Belarusian pro-democratic opposition forces have a long history of existence, which is connected with the development of authoritarian tendencies in Belarus after the election of Alexander Lukashenko as the country’s president. In the conditions of increasing consolidation of power in the hands of Lukashenko, almost every electoral cycle was accompanied by repressions – and that, in turn, generated new waves of political emigration.

The formation of the Belarusian democratic movement in its current configuration took place after the suppression of protests caused by the falsification of the 2020 presidential elections. As a result of unprecedented repression, some of the opposition leaders were imprisoned, while others were forced to emigrate. As a result, the so-called “old opposition”, represented by political parties and organisations that functioned before 2020, was largely marginalised and yielded to representatives of the last wave of emigration in shaping the political agenda.

Despite the fact that, as of today, democratic politicians have much more political subjectivity than before, the environment of Belarusian opposition structures is not homogeneous, and parallel processes of competition and coordination of efforts are taking place between the main groups of influence within the Belarusian democratic movement.

The transformation of the Belarusian opposition movement and relations between its main centres of influence are important for Ukraine in view of the need to strengthen the capabilities of Alexander Lukashenko’s competitors and develop effective mechanisms to counter threats that are associated with close cooperation between Minsk and Moscow.

 

Authors:

• Pavlo Rad, Analyst, “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
• Iaroslav Chornogor, PhD in History, Director, “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme, Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”

 

Content

Introduction

1. Centres of the Belarusian democratic movement: influence and relations with each other

1.1.The main centres of the Belarusian democratic movement

1.2. Coordination of efforts between the main democratic groups

1.3. Signs of competition between the main groups of the Belarusian democratic movement

2. Analysis of relations between the Belarusian democratic forces and official Kyiv: the current state and prospects for cooperation

2.1. The role that representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement assign to Ukraine in their strategies

2.2. Ukraine’s approach towards cooperation with Belarusian democratic forces

2.3. The potential benefits of cooperation between official Kyiv and Belarusian democratic forces

Conclusions

Recommendations

 

 

 

 

1. Centres of the Belarusian democratic movement: influence and relations with each other

 

1.1.The main centres of the Belarusian democratic movement

During the active phase of the protest in Belarus in 2020, caused by the falsification of the presidential election in Belarus, there were three main opposition forces: group of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, group of Viktar Babaryka and the group of Valery Tsepkalo. Suppression of protests, imprisonment of opposition leaders, as well as forced emigration of some of them significantly changed and multiplied the number of centres of Belarusian democratic forces.

Today, only one of the three main opposition groups of influence continues to be active – Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and the environment of the Belarusian democratic forces in 2024 is polycentric. The hubs of the Belarusian democratic movement are mainly concentrated in Poland and Lithuania, but some of the activists and organisations are located in other European countries, in particular Germany and Sweden. In addition, these centres differ in their nature, goals and means they use, and also the level of their media presence and the openness of contact with compatriots.

Although some of the Belarusian democratic groups are quite autonomous in their activities, the work of the most influential actors is concentrated around certain political figures. The presence of a formal leader is a prerequisite for the institutionalization of opposition groups and their acquisition of political weight. This feature distinguishes groups with a certain political subjectivity – for example, Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya or National Anti-Crisis Management, – from informal centres of influence and semi-underground groups such as Charter 97 or Belarusian Hajun.

