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Kyiv, the EU, and the Coalition of the Willing must prepare for numerous new challenges once the war ends.
The core Ukraine’s lesson identified is that early signs of a hybrid campaign must be met by an established system, rather than an ad hoc institutional response.
Many of the capacities Ukraine relied on after February 2022 had developed since the Revolution of Dignity and Russia’s initial aggression in 2014.
Ukraine can leverage NATO and the EU’s structural expertise and standardised mechanisms to foster institutional synergy and align its efforts to counter hybrid and cognitive warfare.
Drawing on NATO conceptual frameworks and Ukraine’s experience of countering Russian aggression since 2014, the workshop examined emerging threats alongside practical Ukrainian responses.
The Ukrainian experience since 2014 has demonstrated that when state institutions are not ready to respond to challenges, civil society, business, and local communities can take the lead.
Participants of the expert group have identified the continuity pillars of government in wartime conditions.
The evolution of the warfare and disruptive techological pace prompts us to revisit existing response approaches to pretiection of critical infrastructure.
These policy briefs are the result of the intensive two days of discussion in three separate working groups which explored core directions in resilience-building: maintaining the continuity of government and essential services, protecting critical infrastructure, and sustaining societal resilience at national and local levels.
The current electoral environment in Ukraine is defined by a profound structural dilemma where the priority to preserve democratic continuity and European integration standards must coexist with an existential wartime framework under martial law.
This report investigates how Ukraine and NATO use AI for both peaceful and military purposes, how they approach AI regulation, and potential mechanisms of cooperation in this sphere.
Using roll-call vote data from the European Parliament covering the period from February 2022 to July 2026, this paper constructs a quantitative measure of voting alignment with Russian positions for Members of the European Parliament from nine Central and Eastern European member states: