Currently, Ukraine is interested in the comprehensive involvement of the countries of the Global South in the implementation of its Peace Formula, which would be able to guarantee a fair victory and recovery of Ukraine after the conflict and increase the chances of Russian aggression not repeating itself in the future.
Through the prism of Ukrainian interests
MAIN VARIABLES
Due to strengthening diplomatic activity (primarily in Africa and Latin America), Ukrainian diplomacy finds its place in the Global South’s extremely active political and informational agenda.
The question of how much the Ukrainian factor fits into regional trends and corresponds to the key global narratives that have an impact on the Global South remains open.
The main variables for the region are as follows:
- A significant number of elections in the region simultaneously make the direction of individual countries difficult to predict and introduce an element of instability into any scenario;
- The growing urgency of overcoming the devastating effects of climate change;
- The division of the Global South between two blocs of global influence, namely relatively pro-Western and relatively pro-Chinese states;
- The continued instability of key economic players, which comes with the growth of China’s “economic bubble” and the overall slowdown in economic growth in the BRICS countries.
SCENARIOS
POSITIVE SCENARIO
During 2024, 38 elections will be held in the countries of the Global South. Even though some of them (such as in Venezuela or El Salvador) will leave de facto dictatorial governments in power, some of the election campaigns have a chance to lead pro-Western and pro-democratic candidates to power in their states (for example, in Senegal), thereby increasing predictability in relations with these countries can be expected. While it is simply not possible to predict the foreign policy of each new government in all the mentioned elections, within the framework of a positive scenario for Ukraine, it is expected that the election processes in the countries of the Global South will not cause an aggravation of the political and social situation and, regardless of the results of each particular election, will play a stabilising role for the region.
The fight against the devastating impacts of climate change has always been at the forefront of the political agenda of the Global South. All the countries of the region experience its consequences, and although some of them may have potential short-term economic benefits, from a strategic perspective, they carry a threat of apocalyptic scale. On a global scale, the climatic disasters of the Global South have a catastrophic effect – for example, the El Niño effect increases the number of climatic disasters in the Caribbean, and on the coast of the United States, deforestation in the Amazon or desertification in Africa have serious consequences.
In a positive scenario, the countries of the Global South will become a driving force in resisting climate change. They may themselves create the necessary projects and political infrastructure to attract global players and resources to combat the consequences of climate change. Under these conditions, the risk of politicisation of this issue will be minimal due to the initiatives and the internal direction of the projects of the countries of the Global South.
Despite objections from US diplomacy, the new Cold War with the PRC is still taking its contours, and both camps are actively luring neutral states to their side. In some places, these processes acquire a sufficiently aggressive manifestation – such as China’s aggressive loan-diplomacy in Africa or the information and investment competition of Washington and Beijing for Latin America. However, within the framework of supporting a stable scenario, it was predicted that the United States would adopt a course to return to “leadership by example” and, accordingly, restore an active global role as a champion of liberal values and a pro-Western world order. Thus, within the framework of Ukraine’s positive scenario of international development, the leadership of the US and the West will be confirmed, and, accordingly, the position of the states of the Global South regarding Ukraine and the Ukrainian Peace Formula will be directly correlated with this improvement.
Russia finds itself more dependent on the BRICS alliance than the BRICS members depend on Russia. This conclusion becomes evident when comparing the projected 2024 GDP growth of the founding and new BRICS members. Similar concerns arise in China, where, for the first time since the People’s Bank of China started providing data in the early 2000s, Chinese banks exhibit a year-over-year net decline in lending to the property sector. If China channels significant funds into its manufacturing industry, it will require markets to absorb the resulting surplus of goods. Given the subdued levels of domestic consumption, China will inevitably turn its gaze back to the Western markets. However, a considerable increase in Chinese exports will likely face resistance from the United States and the EU, especially in an election year. Initiating an EU anti-dumping investigation is only the initial step, and 2024 is poised to witness new trade conflicts. Additionally, during the last quarter of 2023, a sharp decline in Global South countries’ interest in joining BRICS was noted (the most illustrious example being Argentina).
To that extent, within the positive scenario unfolding, such economic barriers will restrain the capabilities of Russian and Chinese malign activities within the context of the Global South and wider on the international stage.
