), Sudan (2.5%), SAR (2.3%), Senegal (2.1%), and Kenya (2.1%). In the sphere of import, Ukraine’s main partners were SAR (28.4%), Guinea (20.1%), Ghana (19.7%), Egypt (11.1%), Malawi (2.9%), Mozambique (3.4%), and Tanzania (2%).

Trade relations have significantly intensified with the countries that export coal, and one of them is SAR: within the framework of a direct contract with an international trader as of September 2015, Ukraine purchased 250 thousand tons of anthracite coal. Development of military and technical cooperation showed some advance. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved a draft agreement with the government of the Republic of Namibia about cooperation in the sphere of defense (instruction No.1233 as of November 25, 2015).
BLACK SEA REGION

C−

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 3
Strategic vision 3
Activities 3
Results 2
The Black Sea region has almost disappeared from Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda in 2015. Significant reduction of goods turnover with all countries of the region, freezing of the significant number of multilateral projects, absence of ambassadors in some countries and disregard for multilateral mechanisms form a negative tendency. In fact, Ukraine’s policy was concentrated only on the issues of security connected to the annexation of Crimea and on relations with Turkey and Romania, and sustained a significant loss of support from the countries of the Caucasus.

Political interest /engagement

Analysis of official documents (political parties’ programs, the Coalition Agreement, statements of the Prime Minister, the Head of the Verkhovna Rada, and the President of Ukraine) shows that the issues of Ukraine’s presence in the Black Sea region, same as before, is not singled out as an independent priority of the foreign policy in the political discourse. Moreover, in 2015, this region has been considered only in the security aspect in connection with the annexation of Crimea. One may say that the very problem of Crimea boosted the political establishment’s interest to the Black Sea region. The issue of de-occupation of Crimea is being actively disputed; the discussions resolve around the ways to counteract the threats to the national security in the context of militarization of Crimea and the Black Sea region in general, Russia’s growing military presence in the South, Russia’s possibilities to cut sea passages, the peninsula’s potential re-nuclearization etc. Opportunities of bilateral cooperation with the countries of Southern Caucasus or Turkey are only mentioned every now and then.

At the same time, the Analytical Report to the annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada pays significant attention to analysis of the security situation in the Black Sea region and acknowledges that some countries of the region supported Ukraine and joined the sanctions against Russia, and some «indirectly support Russia, trying to preserve their high level of cooperation with it». At the same time, the Presidential Address gives no regard to the regional aspects of the Ukraine’s foreign policy.

Institutional cooperation

In 2015, the cooperation was inconsistent: it lacked an unambiguously determined position. To a certain extent, this was related to the lack of the state strategy of cooperation in the Black Sea region and the shrinking level of activities due to the Russian Federation’s policy. It is advisable to divide Ukraine’s policy concerning the Black Sea region into two directions: bilateral contacts with separate states of the region and activities within the framework of multilateral organizations (BSEC – Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation; GUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova; Blackseafor – the Black Sea Naval Force etc.), as these directions require different levels of engagement from other government agencies, besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Strategic vision

As a matter of fact, none of Ukraine’s strategic document mentions the Black Sea region. The 1993 Act of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On main directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy» paid special attention to this region, but later documents do not single out the regional issues separately. Only the National Security Strategy of Ukraine mentions the Black Sea region indirectly along with other regions, in particular, in the context of attention «to be paid to establishment of the mechanisms for ensuring security in the region of the Black Sea», conducting «together with other European allies, the policy of denuclearization and demilitarization of the Black Sea region» and continued use of «the existent formats — «Weimar Triangle», «Visegrad Group», GUAM, CEI (Central European Initiative), BSEC etc. — with the purpose of ensuring protection of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, implementation of economic and energy projects and initiatives». Taking into account complexity of the situation at the Black Sea direction and the prospects this region brings for Ukraine, such approach is insufficient.

Activities

In 2015, the Black Sea region was actually not presented as a regional direction in Ukraine’s foreign policy at the multilateral level. The foreign-policy activities were predominantly concentrated on bilateral relations with separate countries. In this case, when we say ‘regional countries’, we mean members of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, except for Albania, Serbia, and Greece. Ukraine significantly reduced the level of its contacts with the countries of the Caucasus (there are still no Ambassadors appointed to Armenia and Georgia). Activities within the framework of the Black Sea region were pulled off only thanks to active contacts with Romania and Turkey. Relations with Georgia are ambiguous: on the one hand, due to the Ukrainian citizenship granted to the Georgian ex-President Mikheil Saakashvili, and on the other hand — due to the joint work concerning the EU association.

Ukraine’s activities within the Blackseafor and BSEC frameworks were in fact limited due to the Russian Federation’s participation in these organizations. At the same time, at the main event — the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC member-states in Chisinau (June 2015) — Ukraine was represented only by the temporary charge d’affaires of the Ukrainian Embassy to Chisinau, and this can be explained only by disinterest to use this forum to promote Ukraine’s policy in the Black Sea region, as this organization still remains the key arena for communication and alignment of positions of the regional countries.
Results

Ukraine did not utilize sufficiently the opportunities of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the Black Sea region with the purpose of political support of its position or enhancement of economic cooperation. Some positive results can be observed only in Romanian and Turkish directions. At the same time, failure to support the sanctions against the Russian Federation by separate states of the region, lack of Ukraine’s active participation in multilateral institutions, de facto freezing of implementation of the Memorandum Of Understanding for the coordinated development of the Black Sea Ring Highway, as well as of the projects to combat terrorism and organized crime to a significant degree compromises Ukraine’s policy performance in the region. Significant reduction of goods turnover between Ukraine and countries of the Black Sea region (on average by 50% compared to the indicators of 2014, both regarding export and import) is a negative tendency of Ukraine’s foreign policy in this regional direction.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

C

Political interest /engagement 3
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 2
Activities 3
Results 3
Due to the focus on its domestic events, Ukraine was not, in fact, present in the international discourse on security issues. Decrease of involvement in peacekeeping operations is an objective factor, while the lasting absence of an Ambassador-at-large for Transnistrian settlement, where Ukraine is one of the main mediators, is the factor that negatively affects the image of Ukraine. In fact, most of the statements of Ukrainian politicians and official agencies either were about Euro-Atlantic prospects of the country, or were a response to violations of international security with references to Ukraine (Syria).

Political interest /engagement

For today, there is practically no interest or political engagement concerning issues of international security. The 'C' rating is this high only because of attention paid to this issue in the Analytical Report to the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 2015, which, in particular, contains a statement about necessity «to work out a new strategy for achievement of common goals of collective responsibility and security — the European Charter of responsibility», a document, which «could be able to reaffirm the previous international obligations of Ukraine and to facilitate securing concrete tools and mechanisms for observance of the standards of international law and punishment for violating them», as well as about necessity of cooperation with other security organizations.

In addition, special attention was paid to the problem of the UN and OSCE reforming with the purpose to enhance their role in security and making it impossible to veto decisions that support peace and security. In general, the main statements on issues of international security are related to observance of international standards and guidelines in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, or express condolences to one or the other country after terrorist attacks. The issues of the Syrian crisis emerged on the agenda only in the context of concern that it can draw attention away from the events in Ukraine, or as an additional argument concerning the aggressive policy of Russia and its volition to undermine the international security.

Institutional cooperation

Institutional cooperation of governmental bodies of Ukraine concerning the issues of international security in 2015 was taking place based on the declared positions, but in fact was limited only to the European and Euro-Atlantic directions. At the same time, it should be mentioned that several times there were difficulties in communication between the Ministry of Defense and the Verkhovna Rada that have predominantly been resolved.
Strategic vision

International security is considered in strategic documents of Ukraine only in the framework of sub-regional security or the Euro-Atlantic integration. The issues of engagement on a higher level are mentioned in sections dedicated to general threats to international security (Middle East) and issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The only document that to a certain extent can be categorized as shaping Ukraine’s vision on the problems of international security is the Strategy of the International Peacekeeping Activity of Ukraine, adopted yet in 2009.

To a certain extent, the strategic position of Ukraine can be confirmed by the documents on the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration as a security model and the selected course.

Activities

In fact, Ukrainian activities in the sphere of international security were limited to Ukraine’s participation in peacekeeping operations. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ data, in 2015 over 500 soldiers from the Armed Forces of Ukraine and officers of Ministry of Interior have participated in 7 UN peace operations (in the Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Kosovo, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sudan, and Southern Sudan) and in 3 operations under the auspices of other organizations (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Transnistria). Ukraine provides the UN with 50% from the total number of combat helicopters that participate in the Organization’s missions. It should be mentioned that the decline of the Ukrainian participation in peace operations comparing to the previous years, when Ukraine was even among the top ten largest contributors to the UN peace operations, is largely due to the situation in the East of Ukraine, and should be viewed as an objective fact, not a negative tendency.

At the same time, in addition to engagement into peace operations, there are also diplomatic activities related to settlement of conflicts, responding to crisis events, etc. – these activities were also on a significantly lower level in 2015 comparing to previous years. A nine-month’s absence of the Ambassador-at-large for Transnistrian conflict resolution negatively affected the level of engagement in the «5 + 2» format, and also impaired Ukraine’s activities in the issues of Transnistrian settlement, that caused concerns for some partners.

In 2015, Ukraine in fact was not engaged to the activities related to combating piracy, as it was in previous years – its participation was limited to consultations.

The issues of international security predominantly remained in the sphere of responsibility of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, which continued to work on joint military trainings, consultations, and possible participation in joint battle groups.
According to the statement of the Ministry of Defense, in connection with the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and its actual aggression against Ukraine, it became impossible for Ukraine to comply with its international commitments within the BLACKSEAFOR framework. Military cooperation within the BLACKSEAFOR framework in 2015 was not planned. In fact, a decision was made about Ukraine's temporary suspension of its participation in the naval component of the BLACKSEAFOR until the time when the Russian Federation stops supporting the destabilization process in the East of Ukraine, and withdraws from the occupied territory of Crimea. The same goes for the operation «Black Sea harmony»: the work on implementation of its activities is limited to «ongoing mutual information exchange only».

Results

Concentration on internal security problems in fact forced Ukraine to withdraw from the group of countries that were taking care of regional and international security. Ukraine’s foreign policy on this issue was reactive, and predominantly concentrated in the activities of the Ministry of Defense. Certain positive dynamics can be observed only in relations with NATO (both in the sphere of defense and in response to new challenges and hybrid threats) and the countries of the Visegrad Group.
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

B-

Political interest /engagement  4
Institutional cooperation  4
Strategic vision  3
Activities  4
Results  4
To protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in the reporting period Ukraine was actively discussing the commitments of the parties to Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine applied maximum efforts to prevent proliferation of radioactive materials and technologies from the occupied territories.

**Political interest /engagement**

Despite the fact that after surrendering its Soviet nuclear arsenal in 1996, Ukraine is considered an exceptional member to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in the last years its positions weakened to a certain extent. In particular, in 2014, due to the Russian aggression the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine saw several draft laws submitted to return the nuclear status. The first one is the Draft Law on denouncement by Ukraine of the NPT as of July 01, 1968 — introduced with joint efforts of MPs from the parties “Udar” and “Batkivshchyna” on March 20, 2014, and the second one is the Draft Decree on Announcement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine concerning restoration by Ukraine of a nuclear state status — introduced by the party “Svoboda” on July 23, 2014. For now, no voting was held in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for either of these drafts, that is, the question of denouncement by Ukraine of the NPT and restoration of its nuclear status, remains an open question – yet, in the conditions of the exacerbating situation, these issues can surface again in the political discussions or speculations on the part of Ukraine.

In general, if we consider the prospects of such possibility, the voting situation could be quite unclear. In particular, of all political parties represented in the Parliament, three (Oleh Liashko’s Radical party, “Svoboda”, and “Right Sector”) officially support restoration of the Ukraine’s nuclear status. Despite the fact that based on the latest elections’ results, their share in the Parliament does not exceed 15%, such moderate parties as “Udar” and “Batkivshchyna” also support the idea of Ukraine's denouncement of the NPT, so the voting on the mentioned issues has a potential to cease Ukraine' participation in the NPT system.

The President and the Government of Ukraine officially support the country’s membership in the NPT, and this to some extent stabilizes the situation. In his Munich speech, Petro Poroshenko made a statement that Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum that guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for entering the NPT and surrendering its nuclear arsenal. The report to the Annual Address of the President to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015 puts it plainly that Ukraine’s example «made it evident that recording the surrender of the nuclear status in an international treaty signed by five officially recognized nuclear states in reality gives no actual security guarantees».

In the Draft Decree on set of measures for enhancement of Ukraine’s negotiation positions on the international arena related to the Russian Federation’s armed aggression and implementation of the European course of Ukraine as of August 31, 2015,
the group of MPs of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine emphasized the necessity to use the entire complex of the security guarantees and commitments under the Budapest Memorandum.

**Institutional cooperation**

With the purpose of resolving the problems related to loss of governmental regulatory control over some of entities that use sources of ionizing radiation (SIR) and other SIRs that are located on the territory of the annexed Crimean peninsula and on the territory of the occupied cities of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the governmental bodies are coordinating appropriate actions. The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspection initiated creation of an interdepartmental working group on protection and guarantees of nuclear non-proliferation on the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea. The Inspection is actively cooperating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in this direction, especially concerning problems of adherence by the Russian Federation to the IAEA Statute provisions and to the effective provisions of the international law concerning application of the IAEA guarantees on the occupied territory of Crimea within the framework of the 59th session of the IAEA General Conference.

The Decree of the President of Ukraine as of April 23, 2015 No.238/2015 approved the Annual National Program of Ukraine-NATO Cooperation for 2015 that establishes measures to secure maximum control over weapons and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and assigns the governmental agencies responsible for such measures.

**Strategic vision**

The strategic vision of the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in 2015 is mentioned only in the context of other interests guarantee. In particular, the National Security Strategy mentioned that Ukraine intends to strive, based on the Budapest Memorandum, for establishment of the mechanism of security guarantees for non-nuclear states. The Military Doctrine as of 2015 emphasizes Ukraine’s commitment to further nuclear disarmament but points out that Ukraine's surrender of one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world «gives it a right to count on the international community’s support in development of means of conventional defense». The main emphasis is made on certain «bonuses» that Ukraine expects as a result of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the Doctrine states that in the middle-term future, Ukraine relies on its own powers and «reserves the right to select means for guaranteeing its state sovereignty and territorial integrity» – this, in absence of any mentioned reservations about being limited by the international law, again puts the issue of the NPT denouncement back on the table.
Activities

In June of 2015, in the city of Kyiv, the representatives of the governments of the U.S. and Ukraine held a meeting, in which they discussed the achieved progress in countering the contraband of nuclear and radiation-hazardous materials in Ukraine. On July 10, 2015, in the city of Washington, the Ukrainian-US group on nuclear non-proliferation and export control held its scheduled session. In addition, on June 25, 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine hosted the negotiations with the representatives of Germany, the U.S., the Netherlands, Canada, and EU concerning expansion of international cooperation with Ukraine within the framework of the Group of Seven’s Initiative «Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction». On April 27-May 22, 2015, Ukraine participated in the NPT Review conference, which concluded fruitless - without an outcome in a form of a consensus document. In the conditions of current challenges to the international security, the future of the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a priority for the international community, as it was confirmed on March 1-3, 2015, at the Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, in which the Ukrainian delegation was a participant.

Ukraine, together with other representatives of the international community, positively evaluated achievement of arrangements concerning the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan for settling Iran’s nuclear issue, which was declared in an official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine as of July 15, 2015.

Implementation of the joint Ukrainian-US project on technical assistance for enhancement of Ukraine’s export control and countering to WMD proliferation is pending.

Results

In the majority of official documents, we can trace Ukraine’s certain disappointment with the results of its nuclear disarmament and how the guarantor states fulfill their commitments under the Budapest Memorandum. Two draft laws on denouncement of the NPT and further gaining of a nuclear status are more symbolic rather than practical – so it is necessary to consider that Ukraine may take such marginal actions only in case of further escalation of the conflict in Donbas and deterioration of relations with Russia combined with absence of support from the West.

Ukraine continues taking all necessary steps to prevent proliferation of radioactive materials and technologies from the occupied territory, and is cooperating with the international community for prevention nuclear terrorism.
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<td>Institutional cooperation</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Strategic vision</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Results</td>
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In 2015, Ukraine worked on: evaluation of the capacity of the state and of the economy to undertake new commitments within the framework of preparation for the Paris Climate Change Conference; implementation of greenhouse gas emissions reduction projects using the so-called «Kyoto money» from Japan and Spain; the foundations of the state policy in the sphere of climate change; development of the mechanisms of emissions trading and complying with the environmental commitments within the framework of membership in the Energy Community. Quite modest achievements in most fields can be explained to a significant degree by the systemic problem of both the political and governmental structures — poor competence and no sense of responsibility.

Political interest /engagement

Political parties, the Parliament and the government of Ukraine do not identify the problem of climate change in their primary documents, yet indicate national environmental problems and challenges of the global nature in general.

The largest political forces in Ukraine do not name the challenges of climate change in the context of national responsibility, and do not have a consolidated position concerning development of the national economy, simply stating a necessity to follow the low-carbon model.

For a long time, the political forces attempted to control the specialized agencies with the purpose of ensuring influence over distribution of mineral deposits and paid no special attention to environmental problems even inside the country, not mentioning the international level of combating climate change.

Reforming the spheres of responsibilities of governmental bodies, disclosing of information about mineral deposits and who owns licenses to mine them, and about the environment status in 2015, made it possible to reduce influence of national financial and industrial groups and their political protégés on governmental institutions that are responsible for environmental policy of the state. Pre-conditions were formed for increasing the interest of foreign companies in the mineral deposits and in participation in sale of licenses and special permits.

Institutional cooperation

In the context of the problem of climate change, Ukraine has been cooperating with the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNESCO, and international environment-conservation organizations. The main contacts are taking place via the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources of Ukraine and the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for the issues of the environmental policy, management of natural resources and liquidation of the consequences of the Chornobyl disaster.
In 2015 the Ukrainian delegation to the UN Climate Change Conference COP 21 in Paris was headed by the President of Ukraine. A series of bilateral events and meetings took place within the framework of cooperation with Japan concerning the Kyoto Protocol.

Failure to assign a new Minister of Environment impaired the cooperation with other governmental agencies, especially with the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine. Environmental organizations-participants of the working group No.3 of the National Platform of the Civil Society Forum of the Program «Eastern Partnership» are not happy with the level of activities of the Ministry of Environment in the context of development of draft laws relating to the issues of energy consumption, emissions regulation, the governmental environmental policy, and the Intended Nationally Identified Contribution (INDC) filed to the Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The latter does not entail any emission reduction commitments by Ukraine in the period until 2030.

**Strategic vision**

Ukraine is a party to the Kyoto protocol, and expressed its readiness to join the new Framework Convention on counteraction to climate change in 2015. The climate change issues are described on the most complete and systematic level in the draft Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the period until 2035, yet the document itself has not yet undergone final approval at the level of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and is not approved by the Parliament. Other documents that form the strategy of the country development do not include any direct mentions of the problem of climate change, only outline the state goals of environment protection in general that should be included into the fundamentals on sustainable development of the national economy.

Ukraine prepared and filed its national INDC in 2015 – it includes voluntary commitment to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases for the period up to 2030 — not more than 60% from the level of year 1990. Despite the criticism from environmental NGOs, this document makes the commitments of Ukraine more specific and should be taken into account when developing other strategic documents, drafts, and bylaws that will regulate the country’s economic development. These commitments can be reviewed in 5 years, and readiness to follow them needs to be approved by means of ratification of the Paris Agreement by the national parliament in the nearest two years.

**Activities**

According to the available information, during 2015, the attention in the context of international cooperation in the issues of climate change was focused mainly on preparation of national INDC for the Paris Climate Change Conference and coordination of work with the neighboring countries related to resolution of environmental problems of the Dniester river basin.
The issue-specific committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine also conducted activities on coordinating the draft laws in the part related to nature conservation activities, cooperation on bilateral basis in the issues of protecting natural landmarks, parks, and natural reserves.

On the governmental level, a significant work was conducted concerning disclosure of information about functioning of the energy sector, development of mineral deposits, and activities of mining companies. Although the things mentioned above do not directly relate to the issues of climate change, they enable the public to be more aware about the situation, to back their petitions with facts, and to work out proposals related to improvement of the environmental condition locally – and, correspondingly, thus increasing the state’s contribution to combating the negative global processes.

The process of cooperation between the governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations intensified, yet it is noteworthy that each of the parties needs to improve their horizontal communications, enhance advocacy capacity, and develop a broader strategic vision of the issue.

Results

Taking into account the fact that Ukraine’s main contribution on the international level in combating the global climate changes in 2015, as it is considered, is its national INDC submitted at the Paris Climate Change Conference, analysis of the status and prospects of development of the national economy and preparation of the corresponding analysis can be considered the main result of the Ministry of Environment’s work in the mentioned period. Based on evaluation of the Climate Action Tracker (consortium of Climate Analytics, Ecofys, New Climate Institute, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Ukraine’s contribution is not adequate, meaning it will not render a positive impact in the global fight against climate change. The governmental institutions explain such level of national INDC by significant challenges to the national economy caused by financial, economic, territorial, and military losses, and declare their preparedness to review the document after the situation is stabilized.

