Trends 2024: Russia

2024 will be a year of relative strengthening of President Putin’s regime. As a result, the Russian president will further move away from the role of referee in relations between influence groups within Russian political elites.

KEY INDICATORS

2024 will be a year of relative strengthening of President Putin’s regime. As a result, the Russian president will further move away from the role of referee in relations between influence groups within Russian political elites. At the same time, traditional internal competition between these elites will continue, but this process will not seriously impact shaking the political system of the Russian Federation. Despite a certain strengthening of Putin’s regime, there will be an aggravation of conflicts and growing discontent on national, religious, and economic grounds, which may become a serious problem not only for the regional authorities but also for the federal government.

On the international stage, Moscow’s attention will be focused on the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin considers an opportunity to wedge into the confrontation between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the new contours of which are expected to be outlined after the formation of a new administration in Washington. Besides waging the war in Ukraine, to achieve this goal, Russia will intervene in the internal affairs of African states and support the emergence of new hot spots all over the globe. Such actions are expected to undermine the geopolitical strength of Western states and spark internal disagreements in the West. In parallel, the Russian Federation will try to defend its monopoly of influence in those states that are traditionally considered to be a part of Moscow’s sphere of interests and intensify relations with Asian actors as a part of the geopolitical turn to the East.

Inside the state, the following variables are important:

• Conservation of V. Putin’s regime. The personalist regime in Russia will remain, and the 2024 elections will be designed to legitimise the current president’s rule. This process will take place in parallel with the introduction of changes to Putin’s public image and manner of communication with citizens to dispel the greatest concern felt by the Russians – the age of the Russian president.
• Along with conserving the personalist regime, there will be certain changes in the format of functioning of political elites. Thus, V. Putin will move away from the role of referee in relations between those close to him, taking over implementing the most important decisions. These changes were provoked by the lack of reaction of the elites during the Prigozhin coup and the perception of the march as a threat to Putin himself. The death of the Wagner Group’s leader allowed Putin to make sure that there has been no conspiracy behind him and to take control of most of the processes to prevent similar incidents in the future.
• Despite certain transformations in the context of Russian political elites’ functioning, competition between groups of influence will continue in the future. V. Zolotov, the head of Rosgvargiya, will strengthen his positions in the law enforcement bloc since he has incorporated part of the Wagner Group under his authority. This will allow him to compete with Shoigu-Gerasimov tandem. Tensions between other law enforcement agencies are expected to continue, but the actions of the entire group in the external field will be coordinated. Similar processes will take place in the group of technocrats where competition between financiers and persons connected to the political component or the energy sector will not cease to exist.
• Exacerbation of conflicts on national, religious, and economic grounds. The decrease in the share of the Slavic population and increase in the share of Muslims in the national structure of the Russian Federation provoked by different dynamics of the birth rate, migration, and subsequent naturalisation of natives from Central Asia will be a source of constant conflicts between residents of the Russian Federation, especially in large cities. In parallel, there will be growing discontent caused by striking economic inequality, which is a consequence of the exploitation of peripheral regions and also the challenges associated with the war in Ukraine.

In the foreign policy field, the following processes will take place:

• Militarisation of political discourse and preparation for long-term war. Ukrainian track will remain the main for the Russian Federation, and Moscow will not give up its efforts to draw Ukraine into its orbit of influence. Therefore, in order to mobilise citizens and state resources, Putin and the Russian government will promote the narrative of a “patriotic war” that is necessary to preserve sovereignty. In parallel, Russia will make significant investments in the defence industry, increase the production of weapons to fuel its military machine, and further develop a network of military-patriotic education organisations and structures to support the military.
• Creation of additional global hot spots and increasing influence in Africa. Given the fact that elections will be held in many African states next year, Russia can be expected to step up in this direction with its usual tools: corruption, interference in elections, and the use of mercenaries. At the same time, Moscow will try to indirectly fuel local conflicts around the globe in order to create additional problems for the Western states.
• Attempts to maintain a monopoly in relations with states that the Kremlin considers a part of its sphere of influence. In relations with Central Asia, Moscow will try to maintain its position through a wide infrastructure of influence that extends to the political, economic, and cultural spheres. Also, the Kremlin will continue the integration process with Belarus within the framework of the so-called Union State, further undermining the sovereignty of the neighbouring state. Despite a mostly positive situation, Moscow will face several problems, particularly the distancing of Armenia, strengthening of Chinese influence in neighbouring countries, primarily in Kazakhstan, as well as the completion of the process of de-actualisation of certain structures, such as the CSTO.
• Continuation of the geopolitical turn to the East. Russia will be strengthening ties with its partners in military, economic, and political dimensions, which will make it possible to solve urgent issues, in particular in the context of waging war in Ukraine and circumventing sanctions, as well as contribute to the formation of a pool of partners whose interests are based on anti-American sentiments. At the same time, relations with China will retain features of disproportionality, which may deepen due to Russia’s inability to cope with the existing challenges.