Group	Leader	Level of institutionalisation	Overview
The most influential political groups within the Belarusian democratic movement
Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya	Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya	High level of institutionalisation	The most influential group that has political and financial support from Lithuania and Western countries. Formed around Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who is considered by some of the Belarusian democratic forces to be the legitimately elected president. It is the only one of the three main groups that is active and has serious political weight.
National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM)	Pavel Latushko	High level of institutionalisation	One of the most influential groups that has a strong position in the Coordination Council. Has the support of Poland. At one time, it emerged as a competing project to the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Politically active, but not sufficiently influential groups
Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Agency	Valery Kavaleuski	Moderate level of institutionalisation	This group is new among the Belarusian democratic forces, and it is undergoing the process of formation around the figure of Valery Kavaleuski – the former representative of foreign affairs of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus.
Group of Prokopiev-Yehorov	Andriy Yehorov, Vadim Prokopiev	Moderate level of institutionalisation	It exists in the form of the “Belarusians” faction in the Coordination Council, formed around former NAM member Vadym Prokopyev and ex-speaker of the Coordination Council of Belarus Andriy Yehorov. Performs the role of the main opposition force in relation to the structures controlled by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and Pavel Latushko.
Political groups that lost their influence after protests in 2020 or after internal conflicts after 2022
Group of Tsepkalo	Valery Tsepkalo	Low level of institutionalisation	After 2020, the group gradually lost its influence. To date,group Tsepkalo is marginalised, and Tsepkalo himself is not perceived in Belarusian democratic circles.
Group of Babaryka	Viktar Babaryka	Low level of institutionalisation	The group has been in fact dissolved, because most of its leaders, including Viktar Babaryka, are behind bars.
BYPOL	Aliaksandr Azarau	High level of institutionalisation	A group of former security forces operatives investigating crimes committed by representatives of the Lukashenko’s regime. During the last year, it lost a representative in the United Transitional Cabinet, and also got into a number of scandals.
Associations of activists, investigators and volunteers who are in close coordination with the politically influential groups
BELPOL	Matvej Kuprejchik	High level of institutionalisation	A splinter group from BYPOL. Conduct investigates. Cooperates with other centres of the democratic movement, but does not have serious political weight.
BYSOL	Andriy Stryzhak	High level of institutionalisation	Financial group engaged in evacuation of opposition activists from Belarus, support of public initiatives of Belarusians, collection of donations for victims of repressions, etc. The group is close to the Office of Tsikhanouskaya, although it does not have serious political weight.
Semi-underground or underground groups, some of which support communication with other centers of influence within the Belarusian democratic movement
Cyber Partisans	Yuliana Shemetovets (the only public representative of the group)	The level of institutionalisation is unknown	Specialists in the field of IT, who are engaged in collecting information about public authorities and hacking databases. Work closely with the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment.
Resistance	Yuras Zyankovich	The level of institutionalisation is unknown	An underground group that arose as a result of disappointment in Tsikhanouskaya. The group is in very close contact with the Cyber ​​Partisans.
Belarusian Hajun project	Anton Motolko	The level of institutionalisation is unknown	A semi-underground structure, the public leader of which is the Belarusian blogger Anton Motolko. Monitors the movement of Russian and Belarusian troops on the territory of the Republic of Belarus. Motolko himself spoke favorably of the activities of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, although there are no signs of close cooperation between the latter and the “Belarusian Hajun” group.
Representatives of the “old opposition”
Free Belarus	Zenon Pozniak	Sufficient level of institutionalisation	A rather radical group formed around the figure of Zenon Pozniak. It remains recognizable thanks to the figure of its leader, but is less politically active compared to the main actors of the Belarusian democratic movement. Its representatives are sceptical of the main power centres of the Belarusian democratic movement.
Charter 97	Andrei Sannikov	Low level of institutionalisation	A group consisting of representatives of previous waves of emigration. Representatives of the group are sceptical of the new figures of the Belarusian opposition, in particular, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. At the same time, Charter 97 is not a politically active force.

Table 1. The main centres of influence of the Belarusian democratic movement

A separate niche in the context of the functioning of the Belarusian democratic movement is occupied by the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment (hereinafter KKR) – the largest unit formed from among Belarusian citizens in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Being part of armed forces, the Regiment de facto possesses a certain political influence, but in a limited form. The biggest obstacle to gaining greater political weight is the lack of complete independence in the context of carrying out its activities, as well as the atypical nature of the Regiment’s activities, which is a consequence of being within the structure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

In order to overcome the formal restrictions caused by joining the Armed Forces of Ukraine and to strengthen the political subjectivity of the Belarusian volunteer movement, the social movement “Kalinovtsi” was created. Its goals are not only to help with the technical equipment of KKR fighters and to support the veterans and fighters of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, but also to coordinate its efforts with other political organizations of the Belarusian democratic forces, in particular with the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and thus – greater involvement in political processes within the Belarusian democratic forces.

In addition, prominent positions within the Belarusian democratic movement are occupied by former fighters of the Kalinoŭski Regiment, who, after completing their contracts with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, focused on political activities. We are talking about the former deputy commander of the KKR, and now the representative for national security and defence of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Vadym Kabanchuk, as well as some former fighters of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, who are members of the Coordination Council (hereinafter – CC) from the faction ” Independent Belarusians” and the “Volya” (Freedom) bloc.