Also, the work was conducted within the framework of greenhouse gases emission reduction projects using the funds received under the Kyoto protocol, as well as bilateral cooperation with other countries in part of protection of the environment, as well as activities of governmental agencies on the national level, but there is no streamlined report about these activities. As of the date of the study, the State Statistics Service has not yet prepared the statistical bulletin concerning the emissions of pollutants and greenhouse gases in 2015, and for this reason, evaluating the government’s actual achievements related to their reduction and dynamics compared to the previous years was not possible.
HUMAN RIGHTS

B+

Political interest /engagement 4
Institutional cooperation 4
Strategic vision 5
Activities 4
Results 4
In 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Office of the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights showed a high level of activities, including international cooperation for ensuring Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of human rights, as well as special attention to violations of human rights on the occupied territories of Ukraine. The main mechanisms used for promotion of the issues of human rights observance in Ukraine were the OSCE institutions, sessions of the UN General Assembly, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and Sessions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Political interest /engagement

Adherence to Ukraine’s international commitments in the sphere of human rights during 2015 was reflected in official speeches of the President of Ukraine and representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and of the committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights, ethnic minorities, and international relations. Among political parties and parliamentary factions, the most active were representatives of the party «Petro Poroshenko’s Bloc» and the party "Batkivshchyna" (due to its representative holding the position of the chair of the committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights, ethnic minorities, and international relations). The programs of other parties and official declarations of their representatives mentioned the issues of human rights as such not too often.

Institutional cooperation

In 2015, we should note the coordination of activities between the President of Ukraine, the committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights, ethnic minorities, and international relations, the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, and the civil sector in the process of preparation of the National Human Rights Strategy and the Action Plan for its implementation. High level of competence in the issues of human rights observance was shown by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. The available toolset of the UN, OSCE, and of the Council of Europe was actively engaged. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitated the work of international organizations’ monitoring missions for observance of human rights in Ukraine, raised the issues of violations of human rights in the occupied Crimea and in Donbas within the framework of work of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly.

Strategic vision

According to the Office of the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine human rights’ Strategic Plan for cooperation with international organizations for 2013-2017, which provides for consolidation of the Office’ efforts both in Ukraine and abroad, there was intensification and strengthening of cooperation with the govern-
mental international organizations and their bodies and officials, in particular, with
the UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, EU, by means of implementation of joint projects
and program. On the way of institutional securing of the human rights observance in
Ukraine and abroad, the progress was made in the form of the National Human Rights
Strategy, which was adopted by the Decree of the President of Ukraine No.501/2015.
Representatives of governmental structures and non-governmental advocacy organ-
izations (Ukrainian Helsinki Group, «Vostok SOS», «Donbas SOS») were engaged
in development of this Strategy. In total, the working group consisted of 256 people.
Supporting the sustainable development, which secures observance of human rights
according to the international commitments of Ukraine, is the priority of the Strate-
gy-2020.

Activities

In 2015, agreements on cooperation between the High Commissioner of the Verkhov-
na Rada of Ukraine for human rights and a number of international institutions were
not updated (the term of effect of the existent memoranda and agreements remains
valid). The Ombudsman’s Office continued cooperation with such organizations as
the International Ombudsman Institute, the European Ombudsman Institute, the In-
ternational Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights (In December of 2014, the office of Ukrainian Ombuds-
man received the highest rating — «А» — in the certification conducted by the men-
tioned institution), European Network of National Human Rights Institutions. The
Memorandum of Understanding was updated between the High Commissioner of the
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights and the OSCE Office of Democratic In-
stitutions and Human Rights (OSCE/BDIHR), the period of effect of the updated doc-
ument is 2 years. On May 14, 2015, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed
between the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights
and the European Centre for Minority Issues, and the Agreement about partnership
between the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights
and the Centre for Minority Issues. On September 17, 2015, the Agreement was signed
on cooperation between the High Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
for human rights and the Ombudsman Institution of the Republic of Turkey. The High
Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for human rights participated in
a number of international conferences on human rights in Ukraine and abroad (the
OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meetings, the UN Human Rights Council).

During 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine was raising the issues regard-
ing violations of human rights in the occupied Crimea and in Donbas within the frame-
work of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly. On March 25, 2015, within the
framework of the UN Human Rights Council, a joint statement initiated by Ukraine
was published on behalf of 43 UN member states – in support of Ukraine. Within the
framework of the 28th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, there was
a parallel event «The Autonomous Republic of Crimea: a year of illegal occupation.»
On October 30, 2015, within the framework of the 70th session of the UN General
Assembly, a Ukraine-initiated joint statement of 36 states was made public concern-
ing the situation in the sphere of human rights in the Autonomous Republic Crimea temporary occupied by Russia.

The humanitarian situation in Ukraine was the subject of the meeting of the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Peter Maurer with the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko, the Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatseniuk, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Pavlo Klimkin, and the heads of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.

**Results**

Conducting consultations with the institutions of international organizations facilitated development and approval of the National Human Rights Strategy and the Action Plan for its implementation in 2015, which is a considerable achievement in institutionalization of the strategic vision for human rights observance in Ukraine.

In the course of the 24th summer session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (July 5-9, 2015), OSCE member states approved the Helsinki declaration, which includes, among other issues, two resolutions in support of Ukraine: «Resolution on the Continuation of Clear, Gross and Uncorrected Violations of OSCE Commitments and International Norms by the Russian Federation» and «Statement on Abduction and illegal detention of Ukrainian citizens by the Russian Federation.» Despite approval of the resolution of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in July of 2015, Ukrainian citizens that have been illegally imprisoned on the territory of the Russian Federation are still not released.

Prolongation until March 31, 2016 of the mandate of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine by the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine as of September 13, 2015, is the indicator of effective interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Ukraine. The gain of the Ukrainian diplomacy is the fact that the United Nations Human Rights Council approved the resolution «Cooperation and technical assistance to Ukraine in the sector of human rights», which provides for regular considerations at the Council sessions of reports prepared by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission. These reports are documenting blatant violations of human rights on the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and on the territories in Donetska and Luhanska oblasts occupied by DPR/LPR – and they constitute the body of evidence for formation by the Ukrainian party of its position in the UN Security Council, in bilateral relations with other countries, and in multilateral initiatives.

An apparent achievement, which facilitated deepening of the strategic vision in human rights observance, was adoption of the National Human Rights Strategy and development of the Action plan for its implementation. Prolongation of the mandates of the international organizations’ missions that conduct monitoring of human rights observance (UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, OSCE Special Monitoring
Mission — indirectly), the joint visit to Ukraine by the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as publication of the report about violations of human rights in Crimea – these achievements make it possible to highly rate the work of Ukraine’s permanent missions in international organizations.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

B+

Political interest /engagement  4
Institutional cooperation  4
Strategic vision  5
Activities  5
Results  4
2015 was a breakthrough year in terms of shaping a strategic vision and institutionalization of public diplomacy, its transformation into a separate mechanism for promoting Ukraine’s interests in the world. However, the complexity of the tasks of the government in foreign policy and the lack of adequate resource base did not allow experiencing in full manner the result of this mechanism.

