In the late 2010s and early 2020s, Chilean society experienced acute social upheavals and is now facing a total overhaul of the socio-economic model that has dominated the past half century since the military coup of 1973. Public disappointments have been compounded by the “challenges” associated with the spread of the pandemic and the temporary reduction in export potential, a decrease in business activity, medical problems, etc.

 

Therefore, the 2021 presidential campaign reflected the extreme polarization of Chilean society and gave rise to hopes for renewal in all spheres of life. Chileans associated these hopes with a young, non-systemic politician of the new generation, Gabriel Boric, who won the elections, supported by a coalition of political forces. In the year and a half that have passed since his inauguration, we can draw some conclusions and trace the main trends in his domestic and foreign policies.

 

Authors:

• Natalia Shevchenko
• Anastasia Kosenko-Sologub
• Ivan Fechko

 

CONTENT

• INTRODUCTION
• POLITICAL TRENDS
• SOCIETAL TRENDS
• ECONOMIC TRENDS
• TRADE TRENDS
• FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS
• RECOMENDATIONS

 

POLITICAL TRENDS

 

Like most Latin American countries, Chile is a unitary republic with a strong presidential system. Incumbent President Gabriel Boric won the 2021 elections, which were described as the most polarized since the restoration of democracy. With 55.87% of the vote, 35-year-old Boric defeated his right-wing rival José Antonio Casta by a margin of one million votes, becoming the youngest head of state in South America.

The basis of Boric’s political campaign was the slogans of equal distribution of resources, social equality, and rewriting the Constitution. All of these were demands of social protests, so, in essence, his victory was the result of these processes and the consequences of the problems that arose during the pandemic.

The legislative body of Chile is the bicameral National Congress. The lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, consists of 155 deputies elected by proportional representation for 4-year terms. The upper house, the Senate, consists of 50 senators elected for 8-year terms.

The 2021 elections showed society’s desire for new faces. Both of the country’s former main parties (“Chile Vamos” and “Unidad Constituyente”) received weak results, allowing new forces to advance.

A new right-wing radical Republican Party, formed in 2019 by José Antonio Cast, took one of the main places in Chilean politics. It defends Christian conservative values. Due to similar behavior and views, the party leader has often been compared to Trump or Bolsonaro. This party threatens the traditional right (Independent Democratic Union (UDI), National Renewal (RN) and Political Evolution (Evópoli)), which in turn are led by a new young political generation.

The Republican Party is the most radical of the parliamentary political forces. Together with the Independent Democratic Union, the National Renewal and the Political Evolution of Chile, they form the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The government in the Chamber of Deputies is supported by two left-wing coalitions: “I Approve Dignity” (the Communist Party of Chile, the Socialist Green Regional Federation, the Democratic Revolution, the “Communes” movement, Humanist Action and Social Convergence – Boric’s party) and Democratic Socialism (the Socialist Party of Chile, the Party for Democracy, the Radical and Liberal Parties of Chile). Only the first parties of one and the first two parties of the other coalition are represented in the Senate (see infographic).

Their political program varies, as does their political ideology from the ultra-left to the center-left, but Boric can count on their support. The Christian Democratic Party in both chambers and the People’s Party, “Yellows for Chile”, the Green Ecological Party, and the Humanist Party in the Chamber of Deputies are trying to distance themselves from both support and criticism of the President. The newly formed movement “Democrats” is particularly conformist, continuing the motif of regional problems popular in Chile and emphasizing local reforms, supporting the ideas of Christian democracy, humanism and national unity.

The current President of the country,  Boric, has an approval rating of 32% against 61% disapproval. The victory in the Constituent Assembly deprived Casta of the arguments that had strengthened him before, and the lack of clear prospects for adopting the text of the Constitution in a new edition led to a drop in Casta’s popularity by 10%. At the same time, the candidate from the right-wing Independent Democratic Union party, the mayor of Providencia, Evelyn Mattei, is gaining popularity.

The biggest problems that the population demands the government solve remain crime, violence, theft, drug trafficking, healthcare, and education.

Constitutional process. One of the most difficult issues in domestic politics is the adoption of a new Constitution for the country.

The current Constitution of Chile was adopted during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in 1980. Its adoption took place without taking into account the positions of opposition forces, and the norms themselves contain restrictions on public rights and excessively large functions of the President. Mass protests in 2019-2021, known as the “Estallido social”, showed that society needs a change in the Basic Law. In the 2020 plebiscite, 78% of those polled spoke in favor of a new constitution and the creation of a Constitutional Convention – an elected body that will work on the draft text. In the elections to this institution, the left-wing forces, which prepared the new text of the constitution, won the majority of votes.

On September 4, 2022, Chile held its first attempt to adopt a new draft constitution in a referendum, but the idea failed – 62% voted against. Among the reasons for the project’s failure were a large-scale wave of disinformation about the provisions of the constitution (for example, many people feared the expropriation of property and the collapse of the country), the inconsistency of many provisions of the basic law, its radicalism and extravagance, and the lack of consensus with right-wing and center-right forces.