 

1.2. Coordination of efforts between the main democratic groups

Given the existence of separate centres of the Belarusian democratic movement, a  remarkable feature of their functioning is the synchronous processes of attempts at cooperation and coordination of efforts with each other, and at the same time competition for influence and access to resources.

The need to respond to the challenges caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Belarus’ complicity in it became a serious impetus for coordination of efforts and institutionalisation of cooperation. In August 2022, the “New Belarus” conference was convened, as a result of which the United Transitional Cabinet (hereinafter referred to as UTC) was created – the collective executive body of the Belarusian democratic forces.

In addition, at the conference, a decision was made on the two-stage reorganisation of the Coordination Council, effectively defeated in 2020, which turned from a structure designed to ensure a peaceful transition of power after the falsification of the 2020 presidential elections into a representative body in exile.

As part of the first stage of reorganization, the Coordination Council brought together approximately 90 individuals and legal entities – in particular, public organizations, playing the role of a platform for coordinating the efforts of representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement. The official powers of the members of the Coordinating Council included listening to the reports of representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet, making recommendations regarding the approval of new candidacies for positions in the UTC, exercising public control over the activities of the United Transitional Cabinet, etc.

The period of transformation of the Coordination Council into a proto-parliament finally ended in May 2024. Although the powers of the body remained practically unchanged, a characteristic feature of the reform was the launch of a full-fledged political process, because for the first time the composition of the Coordination Council was elected through direct online voting based on electoral lists, and full-fledged factions with their own programs and agendas were also formed.

 

1.3. Signs of competition between the main groups of the Belarusian democratic movement

The different composition, structure and goals of Belarusian political organisations lead to disagreements arising from time to time between the centres of the Belarusian democratic movement. The most obvious are the differences between the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment and the representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet. While KKR relies more on the brute force in the context of achieving democratic change in the country, UTC sees the scenario of a peaceful transition of power to democratic forces as the main one. Although substantive discussions took place between the representatives of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment and the United Transitional Cabinet and the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and the establishment of the “Kalinovtsi” movement potentially opens up more opportunities for political cooperation, the formation of a common political position has not yet taken place.

The different composition, structure and goals of Belarusian political organizations lead to disagreements arising from time to time between the centers of the Belarusian democratic movement. The most obvious are the differences between the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment and the representatives of the Joint Transitional Cabinet. While KKR relies more on the force scenario in the context of achieving democratic changes in the country, the UTC considers the scenario of a peaceful transition of power to democratic forces as the main one. Although substantive discussions have taken place between representatives of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment and the Joint Transitional Cabinet and the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, and the establishment of the Kalinoŭski movement potentially opens up more opportunities for political cooperation, the formation of a common political position has not yet taken place.

The source of the debate was also the provisions of the protocol of interaction between the National Leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the Coordination Council, the Joint Transitional Cabinet and the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, adopted as part of the August “New Belarus” conference. This mainly concerns the nomination of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as the national leader with an almost unlimited term of office, as well as granting her wide powers. Thus, Tsikhanouskaya forms the UTC, while the decisions of the Coordinating Council regarding personnel issues are only advisory in nature, and in the event of the inability of the structures of the Belarusian democratic movement, it has the authority to independently resolve disputes, and also considers them and makes a final decision.

However, disagreements arise not only between different centres of power, but also within specific structures of the Belarusian democratic forces. We are talking about individual organisations from among the Belarusian democratic movement, as well as the United Transitional Cabinet and the Coordination Council. Thus, BYPOL, being one of the most influential groups within the Belarusian democratic movement as of 2022, split due to internal conflicts and practically lost its political weight, remaining without a representative in the United Transitional Cabinet.

The Coordination Council of the third convocation, despite its transformation into a proto-parliament, remained a source of scandals even in the first weeks of its existence, which were primarily related to procedural issues, the problem of a dual mandate and the provisions of the Coordination Council Charter.

The Coordination Council of the third convocation, despite its transformation into a proto-parliament, remained a source of scandals in the first weeks of its existence, which were primarily related to procedural issues, the problem of a dual mandate and the provisions of the Coordination Council Charter.

