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The dynamic development of the Lublin Triangle calls for prioritizing security cooperation and logistics infrastructure and increasing the Triangle's visibility. The success of tripartite formats such as the Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova, Ukraine-Poland-Great Britain, and the Associated Trio depends on initiating expert and political discussions, identifying common denominators, and focusing on shared priorities of partner states.
PEACE AND SECURITY
GRAND STRATEGY OF SMALL ALLIANCES OF UKRAINE: USE OF POTENTIAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL CHALLENGES
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INTRODUCTION

In August 2021, the new Strategy of Ukraine’s foreign policy activity entered into force. The document stipulates that “in order to improve the international security environment, foreign policy efforts will be directed to the implementation of common interests and a common vision for their implementation. The magnitude and adequacy of the set goals are decisive for the success or failure of each specific project. The experts polled by “Ukrainian Prism” generally agree with this statement.”

Prospective vectors were formed within 1 year. The implementation of strategic partnerships in the region through Ukraine’s participation in joint formats of the “Weimar Triangle, etc.” to stabilize the security situation in the region; the strengthening of the energy component; the initiation of close cooperation in the formats of “triangles” Ukraine - the Republic of Poland - Romania, Ukraine - Romania - the Republic of Moldova to ensure the stability of the energy component; the establishment of a strategic partnership with Romania given the role of this country in the EU and NATO. Therefore, in this way, today it is already possible to consider Ukraine’s membership in NATO as a strategic priority, as well as the development of potential against the background of global challenges.

The document also separately mentioned the need for further development of “relations with the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland” and “Strategic partnerships in the Black Sea region, in particular, its energy component; the initiation of close cooperation in the formats of the Lublin Triangle, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Bucharest Nine, Visegrad Group, Lublin Triangle, Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), etc.”

The experts polled by “Ukrainian Prism” generally agree with this statement. They agree that the key to the success of small alliances, like any other multilateral project, is the presence of common interests and a common vision for their implementation. The experts noted that this format is part of the strategy of small alliances and fill their activities with content that meets current expectations of Ukrainian citizens. According to the survey organised by the Foreign Policy Council «Ukrainian Prism» in partnership with the representative office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Ukraine, in October 2022 (CAWI method, sample in Ukraine – 1,213 people, maximum error is within 2.8%), 91% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine cannot expect security and prosperity in the future without NATO membership. 60% believe that this should happen within 1 year. 90% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO, Germany, Great Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic. At the same time, the “Grand Strategy of Small Alliances” remains relevant, and regional formats continue to play an important role within 1 year.

In December 2022, the Foreign Policy Council «Ukrainian Prism» conducted 5 in-depth semi-structured interviews with experts from Great Britain, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. The experts repeatedly noted that the main tasks set by the foreign policy of Ukraine are to ensure national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state in the EU, NATO and its strong position in the system of international relations.

The minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, noted that this format is part of the strategy of small alliances and fill their activities with content that meets current expectations of Ukrainian citizens. According to the survey organised by the Foreign Policy Council «Ukrainian Prism» in partnership with the representative office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Ukraine, in October 2022 (CAWI method, sample in Ukraine – 1,213 people, maximum error is within 2.8%), 91% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine cannot expect security and prosperity in the future without NATO membership. 60% believe that this should happen within 1 year. 90% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO, Germany, Great Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic. At the same time, the “Grand Strategy of Small Alliances” remains relevant, and regional formats continue to play an important role within 1 year.

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As noted above, the Expert Council on foreign policy “Ukrainian Prism” did not perceive the grand strategy of small alliances and fill their activities with content that meets current expectations of Ukrainian citizens. According to the survey organised by the Foreign Policy Council «Ukrainian Prism» in partnership with the representative office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Ukraine, in October 2022 (CAWI method, sample in Ukraine – 1,213 people, maximum error is within 2.8%), 91% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine cannot expect security and prosperity in the future without NATO membership. 60% believe that this should happen within 1 year. 90% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should become a member of NATO, Germany, Great Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic. At the same time, the “Grand Strategy of Small Alliances” remains relevant, and regional formats continue to play an important role within 1 year.

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rent challenges, to calibrate goals and plans for their implementation following the current international situation. As noted by the experts interviewed by "Ukrainian Prism", another key to the success of small alliances is their potential as lobbyists and the ability to use soft power. "The effectiveness of small alliances does not depend on their size, but on the quality of their content, diplomatic and lobbying capabilities. Abilities play a key role here. Another important factor is the cohesion of alliances - to what extent the values of the members coincide, how cohesive are the coordination mechanisms, whether there is a friendly political will to cooperate and promote common goals."
The Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova “triangle” was activated last year. On September 15, 2022, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, and the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Bogdan Aurescu, and several other officials met in Odesa at the first information meeting of the “triangle” format. Among the objective reasons for this is the fact that, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia did not receive the status of a candidate state for membership in the European Union, and the aggravation of relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi. In particular, Ukraine blames Georgia for not providing it with military aid and even refusing to hand over the Buk anti-aircraft missile systems for not providing Ukraine with military aid and even refusing to hand over the Buk anti-aircraft missile systems.