In June of this year, a new constitutional council was convened to prepare a draft of the basic law. This time, the victory was won by the right-wing forces led by José Antonio Casta, who have the necessary 2/5 to veto any article, and in union with other conservative forces they can approve any constitutional proposals. For President Borić, this was a major defeat. One of the reasons for such voting results was the introduction of the mandatory voting principle, which added 4 million new voters who have positions similar to conservatism (religiosity, public order, attitude to abortion and sexual minorities), but, at the same time, adhere to anti-elitist views. Also, since the end of last year, there has been a process of tilting to the right, caused by concerns about security, the spread of drug trafficking, and the immigration crisis. The right-wing and radical-right forces promise to resolve these issues.

The next plebiscite on the new Constitution will take place in December 2023. Polls conducted last week show that only 28% will vote in favor, and 53% will vote against. The situation is such that no matter what the text of the draft Constitution is prepared (to be presented by the Convention on November 7), there is almost no chance of its approval in the referendum on December 17.

This will certainly affect the rating of the Republican Party and personally on Casta’s presidential ambitions. Starting the constitutional process a third time seems impossible, so the constitution may remain unchanged, which will continue to be a challenge for the transformation and democratization of society.

Problems of historical memory. Chilean society remains divided, particularly over historical events of fifty years ago. According to recent polls, more than a third of the country’s citizens (36%) justify Pinochet’s rise to power and his form of government. At the same time, 42% believe that the military coup caused irreparable damage to democracy. The current President of Chile, socialist Gabriel Boric, who calls himself the political heir to Salvador Allende, actively condemns the Pinochet regime and its supporters.

Right-wing opposition parties take a different position on this historical event and prefer not to mention the word “coup”, focusing on the economic growth that occurred after Pinochet introduced a free market economy in Chile. This year’s September marked the 50th anniversary of the military coup and the establishment of the authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile, and the different reactions of society and political forces to these events show their further politicization.

 

SOCIETAL TRENDS

 

Despite the end of the 2019 protests, inequality remains a pressing issue in Chile. At the same time, the poverty rate in the country has decreased from 8% in 2020 to 4.8% in 2022 and to 5.2% in 2023.

Over the past five years, Chile has seen its homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants increase from 4.5 to 6.7. In 2018, there were 845 murders, and in 2022, the figure reached 1,322, one of the highest rates in the South American country, which is experiencing a security crisis. According to the CEP 2023 survey, crime was the biggest concern for citizens, ranking first with 60% .

According to most citizens, the main reason for the increase in crime is the large migration to the country, primarily from Venezuela and Haiti. Currently, there are almost 1.5 million migrants in the country. According to the new migration law, the government plans to tighten the conditions for migration and allow only those who have relatives or official employment to come to the country.

Regarding the situation with national minorities, the draft constitution, which was defeated in 2022, proposed granting them the right to self-determination, which was strongly opposed by opposition forces who believed that such a decision would split the unity of the Chilean nation. The largest indigenous group in Chile is the Mapuche Indians, who number about 1.7 million people in Chile (almost 10% of the country’s population).

 

ECONOMIC TRENDS

In Gabriel Boric’s government program “I support dignity” (Spanish: Apruebo Dignidad), Section 1 (P.2) stated the economic recovery, which is based on the following three principles:

• redesigning labor subsidies with an emphasis on female labor and programs that support women’s employment;
• ecological “green” investments;
• special recovery measures focused on micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (hereinafter referred to as MSMEs) that have been severely affected by the health crisis caused by the pandemic.

Since April 2022, the government has stepped up its efforts to implement the recovery of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. On April 7, Gabriel Boric presented his economic development plan for the country – “Chile Apoya”, which is aimed at overcoming the consequences caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and provides for the creation of new jobs and the recovery of lagging sectors. As part of this plan, at the end of June, the opening of applications for two programs was announced – “Chile Apoya – Recover Your Neighborhood” and “Chile Apoya – Recover Your Pyme”, which are aimed at financial support for small and medium-sized businesses. In July, as part of the “Chile Apoya” plan, a program to support Rapa Nui (Easter Island) with a budget of $700 million was launched. The goal of the program is to restore local small and medium-sized enterprises that were severely affected by the closure of the island for two years due to the pandemic.

To improve the dialogue with MSME representatives, consultative meetings were held, chaired by the Minister of Economy, Nicolas Grau. The first consultative meeting was held on April 29, 2022, at which a number of initiatives of the government program were considered. Long-term challenges such as digitalization, integration and market access, decentralization, public procurement and debt repayment were also discussed. In 2022, similar meetings were held in June, September and December.

An important development in the area of MSME support was the approval by both houses of Congress of the bill to create the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (FOGAPE) in October 2022. The fund aims to provide financing and facilitate the payment of tax debts for MSMEs affected by the pandemic. In addition, FOGAPE can provide assistance even to those businesses that previously did not have access to this type of support.

In November, President Gabriel Boric presented a new draft reforming the country’s pension system. One of the points of the draft is the establishment of a contribution for employers in the amount of 6% of their taxable income, the implementation of which should be carried out gradually. As of October 2023, the draft is being processed by the legislative bodies.

A key event in 2023 was the announcement of the National Lithium Strategy on April 20. According to its content, the lithium industry should be transformed into one of the leading in the country’s economy, capable of improving its growth and ensuring a green transition. In addition, the high demand for lithium and significant reserves of this mineral in the country will allow Chile to become a leader in the green transition at the global level. The basis of this strategy is the creation of the National Lithium Company, whose task is to implement multidimensional development based on innovation, investment in science, technology and knowledge. It is also planned to involve the private sector. Since the creation of the National Lithium Company is a legislative milestone, the bill must first be approved by the country’s Congress, which has not yet happened. In order to promote the National Lithium Strategy, and in particular the search for investors, the Minister of Economy, Development and Tourism, Nicolas Grau, visited Germany, France, Spain and Italy in July, where he had a number of meetings with European business circles.