In addition, questions regularly arise regarding the activities of the Joint Transitional Cabinet, which does not have representatives for the restoration of law and order, finance and the economy, and recently the representative for international affairs Valery Kavaleuski left the team, who decided to create his own initiative called “Agency for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation”, as well as representative for social issues Olha Gorbunova, justifying his decision with a crisis of ideas and people.

In addition, questions regularly arise regarding the activities of the Joint Transitional Cabinet, which does not have representatives for the restoration of law and order, finance and the economy, and recently the representative for international affairs Valery Kavaleuski left the team, which decided to create its own the initiative called “Agency for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation”, as well as the representative of social issues Olga Gorbunova, justifying her decision with a crisis of ideas and people.

Position	2022/2023	2023/2024	2024/2025
Representative on power transition	Pavel Latushko	Pavel Latushko	Pavel Latushko
Law enforcement representative	Aliaksandr Azarau	Vacant	Vacant
Foreign affairs representative	Valery Kavaleuski	Valery Kavaleuski	Vladzimir Astapenka
Representative for defence and national security	Valery Sakhashchyk	Valery Sakhashchyk	Vadzim Kabanchuk
Finance and economics representative	Tacciana Zareckaja	Vacant	Vacant
Representative for national revival	Alina Koushyk	Alina Koushyk	Vacant
Representative on social issues	Volha Harbunova	Volha Harbunova	Olga Zazulinska
Youth policy representative	N/A	N/A	Margarita Vorykhava

Table 2. Composition of United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus

Gorbunova’s departure took place in the wider context of internal disputes surrounding the strategy chosen by democratic politicians. The release of about 100 political prisoners by the Lukashenko’s regime, more active attempts by official Minsk to send signals to Western countries about their readiness to establish a more constructive dialogue, as well as the absence of Belarusian citizens during the August exchange of prisoners between Russia and the West raised a number of questions about the real political influence of Belarusian democratic forces and the relevance of their chosen approach.

The impetus for this discussion was given by the former speaker of the Coordination Council Andriy Yehorov, who declared the crisis of the current strategic approach and suggested abandoning the strategy of pressure on the Lukashenko’s regime, focusing on the release of political prisoners. As part of this process, it was proposed to partially recognize the legitimacy of the Lukashenko’s regime, provided that this step would allow the release of more prisoners.

Transformational processes also took place in the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment for some time, where some of the commanders did not support the idea of ​​participation of the unit’s fighters in the elections to the Coordination Council. Against the background of disagreements in the unit regarding greater involvement in political processes, which existed for a long time, KKR commander Denys Prokhorov left his post, later becoming one of the founders of the “Kalinovtsi” movement.

For this very reason, some fighters left KKR or were transferred to other units, sometimes even whole groups. Therefore, now the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment is not a monopoly in the context of attracting Belarusian volunteers, although it still remains the most famous and recognizable unit.

 

2. Analysis of relations between the Belarusian democratic forces and official Kyiv: the current state and prospects for cooperation

 

2.1. The role that representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement assign to Ukraine in their strategies

Belarusian democratic forces view Ukraine as a key player in the context of solving the Belarusian crisis, realising that the security and future of both are to some extent interconnected. This position was enshrined in the cornerstone document of the United Transitional Cabinet, the Strategy for Transition to New Belarus, which states that democratic forces recognize Ukraine as a strategic partner in all spheres, including the economic one. Forming the contours of their activities in the transition period, representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces emphasize the importance of restoring and developing bilateral relations between Minsk and Kyiv, perceiving this as one of the priorities of their work in the transition period.

Similar wording is used in other documents of the Belarusian democratic forces. Thus, the Declaration on Foreign Policy Priorities of Democratic Belarus, adopted in 2024 as part of the “New Belarus” conference, declares the desire of the Belarusian democratic forces to develop and expand cooperation with its strategic partners, including Ukraine, solidarity with the Ukrainian people, and the desire to provide support and assistance Ukraine. In the Declaration on Responsibility and Restoration of Justice, Belarusian democratic politicians emphasize the need to bring Oleksandr Lukashenko and those close to him to account for the crime of aggression against Ukraine and war crimes against the civilian population.

In addition, Ukraine is given an important role in the Coordination Council. Virtually all factions mentioned Ukraine, outlining the support or development of cooperation with official Kyiv as one of the goals of their activities. The Prokopiev-Yehorov bloc generally set a very high bar for future bilateral relations at the level of establishing a strategic dialogue with Ukraine – a format of cooperation that the democratic politicians of Belarus are already implementing with the USA and the EU.

