09/12/2021
Topics: International security
Regions: Russian Federation and Central Asia
Publications: Video/Audio
“To prevent a possible Russian invasion, Ukraine and its Western partners must make the most of time to rapidly increase Ukraine’s defence capabilities and to elaborate and put on the table a set of really strong measures that would make the price of possible escalation unjustifiably expensive for Russia”, says Maksym Khylko Ph.D., Director of Russian and Belarusian Studies Program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism.
“It is likely that after the meeting between Biden and Putin, Russia will temporarily reduce the pace of military build-up near Ukraine’s borders, but the Kremlin will not abandon its aggressive plans towards Ukraine and all of Europe”, notes Maksym Khylko Ph.D., Director of Russian and Belarusian Studies Program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”.
“The Kremlin will continue stepping up political pressure on Kyiv and its Western partners to force them to actually surrender through abandoning Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, agreeing to a Russian interpretation of the Minsk agreements, and ultimately to make Ukraine return to the Russia’s sphere of influence”, he adds.
“When Russia no longer needs gas transit through Ukrainian territory, a powerful deterrent that helped prevent Russia from waging a full-scale war against Ukraine will disappear”, Mr Khylko warns when asked about the impact of the Nord Stream 2.
More in the interview.
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PolskieRadio24.pl: What is the result of these talks from the point of view of Ukraine, Belarus and NATO’s eastern flank? Will it stop the escalation of Putin’s aggression?
Maksym Khylko, Director of Russian and Belarusian Studies Program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”:
Judging by the official statements from the White House and the Kremlin, Biden did not promise Putin any critical concessions on Ukraine or NATO. But the time will show whether the Biden’s warning on “strong economic and other measures” in the event of military escalation will be considered by Moscow as a too high price for realizing its geopolitical ambitions and Putin’s personal political plans.
As for Belarus, there is no sign that it has been discussed during the meeting at all – it seems that Washington does not believe that anything can be changed there in the near future, and Belarus is considered as a part of Russia’s strategic space.
It is likely that after the meeting between Biden and Putin, Russia will temporarily reduce the pace of military build-up near Ukraine’s borders, but the Kremlin will not abandon its aggressive plans towards Ukraine and all of Europe. The Kremlin will continue stepping up political pressure on Kyiv and its Western partners to force them to actually surrender through abandoning Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration, agreeing to a Russian interpretation of the Minsk agreements, and ultimately to make Ukraine return to the Russia’s sphere of influence.
Does it entail any risks? Beginning of the talks on new security architecture, as Kremlin states?
Kremlin’s proposals are actually not so much about the new security architecture, but rather about the return to the existence of sphere of influence in Europe. Moscow believes that it should have the exclusive rights in the post-Soviet space and at a veto right in the whole Central and Eastern Europe. Hence are Putin’s demands to stop NATO enlargement to the East and to ban the deployment of missiles in NATO’s eastern flank.
Russia itself has ruined the balance of power in the region by invading Ukraine, increasing its military power in the illegally occupied Crimea, and establishing strategic control over Belarus. At the same time the Kremlin demands from Ukraine and the NATO member states not oppose these Moscow’s hegemonic plans.
What are the dangers of NS2 once it is launched?
After the launch of Nord Stream 2, Russia will be able to stop the transit of gas through Ukraine at any time and thus create a significant gas shortage in Ukraine, which could provoke the socio-political destabilisation in the country. The same applies to Belarus, the transit of gas through which Moscow will be able to stop if Minsk suddenly does not agree to a rapid pace of integration, i.e. the actual absorption of Belarus by Russia.
In addition, when Russia no longer needs gas transit through Ukrainian territory, a powerful deterrent that helped prevent Russia from waging a full-scale war against Ukraine will disappear.
How high is the risk of Russian invasion and other forms of aggression in relation to Ukraine? How to prevent them?
Russia will simultaneously use a number of hybrid warfare instruments to destabilize and weaken Ukraine. It is already creating an artificial energy crisis by reducing gas transit through Ukraine and blocking coal supplies to Ukraine from Kazakhstan through Russian territory. Possible power and heating outages in winter can lead to socio-political instability. To the same aim, Moscow can also send thousands of migrants across Belarusian borders to Ukrainian territory. The threat of Russian troops near Ukraine’s borders, as well as possible local escalations along the contact line in the Donbas could be used to force the authorities in Kyiv to make wrong decisions that could lead to political destabilisation. At the same time, Moscow may also support opposition forces in Ukraine, not necessarily pro-Russian, in order to create a political crisis in Ukraine.
At the same time Moscow will also continue putting pressure on the West, including through limiting gas supplies, provoking instability on Belarus borders and threatening with large-scale war in Ukraine.
To prevent a possible Russian invasion, Ukraine and its Western partners must make the most of time to rapidly increase Ukraine’s defense capabilities and to elaborate and put on the table a set of really strong measures that would make the price of possible escalation unjustifiably expensive for Russia.
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Agnieszka Marcela Kamińska, PolskieRadio24.pl