SCENARIOS

STABLE SYSTEM. AN OLD-NEW RUSSIA

In the conditions of the aggravation of the economic crisis caused by aggression against Ukraine and the lack of gains on the battlefield, Russia will be forced to take a more constructive position in the context of a peaceful settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war. The prospects of lifting part of the sanctions may be the factor that will incline the Russian leadership to seek such an exit strategy from the war that would allow them to save face.

Exit from the war on terms that can be presented as the achievement of the goals of the so-called Special Military Operation will make it possible to preserve the power structure from possible shocks, but it will somewhat change the balance of power among the Russian elites. Thus, greater influence will be gained by technocrats who will receive additional levers of influence on the foreign and defence policy. The strengthening of this group will not mean a fundamental change in approaches but a correction that will add flexibility to the regime in Moscow, making its policy more pragmatic in order to adapt its ideology to new realities and get out of the economic crisis. Simply put, this “Kremlin tower” will advocate the creation of an effective empire.

However, complete normalisation of relations with the West will not occur. Russia will continue its usual line of behaviour with neighbouring states, strengthening its influence, which may become compensation for failures in the Ukrainian direction.

ORBITALLY STABLE SYSTEM. PUTIN’S RUSSIA

The political system of the Russian Federation will maintain relative integrity and stability, which will be facilitated by strengthening V. Putin’s positions. Preserving the regime and abandoning the referee role will be quite effective in the short term, but it will not answer the question of Russia’s future without Putin. In parallel, the struggle between various groups of influence will continue, but it will not be of critical importance for shaking the system built by Putin.

Although the Russian economy will continue to show signs of recovery for some time, it will likely enter a period of stagnation and even overheating. This is due to a decrease in export volumes, a shortage of personnel, which will deepen because of the war, and an acceleration of inflation.

On the foreign policy track, Ukraine will remain key for the Kremlin, so the Russian Federation will continue to demonstrate its readiness to wage a protracted conflict. Thus, in 2024, defence spending will make up to 6% of GDP compared to 3.9% in 2023. The system of contract recruitment and covert mobilisation will maintain its effectiveness, ensuring a constant flow of personnel to the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces, and military-industrial complex enterprises will scale up the production of equipment and ammunition. The Kremlin will make a key bet on reducing the amount of aid supplied to Ukraine by Western governments, as a result of what Moscow hopes to gain a better position before possible negotiations on the war settlement.

Russia will be using the war in Ukraine to wedge into the US-China standoff. Therefore, there will be no serious warming of relations between the Russian Federation and the West. However, the Kremlin will be looking for potential allies in the ranks of Western politicians, especially against the background of the presidential elections in the US.

At the same time, Russia will try to preserve its influence in the countries it traditionally considers to be a part of its sphere of interests. First, this concerns Central Asian states, which have become the main way of circumventing sanctions and obtaining sanctioned goods, as well as Belarus as the only formal ally of Moscow. However, in certain areas, the Kremlin will face difficulties due to China’s growing influence, especially in Kazakhstan. Also, Russian influence will be decreasing in the Caucasus after Armenia abandoned the bet on Moscow as the sole security guarantor.

UNSTABLE SYSTEM. UNPREDICTABLE RUSSIA

Russia is conducting a series of offensive operations and gaining an advantage in the war against the background of even greater erosion of the security system, increased military cooperation with Iran and China, escalating relations with the West, and the inability of the latter to provide all the necessary assistance to official Kyiv.

In the conditions of escalation, the Kremlin will move to manual control of the economy. Within this process, a law on contributions from the excess profits of large companies will be adopted. Small and medium-sized businesses may fall under additional tax burden as well. Additional tax obligations will be imposed on Russian citizens, making it possible to switch to a command system but at the same time, it will reduce the stability of the Russian economy and undermine its growth capacity in the medium and long-term run.

There will be a more serious purge of the media sphere with the expansion of blocking, including VPN services, reassessment of the use of messengers, especially Telegram, as well as attempts to introduce a fully censored, state-approved network where the consumer will receive pre-filtered information.

At the same time, the escalation strategy will likely accelerate the deepening of systematic problems within the Russian Federation, which will have an even more negative impact on the economy, exacerbate social issues, and cause misunderstandings among political elites. In this case, the processes inside the country will be more difficult to control, which may lead to the emergence of unpredictable and dangerous situations for the Kremlin.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.