Perceiving Ukraine as one of its strategic partners, the democratic Belarusian politicians try to maintain their presence in Ukraine, for which the Mission of Democratic Belarus functions in the Ukrainian capital – a format of permanent presence of Belarusian democratic forces at international organizations or in key states, which to some extent resembles the work of diplomatic missions.

Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment also realizes the importance of partnership with Ukraine for the future of Belarus. Belarusian volunteers perceive Russia as a common enemy of Belarus and Ukraine, and therefore hope that the liberation of Ukraine will cause Moscow to weaken, and therefore – shake the power of Oleksandr Lukashenko.

Moreover, representatives of almost all groups of influence within the Belarusian democratic movement agree that the future of Ukraine and Belarus are inextricably linked, and the fate of Belarus and the region as a whole is decided within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

 

2.2. Ukraine’s approach towards cooperation with Belarusian democratic forces

Despite the prioritisation of the Ukrainian vector of cooperation by Belarusian democratic forces and despite regular attempts to establish closer contact with Ukrainian political elites, the approach of official Kyiv to cooperation with Belarusian activists is quite restrained, which is fostered by a number of factors.

The main reason is the security factor, which is the main priority of Ukraine and prompts the Ukrainian authorities to refrain from actions that could provoke Lukashenko or disturb the delicate balance in relations with official Minsk. In particular, this applies to the deepening of interaction with the structures of the Belarusian democratic forces.

Another reason is the lack of a clear strategy for work in the Belarusian direction, as a result of which the actions of official Kyiv are reactive, not proactive. Since the spring of 2023, Belarus has not posed a direct military threat to Ukraine, which is due to the withdrawal of almost the entire contingent of Russian troops from the territory of Belarus, as well as the evolution of the role of the Lukashenko regime, which is important for Moscow primarily as a supplier of products for military purposes, and not as a combat unit. Despite the obvious changes, the actions of official Kyiv are still limited to a narrow range of tasks for responding to possible security challenges.

Belarus also does not appear in the rhetoric of key Ukrainian political figures in terms of the future security of Ukraine and the region, not to mention the adopted strategic documents or the updating of existing ones in order to develop a clear approach to the Belarusian vector.

In addition, taking into account the need to confront Russia on a daily basis, official Kyiv is trying to instrumentalize partnerships in favour of achieving quick and distinct results.

Probably, this factor was the reason for Ukraine’s slightly different approach to cooperation with the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, which the Ukrainian authorities considered not only as a formation within the Armed Forces, but also as a political project that can be used to restrain the Lukashenko’s regime.

At the same time, in cooperation with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and structures related to her, Ukrainian officials did not see the potential to achieve immediate results, perceiving this wing of the Belarusian democratic movement as having limited opportunities to oppose the Lukashenko’s regime or provide serious support to Ukraine.

Despite all existing restrictions and caution of official Kyiv, there are certain signs that point to the evolution of Ukraine’s approaches to working with Belarusian democratic forces. So, in January 2024, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya had a short conversation with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba. Soon, in February 2024, Ihor Kyzim was appointed to the position of ambassador on special assignments to Belarus, and the scope of his authority includes establishing and maintaining contacts with all centers of the Belarusian democratic movement.

Communication between Ukrainian parliamentarians from the inter-factional parliamentary association “For Democratic Belarus!” is also on the move with the representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet, which allows them to convey their position to at least a certain proportion of Ukrainian officials.

In addition, there have been minor changes in the rhetoric of Ukrainian politicians. If at the beginning of 2023 Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s advisor Mykhailo Podolyak questioned the need to establish closer relations with the Belarusian democratic forces, and Ukrainian officials refrained from making statements about the future of Belarus, this year President Zelenskyi publicly supported the potential future membership of Belarus in the EU and emphasized the need the existence of a free and democratic country.

2.3. The potential benefits of cooperation between official Kyiv and Belarusian democratic forces

The cautious attitude towards cooperation with the Belarusian democratic movement creates limitations for official Kyiv not only in the context of finding long-term solutions to the Belarusian issue, but also in the context of demonstrating a constructive role in solving wider regional problems.

It is necessary to realise that the establishment of closer interaction with the Belarusian democratic forces will not bring immediate results, but this step can create the prerequisites for achieving longer-term results.