Regarding domestic economic indicators, the Central Bank of Chile’s report for the first half of 2022 indicated that the main global factors that increased inflationary pressures in the country were the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the quarantine regime in the PRC. The review of the latest economic expectations, which the Central Bank of Chile published on October 11, indicates that the country’s GDP will decrease by 0.4% by the end of 2023. However, the Bank called a more optimistic scenario for 2024, and predicted GDP growth of 1.8%.

 

 

TRADE TRENDS

 

A key feature of the trade policy of the Republic of Chile, starting from the 1990s, is the practice of signing free trade agreements. At present, the country has perhaps the most powerful network of free trade agreements in the world. Such a policy has allowed individual groups of Chilean goods to enter international markets with tariff preferences. In the government program of Gabriel Boric, within the framework of the trade strategy (P.2), the emphasis was placed on the development of Latin American economic and trade integration, which would contribute to the formation of regional value chains. In addition, it was noted that the government would not change any trade agreement unilaterally, but would try to update only those aspects that are related to investment sections.

Chile’s main export markets in 2022 were China, the United States, Japan, South Korea and Brazil, while key suppliers were China, the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Germany. The basis of Chilean exports is copper ores and concentrates, copper alloys, cellulose, fruit trees (cherries, apricots, peaches), fish fillets and others. As for import goods, these are petroleum products, cars and motor vehicles, telephone equipment, etc.

The PRC is Chile’s main exporter and importer. In 2022, 39.4% of Chilean exports went to China. The basis of Chilean exports to China is agricultural and forestry products, primarily cellulose. Chileans import textile and chemical products, as well as electronics products, from China. A free trade agreement has been in place between the countries since 2006. In 2019, an expanded version of this agreement came into force, according to which zero tariffs were introduced on about 98% of goods between the countries. Another important event that strengthened trade and economic cooperation between the countries was Chile’s accession to the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative in 2018. It was on the occasion of the III Belt and Road Forum that Gabriel Boric arrived in Beijing on October 16. As part of this visit, the President of Chile had a bilateral meeting with the Chinese leader, which he noted on his official page on the social network X (formerly Twitter). “We met with the President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping in order to strengthen our ties and sign a number of agreements in the fields of agriculture, water resources, politics and cooperation…”, wrote Boric. In addition, it was important for the Chilean President to convey to the Chinese side that his national lithium program is favorable for foreign capital. In order to attract Chinese investments to the Chilean economy, Boric’s delegation was joined by Chilean Minister of Economy Nicolas Grau.

The United States is Chile’s largest trading partner in the Western Hemisphere. As with China, the two countries have a free trade agreement in place since 2004. Chile exports primary metals, agricultural products, animal products, wood products, and processed food products to the United States. The main imports from the United States are oil and coal products, chemical products, transportation equipment, and electronics. The United States’ share of Chile’s exports in 2022 was 13.9%, almost three times less than China’s share. On the other hand, the United States is Chile’s largest investor. During the Safe Summit, which took place in Washington on March 28-29 of this year, Chilean Ambassador to the United States Juan Gabriel Valdes emphasized: “My main message is that we want American, Canadian and Western investment in Chile, in the lithium industry… We have excellent commercial relations with China, which is our main trading partner, but we want our strategic minerals, our strategic development, to be linked to countries with which we share values and a long history.” This statement provoked a reaction from the Chinese Ambassador to Chile, Niu Qingbao, who noted that these words “surprised him and did not correspond to the real practical policy of the country’s government.”

Chile’s major trading partners are Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea. Free trade agreements are in force between these countries and the Republic of Chile: with South Korea it was signed in 2003, making it the first Asian country with which such an agreement was concluded; with Japan in 2007. In 2022, Japan accounted for 7.6% of Chilean exports, and South Korea – 6.2%.  In October of this year, the Minister of Economy, Nicolas Grau, visited these countries, the purpose of which was to intensify investment contacts with them. In Tokyo, Grau, together with the Chilean Ambassador to Japan, Ricardo Rojas, held a meeting at the Institute of Economics and Energy with representatives of twelve companies, and spoke about their benefits from investing in the Chilean lithium industry. In addition, a number of bilateral meetings were held with representatives of Japanese companies, including Sumitomo^[1], Mitsui^[2], Sojitz^[3], as well as the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Chile’s largest trading partners in South America are Brazil and Argentina. Free trade agreements with these countries were signed relatively recently compared to others – with Argentina in 2017 (entered into force in 2019), with Brazil in 2018 (in force from 2022). This can be explained by the fact that Chile concluded a trade agreement with MERCOSUR back in 1996. The document was signed within the framework of ALADI^[4] as a partial agreement on economic complementarity. The main goods in Chile’s exports to Argentina are petroleum gas, copper wire, fresh fish, canned tomatoes. While the basis of imports from Argentina is corn, beef, wheat, etc. According to the Argentine Ministry of Economy, Chilean real investments take 5th place in the country’s economy.