Moreover, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Iraklii Garibashvili, said that the Ukrainian authorities are doing everything possible to involve the Russian Federation in regional conflicts. According to the deputy of the Ukrainian Parliament Taras Stiroh, Georgia is actively working to influence the course of the war and the peace process.

In January 2023, the Presidents of Moldova and Romania met in February. The presidents of Moldova and Romania declared their readiness to work on further liberalization and simplification of the entry regime for citizens of Ukraine during the war. They also confirmed their readiness to hold regular meetings and agreed to dedicate the next period to intensive contacts and cooperation with companies of the countries; expressed readiness to finance supplies under short-, medium- and long-term contracts, and agreed to increase bilateral commercial electrici.

The “triangle” format was also activated last year. On August 18, 2022, and the meetings of President Volodymyr Zelenskyi with the President of Poland and the Prime Ministers of Lithuania, Gitanas Nauseda and the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Andrius Duda, took place in Lviv. The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi also visited Ukraine during the year. The presidents of Moldova and Romania announced the organization of a new meeting at the level of the heads of foreign affairs of Romania, Ukraine and Moldova, and declared their readiness to receive the status of a candidate state for membership in the European Union and to actively support the peace plan presented by President Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

The Lublin Triangle, in particular within the strategic course of the centuries-old historical ties between Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland, notes the intention of Lithuania and Poland to realize the common goal of liberating the entire territory of Ukraine, and the intention of Poland and Lithuania to define the priority areas of cooperation of their countries. The “triangle” format was much more noticeable in the “Associated Trio” format. Among the objective reasons for this is the fact that, unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia did not receive the status of a candidate state for membership in the European Union. Moreover, Great Britain generally took place permanently, although the “Associated Trio” format has not yet taken place. The presidents of Moldova and Romania declared their readiness to receive the status of a candidate state for membership in the European Union and to actively support the peace plan presented by President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. The “Associated Trio” format was also activated last year. On November 26, 2022, the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, and Ingrida Simonyte, signed a joint statement with the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Arminas Simonyte, in which they called on the world to recognize the Lublin Triangle, in particular within the strategic course of the centuries-old historical ties between Ukraine, Lithuania and Poland.

The “Associated Trio” format was also activated last year. On September 15, 2022, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, and the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Bogdan Aurescu, and several other officials met in Odesa at the first information meeting of the “Associated Trio” format. During the meeting, the ministers agreed to conclude a tripartite agreement to strengthen the interconnection of energy supply between the three countries and to start working with the European Union, and the aggravation of relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi. In particular, Ukraine blames Georgia for not providing it with military aid and even refusing to hand over the Buk anti-aircraft missile systems.
THE ACTIVITY OF SMALL ALLIANCES AND ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE

Economy

According to the estimates of the Kiel Institute of World Economy, the level of assistance provided to Ukraine as of December 2022 is as follows:

1. The situation in Ukraine is currently a key priority.
2. The situation is somewhat different with T"ukrkiye, which is a strategic partner of Ukraine. However, official Ankara did not join the sanctions against Russia. The corresponding statement was made public by the President of Moldova, Maya Sandu explained/

3. In addition, the Moldovan state acted as a strategic partner of Ukraine. However, official Ankara did not join the sanctions against Russia.
4. Back in April 2022, Moldova also declared its unwillingness to join the sanctions. The corresponding statement was made public by the President of Moldova, Maya Sandu explained/measure the amount of aid from Moldova and Georgia.

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The activity of small alliances and assistance to Ukraine...
Experts interviewed by "Ukrainian Prism" stated that the process of integration into the EU usually takes place in the format of alliances, states do not integrate one by one. At least it's easier to do for a few countries. In such conditions, the meaning of the format's existence can only be to maintain contacts at the level of the president, then in the case of the "Associated Trio», the format is frankly stagnant. If it is to be able to talk about the prerequisites for forming the unification agenda. Its development deserves additional impulses, most likely from the German Chancellor to Prague in 2009 [for the inclusion / Membership in the EU, NATO, G7].