Political interest / engagement

The issue of public diplomacy was not presented in any of the election programs of the political parties represented in the current Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as well as creation of a positive image of our country in the world. "Samopomich“ was the only political party that paid attention to this issue in the context of developing a system of proactive public information policy.

The Coalition Agreement does not directly mention public diplomacy as a global tool to popularize Ukraine in the world and interact with the public, but at the same time it indicates the need for introducing foreign broadcasting in order to create a positive image of Ukraine and to provide adequate funding for Ukrainian cultural centers abroad, to support promotion of Ukrainian cultural product in other countries. At a later stage, it was partly reflected in the program of the government. Special attention for public and cultural diplomacy was paid in the Analytical report to the President’s Annual Address to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2015.

Institutional cooperation

In 2015, cooperation between the central authorities was quite active, though not always this activity can be highly assessed in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. After the Strategy on Sustainable Development “Ukraine-2020” approved the list of priority programs in January, including the Programme on Ukraine’s popularization in the world and promotion of Ukraine’s interests in the global information space, a kick-off meeting of the Target Group of the Programme on Ukraine’s popularization in the world was held on 26.02.2015. The Administration of the President of Ukraine was appointed responsible for the program implementation, and the team comprised of representatives of the Verkhovna Rada, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Information Policy, the Ministry of Culture and a number of other public and civil institutions. Progress in the development of the program was often evaluated at the National Reform Council (NRC). In July, at the NRC meeting the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was appointed responsible for the program implementation.

In November, in pursuance of the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers the Interdepartmental Working Group was established under the Ministry of Information Policy. The Group’s tasks are as follows: to develop the Concept of Ukraine’s popularization in
the world and promote Ukraine’s interests in the global information space. The Group comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Information Policy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Regional Development, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Infrastructure and Ministry of Youth and Sports. As of December 31, 2015 the project was not yet agreed by all stakeholders.

There was an interesting initiative of the Ministry of Culture to establish an institution for the promotion of Ukrainian culture abroad. On March 31, 2015, the Ministry proposed a Project Concept on the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute (Institute of Taras Shevchenko) for the public discussion. Surprisingly the first draft of the Concept did not mention the MFA as a coordinating structure, although most of such institutions in foreign countries are coordinated by foreign affairs agencies.

The issue of the institute and cultural diplomacy in general was repeatedly raised at the meetings, hearings and round tables of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Verkhovna Rada involving representatives of the MFA and the Ministry of Culture. As of the end of 2015, the draft law was not approved yet.

Strategic vision

Majority of strategic documents mention public diplomacy quite casually or indirectly, mostly in the context of the need for strengthening Ukraine's leading place in international relations, strengthening international authority of the state, support for Ukraine's integration into the global information space, popularization of Ukraine in the world and promoting its interests. The Military Doctrine of Ukraine mentions public diplomacy, but in the context of strategic communications. It refers public diplomacy to communication capabilities of the state, which require well-coordinated and proper use.

However, 2015 was marked by close attention to the issue of public diplomacy, though it was not always clearly defined by this term. The Strategy on Sustainable Development “Ukraine 2020” includes a program on popularization of Ukraine in the world and promotion of Ukraine’s interests in the global information space. The Target Group developed the regulations and implementation plan for this program.

The National Reform Council recognized promotion of Ukraine in the world as one of the priority reforms. In pursuance of the set goals and objectives, the Draft State Target Program was created to promote Ukraine’s interests abroad and create a brand of the country for 2016-2018 years.
Activities

In 2015, the MFA continued an active campaign to draw attention to Ukrainian issues through social networks, primarily through Twitter.

Also, the idea of creating a platform for interaction of all stakeholders to promote Ukrainian cultural product in the world was implemented. For this purpose, on June 2, 2015 at the MFA initiative, the First Forum for Cultural Diplomacy of Ukraine was held.

During the year, the MFA organized repeated cultural events to support N. Savchenko, O. Sentsov and all Ukrainians who were illegally detained in Russia.

The Roadmap on strategic communications between the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and NATO's International Staff was signed, which aims at countering Russian propaganda and informing the general public on events in Ukraine. On November 19, 2015, an agreement on the participation of Ukraine in the EU program “Creative Europe” was signed.

The international NGO Global Ukraine organized two forums «Global Ukrainians» (in July and October 2015) to establish a network of Ukrainians living abroad and to promote Ukrainian interests in the world.

In 2015, upon the results of cooperation between the Ministry of Information Policy and organization StratCom.UA, the MFA started an international online campaign #myukraineis (My Ukraine - this is) to promote the country abroad and launched the website www.myukrianeis.org.

Training events on communications for Ukrainian diplomats were conducted to improve skills in international communication, along with this, other central executive authorities initiated the process of appointing advisers for international communications. The MFA invited experts on cultural issues, launched the support initiatives for Ukrainian cultural projects abroad on a competitive basis.

Results

The system of cultural and information centers turned out not ready for the new challenges of public and cultural diplomacy. Only in France, Austria and Sweden certain progress in the development of institutional forms of public diplomacy was achieved due to the joint efforts of the civil society activists and MFA. The Ukrainian Institute in Sweden is a good example.

On October 1, 2015, the Ukrainian media platform for foreign broadcasting UATV was launched by the Ministry of Information Policy. Additional prerequisites for imple-
mentation of the set tasks became the unified calendar of events, where Ukraine must participate, creation of a team of speakers and development of the common approaches to information sharing, as well as creation of a database of the agents of influence in Ukraine.

On December 22, 2015, the MFA established the Office of Public Diplomacy, with the key objectives, among others, to coordinate activities of other executive authorities to implement Ukraine’s projects abroad in a field of branding, culture and information.

According to the MFA, it hit 10 foreign affairs agencies most active in social networks. However, establishment of efficient public diplomacy in some key countries and international organizations was hampered by the lack of ambassadors (Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Cuba, EU, and NATO).
## Economic Diplomacy

<table>
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<td>Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results</td>
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</table>

* - For assessment of this area, the author uses the definition of economic diplomacy as a sphere of international activity, in which interrelation and intertwining of economy and politics are subordinated to the task of creating best conditions for the national economy’s inclusion in the world economy, as well as diplomatic activity related to using economic levers as objects and tools of cooperation and competition in international relations.
The year 2015 did not become a breakthrough for Ukraine’s economic diplomacy – with the domestic situation this complicated it is quite difficult to count on success in the foreign economic policy. First steps were made to create additional favorable trade regimes and foundations of institutional support of economic diplomacy were laid.

Political interest/engagement

The discourse of economic diplomacy is vividly present in Ukraine’s modern political agenda. Elements of focusing on priorities of Ukraine’s economic activities on the international arena can be found both in the programs of parliamentary political parties and presidential candidates from these parties and in the coalition agreement. These issues are covered in separate sections in the Annual Address of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: «New Quality of Economic Development», «Interaction With Key Allies and Partners», «Integration of Ukraine into European and Euro-Atlantic structures», «Regional Context of Ukraine’s Positioning in the World», «Relations of Ukraine with Russian Federation», «Advancing Ukraine’s Interests in Strategic Regions of the World».