In 2022, Brazil was among the top five countries in both Chile’s export (4.6% share) and import (9.7%) markets. Chileans mainly export copper, minerals, fish products, and fertilizers to Brazil.

Chile’s trade and economic cooperation with the European Union is governed by the 2002 Association Agreement. In November 2022, the parties concluded the negotiation process on the modernization of the existing agreement, with environmental standards, sustainable trade and gender equality issues as the main topics of discussion. The European Union is one of Chile’s largest investors, with investments present in almost all sectors of the South American country’s economy. Chile mainly exports agricultural products, mining products, copper and chemical products to the EU. Imports from the EU consist mainly of industrial goods (machinery and electrical equipment, vehicles, aircraft). On 18 July 2023, during the EU-CELAC Summit in Brussels, Chile and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding to deepen cooperation in the supply chains of raw materials essential for clean energy and the digital transition of both partners.

 

FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS

 

Gabriel Boric’s government is characterized by gender equality, regional balance, and generational change. These trends were a response to the demands of Chilean society after the wave of sharp social protests of 2019-2021, which were a kind of watershed between the old socio-economic model and the new one that Chileans have yet to build. Thus, the country’s new development cycle was to be accompanied by a renewed foreign policy, responding to the current challenges facing the country at the regional and global levels. Since 2020, the members of the Nueva Política Exterior network, which unites scientists, diplomats, politicians, and international experts, have been actively speaking about the need for change. The influence of their ideas can be seen in the Program of President Boric and in the guiding principles of his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and several representatives of this association have taken up positions in his cabinet at the ministerial level and in the Foreign Ministry.

Going to the elections, Boric presented to Chileans the principles of a new foreign policy, which enshrined: respect for international law, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and responsible cooperation with government and non-governmental structures to overcome new “challenges”, including transnational organized crime, humanitarian (migration) crises, etc.

Respect for the rule of international law is the foundation of Chile’s renewed foreign policy. In the international arena, Chile adheres to the following basic principles that ensure the peaceful coexistence of states:

●      respect for international treaties and fulfillment of international obligations undertaken in accordance with them, as they establish clear rules of conduct on the world stage;

●      peaceful settlement of disputes and prevention of the use of force or threats of force in international relations, consistent with the UN Charter and the commitments undertaken as founding members of the UN;

●      respect for sovereignty and, at the same time, in the context of the evolution of international law (in particular, in terms of respect for human rights), the possibility of conducting humanitarian operations within the framework of the UN if it is recognized that the situation poses a danger to the population;

●      respect for territorial integrity, with an emphasis on the fact that Chile attaches great importance to preserving its integrity, which includes, in particular, the “Chilean Antarctic territories.”

The government of Gabriel Boric not only declared on paper its commitment to the rule of international law, but also constantly confirms it, in particular, by supporting Ukraine in countering Russian aggression at all possible international platforms at the global (UN General Assembly) and regional levels. Thus, during his speech at the XXVIII Ibero-American Conference, which was held on March 24-25, 2023 in the Dominican Republic, he called the Russian invasion unacceptable and stated that the world should not get used to this war, emphasizing that in this case we are observing a brutal violation of the principles of the UN Charter. His consistent position has already caused undisguised “irritation” from the leader of Brazil, Lula da Silva, which he voiced during the work of the EU-CELAC summit, which was held in July 2023 in Brussels. Commenting on the words of Boric, who addressed the present leaders of Latin American countries with a call for unconditional condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine “..today it is Ukraine, and tomorrow it could be any of us”, Brazilian President Lula da Silva incorrectly emphasized the youth and inexperience in public affairs of his Chilean colleague.

The condemnation of the aggressor and the principled support of Ukraine also caused disagreements among part of the pro-government Chilean politicians. This was manifested, in particular, in public criticism of giving the floor to the President of Ukraine through a video address to the deputies of the Chilean Congress (April 2023). At the same time, Boric himself has already had 2 video conferences with Volodymyr Zelensky (July 2022 and March 2023), and a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (September 2023), during which he assured of his unwavering position on supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Our foreign policy departments also support the constant dialogue: in particular, in August 2022 and May 2023, respectively, telephone conversations between Chancellors Antonia Urrejola and Alberto van Klaveren with the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba took place.

Respect for human rights and the promotion of democracy are also one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy course of the Gabriel Boric administration. He noted this in his inaugural speech: “Chile…will always promote respect for human rights, everywhere and regardless of the color of the government that violates them.” The election of Boric gave rise to expectations that he would join the cohort of ideological left-wing politicians who managed to stay on the wave of the “left turn” of the early 21st century. – in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia. However, despite similar ideological principles, Gabriel Boric is a politician of a new generation who not only declares, but also adheres to the principles of protecting democracy and human rights. Therefore, even during his election campaign, tense relations with coalition partners – the Communist Party, which welcomed the election of Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2021, became apparent. Then Boric made it clear to his partners that his government would be committed to democracy without bowing to leftist authoritarian or dictatorial regimes. Therefore, during the XXVIII Ibero-American Summit, which was held at the end of March 2023 in the Dominican Republic, the President of Chile reminded those present that this year marks the 50th anniversary of the coup d’état in Chile, when the government of Salvador Allende was overthrown and a brutal dictatorship was established, and condemned the repression against Nicaraguans currently carried out by the regime of Daniel Ortega. In response, the representative of Nicaragua at the summit demanded an apology and accused the President of Chile of “betraying the Chilean people and capitulating to the North American empire and its allies.”