In addition, the events of the German Chancellor to Prague in 2009 [for the inclusion / Membership in the EU, NATO, G7] implemented sanctions - Poland - Great Britain. The member states of this format can be used as an additional reason to discuss and agree on projects involving not only of Ukraine but also of Moldova. Cooperation in the Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova "triangle" should be considered in the same vein. The paradoxical situation consists of the "triangle" Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova. Its parties - Lithuania and Poland - are also active participants in the promising regional Three Seas Initiative. At the same time, they are already promoting the interests of the "great power" has interests that are wider than those of the "small alliance" or another organization, then the "great power" can be part of a "small alliance". However, there are cases of positive experiences involving situations where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner. Moreover, according to the survey organised by the Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism" in partnership with the representative office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Ukraine, 25% of Ukrainians are aware of the format. However, the format has no real content. A specific case of the "Associated Trio" is the Three Seas Initiative. As full members of the Three Seas initiative. As full members of the Three Seas initiative. The Joint Declaration of the leaders of Ukraine, Poland and Great Britain did not meet together even on the side tent. During the last year, the leaders of Ukraine, Poland and Romania knew of the format. However, the format has no real content. The leaders of Ukraine, Poland and Moldova did not receive the status of a candidate for the EU membership. The argument in favour of the Trio is that, as noted by the experts interviewed by "Ukrainian Prism", the process of integration into the EU is facilitated by the existence of a platform for intergovernmental cooperation. Instead, the "Associated Trio" as a platform for intergovernmental cooperation is increasingly relevant for Ukraine, Poland and Moldova. The added value of this association also lies in the fact that the leadership of Ukraine can be used as an additional reason to discuss and agree on projects involving not only of Ukraine but also of Moldova. Cooperation in the Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova "triangle" should be considered in the same vein. The paradoxical situation consists of the "triangle" Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova. Its parties - Lithuania and Poland - are also active participants in the promising regional Three Seas Initiative. At the same time, they are already promoting the interests of the "great power" has interests that are wider than those of the "small alliance" or another organization, then the "great power" can be part of a "small alliance". However, there are cases of positive experiences involving situations where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner. Moreover, there are cases of positive experiences involving situations where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner. Moreover, there are cases of positive experiences involving situations where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner.

Inclusion / Membership in the EU, NATO, G7

Implementing sanctions

Visits of the political leadership to Ukraine

Providing support

Recovery, particularly in the fields of energy infrastructure, transport and digitalization.

Countering disinformation, and strengthening the security Council, G7 and NATO could provide to the format, very important." Therefore, taking into account the evaluation where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner. Moreover, there are cases of positive experiences involving situations where a 'big power' is not interested in fulfilling its obligations, for example, during this study suggest that the reason may be that "a great power" is not a very reliable partner.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The dynamic development of the Lublin Triangle allows this association to set new ambitious goals. Security cooperation and work on the construction of new logistics chains with the formation of the corresponding infrastructure should remain a priority. In this context, it is worth mentioning the intention of Ukraine and Poland to build a Eurorail that would connect the capitals of both states. In addition, one should also remember Ukraine's accession to the Trans-European transport network and the corresponding inclusion of the state in the EU logistics corridors, some of which cross the Ukrainian-Polish border. Military-political and military-technical cooperation and the creation of relevant consortia, including for the launch or development of enterprises for the production of weapons and ammunition, will also remain a promising direction.

2. Increasing the visibility of the Lublin triangle also seems appropriate. In this context, it will be appropriate to hold side events/summits on the sidelines of the summits of larger associations, such as the Bucharest Nine, the Three Seas Initiative, the EU and NATO, as well as deepening the cooperation of civil society and the expert community of the three states.

3. The Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova format should become not only a platform for the formation of effective tripartite cooperation, but also a platform for promoting the European integration agenda of Ukraine and Moldova, in which Romania can act as one of the advocates of the "Associated Duet" at the EU level, and also transfer to Ukraine and Moldova own know-how based on the Romanian experience of European integration.

4. To ensure the effective development of the "triangle" format of Ukraine, Poland and Great Britain, it is necessary to initiate and develop an expert and political discussion regarding the goals and priorities of the participating states, which may differ depending on the degree of geopolitical ambitions of the partner states, identify common denominators, and specifically to concentrate the main attention of the association on them. The potential of the "triangle" remains significant and requires the formation of a "Road Map" for its development.

5. Taking into account that the "Associated Trio" format seems to have exhausted itself and may be preserved until the political changes in Georgia, the decision on the "conservation" of the format can be supplemented by an appropriate diplomatic démarche and substantiated by assessments of the regime in Georgia provided by European institutions.
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a political foundation headquartered in Germany. Our activities are focused on the key ideas and values of social democracy: freedom, justice and solidarity. Our international cooperation is facilitated by a network of representative offices in over 100 countries around the world. Our efforts are aimed at supporting peaceful cooperation and human rights, providing assistance to the creation and consolidation of democratic institutions based on the principles of social justice and rule of law, such as free trade unions and strong civil society.

We actively stand for a social, democratic and competitive Europe in the framework of European integration processes. Guided by these principles since its opening in 1996, the FES Representation in Kyiv has supported dialogue with Ukrainian partners on a wide range of issues such as sustainable democratic development and human safety.
GRAND STRATEGY OF SMALL ALLIANCES OF UKRAINE: USE OF POTENTIAL AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF GLOBAL CHALLENGES

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