Global Trends 2024: UKRAINE’S TOOLKIT TO INFLUENCE GLOBAL PROCESSES

The possibility of Ukraine being involved or even influencing global processes will depend on the number of variables. In this category, it is difficult to clearly state which will have greater influence: those dependent on the internal developments in Ukraine or those that characterize the international system itself and the actions of the third actors.

MAIN VARIABLES

1. Competition in the high-technology domain. This variable for 2024 comprises both innovation development and access to hi-tech, including microchips and rare materials for their production. The main development will depend on the readiness of the United States and China to recognise the importance of proactive crisis prevention and management in this sphere, sanctions regimes, and possible crises in countries with rare materials.
2. Ability to refocus attention of the Global South. For the last two years, Ukraine’s authorities have been proclaiming their focus on Asia, Africa, and Latin America. However, this policy still lacks a coherent and comprehensive approach, with limited diplomatic presence and not always the ability to attract the attention of these regions and explain why they should care about Ukraine. Participation of the Global South states in the Peace Formula, voting in the UN, number of bilateral interactions, and opening of the new embassies of Ukraine are among the factors to follow.
3. New crises in Asia, the Middle East or Africa. Ukraine’s ability to influence the global process will also depend on the necessity to balance between the conflicting parties in other parts of the world (e.g. Israel-Arab countries, China-Taiwan, etc.). The appearance of new crises or the escalation of those developed in 2023 (e.g. Gaza, Red Sea, Venezuela-Guyana, Iran, Sudan, Mali, Ethiopia) may distract attention from the Ukrainian agenda.
4. EU elections and deepening of the integration process. Integration of Ukraine into the EU has increased the interest of many countries around the globe in possible cooperation with Ukraine. The successful integration process without disruption will make this tendency more stable and can allow Ukraine to join the EU global initiatives. EU election results in 2024 are important in this sense as they will determine a more nationalist isolationist approach or the greater global involvement of the EU as a single actor. Joining PESCO and other defence industry initiatives of the EU may also become an important factor that will have not only a European effect but may allow the promotion of Ukrainian technologies to the global market.
5. Russia’s ability to conduct active foreign policy. Russia is not only a counterpart in the Russian-Ukrainian war but also a competitor in the grain and weapons market. It also provides active information policy and hybrid warfare in different countries around the globe and within international institutions. In such context, as the previous experience demonstrated, it will aim to undermine Ukrainian positions abroad. Internal destabilisation, the efficiency of sanctions regime implementation (minimising grey supplies and sanction bypass), economic decrease, anti-war sentiments – all this may lead to greater concentration on domestic politics rather than international, remaining fewer resources for conducting special operations abroad and project influence. The domestic weakness of the political system, first of all, the current regime, may also lead to a different balance in Moscow-Beijing relations.

In addition to the external factors, the following internal variables should be named:

1. The ability of Ukraine to conduct an asymmetric warfare. The success of Ukraine on the battlefield has a significant impact not only on the security of the state but also on its perception around the globe. However, not only a counter-offence or de-occupation of the territories influence such perceptions. Use of the new technologies and marine drones, change of the balance of power in the Black Sea due to their use, ability to counter cyber-attacks and to build an integrated command and control system, successful counter-disinformation campaigns and gaining the support of the big players – all this allow Ukraine entering spheres that previously were not in its portfolio, to begin with maritime security, additional military industry sectors and future of warfare, strategic planning, etc.
2. The pace of the EU and NATO approximation reforms. This variable contributes both to Ukraine’s ability to join the EU and NATO’s global projects and demonstrates to the third countries its ability to economic and democratic development during the war and opening of new markets.
3. International presence. Though this variable aims at the external dimension, nevertheless, it mostly originates from Ukraine’s internal capacity and capabilities to be active and comprehensive in conducting its foreign policy and guarantee global presence. To be involved in the global processes, Ukraine should be ready to react to other regions’ agenda, be present at top international events and voice its position in the international discourse. For this, it should be a complete deck of actors involved – the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its diplomatic missions abroad, and other ministries involved, all parties representatives of the Parliament, and civil society.

SCENARIOS

Considering the above mentioned, we can conclude that there are a limited number of spheres where Ukraine can have a global involvement. Still, there is a possibility to be an initiator of certain discussions or an example for lessons learned. Three basic scenarios are simple in this case:

A positive scenario will mean the ability of Ukraine and its actors to impact the global agenda and to be included in the global process, for which we will need a lower level of crisis development around the globe, with deeper EU and NATO integration, plus success in the war against Russia.

A neutral scenario de facto envisages securing the current status quo of an ambiguous situation. Alternating currents of attention towards Ukraine due to the sporadic new conflict spots appearance but without serious regional conflict’s developments that will include major powers, uncertain situation at the front-line, and unstable position of many countries at the Global South regarding support of Ukraine or Russia, participation in Peace Formula meetings, in parallel with continued European integration of Ukraine, smooth elections to the European Parliament and US elections – are the main indicators that will characterise this scenario.

A negative scenario will mean inability of Ukraine to attract attention of the Global South, losing positions in priority spheres, which among others identified in the Peace Formula (e.g. nuclear and food security, rules-based order, etc.), losing support within the international institutions that can be driven both by the internal developments in Ukraine (lower pace of reforms, economic difficulties, loses at the battlefield, political conflicts) and external factors of increased conflict potential around the world, rose of populistic sentiments and pro-Russian politicians, EU crises, etc.

FIVE SPHERES TO BE INVOLVED IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Within all these scenarios, the following five spheres will be the most preferable and realistic for Ukraine to be involved in the global process in 2024.

1. Maritime security. This will include both military and transport aspects of the maritime domain. From the protection of the seaports and freedom of navigation to the use of marine drones and asymmetric warfare on sea – these spheres “tested” in the Black Sea have a significant potential for lessons learned and initiation of the global or regional forums for sharing experience and norms clarification.
2. Food security. The issue of food security will continue to be among the top security priorities for many countries around the globe, with the situation aggravating due to the new crises and long-term effects of the Russian war against Ukraine. The food security issue through Ukraine’s lens can attract the attention of other countries as it can be packed together with transport security, maritime domain, hunger and sustainable agriculture development, customs and populist border blockades, humanitarian aid, sanctions, and the role of the international humanitarian institutions.
3. Nuclear security. If, for decades, the issue of nuclear security has been seen predominantly through the lens of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, so Ukraine has a chance to add the issues of nuclear safety, nuclear terrorism and threats of using civilian nuclear infrastructure as blackmail and an instrument of war. This may also lead to the question of empowerment for the respective international organisations, including the IAEA.
4. Reform of the UN. The long over-ripped issue is gaining new momentum. First, there is a question of the Security Council reform and efficiency of the UN institutions, manipulation of the UN procedures, and the inability of proper crisis reaction and humanitarian aid provision. Russian-Ukraine war amplified these problems, so Ukraine may not only be involved in the reform discourse but also be a promoter of certain proposals.
5. Hybrid warfare, including asymmetric warfare and cyber domain. This sphere will continue to be among the top of those interesting to the international community in terms of Ukraine’s experience. This experience gives Ukraine access and moral authority. While many of the issues within these spheres will be less public and of concern to the respective agencies and experts, nevertheless, this may allow building bridges and authority that will allow Ukraine to enter sensitive domains of interstate cooperation. The most important will be to project this experience to other countries’ and regions’ expectations, and generalise the knowledge that will not be purely Russia-focused.

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.