Thus, cooperation with Belarusian democratic forces can become a mechanism of influence on Belarusian society both abroad and partially within Belarus itself. More active interaction with them opens wider opportunities for influencing the Belarusian diaspora. It’s no secret that many Belarusians abroad keep in touch with relatives, loved ones, and friends who have remained in the country. Therefore, personal connections can help broadcast the necessary narratives and form a positive image of Ukraine among Belarusians.

What is no less important, working with the Belarusian democratic movement will undoubtedly make it possible to have an indirect influence on the formation of the agenda in the circles of opposition politicians. We are talking not only about possible formats of cooperation in the field of personnel training or exchange of experience, which will make it possible to establish close interpersonal and working ties between Ukrainian intellectuals and political actors on the one hand and Belarusian activists and politicians – on the other. We are also talking about direct and transparent communication and interaction.

The latter aspect is particularly important in the context of the strengthening of Belarusian democratic politicians connected to Ukraine. In particular, this concerns the appointment of the former deputy commander of the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment Vadym Kabanchuk to the position of national security and defense representative of the United Transitional Cabinet, as well as the membership of the Coordination Council of a number of figures who carried out or continue to carry out their activities in Ukraine.

Considering the fact that, as of today, in addition to Lithuania and Poland, there is a third center of the Belarusian democratic movement, which is located in Ukraine, official Kyiv has all the opportunities to turn into one of the most influential players in the context of solving the Belarusian issue.

Given the not entirely favorable foreign policy situation caused by internal political debates in the West and war fatigue, Ukraine could consider the Belarusian issue as an opportunity to act as a constructive regional player. This means that Kyiv in its communication with Western capitals will be able to appeal not only to emotional narratives, which over time receive less and less feedback, but also to be a participant in the transformations in the region, which will allow finding new arguments in interaction with the West.

However, the most important advantage of Ukraine’s more active involvement in processes related to Belarus is the creation of prerequisites for the formation of a full-fledged strategy and the establishment of long-term mechanisms of influence on the situation. This factor will be important when responding to challenges related to the formation of a new security architecture in the region after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as to challenges related to internal political transformations in Belarus after Alexander Lukashenko left power.

 

Conclusions

The Belarusian democratic movement abroad has gone through an evolution, in which separate political structures and public initiatives have begun the process of coordinating efforts and establishing a closer dialogue. This was reflected not only in the creation of such proto-institutions as the UTC and the CC, but also in the formation of a network of partnerships between the main political forces of the Belarusian democratic movement and organisations or public initiatives close to them.

At the same time, the existence of the main poles of power, which are the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the National Anti-Crisis Management and the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment, as well as the existence of a number of less influential, but active political groups, creates conditions for internal competition and struggle both at the level of ideas, and at the level of access to material resources. So the main feature of the Belarusian democratic forces is their heterogeneity.

Ukrainian political elites need to pay more attention to internal processes in the environment of Belarusian democratic forces in order to determine the priority vectors of work and develop a strategic vision in the context of solving the Belarusian issue.

It is important that the potential cooperation with the Belarusian pro-democracy groups is not limited to symbolic and sometimes counterproductive steps, but is part of a broader strategy to oppose the Lukashenko regime and prevent restrictions on Belarusian independence by Russia.

Although the immediate benefit from a closer interaction with the Belarusian democratic movement may not be significant, the Belarusian democratic forces should be considered as a locomotive for Ukrainian interests both in the context of influencing a part of Belarusian society and in the broader paradigm of preventing security challenges and Belarus losing its independence.

 

Recommendations

In the context of cooperation with the Belarusian democratic parties, Ukraine needs to work on several tracks at the same time, which will allow establishing an effective format of cooperation taking into account the security situation and current interests of Ukraine.

1. Development of a full-fledged strategy that will go beyond containment of the Lukashenko’s regime and include a wider set of tools with the aim of building an infrastructure to influence Belarus. As part of this process, the necessary steps are as follows:

• Conduct an “inventory check” of Ukrainian-Belarusian relations at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and law enforcement agencies in order to assess the domestic political situation in Belarus, security risks from the Lukashenko’s regime, as well as identify potential sectors in which cooperation with the Belarusian democratic forces can be intensified.