These verbal battles reveal not only a conflict within the Latin American “left”, but also a clear distancing from undemocratic, repressive regimes, which, moreover, in the international arena, position themselves as supporters of the aggressor country – the Russian Federation (it is no coincidence that after the summit, the representative of Nicaragua hurried to a three-day visit to Russia).

Taking an uncompromising stance against the repressive Nicaraguan regime, Chile is part of an international initiative group under the auspices of the Organization of American States that aims to achieve dialogue with the country’s President, Daniel Ortega, to peacefully resolve the human rights crisis. However, the initiative does not seem achievable, as Nicaragua’s decision to withdraw from the regional organization will take effect in November 2023.

At first glance, it may seem that Boric has demonstrated an inconsistent position on the Venezuelan regime: condemning Nicolas Maduro for human rights violations, directly accusing him of pressuring the opposition and provoking a migration crisis that threatens the stability of South American countries, criticizing Lula da Silva for a special reception for N. Maduro at the South American Summit organized by Brazil (May 2023), Boric, at the same time, called Biden’s decision not to invite the Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Cuban delegations to the Summit of the Americas, which the United States hosted in the summer of 2022, a “mistake”, considering such a decision unproductive. Comparing these approaches (June 2022 and May 2023), it can be assumed that the change in position of Boric. The crisis is related to the worsening situation with Venezuelan migrants fleeing the economic crisis and oppression of the Maduro regime in neighboring countries, in particular, in Chile (there are about 450,000 of them here). Recently, hostility towards migrants from Venezuela has been growing in Chile, and in May 2023, their presence in the border zone gave rise to a diplomatic crisis between Chile and Peru. At the end of May 2023, after a five-year hiatus, a Chilean ambassador was appointed to Venezuela. Commenting on this appointment to the media, the head of the Chilean foreign ministry, van Klaveren, directly noted that the intensification of relations between the states was prompted by the aggravation of the crisis with Venezuelan migrants on the border with Peru. And although Boric, who is a representative of leftist forces, distanced himself the most from the Maduro government, Chile nevertheless became the last country in the region to take a step towards normalizing relations with Venezuela, doing so after Colombia and Brazil.

Criticizing the Nicaraguan and Venezuelan regimes for human rights violations, Boric, at the same time, demonstrates the same consistency with regard to the Cuban regime, and at the same time criticizes the USA for maintaining the sanctions regime and calls on them to return to the more constructive policy of the times of the presidency of Barack Obama (speech at the 78th session of the UN General Assembly). Commenting on his position on the current so-called “leftist dictatorships”, he emphasizes that, firstly, they should not be isolated in the international arena, it is better to “discuss with them”, and, secondly, the imposed sanctions cause suffering to ordinary people and only lead to the strengthening of the regimes.

Condemnation of human rights violations does not only concern Latin America. Speaking at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, the President of Chile called for an end to violence against women in Iran and “not to make the constant violations of the rights of the Palestinian people the norm,” emphasizing the need for the Palestinians to create their own state and, at the same time, guaranteeing “Israel’s legitimate right to live within secure and internationally recognized borders.” Recall that Chile is home to the largest Palestinian diaspora in Latin America. After the Hamas terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023, which resulted in numerous casualties among Israelis and foreigners, including immigrants from various Latin American countries, President Boric condemned “brutal attacks, kidnappings, and murders” and, at the same time, pointed out to Israel that it violated international law through “indiscriminate attacks” on the civilian population. After the President’s statements, Foreign Minister Van Klaveren emphasized that “the use of force by a country that has been attacked must be proportional,” but in his opinion, Israel is not currently adhering to this principle.

In the context of ensuring human rights, it is noteworthy that the administration of Boric has taken a course towards maintaining gender equality in appointments to public positions. Thus, initially, out of 24 ministries in his cabinet, 14 were headed by women. This also applies to the sphere of foreign policy, where women received the positions of Chancellor (Antonia Urrejola headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the first year of the administration of Boric), Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director of the Diplomatic Academy, as well as headed the embassies of Chile in key countries – Great Britain and Argentina and the representation at the UN in Washington and Geneva. Also, when appointing ambassadors, an 80-20 ratio was observed, where 80% of the positions are held by career diplomats, and 20% are appointed on a political basis. In June 2023. The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a Feminist Foreign Policy, which will serve as a tool to establish the principle of gender equality as a kind of axis in the work of the country’s foreign policy department, and Chile became the first South American country and the second state in Latin America (after Mexico) to introduce it.

Regional vector of Chile’s foreign policy. In his first speech, Gabriel Boric declared “we are deeply Latin American”, emphasizing the importance of the regional dimension of his foreign policy and continued: “we will make efforts to ensure that the voice of the South is heard again in a changing world”. The implementation of the Latin American policy of G. Boric’s cabinet takes place at two levels: multilateral initiatives and bilateral relations. G. Boric’s victory in the elections gave rise to hopes for a kind of incentive for integration processes in South America, which, as the first two decades of the 21st century have shown, turned out to be dependent on changes in political elites, since they carried an ideological component at their core. This applies, first of all, to the UNASUR association (Union of South American Nations, founded in 2004), focused on the comprehensive integration of nation-states in the spirit of the ideas of Bolivarian unity into an association similar to the EU, and PROSUR (Forum for Progress and Integration of South America, founded in 2019), which aimed not only to accelerate integration, but also to get rid of the ideological component in its implementation. However, as practice has shown, both structures have so far proven unviable. The attempt of the President of Brazil to restore a structure similar to UNASUR by convening the First Summit of South American Nations in May 2023, although supported by Boric, who attended this event, nevertheless, it seems, did not arouse enthusiasm given the differences in the ideological approaches of individual participants in the event. Here it is important to recall the verbal battles between Boric and Lula da Silva. The latter, commenting on the accusations of the undemocratic nature of the Venezuelan regime (Nicolas Maduro became Lula’s “special” personal guest at this event), stated that “democracy is a relative concept” and continued that in recent years there have been more elections in Venezuela than in Brazil itself. In turn, the Chilean President noted that “the human rights situation is not a narrative, it is a serious reality.” Boric’s unwillingness to support South American integration projects at the current stage may also be evidenced by his cautious position on the idea of creating a common currency, which the leaders of Brazil and Argentina actively talked about in early January 2023. Commenting on this initiative, he called it “interesting” and at the same time noted that regional processes should be thought about in the long term.

More interesting for Chile is the Pacific Alliance project (including Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Chile). It is focused mainly on trade and finding ways to involve Asia and until recently was devoid of ideological contradictions, including due to situational political affinity, since leftist forces were in power in all 4 countries. However, the situation changed last year, when Peru fell into a whirlpool of political instability, which even led to sharp disagreements with Mexico, which refused to transfer the presidency to Peru, not recognizing the legitimacy of the regime there. This threatened to paralyze the work of the organization. Offering a way out of the crisis trap, Chile took over the presidency of the Alliance in June 2023. Therefore, the Chilean chairmanship could help somewhat reduce tensions between these two countries and save the alliance from an institutional crisis and a repeat of the fate of UNASUR and PROSUR, which exhausted themselves due to political differences.

As for the level of bilateral relations in the regional dimension, after the election of Boric, rapprochement with Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and later with Brazil and Colombia after the elections in these countries, where ideologically close leaders are in power. And although the statistics of his visits generally confirm such expectations, there is still the impression of equidistance from the mentioned regional neighbors. Instead, there is a similarity of positions between Boric and the President of Uruguay, Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou, who represents right-wing forces, on acute issues of the regional and individual problems of the global agenda.

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on relations with Bolivia, where the socialist Luis Arce is in power. Diplomatic relations between the countries have been suspended since 1978 and remain only at the level of consular affairs. These relations are influenced by 2 factors: territorial disputes and, recently, the migration issue. While still communicating with representatives of the international media immediately after his inauguration, Boric stated that such a situation is not normal, because “we have many elements of integration that we can work on (with Bolivia)”, so the restoration of diplomatic relations, in his opinion, depended only on the will of both parties. At the same time, he emphasized that Chile will not negotiate with Bolivia about its sovereignty.

Regarding the first, in addition to Bolivia’s attempts to review the territorial consequences of the Second Pacific War (1879-1884), as a result of which it lost access to the ocean, which was embodied in a lawsuit during the presidency of Evo Morales about sovereign access to the sea, which was considered in the International Court of Justice (the decision in favor of Chile was made in 2018), the issue of the status of the transboundary small river Silala, its origin, flow and use was exacerbated. The origins of the problem also date back to the end of the 19th century. and are still quite sensitive to public sentiment. Bolivia continued to consider it only as its source, which it can use without taking into account the interests of Chile, through whose territory the small river flows in the lower reaches, and later also began to demand payment for the use of its waters. In return, Chile recognized that its channel has an international status, which implies reasonable use. The case regarding this river was analyzed at the International Court of Justice of the United Nations in 2016-2022. However, in this case, the role of the court was minimal, since during the consideration of the issue, the Bolivian side gradually agreed with the Chilean arguments, so the decision was purely a formality. The resolution of the issue was, in fact, the result of a compromise reached by both sides in the spirit of the course initiated several years ago to normalize bilateral relations. However, recently, the border problem has become more acute due to the issue of uncontrolled entry into the territory of Chile of migrants from Venezuela and Colombia. At the end of February 2023, Chile deployed its armed forces in the border zone with Bolivia in order to avoid the growth of social protests on this issue in the north of the country. The situation is complicated by the lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Extra-regional relations. Relations with the United States are consistently constructive, despite the fact that Boric can afford to publicly criticize American sanctions against the Venezuelan and Cuban regimes as not particularly effective against the regimes themselves, but only causing suffering to the citizens of these countries. In our opinion, in this way he is also trying to convey the idea that the sanctions pressure has the downside of increasing migration flows. And Latin American countries themselves, and Chile in particular, are already having to deal with this. Boric shares with Biden a vision of strengthening democracy in the LAC region and a common understanding of the nature and geopolitical consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine. During last year’s visit by US Secretary of State E. Blinken to Chile, then-head of the Foreign Ministry Urrejola called the countries “allies.”

Canada is called an “ally” by Boric in his post, who paid a state visit to the country in the summer of 2022 and met with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on the sidelines of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly. Both leaders have common positions on a number of modern global “challenges,” including the Russian aggression against sovereign Ukraine, climate threats, human rights violations, the need to uphold gender equality, etc. The pragmatic interest lies in the possibility of increasing trade and economic cooperation and increasing Canadian investments in the Chilean economy, and supporting environmental initiatives. The Chilean side invests a similar content in its relations with the EU, which have intensified since the beginning of Boric’s presidency.

The relations between Chile and China are of particular interest. On the one hand, Chile demonstrates a consistent course for closer beneficial economic cooperation with the Ukrainian SSR in the economic sphere, as evidenced by the participation of the delegation led by the President in the III Forum of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which was held on October 17-18 of this year. On the other hand, political issues are very important for Boric himself. He is a consistent critic of undemocratic regimes for human rights violations, he directly condemns Russian aggression against Ukraine, so participation in this event became a personal “challenge” for him. In addition, the PRC has not forgotten the 2022 report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, former President of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, in which China is accused of “serious human rights violations.” Probably, in order to smooth over sensitive issues for both sides, he was accompanied on this trip not only by the experienced Foreign Minister van Klaveren, but also by two influential figures from the Communist Party.

As part of the trip to the PRC, the so-called “Chilean Week” took place, during which business meetings were held in several cities, which were attended by several dozen businessmen. As a result of the visit, more than a dozen agreements were signed. For the PRC, Chile is a country with large lithium reserves, having access to which the Chinese economy can ensure uninterrupted battery production. For Chile, cooperation with the PRC has traditionally been seen as an opportunity to diversify both the range of its exports and its foreign economic contacts. However, now it is quickly falling into the trap of dependence on the Chinese market, which has been demonstrated by the years of the pandemic, since 40% of Chilean exports already go to this country. So, if we evaluate the consequences of the visit to China purely in the economic plane, they demonstrated that for Chile, the PRC remains a strategic economic partner. If we consider the visit to China and participation in the “One Belt, One Road” forum in the geopolitical plane, then the scale of this event, attended by representatives of several dozen countries in the midst of multiple global crises, indicates the formation of a geopolitical “pole” led by China, and then the question remains whether such positioning corresponds to Chile’s national interests.

Boric paid special attention to the country’s positioning on the international stage as a leader in the fight against climate change. In the President’s Program, the new Chilean foreign policy is called “turquoise”, which implies its focus not only on the protection of biodiversity (“green” – terrestrial, “blue” – aquatic), but also on the promotion and participation in multilateral initiatives in accordance with the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Until last year’s elections in neighboring Brazil, where Lula da Silva won, Chile alone occupied a special diplomatic niche in the fight against climate change, thus increasing its international status. The “turquoise” foreign policy positions it as a state that advocates the use of “clean” energy. This should be served by the Framework Law on Climate Change (published on 06/13/2022), according to which Chile has set a goal of achieving carbon neutrality and greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. This should make it less vulnerable to climate change and its consequences (such as water shortages and food insecurity), and the international nature of the commitments made and the fact that 17 ministries at the state level, regional authorities, and private business should work on achieving this goal, indicates the priority of this direction not only in the domestic but also in the foreign policy of the state.

Part of the foreign policy program of the government of Boric was the Escazú Agreement (Spanish – Acuerdo de Escazú), named after the place of its adoption in the Costa Rican city of Escazú (March 2018). This is the first regional environmental agreement in the Latin America region, aimed at informing citizens on environmental issues and cooperation between states, as evidenced by its full name – “Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean”. Chile joined it in June 2022, however, it officially expressed its reservations, which relate to both harmonization with national legislation and potential threats to national sovereignty from neighboring Bolivia.

During the Summit of the Americas (June 2022), Chile promoted the “Americas and Ocean Protection” initiative, which envisaged the creation of a network of special maritime corridors from Chile to Canada to protect marine biodiversity. Nine countries in the region signed the Declaration. To coordinate cooperation, a rotating two-year presidency was proposed, and Chile and Canada were the first to take it on. This declaration was seen as a first step towards uniting international efforts in the policy of preserving the world’s oceans.

Despite the fact that almost 76% of Chile’s territory is arid and water-scarce, Chile’s economic potential is based on sectors with a high degree of water consumption, primarily mining, energy and agriculture. This has exacerbated conflicts between the state, which controls water use and previously granted corresponding indefinite concessions to companies, including international ones (in accordance with the “Pinochet” code of 1981), and local communities that suffer from water shortages, especially in the context of sharp climate changes of recent times (in particular, in the context of an unprecedented 14-year drought caused by a catastrophic reduction in rainfall). This issue was to be resolved by the new “Water Code” (March 2022), which prioritizes water use (equal access to water was one of the demands of the 2019 public protests), limits the rights of companies to water concessions to 30 years, and establishes higher environmental standards for them in general. This initiative was received ambiguously by both national and international business.

As well as the idea of creating a National Lithium Company and developing a corresponding Strategy, which was announced by President Boric in April 2023. It is aimed at expanding and controlling this highly profitable industry by combining the efforts of the state and private business. However, the lithium industry is water-intensive, and this, combined with the above-mentioned Water Code and the introduction of higher standards of environmental responsibility of business, is already affecting the interests of Chinese investors in this industry. Obviously, Boric’s visit to the PRC as part of participation in the “One Belt, One Road” summit (October 2023) was intended to relieve some kind of tension. During it, the prospects for Chinese companies in the Chilean market were also discussed in accordance with the government’s new plans. As it became known, the Chinese company Tsingshan Holding Group is to invest more than $ 233 million in the construction of a corresponding plant in the north of the country.

At the same time, the EU has started to talk about interest in Chilean lithium. This was discussed, in particular, during the visit to the country of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (January 2023). At the same time, the German proposals looked more attractive than the Chinese ones, as they are aimed at reducing environmental damage in the process of lithium extraction and processing and conducting most of the production process in the country, which should have a positive impact on employment for the local population. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, spoke about the need for a strategic partnership between the EU and Chile in the field of lithium extraction during her visit to the country (June 2023), and during the EU-CELAC summit (July 2023), she and President Boric were present at the signing of a memorandum of understanding on establishing a partnership between the EU and Chile on sustainable raw material value chains. It is planned to be developed within the framework of the EU Global Gateway investment program for Latin America and the Caribbean. At the same time, supporting the climate agenda in the implementation of the renewed Chilean foreign policy, the EU and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection launched the Renewable Hydrogen Development Project in Chile in June 2023 with funding of 8 million euros. The second stage, as announced, will be the creation of a special European Fund for the Development of Renewable Hydrogen in Chile, which will direct funding to the development of relevant projects. It is already planned to attract more than 200 million euros in the form of targeted loans for their implementation.

Chile’s foreign policy under the Boric’s administration is characterized by multi-vectorness, equidistance from all existing geopolitical centers (USA, EU, PRC), consistency and pragmatism, compliance with the UN Charter and the norms of international law and human rights. His climate initiatives are a conscious responsibility to future generations of Chileans and humanity as a whole. He is a politician of a new generation of left-wing forces, devoid of both ideological (anti-American, anti-imperialist) rhetoric and extreme populism.

 

 RECOMENDATIONS

●      Maintain the trusting relationship that has developed between the leaders of Ukraine and Chile and give them a public assessment.

●      Disseminate pro-Ukrainian statements by both President Gabriel Boric himself and his political entourage through domestic media and social networks, conveying the official position of the Chilean Foreign Ministry to Ukrainian citizens that in Latin America we have allies in resolutely opposing Russian aggression. The lack of information among our citizens about the support of Ukraine from Latin American political elites forms a persistent perception that we have no one else to rely on in confronting Russia, except for the USA and European countries.

●      Given the coalition composition of the Chilean government, it is necessary to consistently and delicately establish contacts with representatives of influential political forces, including in Congress.

●      Try to convey to Chilean policymakers (representatives of individual political forces) the view that failure to strongly condemn and counteract Russian aggression in Ukraine may cause reputational losses to Chile, which positions itself on the international stage as a country that strongly condemns authoritarian regimes, human rights violations (the most fundamental of which is the right to life), and is a champion of compliance with the norms of international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of states.

●      Develop an information campaign about the tragic fate of the Crimean Tatars and intensify efforts to include Chile in the “Crimean Platform”, based on the fact that the government of Boric declares its commitment to the norms of international humanitarian law.

●      Intensify attempts to cooperate on issues of global environmental security and, based on Chile’s intentions to maintain world leadership in this area, to emphasize the need for closer cooperation, including within the framework of the Ukrainian “Peace Formula”.

●      Intensify ties between inter-parliamentary “friendship groups” – since, as last year’s visit of several deputies of the Chilean Congress to Ukraine showed, there is interest in intensifying cooperation.

●      Make attempts to delicately establish contacts with the Venezuelan opposition community, based on the fact that Chile has become a country with a large concentration of refugees from Venezuela.

●      Take advantage of the twice-voiced proposals by President Boric to assist Ukraine in demining its territories and take into account the legislative possibility of involving the Chilean contingent in peacekeeping operations after the end of the war.

●      Promote the consolidation of the Ukrainian diaspora (creation and support of a network of existing organizations) in Chile.

●      Establishing cooperation with analytical and university centers to hold joint events, in particular, round tables dedicated to the study of similar tragic pages of the past, imprinted in the historical memory of our peoples, and the prospects for bilateral relations in various areas.

●      Identify attempts by Russian propaganda to damage Ukraine’s image in the Chilean media space and social networks and to counteract them by involving public organizations, influencers, etc.

●      Study Chile’s experience in building residential structures, infrastructure facilities, and communications that are more resistant to destruction of natural (relevant for Chile) and anthropogenic origin (relevant for Ukraine given the constant Russian missile attacks against the civilian population).

●      Monitor the issue of opportunities to join regional international organizations and integration projects (for example, the Pacific Alliance), building on potential assistance to Chile.

●      Critically assess Ukraine’s production capacities and our export opportunities, having previously studied the Chilean consumer market, in order to provide state support to promising Ukrainian projects or the promotion of goods and services to local markets.

●      It is also important to convey that Ukraine has good prospects for potential Chilean investments, both in post-war reconstruction and given its geographical proximity to the EU (membership in which is a strategic goal for us), which creates good conditions for Chilean business.

 

^[1] Sumitomo Group is one of the largest Japanese keiretsu, which includes companies in the financial sector, mechanical engineering, electrical industry, and ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy.

^[2] Mitsui & Co is a large trading company in Japan in the fields of power generation, mechanical engineering, finance, chemical, food, and textile industries.

^[3] Sojitz Corporation is a Japanese company operating in the construction, forestry, mining, oil, textiles, and multiple other industries.

^[4] Association for Trade Integration of Latin American Countries.