The key political forces and their leaders express positions consolidated around Ukraine’s European choice, in particular the economic component of integration. The declared goals are creation of competitive export-oriented enterprises, and the role of the main driver is planned for the agrarian sector. Their position cannot be considered completely consolidated due to disagreements on the issues of depth of economic integration with the EU, further development of relations with Russia, sector and regional directions of international economic expansion, as well as internal priorities in reforming the economic system intended to strengthen Ukraine’s international position.

Institutional cooperation

In the conditions of absence of a unified agreed policy on advancement of Ukraine’s economic interests in the world, the governmental decision-making entities in the studied sphere did not engage in any inter-institutional struggle in 2015.

The routine activities related to implementation of the new economic policy were conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) according to «Action Plan for Implementation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine’s Program of Activities and the Coalition Agreement In 2015». Analysis of reports on implementation of the mentioned plan shows there is dialogue and cooperation between the ministries. Work was being conducted to create structures for facilitation of international trade; issues of establishing and operation of trade missions were discussed; an example of inter-institutional cooperation is the Export Facilitation Council created by the Ministry of Economic Development. At the same time, institutional cooperation between the branches of power related to economic diplomacy is not systematic and lacks public coordination documents.
Strategic vision

The basics of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy provide for securing sustainable development of economy on the market basis, the economy's social focus, as well as mutually beneficial cooperation between the states. The Sustainable Development Strategy «Ukraine–2020» outlines its «development vector» as implementation of the reform of the diplomatic service and a number of internal reforms in the field of economy (including programs of Ukrainian export development). This Strategy does not provide details related to the sphere of economic diplomacy, but sets as its transformations roadmap the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, which gives grounds to see this direction as the main vector of Ukraine’s foreign economic policy. The Ministry of Economic Development started working on developing the National Export Strategy and Action Plan for 5 years. As a separate item, we should mention the impact of the 4-year extended agreement with IMF within the framework of the extended funding mechanism.

At the same time, there are no current strategic documents on the topic that would comprehensively reproduce Ukraine’s international vector. The status of international economic cooperation is mainly characterized by absence of current bilateral middle-term documents, with the exception of the Association Agreement.

Activities

In 2015, the activities in the sphere of economic diplomacy were related, first of all, to the issues of implementation of the Association Agreement. They were conducted, firstly, under implementation of the Agreement (including within the framework of the autonomous trade preferences regime), and, secondly – within the framework of the negotiation process with EU and Russian Federation (RF) related to implementation of a free trade area starting from January 1, 2016. The detailed information on the progress in the first of the mentioned activities is provided in periodic Reports on implementation of the Association Agenda and Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU published by the Government Office for European Integration. As to the second component, in the course of the trilateral EU-Ukraine-RF trade negotiations, over 20 meetings were conducted, yet no compromise was achieved. MFA was building its routine activities in correspondence with the approved Plan, which provided for an active promotion of export and protection of the domestic market, holding an international donor conference (and approval within its framework of the international plan for renovation of Ukraine for 2015-2017), and securing accelerated economic development. Periodical reports on implementations of this plan are being published. The practice of meetings of intergovernmental commissions, trade visits, participation in international forums, and anti-dumping investigations continues.

Thus, in 2015 we can state that activities were dynamic, in particular, in the form of constant meetings in various formats, yet at the same time Ukraine's foreign economic policy manifests itself mostly as reaction.
Results

As results of the economic diplomacy depend on a stable foundation inside the country, absence of a noticeable progress of domestic reforms in 2015 does affect the efficiency of the international economic policy. Based on the latest data, compared to the last year indicators, the volume of international trade reduced by 30% (including trade with the EU – by 30%, with RF – by 50%), the amount of foreign investments reduced by 10%, depreciation of the national currency was as high as 100%, the external debt exceeded 135% of GDP. The positive results are the increase of gold and foreign currency reserves up to USD 13 billion (at the cost of cooperation with IMF), and avoiding default by restructuring the external debts. Also, the progress of the Association Agreement implementation is generally evaluated as positive.

In late December, the Russian Federation unilaterally suspended the CIS free trade treaty in relation to Ukraine, and imposed embargo on Ukrainian goods. Ukraine approved the corresponding countersanctions; at the same time, other CIS countries abstained from taking such steps. In 2015, a number of Ukrainian export goods were returned to the sphere of coverage of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, the free trade treaty with Canada was initialed, and negotiations with Israel and Turkey intensified. Since January 1, 2016, the free trade area with EU started to operate fully.

As to the economic results in the international sphere, 2015 was marked by accomplishment of scheduled tasks related to the EU Association Agreement implementation, the discriminatory policy in the trade sphere with RF, decline of international trade and investments indicators, and absence of any substantial joint international projects.
SUMMARY TABLE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY EVALUATION IN 2015
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**Regional Cooperation**

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**Multilateral Initiatives**

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO 2016 FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA
Recommendations to 2016 Foreign Policy Agenda

Strategic vision for foreign policy directions

1. The return in 2014 to the Constitution of Ukraine of the version from December 8, 2004, was of a democratic nature. Yet, as it was pointed out in the report of the Venice Commission (№ 339 / 2005 CDL-AD (2005)015), several Constitutional provisions remain conflicting and do not correspond to the aim of limiting Presidential powers and reinforcing Parliamentary features of governance in Ukraine. The Fundamental Law kept the difference between the procedures of appointing the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence (candidates proposed by the President) and the rest of the Cabinet of Ministers (candidates proposed by the Prime Minister) as well as delegating powers to the President and the Cabinet of Ministers in the sphere of foreign policy implementation. Therefore, the further constitutional process has to go in line with strengthening the role of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine within a system of “checks and balances” and unification of the procedures of appointing Cabinet of Ministers and defining their status.

2. Taking into account the reinforced Parliamentary features of the political system in Ukraine, one of the key documents to determine directions and foundations of the foreign policy should be the Coalition Agreement, which serves as a basis for the government program, and therefore, for action plans of the actors implementing the foreign policy. This context provides for the appropriate reinforcement of analytical capacity of political parties concerning forming conceptions, detailed from the point of view of geographical and thematic directions of the foreign policy.

3. Nowadays Ukraine does not have a united strategic document that would determine the key directions of foreign policy in the medium-term perspective, its aim, mission and resources necessary to the implementation of the Ukrainian interests on the international arena. In this context, it is appropriate to develop within the interinstitutional and intersectoral formats a separate document – the Priorities of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine within the period until 2020. The mentioned document has to consider tasks stated in the Coalition Agreement, the new National Security Strategy of Ukraine, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, and the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine-2020”, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the Association Agenda.