NEUTRAL SCENARIO
In a neutral scenario, the electoral unpredictability currently present in many countries of the Global South will be balanced. Although, in many cases, the results of the elections will lead to temporary instability and/or political realignment of specific states, such changes will not have a decisive impact on the region’s stability. Thus, the elections will lead to a change of political leadership in some countries, cementing the position of the ruling circles in others, but will not have a decisive impact on the stability of the regional system of international relations itself or Ukraine’s national interests regarding the development of relations with the countries of the region. Thus, in terms of the election issue, a neutral scenario means that Ukraine would have to reconsider its stance on specific countries on an individual base if the political leadership is changed as a result of the elections.
In terms of disaster management and radical climate change, the neutral scenario will see a certain status quo of current activities and policies. Accordingly, climate change will continue to play an important role in the activities of international organisations, regional and interregional associations, but it will fade into the background in the policies of governments in the Global South (especially new governments that will come to power as a result of elections) due to existing security and political challenges.
In addition, the competing state of the aid and support system for countries and regions affected by natural disasters plays an important role in maintaining the status quo.
In the neutral scenario, the status quo will remain in the issues of division between the two major geopolitical blocs, similar to the issue of elections. In the absence of significant changes in the balance of power in international politics (which will be responsible for the orbital-stable scenario in most regions), the current course of the Global South states to maintain contacts with Washington or Beijing will also continue. This factor also correlates with the issue of elections and the transition of power, which will not have a decisive impact on the regional system in this scenario.
The economic crisis that much of the Global South is currently struggling with will begin to slow down in 2024 under the neutral scenario. According to the World Bank’s general forecasts, the growth rates of the region’s largest economies will not meet the successful “ceiling” of 2023 and will fall by an average of 1-1.5% compared to the forecasts made in the last quarter of the previous year. However, given the market activity and the gradual recovery of supply chains and trade flows after the COVID-19 economic crisis of 2019-2022, such a crisis will not be protracted.
NEGATIVE SCENARIO
In the negative scenario, the elections will mostly be a crisis point for the Global South. Such a development could be particularly threatening in India and Pakistan, where society is already significantly polarised on political grounds. Similarly threatening scenarios can be observed in Africa, where the risk of growing authoritarianism and anti-democratic forces is growing. Russia and China will undoubtedly exploit such sentiments and potential outcomes, each within their spheres of influence and with a significant set of pressure tools. Thus, in this scenario, the elections will become a destabilising factor and deepen both the internal crises of individual countries and the division into geopolitical blocs of the Global South and its involvement in the Washington-Beijing confrontation.
As mentioned earlier, the issue of rescuing the countries and peoples of the Global South from the effects of natural disasters sometimes becomes an arena for political confrontation between major players from outside the region. The leaders of the region themselves are interested in using these problematic issues to attract investments in the development of specific sectors of the economy and expand direct financial support to overcome the consequences of natural disasters. In a negative scenario, we will see the politicisation of climate cooperation between African, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries, with money and humanitarian support allocated to the affected regions becoming the subject of political bargaining and blackmail (examples of this approach were seen in the discussion of China’s assistance to combat the effects of El Niño).
In the negative scenario, the pro-Chinese camp in the Global South will grow and gain a foothold. China’s engagement with countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, despite international condemnation, underscores its ability to build ties with diverse states. By contrast, the West’s emphasis on human rights and promotion of democracy has, at times, strained its ties with the Global South, leading to accusations of interference. On the other hand, China can engage states quickly enough through investment and loan diplomacy, complemented by infrastructure and technology projects. For Ukraine, such a scenario is risky, as it would tie more states to Beijing’s position, which could be detrimental to the ability of Ukrainian diplomacy to work in the region, especially in the context of the initiative to engage the Global South in the Ukrainian Peace Formula.
Under the negative scenario for Ukraine, the economic element of the system will become one of China’s global achievements in 2024. Despite the projected slowdown of the Chinese economy and the loss of a significant part of its growth potential in the first half of 2024, China has a chance to restore its potential by concluding new trade, credit and investment agreements within the Global South. Some of these agreements will be possible within the expansion of the pro-Chinese camp in the region, which is also present in this scenario. Thus, as the most powerful economic partner of the aggressor state, China will be able to continue creating conditions for Russia to conduct international trade, circumvent sanctions and obtain markets for Russian raw materials.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works.