• Research of the potential and capabilities of all centres of the Belarusian democratic movement. In addition to the most recognizable structures, there are also less formal or visible groups of influence that have a unique competence that can be useful for official Kyiv.

• Conducting consultations with Ukrainian expert, intellectual and media circles, as well as representatives of Belarusian democratic forces on the subject of possible directions of cooperation and the format of interaction. Such areas of cooperation can be the strengthening human resources potential, the development of information influence mechanisms and the promotion of the necessary narratives, etc.

• Assessment of human and financial resources that can be used in the context of implementation of the specific course, as well as development of solutions for potential resource limitations.

• The creation of analytical structures that will be engaged in the study of processes related to Belarus and democratic forces on an ongoing basis, as well as the involvement of certain highly qualified specialists and existing structures within civil society in this process.

2. Development of influence mechanisms on Belarusian society in cooperation with the Belarusian democratic movement, which will include the following elements:

• The development of informal media resources, as well as the creation of a discussion platform for Belarusian and Ukrainian experts and opinion leaders. As long as there is no firewall established on foreign online resources in Belarus, they can be used to re-broadcast essential narratives from Ukraine and Belarusian democratic forces to Belarusian society.

• Cooperation with Belarusian independent mass media operating abroad can be implemented in the format of a large tour of Ukraine, based on the results of which a number of text and video materials will be prepared. In particular, the communication of Ukrainian high-ranking officials with representatives of the Belarusian non-state mass media can create sufficient informational resonance for a significant part of Belarusians to form a more positive impression of Ukraine.

• Support for Belarusian independent authors, which will include the creation of an infrastructure for their training, provision of expert and coordination support. This will not only make it possible to convey the necessary signals to Belarusians more effectively, but also make it possible to have loyal people in the Belarusian independent media pool.

• Implementation of educational programs for Belarusian students in Ukraine. Considering the fact that Russia actively attracts Belarusian youth to study at Russian universities, thereby integrating them into its cultural and worldview space, Ukraine also needs to be included in the process of “fighting” for Belarusian students both to partially prevent the spread of Russian influences and to form a positive image of Ukraine.

3. Strengthening the competence of the political bloc of the Belarusian democratic movement, which will include the following elements:

• The organisation of study visits, internship programs and even the adoption of short-term employment contracts with some of the participants of the Belarusian democratic movement would make it possible to establish close ties between Ukrainian political elites and representatives of Belarusian democratic forces. In addition, such a step would partially overcome the shortage of personnel in the civil service.

• The organisation of the so-called shadow cabinet – a program in which representatives of the Belarusian democratic movement carry out a simulation of the real government in ministerial and other government roles. Such a program would be useful both from the point of view of preparing certain position documents for the Belarusian democratic forces, and also filling vacant positions, for example, in the United Transitional Cabinet.

• Ukraine is on the path that representatives of Belarusian democratic forces will potentially have to go through as well, so relaying the successful experience of state reforms is an important mechanism to assert Ukrainian influence on at least a certain part of the Belarusian democratic movement.Information about the authors

 

 

 

Pavlo Rad

Analyst of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. He holds an LLB in International Law from the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv and is an alumnus of several programmes by Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg (Germany), Mercatus Center at George Mason University (US), and Central European University (Hungary).

His research interests include activities of the Belarusian democratic forces, domestic and foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus, its relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union.

 

Iaroslav Chornogor

Ph.D. in History, director of the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”,  senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.“

He graduated from the historical and economic faculties of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (2001) and pursued additional training in Germany at the University of Konstanz (2004) and the Christian-Albrecht University of Kiel (2006). He earned a Master of History degree (2001) and a Ph.D. in History (2006).

Iaroslav worked at various institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (2004–2023), combining scientific research with teaching at the National University “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,” the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, and other universities.

A reserve officer and war veteran, he participated in the anti-terrorist operation (2017) and served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2016–2021).

His research interests focus on Ukraine’s foreign policy, comprehensive studies of Belarus and the Russian Federation, political processes in these countries, their prospects for transformation, and issues related to Ukraine’s information security, countering Russian propaganda, and disinformation.

 

 

 

 

 

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The policy brief was prepared within the “Russian and Belarusian Studies” Programme of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with the support of “Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom” Representation in Ukraine. The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the Ukrainian Prism and do not necessarily reflect the position of “Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom” Representation in Ukraine.