4. With the aim of the systematic vision of the abovementioned medium-term strategic document, its development has to include public consultations for the project discussion, for example, in specialized academic institutions, during events with the participation of experts from the state and non-governmental analytical centres both in Ukraine and abroad. Taking into consideration the European choice of Ukraine, it would be appropriate, when developing the Priorities, to utilize the mechanism of revising strategic documents and policies that is used by the European Union. For example, when taking into account the adaptation aim, attention should be paid to the EU consultation mechanism of revising the European Neighbourhood Policy or developing the Global Strategy on Global and Security Policy.
5. The annual plan for Priorities implementation can be of a confidential nature and facilitate coordinating activities for different Ministries and departments related to the achievement of the medium-term aims. An annual public report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine regarding the implementation of the Priorities, other medium-term government plans, separate tasks in accordance with the Presidential Decrees, and the decisions of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine has to take place. This reporting can take place in the form of publishing the general report of the MFA at the official website of the Ministry.

6. Despite the fact, that adopted at the beginning of 2015 the Strategy for Sustainable Development “Ukraine-2020” considers the reform of the diplomatic service as a separate priority, as of now the MFA has yet to produce an integral conceptual document with the fundamental parameters of such reform vision. Since reforming the diplomatic service as well as the general system of foreign affairs has to take into account the strategic vision of Ukraine’s place in the international environment, the conceptualization and final aims of such reform have to consider the strategic priorities of the foreign policy. In other words, the strategy of reforming has to follow the adoption of the strategic directions of the foreign policy.

**Interinstitutional cooperation**

7. Inter-institutional cooperation needs to be improved in terms of the implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine. The normative acts coordinating a role of the MFA within the system of ministries and departments, which deal with the implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine, have to be renewed. Apart from the approvals and recommendations, special attention can be paid to creating the institutional form of cooperation under the auspices of the MFA. It has to include representatives of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine, the Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, the specialized committees of the VRU, the Audit Chamber of Ukraine and other departments and organizations that are included into the process of foreign policy implementation. Meetings should take place not less than once per quarter with the aim of information exchange and activity coordination in the direction of political dialogue development, economic and public diplomacy, and foreign information policy according to the strategic and operational documents.

8. The new version of the Law of Ukraine “On Diplomatic Service” has to include a mechanism of agreeing candidates for the positions of the heads of foreign diplomatic missions with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the VRU, as well as to formalize the annual action plan presentation and reporting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Committee. In 2016, staff gaps in the foreign diplomatic institutions that operate without their heads have to be filled, according to the new procedure of agreement. In accordance with the abovementioned mechanisms, there have to be procedural documents of the VR (the Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada, provisions on committees dealing with agreeing upon the heads of foreign diplomatic missions as well as report hearings).
Political dialogue with key countries and international organizations

9. With the aim of having better results and more efficiency of the foreign policy activity, especially concerning building a political dialogue with its key partners and international organizations, the central bodies of the executive power need to focus on reform implementation, which is envisaged by the series of bilateral documents between Ukraine and the EU, the USA, IMF and Energy Community. The successful implementation of the anti-corruption reform is important not only for the visa-free regime with the European Union and continued IMF funding, but also for the level of relations with the Ukrainian key partners in the west.

10. Ukraine has to demonstrate more leadership ambitions within the region of the Eastern Partnership, to be precise, regarding forming a joint agenda for Eastern Partnership countries, which signed the EU Association Agreements (Georgia, Moldova) and creating a common economic space in the medium-term perspective. At the same time, Ukraine has to develop a strategy of relations with the Eastern Partnership countries that have yet to achieve political association and economic integration with the EU on the grounds of differentiation logic, reinforce the cooperation and offer a role of the “intermediary” between them and the EU in the spheres of common interest.

11. To achieve better quality of communication and coordination of different branches of power and institutions in Ukraine, which are involved in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine it is mandatory to create a Coordination Council under the auspices of the President of Ukraine, that would not merely act as a new bureaucratic institution but would act as a framework for a monthly meetings of involved MPs, ministries, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and experts, aiming to exchange information regarding the cooperation process at different levels, agreeing Ukrainian positions and further plans, and action coordination.

12. Despite a high level of interaction between the MFA, the President of Ukraine, some MPs, and factions of the Verkhovna Rada and different OSCE institutions, as well as other forms of cooperation (participation in the Trilateral Contact Group) there is a need for arranging a joint seminar of the representatives of different OSCE institutions with the ministries of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in order to inform the latter of the advantages of using the opportunities of Ukraine’s participation in the OSCE and stronger cooperation. For instance, one of the planned priorities of Austria’s OSCE Chairmanship in 2017 has to do with stronger economic ties between the member states. Ukraine can join this initiative with respect to its meaning and political support.

Regional cooperation

13. Ukraine should support the initiatives regarding search for the formats of regional development and cooperation, which are proposed by the neighbouring countries. This can be said regarding wider cooperation within the frames of the Visegrad Group as well
as regarding the new projects with a wider regional perspective. In order to do this, Kyiv can be suggested as a place for discussions and should be an active participant of such discussions.

14. The majority of Ukraine’s regional activity, outside the groups of Central European countries and the Baltic states, is considered satisfactory by experts taking into account the low political interest and the lack of mention in the present strategic documents. In this context, it would be appropriate to develop regional strategies (Asia Pacific, Middle East, Africa, CIS, Eastern Partnership region, Black Sea region, Latin America) that would provide for a complex vision of Ukrainian interests in the regions and mechanisms of their implementation. This issue can also be solved after transformation of the MFA policy elaboration, considering the geographical and thematic directions of activity.

15. With the aim to motivate diplomatic and economic contacts with the regions of Middle East and Africa it is necessary to enlarge the number of official visits of respective Ukrainian representatives to these regions; to intensify the work of the Special Representative of Ukraine for the Middle East and Africa, as well as to activate the contacts of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry with the Economic Community of West African States by hosting joint meetings or expert meetings (twice per year).

International security

16. Ukraine needs to initiate the issue of activating the negotiating process in the format of “5+2” on Transnistrian conflict settlement at level of regional international organizations.

17. It is important to continue work on promotion the issue of establishment of terms “aggression” and “intervention” within the frames of regional organizations.

18. Taking into account the fact that Ukraine will not have an opportunity to be actively represented in peacekeeping operations in 2016, Ukraine can stimulate its activities in international education in this sphere including its own training possibilities.

Climate

19. 2016 provides Ukraine with the task of examining and ratifying Paris Agreement on Climate Change, adopting a series of legal bills regarding the issues of lower energy consumption, emissions control, the national environmental policy etc. One of the pre-conditions for the successful implementation of the above-mentioned should become the appointment of the professional Minister of Environment and better interaction with the respective departments of the legislative, executive powers, non-governmental organizations and international partners of Ukraine.
Human rights

20. Despite the consistent work of the Permanent Missions of Ukraine to the International Organizations on human rights protection in Ukraine and human rights violations on the occupied territories, Ukrainian embassies in their host states should pay attention to the abovementioned issues in their activities (issuing official statements, holding discussions, media interviews etc.) with the aim of forming a public opinion regarding the Russian aggression to Ukraine. The Permanent Missions of Ukraine to the International Organizations need to increase the level of cooperation with specialized Ukrainian organizations of civil society aiming to arrange parallel events during conferences that are being held by the international organizations.

Public diplomacy

21. The already started institutionalization of public diplomacy, which has to take a leading position among the instruments of the foreign policy of Ukraine, needs to be finished. The creation of the public diplomacy department within MFA can be considered a breakthrough, however, there have to be joint efforts at the political and administrative levels for a more effective use of this instrument. Taking into account the complexity of the set goals, it is appropriate to create an inner institutional vertical, with the head being Deputy Minister supervising public policy department (a Directorate General, in the perspective), as well as building a system of Ukrainian institutions in the key countries and regions.

22. The vertical integrated instrument of public diplomacy has to possess the open nature of being understandable and regular reporting. The medium term perspective of planning (up to three years) and annual reporting have to become standard practice.

23. In 2016, a joint interdepartmental working group has to finish its work on the legal bill regarding the creation of Shevchenko Institute. The formal coordination of creation and further activities of the mentioned institutions should be delegated to the MFA.

24. The inventory of formal and informal ties of Ukrainian cities and communities with the cities in other countries in order to form a separate direction of public diplomacy development is necessary.

Economic diplomacy

25. Even though, to a greater extent, the situation in the sphere of economic development and trade in Ukraine depends on inner political changes in the country and the success of reforming the economy, from the point of view of the economic diplomacy, 2016 needs to see better concentration of efforts in order to promote the interests of Ukrainian producers of the determined prioritized spheres on world markets. The implementation of the policy of supporting exporters has to be done by adopting a National export strategy and creating an export-credit agency.
26. 2016 has to see the end of negotiations and signing agreements regarding free trade zones between Ukraine and Canada, Turkey, Israel, with the aim of providing additional export opportunities to Ukrainian enterprises.

27. Within the frames of full and all-inclusive free trade zone between the EU and Ukraine it is necessary to continue work on decreasing quota and tariff restrictions, that would additionally support opportunities of Ukrainian exporters at the markets of the EU countries. Another direction should focus on informing the representatives of small and medium size businesses regarding conditions and opportunities of using the mentioned trade regime to access the European market.

28. The real incentive for the implementation of the set goals of the foreign policy of Ukraine with the aim of stronger economic cooperation should be provided by the high level visits to some countries and regional leaders, for example, to China. What’s more, it is of high importance to Ukraine that Chinese business is not limited by loan agreements, but can invest in the Ukrainian economy and enter equity capital.

29. A long-term mission of foreign policy regarding some key countries has to become the implementation of differentiated strategies on attracting international and foreign business communities with the help of economic incentives to the Ukrainian market and providing conditions for attraction European business, including defence industry.

**Expert diplomacy**

30. Expert diplomacy is a key feature of countries interested in the development of a wide spectrum of instruments promoting their interests abroad. The existence of affiliated analytical centres or expert-discussions formats, which work with the representatives of expert community of other countries can become a solid instrument for better understanding of the situation in our country. 2016 can see an attempt of conceptualizing the vision of which institutional form of expert diplomacy can be used in building the system of foreign relations.

31. Renewed fully functional work of the MFA expert council contrary to the low efficiency of the public council deserves to be mentioned separately. The expert approach has to become dominant compared to the wide public representation of non-specialized NGOs. The current legal terrain of MFA activities gives a possibility to create expert councils under the auspices of the Ministry, however, there is a lack of certain political will in this respect now.

32. Together with Ukrainian non-government centres, MFA has to develop a mechanism of hosting expert exchanges and familiarizing visits for foreign experts who are interested in Ukrainian events.
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On Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is a network-based non-governmental analytical center, the goal of which is to participate in providing democratic ground for developing and implementation of foreign and security policies by government authorities of Ukraine, implementation of international and nation-wide projects and programs, directed at improvement of foreign policy analysis and expertise, enhancement of expert community participation in a decision-making process in the spheres of foreign policy, international relations, public diplomacy.

The activities of the “Ukrainian Prism” are:

- provision of sustainable collaboration between the expert community and the bodies of executive and legislative power of Ukraine, which are involved in the development and implementation of the foreign policy of Ukraine;
- research on the foreign policy, diplomatic service, international relations and security, development and publication of respective recommendations;
- assistance to the state authorities of Ukraine in spreading reliable information about Ukraine abroad, creation of public diplomacy channels.
- facilitating improvement of legislation, which regulates foreign and security policy of Ukraine, the basics of diplomatic service and public diplomacy.
- informational, organizational and consulting support of public authorities, civil society organizations, educational establishments and other subjects of foreign policy and security issues.

The Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” is officially registered as a non-governmental organization in 2015, while analytical work and research had been carried out within the network of foreign policy experts “Ukrainian Prism” since 2012. At present, the organization united more than 15 experts in the sphere of foreign policy, international relations, international security from different analytical and academic institutions in Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Chernivtsi.
On Friedrich Ebert Foundation

**Friedrich Ebert Foundation** is the oldest political foundation of Germany, which has had rich social-democratic tradition since the day of its foundation in 1925. The foundation was started as a political will of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected president of Germany, whose name the Foundation bears.

The key activity of our political Foundation is the implementation of basic ideals and values of social democracy: freedom, justice, solidarity. The Foundation operates in close connection with social democrats and organizations of independent trade unions. As a non-profit, the Foundation organizes its activity on the principles of independence and self-governance.

**Aims:**

The Foundation fosters the development of:

- free society, which is based on the principles of solidarity and gives all its citizens the opportunity to participate in the political, economic, social and cultural life, regardless of their background, gender or religious beliefs;

- active and strong democracy, sustainable economic growth and decent job opportunities for all citizens;

- welfare state with developed education and health system, which at the same time strives at overcoming poverty and provides shelter against endeavors and hardships that citizens have to face during lifetime;

- a state that holds responsibility for peace and social progress in Europe and the whole world.

**Activity:**

The Foundation supports and enhances the ideals of social democracy, in particular by means of:

- **political awareness-building** with the aim of strengthening the civil society. Political awareness-building programs of the Foundation in Germany are focused on motivating citizens, developing their independence, informing and teaching them best practices of active participation in political life, activities of trade unions and civil society. We promote citizens’ participation in discussions on social issues and in decision-making processes;

- **political consultations:** Foundation holds strategic research on main issues of economic, social and educational policies, as well as on the ways of further de-
development of democracy. Due to engagement of academic circles and active politicians, the Foundation creates conditions for a broad discussion on the issues of building a fair and sustainable economic and social pattern in separate countries of Europe and the whole world;

- **international collaboration:** due to international offices of the Foundation, which carry out their activities in more than 100 countries of the world, the Foundation supports the policy of peaceful collaboration and human rights protection, promotes creation and reinforcement of democratic, social and constitutional bodies. We are in favor of independent trade unions and strong civil society. Within the framework of European and integration process the Foundation actively promotes socially-oriented, democratic and competitive Europe;

- **support for talented youth** by providing scholarships, in particular to students and post-graduates from underprivileged families or migrants;

- **preservation of collective social democratic memory:** archives and library of the Foundation, as well as works on contemporary history allow to preserve the roots of social democracy and trade unions, at the same time they are information sources for conducting social-political and historical research.

At present, there are offices of the Foundation in Bonn and Berlin. Besides, in Federal Republic of Germany the Foundation has 6 educational centers as well as 12 county and regional offices. Apart from that, Friedrich Ebert Foundation possesses its own library in Bonn, which comprises 650,000 volumes. “The Archives of Social Democracy” of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn includes the biggest collection of materials from the history of the European labor movement.